

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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TO
JEAN AND JOANNA

PREFACE

The world is full of objects that a scientist may study. It is natural that science in its preoccupation with the environment should long overlook, as an object of study, man himself. Man is a creature not only capable of inspiring poetry and drama, but one whose social living may be scrutinized with the same scientific objectivity that is applied to non-human things. The application of scientific method to man and his problems of living with his neighbors is a comparatively recent development. It is as if a spectator at the opera, after having viewed the drama before him for some hours, should suddenly turn his glasses upon his companions and the audience.

Now the problems of late development are clearly demonstrated in the field of social science. In spite of its youth the development of social psychology, as compared with botany and astronomy, has been very rapid. The result has been an uneven rate of progress in its experimental findings. Research in some fields of social psychology has far outdistanced experimentation in other fields. Moreover, time has not yet permitted a thorough assimilation of facts and concepts in this broad province to a generally accepted systematic framework. These problems which grow out of the late development of the science conflict with two requirements of a textbook: (1) An elementary textbook should give the student a balanced and integrated picture of the whole discipline. (2) An elementary textbook must be related to the everyday life of the individual if it is to awaken a lasting interest in the subject matter.

Psychology has long taught us that one way to deal with a conflict is to ignore one of the elements. To date this has been a characteristic solution of the dilemma in many textbooks.

There have been excellent introductions to social psychology which have, however, ignored the vital problems of everyday life and have given a very distorted picture of the whole field. Nevertheless these books have had a worthwhile influence in demonstrating the experimental method and in making scientific inroads in the field of social problems.

Contrasted with these have been many sociological textbooks which have emphasized the problems of everyday adjustment and which have in a sense surveyed the field of social psychology. But in the majority of instances their value varies in proportion with the brilliance of the writer and leaves the scientific student with the feeling that these are splendid descriptions of problems rather than conclusive findings about them. Undoubtedly there are some writers who believe that the experimental method is unsuited to many of these facts of social life, but we must confess that our prejudice lies in the opposite direction.

We believe, however, that it is possible to meet the requirements of scientific validity and conceptual adequacy within the bounds of the experimental tradition. The development of experimental work in social psychology has progressed to a stage wherein a fairly complete treatment of the entire subject matter can now be given in the light of experimentally derived knowledge. In other words, where actual experiments remain yet to be performed, the problems can even now be envisaged in terms of experimentally established facts.

Specifically, the plan of organization to be followed in this book attempts an adequate, vital approach by introducing materials and problems from the point of view of different participants in the social scene. The social world as it appears to the man on the street, social phenomena as seen through the eyes of the clinician or psychiatrist, and the social drama as viewed by the social engineer or planner all provide points of departure for our study. A unity in these descriptions derives from a continuing emphasis upon naturalistic and scientific interpretation. A whole section (Part II), moreover, is devoted to a detailed analysis of the mechanisms and main-

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springs of action, the motives of men, and the processes of social interaction as revealed in experimental findings.

In Part I the student meets the social world of everyday experience. Herein are treated the actions and ideas of people in terms of conformity and non-conformity, taboos and mores, crime and custom, cooperation and competition. These social events are given psychological order and description. Part III investigates the world of another participant in the social scene, this time the clinician. The socialization of the individual, the internalization of cultural values and prohibitions, personality conflicts and problems are the subject matter of discussion. Part IV shifts to the social world of the social engineer or planner. This section is really collective psychology and deals with some of the most complicated interrelationships of human beings and society. In it the attempt has been made to handle the complex problems of societal evolution without deserting the individual as the subject of discourse. The aim has been to demonstrate the possibility of resolving these problems into the problems of individual psychology rather than a dogmatic defense of any of the descriptions given. In it we have had to rely upon the soundness of observation of many writers in other fields, and to be content with translating their pictures into a psychological account. Part I is thus descriptive and sociological, Part II is analytical and experimental, Part III is genetic and developmental, Part IV historical and dialectical.

Perhaps a word is necessary concerning the position of this book in the conflict of psychological and sociological approaches. Many writers have made much of a *psychological* point of view as contrasted with a *sociological* viewpoint. Some have defended one, some the other, while a third group have attempted to reconcile the two. We feel this controversy to be a straw-man affair. With a few exceptions we have found that psychologists and sociologists agree in believing their data to be the behavior of living human beings and in accepting scientific method as the technique for dealing with these data. The real issue is not between sociologists and psychologists,

but between those who believe in a high degree of abstraction and those who believe in very little abstraction from the original data. The highly conceptualized treatment of multi-individual behavior which occurs in social science tends to lead to metaphor and personification. These figures of speech are often used to delude individuals about the real facts of social relationships rather than to inform them. Stuart Chase has recently written on word trouble among the various social sciences and has exposed the lack of perceptual fact back of many concepts of the social scientists. We have attempted to develop a rigorous emphasis upon the perceptual data which underlie social psychology, and to keep our feet as close to the grounds of observable fact as seems possible, hence our emphasis on the psychology of the individual. Yet we have attempted to keep our account from becoming a Robinson Crusoe adventure on a desert island.

It is hoped that the instructor will find this treatment a broad exposition which includes many phases of the behavior of the individual as he encounters the social world of his fellows. The gearing of this account to the problems of everyday life increases its vitality to the student. The course in social psychology should become a useful ground work for courses in political science, economics, and sociology. The emphasis upon the experimental tends to accentuate an attitude basic to psychology, and we believe orients social psychology toward the general line of courses in psychology which may follow.

The importance of our aim of vitality and balance has made it necessary to neglect a certain amount of research in social psychology which could not be incorporated in the scheme of the text. Some instructors may find it very useful to include Murphy's and Newcomb's *Experimental Social Psychology* as a supplementary textbook, especially where the course in social psychology is a year course.

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PART I

*THE SOCIAL WORLD OF THE MAN ON
THE STREET*

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE

The Field of Social Psychology

Man is born into two worlds. One world is a material world and is inarticulate. It cannot talk to man, write him letters of propaganda, or spin theories of social science. Man is interested in this world as the source of the raw materials upon which his bodily welfare depends. The reactions of man to this world and his experiences in it are the subject matter of *individual psychology*.

The second world which confronts man is social. He lives in a community of people as well as in a land of corn fields and coal mines. This is so in the very nature of things. By his biological make-up man is destined to be a social creature. The utter helplessness of the human being through his long period of infancy and childhood makes his survival dependent upon the ministrations of others. In primitive societies even adults can eke out an existence only through association and grouping together. In modern times we are organized in such complex and interdependent groups that a steel strike in Ohio may affect the stability of the French government. It is this social world, based upon the relations of man to his fellows, which furnishes the subject matter for *social psychology*.

The delimitation, or separation, of social from individual psychology is not clear-cut. It is an arbitrary division created by specialists, interested in different problems in the study of man. The reactions of men to their natural environment are colored and determined by the social milieu which has bred them. In turn, their reactions to one another are limited by

their biological and psychological nature. Three classes of facts by usage and common consent have fallen to the lot of the social psychologist. They are: (1) social stimuli and social stimulus situations, (2) men's reactions and experiences arising from social stimulation, and (3) the long-run effects of the social environment upon the individual.

In the first category belong the forms and types of social stimulation. A social stimulus can be one of two types: (*a*) directly social and (*b*) indirectly social. Stimulation is directly social when it comes from another human being. It is indirectly social when it comes from an inanimate object which derives its effective stimulating qualities from previous human association. Such objects are termed *social symbols* because they stand for more than their simple physical characteristics. For example, the motorist does not respond to a red traffic light by exclaiming, "What a bright light!" He brakes his car in obedience to it as a sign which represents a legal rule. This type of social stimulus includes books, art objects, institutional symbols, and a great deal of our material culture. The behaviorists would call them conditioned stimuli. Direct social stimuli, on the other hand, include all the visual, olfactory, tactual, and auditory cues which we receive from other people. Thus a man's speech, gestures, facial expression, and overt actions as well as his mere physical presence are social stimuli which affect his fellows.

The forms of social stimulation are many and varied. Here we need only point out that the social stimuli listed above are relatively simple in form. In addition there are complex patterns of social stimulation based upon the groupings and relationships of people which we cannot ignore. On a basketball court a player's reactions at any one moment are determined by the relative positions of his teammates and opponents. In a strike riot the striker is responding to a complicated social pattern made up of the grouping of the opposed police, the behavior of the strikebreakers, the attitudes the police manifest toward the strikebreakers, the actions of the police toward the striker and his fellows—not to mention the cheers and cries of

spectators, among whom may be included strikers' wives. Now the behaviorists tend to neglect the *patterning* of the stimulus situation. On the other hand, the Gestalt psychologists are guilty of the opposite error. They have overcorrected so far for the mistake of the behaviorists that they regard as patterns in the *objective* world relationships which they have *subjectively* added to the external situation. Take, for example, the employer who watches the strike riot just mentioned. If he were a behaviorist, he would see only men using clubs and throwing brickbats. If he were a Gestalt psychologist, he would not see mere men struggling with one another. He would perceive the organized forces of communism going down to defeat before the organized forces of law and order. The behaviorist sees less than is actually there before his eyes. The Gestalt psychologist visualizes a great deal more. As social scientists, we must be able to describe stimulus situations without committing either error. We must also take into account the fact that the participants in the drama are not scientists. They act as they do, because they view the social scene much as the Gestalt psychologists regard it. They project patterns of their own making into the external world and then act *as if* these patterns were really out there.

The second class of facts studied by the social psychologist consists of the experiences and reactions of people to social stimulation. Thus we are concerned with people fighting or cooperating with one another, complying with social rules, planning for their children, listening to their favorite radio performers, and in general carrying on the business of social living. From the polite exchange of formalities at a tea party to the violent emotional outbursts of the lynching mob emerges behavior which is the natural material of social psychology.

A third division of our subject matter is given over to the study of the effect of the social environment upon the individual. Here the emphasis is not upon immediate reactions to social situations, but upon the individual's permanent characteristics which result from such experiences. For example, a child, thwarted by his older brothers at every turn, may develop

defense reactions which become part of his very make-up. In later life his conduct is in good part a function of these infantile habits rather than of the immediate social situation. In other words, social psychology includes the study of personality.

The Source of Social Materials

Professional habits of mind die hard. In the early days of the social sciences the professional practice was to take the reader off to a hypothetical desert island for a scrutiny of social origins. Today the tendency is to metamorphose him into a traveler from Mars, who can view the modern social scene with an impartial objectivity, if a somewhat naïve lack of understanding. To the present writers, however, it seems more fitting to reverse the process. Instead of starting at an abstract and generalized level, our study of society can well begin with the social phenomena of everyday life (1). What is the nature of the social world as we see it in our daily activities? For the moment we can drop our academic preconceptions and turn to the social phenomena which confront the man on the street.

The man on the street sees his fellows going to work day after day at the same time in the morning. He witnesses a wedding ceremony today and a funeral procession tomorrow. He beholds employees with the help of armed deputies trying to break through the massed picket line before a shop on strike. He observes the doctor speeding to a patient, restrained by a traffic officer, but released when the physician's mission is known, while another less fortunate traffic violator is herded off to jail. He hears radio speeches espousing a political cause or a candidate. And somewhere in the fringe of his mind he notices the ubiquitous advertising slogans of the billboard or the neon sign.

But the thousand and one events of everyday life do not present themselves to the man on the street as an unorganized mass of confused impressions. It takes little penetration on his part to group these phenomena into rough categories. The many common routine activities of his fellows fall into one

class. He attends them only in passing, since they are so commonplace. Exceptions to these well nigh universal patterns surprise and startle him. These two classes of social phenomena really involve the comparison of people. The similar routine habits which most people show can be called *uniform ways*; the exceptions to these norms, *atypical ways*. In addition to this general division the man on the street discriminates between social behavior which consists of separate non-continuous acts and social behavior which is *sustained interaction* between two or more people. In other words, he sees men responding individually to social stimuli, and he sees various forms of group activity.

The first step of the social psychologist is to take these rough groupings of social phenomena from everyday life and give them more precise definition. The second step is to break down these blanket groupings into their distinctive components. A third step is to relate them to other findings of science by fitting them into the generalized descriptions of experimental psychology. The fourth step takes us back again to the level of practical experience. It consists of tying up the facts, observed by the man on the street, to the facts known by other individuals participating in the social drama. The clinician, the social engineer, and the social planner all visualize the world from their respective vantage points. As social psychologists we need to understand and relate the findings of all these active participants in the workaday world. Part I of this book attempts the first two steps, Part II the third step, and Parts III and IV involve the fourth step.

Uniform Ways

The social scientist is constantly perplexed by the irregularity and unpredictability of social events. To the man on the street, however, the great majority of people behave in predictable fashion. The average citizen's whole life is based upon the fact that he can depend upon similar reactions from almost all individuals in the same type of situation. He is able to drive

expressed in the same or similar situations which mark off people as distinct or different individuals. Atypicality includes the bizarre opinions of the crank, the shades of non-conformity of the radical, the violation of law of the criminal, as well as the unique solutions forced on us by new and untried problems. In contrast, *uniform ways* include the agreement in the ideas and actions of men, whether such similarity in response is a matter of fad and fashion, membership in an organization, or a function of community life. This term applies not only to social acts universal to one's society, but also to activity common to a minority group as long as the group includes a fair number of people.

The Voluntaristic and Regimented Nature of Behavior in Relation to Uniform and Atypical Ways

The problem of why we sometimes encounter uniformity and sometimes atypicality in the responses of people cannot be completely solved at the level of the casual impressions of the man on the street. To him the problem is usually greater in respect to atypicality than in respect to uniformity. He sees little difficulty in accounting for the common routine actions of his fellows, but the queer antics of the non-conformer puzzle him. As a matter of fact, from a scientific standpoint uniform behavior demands just as much psychological explanation as atypical behavior. The layman's idea of what is back of commonplace regularities is often very erroneous. As a result of this belief that the regular must be obvious, the psychology of social institutions is a very recent development. The more it has been pursued, the more students have been convinced that not only are there habitual regularities of action, but there is also habitual ignorance as to its psychology.

This should not, however, discredit the genuine insight of the man on the street. He often notices an important aspect of social behavior which furnishes a clue to its causation. He can frequently tell whether people are voluntarily doing what they want to do, or whether they are regimented into uni-

formity by fear of public opinion, physical coercion, or some other penalty. For example, many men grumble as they struggle into their evening clothes, but they conform nonetheless. On the other hand, most women willingly accept the new fashion according to which skirts are to be worn an inch shorter or longer. Compare the grudging obedience to the rules of the university concerning attendance at classes with the wholehearted compliance with the cheer leader's direction of college yells at a football game. These obvious differences in our social actions can conveniently be referred to by the terms *voluntaristic* and *regimented*. Voluntaristic action as used in this book does not imply freedom of the will. It denotes behavior which entails little or no conflict in the individual. Regimented behavior, on the other hand, refers to actions in which part of the individual's wishes are in conflict with the outward conformity expressed. Students appear for their classes on the afternoon before Christmas recess-begins, though they would rather be on their way home.

The distinction between regimented and voluntaristic actions points to possible explanations and to the prediction of future behavior. In daily life, however, we tend to overgeneralize this distinction in the following manner. We regard uniform ways as an evidence of regimentation and atypical ways as an indication of voluntaristic action. This conclusion is reached because, when people depart from rigid standards, it seems to be due to some inner need for self-expression. And when many individuals act alike we suspect regimentation because people do differ in hereditary background, physical make-up, and personality. Frequently this assumption is justified, but too many other factors are involved in atypical and uniform ways to label the former dogmatically as voluntaristic and the latter as regimented. The variant behavior of the man who disobeys a law may not be an expression of his basic attitudes and habits. He may be driven by an exceptional situation to depart from his old standards of conduct. Similarly, the uniform activities of a group of people may represent their fundamental wishes very well and may not be a function of external regimentation.

This does not mean that we need to discard the concepts of voluntaristic and regimented behavior. We can employ them usefully not as synonyms for atypicality and uniform ways, but as more analytical classifications of these types of behavior.

In describing either atypical or uniform behavior as regimented or voluntaristic, our observation in terms of everyday experience is often not enough. It is frequently necessary to follow specific individuals through a long period of time. They may show complete acceptance of group-ways as far as we can tell from their present behavior. But case studies may reveal that their social conformity masks a personal dislike of what they feel themselves compelled to do. The importance of a thorough study of the nature of group-ways is apparent in Germany today, where thousands of arms are raised in the Hitler salute on every occasion. The social psychologist is interested in how deep that respect for the Nazi leader goes, i.e., is the universal acceptance of the Hitler regime in Germany a regimented or a voluntaristic group-way? Similarly, in respect to atypicality, we need to know whether the non-conformity of the lawbreaker is due to his thoroughly anti-social nature or to an exceptional set of circumstances in which he may have been placed.

Group Activity and Social Interaction

The man on the street sees other facts about behavior besides its uniformity and atypicality. Not only does he classify his fellows as steady, dependable chaps or individualistic persons, he also notes the differences between men responding to one another and men reacting to social objects and symbols. In the former case he sees a business deal or a card game; in the latter, institutional behavior. *Social interaction* is the term applied to the behavior of two or more people who mutually stimulate and respond to one another. A conversation is thus social interaction; a monologue is not. Social interaction sustained for more than a few minutes and involving more than two people is called *primary group activity*. Much of our daily life is spent in social interaction and group activity. This is

the most interesting phase of social psychology, for here emerge events which cannot be treated in terms of the psychology of the isolated individual. Two men cooperating in attaining an objective can accomplish more than the summated effort of each applied individually. The emotional outbursts of people in a crowd are sometimes only an intensification of their normal behavior, but on other occasions the behavior of the crowd man shows a qualitative change from his actions outside of the crowd.

Primary groups are distinguished from *secondary* or *derivative* groups in that the former involve the actual physical presence and interaction of the group members. The eminent sociologist, C. H. Cooley, to whom we are indebted for the terms, wrote: "By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and co-operation" (2, p. 23). Secondary groups are those in which we have absentee relationships. The family group or the play group are examples of primary association; the Democratic Party, and the public which reads the stock market reports, are examples of secondary groups. Now the man on the street sees many instances of primary groups, but he cannot actually see secondary groupings. He can see the effects of these derivative groups in the uniform ways already discussed. Hence in Part I we shall deal with secondary groupings largely in terms of the common ideas and responses of people. In the closing chapter of Part I, however, these uniform ways will be considered in relation to the social institution on a more conceptualized level. And in Part IV, where we turn to the world of the social engineer, derivative or secondary groups will assume added importance.

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CHAPTER II

A DESCRIPTION OF UNIFORM WAYS AND THEIR PSYCHOLOGY

A description of people in terms of their uniform and atypical behavior tells us a good deal about a community or about society. We know how homogeneous it is, how like-minded its citizens, and, therefore, how we need to comport ourselves to become accepted members. If our analysis is to be of maximum utility, however, it must tell us something about the psychological processes involved in variable and uniform behavior. An accurate description will aid us in adjusting to social life, but there are times when for our own sake, as well as for the sake of others, we must refuse to adjust and seek a change in the pattern of our fellows. To secure changes we must understand the psychology of these social patterns. Uniform behavior will be examined in this chapter from these two points of view: (1) from the standpoint of the relation of the uniform way to other behavior in the social pattern (description); (2) from the standpoint of the psychological nature of the uniform way itself as the behavior of individuals.

From the first approach, uniform ways can be divided into six classes: *coenotropes*, *folkways*, *mores*, *institutional ways*, *normal behavior*, and *fad and fashion*. The first five categories involve a static comparison of behavior. The last type, *fad and fashion*, is a contrast of passing forms of behavior with the more stable forms such as folkways and mores.

In considering these various uniformities our psychology, at this point, must be *actuarial*, or shotgun psychology. In dealing with the masses of people, who manifest a certain uniformity of behavior, we cannot hope to demonstrate the meaning of the particular pattern to every personality involved. We

can only hope to demonstrate the psychology which by-and-large characterizes the majority. Such a method is bound to be a shotgun method, for in finding the mechanisms involved in the behavior of the majority we necessarily lose the ability to predict accurately about any specific individual. Thus, of people passing along the street, the percentage who will stop in a moving-picture theater can be predicted fairly accurately. Moreover, some of the major reasons for the attractiveness of a particular picture can be demonstrated. But we cannot tell whether any particular man will be the one who is going to stop in, and we cannot tell if he does whether he is attracted by the same appeals that attract the majority. These limitations do not make this method ineffective for certain purposes, namely, mass social control in which the specific individual is unimportant. Later in Part III under the psychology of personality we will deal with the separate individual in other than shotgun fashion and attempt to see exactly how he is motivated by such conditions.

COENOTROPES

The word *coenotropes* was coined by S. Smith and E. R. Guthrie to describe uniformities in human behavior rising out of conditions of the environment which point unequivocally to one behavior pattern as a means of adjustment for everybody (11). For example, all men turn up their collars in the face of a blizzard. This simple reaction with its strong biological basis is of little social significance in an advanced culture. Hence we can pass it by after once clearly recognizing its nature. The stimulus source is, of course, the most important psychological fact to be examined. The synergic nature of the stimulus situation, the working of all factors toward some single adjustment as a common solution, is evident. There is little question as to whether other people are acting likewise. Animals as well as humans may find the form of behavior imperative, as in fleeing from a forest fire or flood. The ideological factor which comes into many other uniformities of human action is absent.

FOLKWAYS

Uniform ways have been variously designated as *folkways*, *mores*, *institutional ways*, and *fad and fashion* on the basis of their social function. These distinctions arise from a consideration of the manner in which the uniform way fits into other parts of group life. Observation of a common type of action must include something of the social background against which it appears, if it is to be understood as a folkway or an institutional way.

The word *folkway* has been reserved for a universal * custom which is in good part uncoerced. It is a voluntaristic uniform way, though not all voluntaristic common actions are folkways. It represents, moreover, a *stable* adjustment of people. The folkways of a group change slowly. We are indebted for this concept to the monumental work of the sociologist W. G. Sumner, entitled *Folkways*. For Sumner the folkways were the uniform, invariable, and imperative ways of a group of men for meeting common needs. They do not represent rationally thought-out solutions to the problems of life. They arose originally from the blind trial-and-error attempts of men to satisfy biological needs. "All at last adopted the same way for the same purpose; hence the ways turned into customs and became mass phenomena" (12, p. 2).

In our society the wearing of shoes is a folkway. So too are such common customs as the man's tipping his hat to the lady, the handshake upon being introduced to a stranger, eating with knife and fork, eating three meals a day, sleeping on soft beds, calculating problems by means of the decimal system, and beginning a business letter with "Dear Sir" or "Gentlemen." Folkways cover a good proportion of our daily habits, from the rules of simple etiquette to the technical ways of handling problems.

The folkways serve the function of providing a large body of routine actions which can be automatically accepted and unconsciously used. The actions, moreover, apply to matters

* Universal to the society in which it is found.

which are not of vital importance and about which we see no need for working out an alternative adjustment. Hence there is no formal agency of coercion in back of the folkway. Nor does public opinion become crystallized in the defense of a violated folkway. The lack of deep significance in the folkway is not for the most part a consequence of the nature of the behavior involved. Rather it results from the relation of an activity to other group activities. Actions that in our society involve no intense emotional feeling and cloak no vested interest may be in another culture (or at another time in our own group) a matter of strong public opinion or of definite governmental interference. Likewise, certain folkways of another group may be really mores or institutional ways in our society.

For example, the cleansing of hands before the preparation of food is in our culture a folkway; among the ancient Jewish tribes it was an institutional requirement of the Jewish religion. The crux of the matter is that we find folkways in all societies, though the same specific acts are not necessarily folkways in all societies. In the process of social living some common activities tend to remain outside the area of coercion through institutions and public opinion. What these activities are for any one society depends upon the particular problems of its historical development. We can discover a folkway in a given culture not by the nature of its isolated content but by the social consequences of its violation.

MORES

Folkways are commonly contrasted with *mores*. Mores are universal customs in which the element of coercion is one of public opinion. Sumner holds that the mores grew out of folkways and that the folkways became mores when philosophical and ethical generalizations pertaining to societal welfare were added to them. A more practical distinction between the folkways and mores has been made by F. H. Giddings and E. B. Holt, both of whom point out that a serious penalty attaches to the violation of the mores but not to an infraction of the folkways (2, 3). The violation of a folkway is generally met

with laughter, and though this is often punishment, it is much less severe than the social ostracism which may penalize the transgressor of the mores. Whereas the man who eats six meals a day instead of the conventional three is a source of amusement or irritation to his colleagues, the nudist who carries his practice into public situations may become a social outcast.

The element of coercion in the mores is often more than an outraged public opinion. It involves the consequences of such an aroused public feeling. People may show their disapproval by expressing scorn, or by ostracizing the guilty individual, but sometimes they resort to violent action as in a lynching. Frequently the disapproval takes the form of economic pressure, as when people boycott a particular product. The coercion back of the mores is not automatic and formalized as in the case of legal penalties. The punishment varies considerably from case to case even though the nature of the offense may be constant.

Some American Mores

In our society the mores center about sex, property rights, and getting ahead in the world. There is probably no culture in which the expression of sex is not subject to some social control. Our civilization with its Puritanical background is fairly extreme, however, in rigorously defining the correct sexual pattern. So fundamental are our sex mores that many practices outrage public opinion because they are in some way related to sex. Nudism incurs disapproval for this reason. The use of rouge and tobacco by women was bitterly contested for a long period, because these habits were once associated with women of ill repute. It was many years before cigarette advertisers dared to picture women in the act of smoking. Research findings indicate that the double standard (according to which it is considered worse for women than men to err) is strong in proportion to the connection between the erring act and sex (5). Thus lying and stealing are not regarded as much worse sins for women than for men, but intoxication, which is

associated with loss of self-control, is much more reprehensible in the public mind for the female than for the male.

Public opinion in the American community often flares up when property rights are disregarded. In addition to the legal penalties there is a recognition in the minds of most Americans of the rights associated with the possession of property. The man who allows his chickens to feed from his neighbor's garden is regarded as an undesirable citizen. So, too, is anyone who interferes with the merchant's transaction of business or the industrialist's operation of his factory. This sentiment has been one of the obstacles in the path of the New Deal program. Another ramification of the respect for property rights in our mores is seen in the popular attitude toward taxes. Exposure of the devices by which individuals evade their tax burdens has not brought popular condemnation, but has evoked the attitude that it is smart business to hang on to one's possessions. Another central value in our society is the desire to rise in the social and economic scale. The failure to do the right things for our advancement leads to censure and criticism. We envy success and we damn failure.

Function of the Mores

The function of the mores is that of simple and direct social control. The public reaction which pillories the deviant from the mores is immediate and spontaneous. It is not based upon high-pressure propaganda released through institutional channels. The lynching mob, which kills the sex offender, is not organized and directed from above. The ostracism and black-listing which ruin the non-conformer may occur without the aid of formally organized groups. The mores, then, are those uniform ways which must be observed if a man is to remain on speaking terms with his neighbors and to live as a member of a community. The effectiveness of the mores in their social control is apparent to the reader who has lived in a small town. Anthropologists report that in primitive societies natives have been known to commit suicide after a violation of the mores

rather than to live as social outcasts subject to the contempt and scorn of their group.

The relative importance of the mores in the social life of men is much greater in primitive cultures than in complex civilizations. In Western European societies the formal machinery of the law and other institutional agencies take over the role played by the mores in a primitive society. Specialized organizations for controlling people are not necessary in the folk community, where the group is small in numbers and its members live and die in the same village. Conversely, it is difficult to rely on community opinion alone as a check against deviants and transgressors in a complex culture like our own, in which people live in large urban centers and frequently change their place of residence. In the primitive group an individual's actions are easily identified as his, and he constantly meets his relatives and friends in his work and play. In an American city the individual's identity and personal responsibility are often obscured in the multitude, and he can go about his work and seek his recreation without constantly bumping into associates and friends.

The anthropologist B. Malinowski has described the effective functioning of a Melanesian society through the operation of the mores (9). The Trobriand Islanders have a complex system of carrying on their simple economic pursuits, and this system does not rest upon institutionalized governmental agencies. The coastal villagers fish from canoes, which are individually owned but jointly operated. Mutual obligations exist between the owner and crew concerning the fishing expedition, and the catch is distributed so that each participant gets his fair share. The economy of the tribe is further complicated by an exchange of economic produce between the coastal fishing village and an inland agricultural village. Each fisherman has a friend and partner within the inland village to whom he makes gifts of fish and in return receives vegetables. This economic system is buttressed by the mores. The native gains in prestige according to the size of gift which he presents to his partner. He loses face if he neglects his obligation, and he

meets a more telling rebuff in the failure of his partner in the future to supply him with food. The whole Trobriand culture with its mutual obligations and exchanges rests upon economic sanctions, personal vanity, and public opinion.

Unlike the folkways the mores in many instances are regimented rather than voluntaristic uniform ways. The fact that their violation is attended by social punishment is suggestive evidence of this. Penalties arise, of course, from other sources than the need for a deterrent. In many cases rallying to the support of the mores is due to anger at the flouting of our sacred beliefs and practices. In other situations, however, it is due to the necessity of keeping people in line. People quickly and willingly follow the folkway without coercion because it tends to be an immediate solution of a simple problem. Acceptance of the mores by all requires some coercion because it is natural for some to want the benefits of a long-run adjustment without meeting the requisite obligations. Sumner in describing the development of the mores from folkways has shown something of this conflict. He writes, "The most uncivilized men, both in the food quest and in war, do things which are painful, but which have been found to be expedient. Perhaps these cases teach the sense of social welfare better than those which are pleasurable and favorable to welfare" (12, p. 3). The conflicting elements here are the immediate discomforts which make for avoidance and the hope of future advantages which make for acceptance.

THE METHODOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCEPTS, FOLKWAYS AND MORES

The folkways and mores have been particularly useful concepts in calling attention to the tremendous variation in the habits, attitudes, and practices of different cultures. This has served two valuable purposes. First, Sumner's work has shown the enormous influence of environmental forces upon social phenomena. The instinct doctrine which at one time threatened to dominate the whole field of social psychology broke down, when it had to postulate instincts for such varied folkways and mores as infanticide, the killing of the old, the

revering of the old, polygamy, prostitution, monogamy, and self-flagellation. Second, the folkways and mores have been excellent conceptual tools for the construction of an objective social science. Social science is handicapped by the fact that its students grow up in one culture and falsely, albeit unconsciously, take the standards of their culture as scientific truths. It is impossible for anyone to shed this *ethnocentrism* completely; but by studying the folkways and mores of other cultures, people can attain to a fair degree of objectivity in envisaging their own habits and attitudes.

On the other hand, the concepts of the folkways and the mores have been limited in their usefulness, because they are blanket names which cover over the behavior of individuals. Thus they have discouraged an analysis of the habits and customs of peoples in terms of the mechanisms of human behavior. Too often the attempt is made to explain the actions of a people by referring them to the folkways and mores of the group, in complete forgetfulness of the fact that the folkways and mores are merely terms for summing up the behavior of a group of individuals. In this fashion circular reasoning takes the place of genuine explanation. Even Sumner is guilty of this error. After describing the mores as the beliefs and practices of a group which are believed to be morally right, he explains the rightness of actions as due to the mores. This is equivalent to saying that a moral act is a moral act because it belongs to that group of actions which we call moral.* Even after the com-

* E. B. Holt has called attention to Sumner's circular explanation in entitling Chapter XV of the *Folkways* "The Mores Can Make Anything Right and Prevent Condemnation of Anything." P. Sorokin has similarly criticized Sumner. After summarizing Sumner's concepts he writes, "We may agree that the theory states correctly the origin, variation, selective character, societal nature, growth and decay of the folkways and *mores*; but quite different is the situation in that part of the doctrine which claims a great controlling power for the folkways and *mores*, and tries to make them a basic factor of social processes. Is this part sufficiently proved? Is the very meaning of the claim itself clear? I am afraid it is not. Since the folkways and *mores* 'are the ways of doing things which are common in a society' (*Folkways*, pp. 34, 61), to say that they determine human behavior means no more than a tautology: 'the ways of doing things determine the ways of doing things, or X determines X' (p. 699 in *Contemporary Sociological Theories*. Harper & Bro.)

mon habits of a group of people have been described, it is still necessary to show the environmental situations out of which they develop, if we are to understand them adequately.

The whole problem of the mores needs to be investigated by a more multi-individual approach than the usual sociological procedure. The following instance observed by one of the authors, in studying a small community, is evidence in point. A woman who had violated the sex mores was ostracized and expelled, but the process was not immediate and spontaneous. The way in which public opinion was formed demonstrates the necessity of studying these questions from the angle of the psychologist. One instigator of trouble for the woman was her husband's partner, who saw in the woman's misbehavior an opportunity to force the husband out of their business partnership. "Buy or sell," he kept urging the husband, as he pointed out the harm the wife was doing to the business (though it was doubtful that she was doing any). The partner's actions, however, were not enough to discredit the woman. Finally, her child innocently related some behavior of the mother of a nature to spread like wildfire through the village. Even the most objectively minded villagers were convinced. Where other reports had been treated as malicious gossip, the undesigned testimony of the child was uncritically accepted.

INSTITUTIONAL WAYS

Many of the uniform ways in complex cultures are the result of the formal organization of people into institutions. Such organization of people involves standardized relationships between leaders and followers, an elaborate ideology, and specialized agencies of control or coercion. The man on the street can not see this complicated framework, and more adequate treatment is reserved for later discussion. Nevertheless we can see the effects of membership in institutions in the similar ideas and actions of people.

The term *institutional ways* applies to all cases of uniformity arising from membership in such organizations as the political party, the business corporation, the church, the school, and

the state. Folkways, mores, and institutional ways when regarded as isolated bits of behavior are difficult to distinguish. If we carry through our observation for even a brief period, however, we can differentiate between them. Practically, we can detect the institutional way if we watch its enforcement. It functions through the agency of a specialized group of men who play the role of officials. Thus the church operates through its priests, the state through its civil service and armed forces, the political party through its machine-employees. The social control which operates institutionally is a more deliberate and conscious process than the control exercised through the mores.

It is common to find one type of institutional way pervading the whole of a culture with other types holding for only sections of the population. In our society the symbols of the state command universal obedience, while the various churches are confined to limited groups. In the totalitarian state the effort is being made to bring all institutions within the central framework of the state. During the Middle Ages the universal institutional ways were religious beliefs and practices, and stateways were relatively unimportant.

Institutional Ways Compared with the Mores

Modern society functions largely through institutional ways. The mores owe their efficacy to the community situation. Today we are not a nation of communities but a nation of institutions. Our uniform ways arise not only out of the face-to-face contacts of the community, but also from membership in specialized groups. Through this membership we are positively stimulated to conformity by concentrated propaganda from a central source and negatively held in line by fear of fines, imprisonment, or expulsion from the organization. The neighborhood group is still important, but people are susceptible to the suggestions of officials and leaders speaking in their constituted fields of authority. The church member, for example, may be more influenced by his minister and bishop in religious matters than by his friends and associates.

People can belong to only one community but to many institutions. Since the mores hold for the whole community, whereas institutional ways apply within a single organization, modern complex cultures show a greater variety of uniform ways than primitive groups. They lack the homogeneity and cohesiveness of the simpler agrarian economy. To rally the citizens of an American city around a program of action involves propaganda from above, while in the primitive group unity of action readily occurs following violations of the mores. To insure complete and effective social control, strenuous attempts have been made in the dictatorial states to coordinate all institutions into one unified pattern.

It is a mistake to assume, however, that all social control in modern society occurs through institutional ways. The primary method of control of the individual genetically is still through the mores of the face-to-face situation. People conform to the absentee institutional authorities because they learned obedience as children in the family and because they became graduates in the knowledge of social approval and disapproval in their own play groups. Throughout life the family, the neighborhood group, the group of friends, and the community furnish the basis for an effective pattern of mores.

Social control through the mores can be contrasted with control through institutional ways in an analysis of the processes involved. For practical purposes they go hand and hand. Institutional ways tend to be built upon the mores and to derive their strength from this foundation. In turn the mores are stiffened by the addition of formal penalties. F. H. Giddings has emphasized the interaction between the folk society (or community based upon mores) and the state (an institution) in these terms: "Thus normally we are at one and the same time members of folk society and citizens (or subjects) of the state. The folk associations to which we belong and within which we work and find satisfaction are in law subject to the state, but are not actually subjugated or transformed by it . . . not only is folk society more or less conditioned by the state,

but also the state is conditioned by folk society, which now and then nullifies law and defies government" (2, p. 63). President Roosevelt showed his appreciation of the need for combining institutional ways with the mores in his fireside chats. By this technique he appealed to the mores. He spoke as a friend to family groups gathered around the hearth. Nonetheless, he was still the President of the American people, the institutional source of authoritative suggestion.

Regimentation, Government-Ways, and State-Ways

The folkways are voluntaristic uniform ways. Into the mores has crept an element of regimentation. Institutional ways reflect further regimentation. Since we belong to many institutions, we cannot participate very fully or completely in all of them. Hence we are not always in thorough agreement with the conformity demanded of us. Institutional organization, moreover, involves specialization and indirection. We follow the institutional ways of the school because ultimately the standardized training should help us fill a niche in life. In the process, however, we inhibit other, more immediate wishes. Institutional ways are often adopted by the individual at the expense of other attitudes. A practical means of checking upon the voluntaristic or regimented nature of the institutional way is to observe the amount of organized coercion maintained by various institutions. Organizations which levy fines and expel members frequently are regimenting their followers. Laws which require large armed forces for their enforcement are obviously regimented rather than voluntaristic uniform ways.

In the field of political institutions it is useful to distinguish between regimented institutional ways and voluntaristic institutional ways. The former will be called *state-ways*, the latter *government-ways*. Government-ways are exemplified in the many useful administrative functions which satisfy common needs. The attitude of obedience toward the traffic officer, who acts as an expert in clearing up a traffic jam, is a government-way. We are eager to be about our business and we willingly

follow his directions as he unsnarls the traffic tie-up. Similarly, we accept the health rules laid down by governmental officials and support the educational laws of our society.

In contrast with *government-ways* are the attitudes of obedience which rest upon coercion. These *state-ways* appear when we regard government as a repressive force operating in the interests of only part of the community. Government-ways in the main are attitudes which imply a recognition of governmental authorities as specialists delegated to act for the whole community. Where government-ways exist, there is no need for a special coercive force behind them, for they stand for the interests of all the people. The traffic officer who solves the problem of traffic congestion forms a contrast to the policeman who is enlisted in a strike on either the side of labor or capital. In the former case we have the expert to whom is delegated the function of helping us all out of traffic difficulties, and in the latter, the agent of the state who is using coercion for special interests.

The tacit recognition in the government-ways that officials are acting for the entire community does not have to be based upon fact. The correlation between people's ideas and the realities which they supposedly represent is rough. A governmental action in the interests of one section of the population may be enthusiastically accepted by people in all sections of society because they mistakenly believe that it is to their interests as well. For every measure which is correctly labeled class legislation there are ten legislative acts which conceal their class character behind the fiction of the nation as a whole. Tariff laws, merchant marine subsidies, and monopolistic franchises are notorious examples.

Psychologically, therefore, government-ways are based not so much upon the actual merits of a law as upon the belief of the people in its merits. In addition to the services, real or imagined, rendered by administrative agencies, government-ways include all those wholehearted responses of reverence and respect to the generalized symbols of the law and the nation such as the President, the Constitution, and the Supreme

Court. Even though people object to the particular action of a particular president, they do homage to the President of the United States as an institutionalized symbol.

A striking example of the difference between political regimentations and government-ways can be seen in the attitudes of different peoples toward their military and police forces. In the United States, people identify themselves with the soldiers of Uncle Sam. In old Czarist Russia the Russian troops, especially the Cossacks, were regarded as a foreign garrison quartered on the people by an alien power. American police, however, do not compare favorably with the English police in the popular support they receive. We tend to think of our police as the tools of local politicians and not as the representatives of our interests. One consequence is that English police officials can handle crowds without guns or clubs, while the American police need guns, nightsticks, and tear-gas bombs.

NORMAL BEHAVIOR OR FLEXIBLE NORMS

There is another kind of uniformity of a gross sort which the man on the street observes. It might be called normal behavior. There is no code or regulation that prescribes uniformity. Nor is the uniformity always consciously recognized. Nevertheless, it is true that between certain ranges of a typical conduct, which are clearly noticeable, a whole gamut of slightly perceptible differences are accepted as normal. Most people are more alike than they are different, though the deviation is enough so that the behavior can be considered uniform only if the category is a gross one.

The psychology of this behavior is not difficult to trace. The central tendency, or clustering of people around a norm, has little to do with coercion, public opinion, moral indignation, or feeling of universality. Rather it arises out of the complexity of social situations and the complexity of human nature. Thus Smith and Guthrie say effectively, "As no animal is ever acted upon by just one stimulus at a time, but at any given moment is exposed to a great *complexity of stimuli*, its resulting behavior

is the interplay of many responses" (11, p. 43). The implications of the elements of any social situation may be very different for each individual. By and large, because of the number of different responses called forth, however, there is enough interference so that responses tend to cancel one another. One man has very trustful attitudes toward all strangers. Another man has nothing but distrust because of many unfortunate experiences with strangers. These two individuals, however, are abnormal, for the chance experiences of life tend to give most individuals some experiences which lead to distrust, some which lead to good will, and many which have only slight implications in both directions. The extremes in attitudes cancel themselves out. Yet this whole process is entirely an experiential one. The norm or central tendency of trust in a city like New York is much lower than in a rural district where strangers are few. The average individual develops his attitude out of a series of experiences and believes his behavior to be a result of his good judgment derived from facts. Occasionally he is aware of some individual who seems to deviate from his own position, and he thinks he is either a "sucker" or else a "hard-boiled" fellow. His evaluation shows that he has some knowledge of the norm for this kind of behavior, but it is generally evoked by atypicals rather than by individuals who are within the norm. The behavior has much less of the social attached to it than folkways, mores, and institutional ways have. The emphasis is upon the adequacy of the response to complex stimulus situations. The atypical is suspected of hasty generalization, i.e., of forming a judgment without a fair sample of the facts.

FADS AND FASHIONS

The folkways, mores, institutional ways, and normal ways, though not impervious to change, are all fairly permanent aspects of social life. The wanderer who returns to his native land after an absence of a dozen years or more recognizes many of these old patterns. R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd made a thorough sociological study of an American community in

1924-1925. They returned in 1935 for a renewal of their investigation (7). In spite of the depression years which had intervened they report: "With the exception of the widespread innovations in caring for the unemployed, which by 1936 were already contracting their scope, a map of Middletown's culture shows today the same contours as before. . . . In the main, a Rip Van Winkle, fallen asleep in 1925 while addressing Rotary or the Central Labor Union could have awakened in 1935 and gone right on with his interrupted address to the same people with much the same ideas" (7, p. 490). The Lynds have reference here to the mores and folkways.*

On the other hand, the returning native does encounter certain strange new practices fairly uniform through the culture. In America the common activities which change rapidly are related to dress, colloquial speech, popular music, hobbies and recreation, unorthodox ways of making money, and ornamentation and ostentation in personal possessions. Good style in women's dress is a function of novelty, yet all women follow the style. The slang of one college generation is unintelligible to its predecessors and successors, yet it is sufficiently stable to serve the purposes of a given college generation. Styles in furniture and other personal possessions are more short-lived than the articles themselves; nevertheless they last long enough to be widely followed. Actions and attitudes the essence of which is change but which have enough permanence to be commonly accepted by many people are known as *fads* and *fashions*. Fashion generally implies more of a constant pattern than does fad. Sometimes fads and fashions represent clusterings around a norm, sometimes a codified similarity of conduct.

Fad and Periods of Stress and Strain

Fad and fashion increase in times of social stress and strain. When old mores and institutional ways are breaking down and new standards and institutions have not as yet evolved,

*The Lynds do report an intensification of underlying conflicts but this is not germane to the point under discussion.

people seize eagerly upon innovations either as an absorbing diversion or as a panacea. In transitional periods fads in ideas are unusually popular. During the depression years the phrases of technocracy had a remarkable but brief currency. They were followed by Huey Long's "share the wealth" slogans and the ideas of Father Coughlin. In California, where the millennial hope dies hard, fads in religious doctrines are not uncommon.

The type of fad prevalent in American society has been investigated by E. S. Bogardus, who asked 170 people from a wide variety of occupations and professions to name the five leading fads of the time (1). The study covered the decade from 1914 to 1924. Bogardus classified the fads mentioned into seven groups. In the opinion of his subjects, dress and personal adornment were named the most often, as the following table indicates.

TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF FADS

Fields	Percentage
Women's dress and decoration	72.2
Men's dress and decoration	10.8
Amusements and recreations	5.7
Slang	3.6
Autos	3.1
Architecture	2.0
Education and culture	1.7

The Stability of Fashion

In spite of their frequency in transitional periods, fads and fashions are part and parcel of a normal era. They afford an opportunity for people to be different and yet the same, to express themselves without dissociating themselves from their group. Men can display their individuality and enhance their egos through their acquisition of the newest model of a motor car with the latest gadgets. Nevertheless they remain within the accepted pattern in embracing the new fashion and they are not alone in their extravagance. Moreover, though the specific

content of a fashion varies, its general form has a certain constancy. New fashions tend to be quantitative intensifications of the old or, if qualitative, they are not sweeping departures. Streamlining replaced the old lines of automobiles by degrees. In the case of one car where the jump was too violent, sales lagged.

The tie which binds new fashions to old customs is the psychological persistence of habit. New designs in clothing and in art must be related to what has gone before, even to get a hearing. Some of the poorest art has been created because men could not adapt rapidly enough to a changing material world. L. Mumford has portrayed the stages through which the machine has gone before its satisfactory aesthetic assimilation (10). The first tendency was the garnishing of machine forms with incongruous ornamentation. Shotguns, sewing machines, cash registers all were dressed up with elaborate floral designs. Men "embellished their steam engines with Doric columns or partly concealed them behind Gothic tracery." A divorce between aesthetic and utilitarian interests followed, and the aesthetic tried to revive the handicrafts methods of an older day. Finally, however, a new functional art assimilated the machine by breaking away from associative values and the imitation of nature and by harmonizing from the very outset the purpose of the practical design with its execution. A functional art was not achieved sooner because it was too great a break with the past. Fashions in art, as in other fields, are more often slow changes than leaping developments.

Another factor which makes for gradual change is the interrelated or organic nature of a culture. One habit, or pattern of action, is geared to many other forms of behavior and cannot be readily changed without affecting associated ways of behaving. The adoption of a radically designed car may make the individual appear too "sporty" for his profession and may prove a business liability rather than an advantage. The extremes in fashion are often adopted by the theatrical profession, people associated with the race track, and others whose

habits are not interrelated strongly with the life of the community.

A. L. Kroeber has asserted that styles in women's clothes follow a very regular cycle (6). This assertion was based on the measurement of the evening dress illustrations in style journals from 1844 to 1919. Kroeber found that over a period of years the skirt length increased gradually until it swept the ground, remained stationary for a time, gradually grew shorter until the limit set by the public notion of decency was reached,



FIG. 1. THE CIRCLE OF FASHION.

(Strube in the *Daily Express*, London. From the *Landmark*, Oct. 1927, p. 623.)

and then rapidly descended. The rhythmic period for skirt length according to Kroeber is about thirty-five years. Writing in 1919 Kroeber predicted that: "The child whose braids hang down her back may be reasonably sure that in the years when her daughters are being born she will wear longer dresses than her mother now goes about in; and that her skirts promise to be wider each successive decade until she is a grandmother" (6, p. 258). Although Kroeber imputes far too much cyclical regularity to dress styles, it is nevertheless true that fashions are not a spasmodic phenomenon.

Recurrence of Fads

Fads are much less regular in appearance than fashions, but it is surprising to see the same type of fad finding popular favor a few years after it died a violent death. Chain-letter schemes of one kind or another keep reappearing in our culture. So too does the craze for spiritualistic séances, and within recent years phrenology and other forms of occult character reading have been pursued with profit—to their principals. Interesting chapters in social history have been written about speculative manias in which people have pyramided their investments in valueless articles.

An example of these so-called mental epidemics is the famous tulip mania which obsessed the Dutch during the sixteenth-thirties (8). A good part of the population of Holland neglected their work and engaged in the buying and selling of tulips. Forty tulip roots brought as much as 100,000 florins, and people of all ranks in society converted their cash into tulips. A popular mania of this sort is an extreme case of a fad. It involves the substitution of new and impermanent uniform ways for old mores and institutional ways. Ordinarily fads and fashions are queer and mysterious phenomena. Either their explanation is not attempted or else they are circularly explained as due to their essential nature. Women wear picture hats, we are told, "because it is the fashion." Fads and fashion as well as most social phenomena are difficult to explain at the level of everyday observation because they are interconnected with many other parts of the social world. A more adequate understanding of them will be possible as we broaden our horizon to include more than is seen by the man on the street. It has already been suggested, however, that fads and fashion furnish relief from the regimentation often involved in the mores and institutional ways. "The deadly routine of mill, factory or office," writes E. B. Hurlock, "and the position of being merely one of a thousand unimportant cogs in a huge machine, drives modern youth to seek some vent for the natural desire to be 'somebody'" (4, p. 29). The

outlet, moreover, is not revolutionary in nature and is not a direct attack upon established uniform ways. Its social function is often that of a safe release from the rigid conformity of institutional ways and the binding restriction of the mores.

SUMMARY

We have demonstrated that it is possible to know a great deal about common habits and attitudes of people which the layman overlooks. Such knowledge enables us to adjust to the problems of social life in a much more effective manner. But even this amount of information is not satisfactory to the scientist. Whenever possible he is interested in going beyond description and actuarial analysis to actual experiments with people in controlled situations. In the next chapter we shall attempt to expand this treatment with the aid of the experimental and statistical data which social scientists have provided on these problems.

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CHAPTER III

THE MEASUREMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL WAYS AND THE J-CURVE HYPOTHESIS

In dealing with the uniformities and similarities in the social behavior of men in our own society, institutional ways merit special attention. More and more we live our lives within the confines of institutions and organized groups. We are a nation of joiners. The business man has his Rotary Club, his chamber of commerce, his manufacturer's association, his golf club, his political party. The working man has his labor union, his sick and death-benefit society, his fraternal lodge, his bowling club. The common activities and ideas of these organized groups are just as much institutional ways as the uniform responses to those two great traditional institutions, the church and the state.

Political scientists in describing dominant trends of public opinion, sociologists in recording the activities of groups, and economists in observing the specialized economic functions of men have all given accounts of institutional ways. The first systematic quantitative studies of the common-group activities of people, however, are the work of F. H. Allport and his school (2). Allport and his students invaded the various institutionalized fields of modern life and recorded the similar attitudes and actions of individuals on scales of measurement. When the data, so recorded, were plotted in graphical form, the investigators were surprised by their findings. Every study showed the same type of distribution, but it was not the familiar normal curve, so frequently found in biological and psychological measurement. It was highly asymmetrical in form and resembled the reverse of the letter J. On the basis of these results F. H. Allport has advanced an hypothesis known as the *J-curve hypothesis of conforming behavior*. Before inquir-

ing into this theory, let us examine some of the studies upon which it is based.

1. Schanck's Study of a Small Community

The first recognition that common attitudes and practices, when measured, assume a J-shaped distribution came from R. L. Schanck's study of a small town in central New York state (5). The attitudes of the Methodists toward the tenets of their religion and toward the officials of their church were essentially alike. Most of the Methodists were orthodox in their attitudes, a very small minority departing from orthodoxy. And the greater the departure from accepted Methodist tradition, the fewer the individuals who deviated. For example, Schanck recorded the attitudes of the Methodists on the following four-step scale: "In sending preachers to Elm Hollow I feel that the Bishop has:

- "1. Made a real effort in behalf of the community.
- "2. Considered the community.
- "3. Been indifferent to the community.
- "4. Been deliberately antagonistic to the community."

Figure 2 shows that 92 per cent of the local Methodists felt that the Bishop had shown real effort in their behalf, 6 per cent thought he had shown consideration, 2 per cent thought him indifferent, and no one regarded him as antagonistic. The distribution of attitudes on this question thus assumes the highly asymmetrical form known as the J distribution. Attitudes and practices in regard to many community, church, and lodge matters in Elm Hollow showed the same piling up at one extreme of the measuring scale with a rapid falling off of cases as the steps grew more distant from that extreme.

2. Loeb's Study of Employment Registration

The employees of a city welfare department were informed of a government ruling that it would be necessary for them to register with the Civil Works Administration if they wished

to keep their positions. D. Loeb recorded their compliance on the five-step scale presented in Figure 3. The five steps




FIG. 2. PUBLIC ATTITUDES OF METHODISTS REGARDING CONSIDERATION SHOWN BY BISHOP IN SELECTING LOCAL PREACHER.

(From R. L. Schanck, 5, p. 39.)

represent five successive days beginning with the day on which the necessity for registration was announced. They are marked




FIG. 3. PROMPTNESS IN REGISTERING TO INSURE CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT.

(After F. H. Allport, 1, p. 145.)

in Figure 3 as *very prompt*, *prompt*, *moderately prompt*, *slightly delayed*, and *delayed*. Of the 271 employees, 187 regis-

tered on the very first day, 56 on the second, 21 on the third, 5 on the fourth, and 2 on the fifth. The curve is thus positively accelerated toward the extreme of maximum conformity.

3. Simpson's Study of Motorists' Parking

In city regions where the parking limit is restricted to half an hour, H. S. Simpson recorded the length of time cars were left parked.* Figure 4 summarizes his findings in terms of half-hour intervals. Thus in over 20,000 cases the law was complied with and motorists remained parked no longer than 30 minutes. In about 5,000 cases, however, motorists exceeded




FIG. 4. LENGTH OF MOTORISTS' OVERPARKING.
(From F. H. Allport, 1, p. 144. After H. S. Simpson.)

the parking limit, but by not more than a half hour. Succeeding half-hour intervals show fewer and fewer cases. The distribution curve is again highly asymmetrical with the mode on the step of compliance with the law.

4. Katz' and Allport's Study of Religious Attitudes

Figure 5 presents the distribution of beliefs of male Catholic students regarding the nature of the deity (3). The students were asked to indicate which one of seven statements most nearly approximated their conception of the deity. The position at the extreme left expresses a thoroughly orthodox belief in a personal creator and ruler, and the position at the extreme right, an atheistic and mechanistic conception of the

* This study is not from the Allport school. It is included here because it shows the same J distribution as Allport's investigators report.

universe.* The middle position is true agnosticism. Fifty-one per cent of the 98 male Catholics in the study accepted the most orthodox position, and only 4 of the men accepted agnostic doctrines. The relatively large number of cases falling in the second step makes the distribution less of a J curve than those previously described. Nevertheless, the distribution is of the same general pattern with the greatest number of cases on




FIG. 5. BELIEF OF CATHOLIC MEN IN THE DEITY.
(From D. Katz and F. H. Allport, 3, p. 265.)

the extreme step of conformity and fewer and fewer cases as the steps depart more and more from compliance with institutional requirements.

5. Zambrowsky's Study of the Holy Water Ceremony

It is customary for Catholics upon entering their church to dip their fingers in holy water, make the sign of the cross, and to say a "silent" prayer. After consulting with Catholic authorities, B. Zambrowsky constructed a scale for the recording

* The two extreme mechanistic positions are not indicated in Figure 5 because no Catholics endorsed them. The complete scale can be seen, however, in Figure 8.

of this behavior (Fig. 6). The first step in the scale, complete compliance with the ceremony, is represented by dipping the fingers and making the sign of the cross; the second step, by the touching of the font (without dipping the fingers) and making the sign of the cross; the third step, making the sign of the cross without either dipping the fingers or touching the font; the fourth position by dipping the fingers but not making the sign of the cross; and the fifth position, by walking in without observing any ceremony at all. Sixty-three per cent of 1,557 cases showed complete conformity with the ceremony,




FIG. 6. DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION IN THE HOLY WATER CEREMONY.
(After F. H. Allport, 1, p. 146.)

8 per cent fell into the second position, and less than 2 per cent were found in the third and fourth positions. Twenty-seven per cent, however, walked in without performing any ceremony. This last group destroys the J-shaped character of the distribution, but it may include non-Catholic visitors to the cathedral who do not properly belong in this study.

FACTUAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE J DISTRIBUTION

With the possible exception of the study of the holy water sacrament the above investigations agree in one essential respect. Their data, when plotted graphically, assume the form

of a J-shaped distribution. What particular significance attaches to this aspect of the measurement of uniformities in attitude and behavior? There are at least six theoretical and factual implications of the J-shaped distribution for the study of social behavior.

1. The Asymmetry of the J Distribution Reflects the Loading of Factors Determining Behavior

Perhaps the most obvious fact about the J distribution is that it represents a loading of the factors which determine the attitude or behavior in question.* If there are many indepen-




FIG. 7. THE DISTRIBUTION OF FRESHMAN GRADES AS AN APPROXIMATION OF THE NORMAL CURVE.

dent factors all of which have an equal chance of influencing the conduct of men, the result in terms of complex probabilities is the normal curve. The normal curve (See Fig. 7) shows a peak in the center with a gradual falling off on either

* At first glance the careful student may think that the J distribution is an artifact, i.e., a finding due to the particular method of recording behavior. This apparent artifact, however, is part of the nature of society rather than a reflection of the investigator's technique. Social requirements cut across the variation in behavior which otherwise might exist. This fact appears in Dickens' study (see pp. 117-118) in which the same method and the same measuring scale were used in studying the behavior of motorists in two situations: at a street intersection with cross traffic and no stop signal, and at a street intersection with a stop signal. In the first situation the behavior showed variability very similar to the normal distribution. In the second situation the institutional symbol of the stop sign stereotyped the behavior into a J distribution.

side. It is symmetrical in that the decline on one side is balanced by the decline on the other. If we plot the examination grades of 500 freshmen in any required course, we usually get an approximation of the normal curve. Most of the scores fall in the middle ranges. The closer we approach the grade of 100 the fewer students we find, and the closer we approach the grade of 0 the fewer students we find. The general theoretical explanation of this common type of normal distribution is that it takes an unusual combination of factors to get an extreme score. For example, grades in the nineties represent high native ability, thorough preparation, specific ability in the art of writing an examination, judicious use of time, a high degree of motivation, etc. Very low scores require an unusual combination of unfavorable factors. Any number of combinations of factors, however, will throw a student in the middle ranges. A student of fairly low intelligence who has worked very hard, a bright student who has been ill, a mediocre student who has prepared himself moderately well, a student who has learned useful techniques for getting by in an examination—all these individuals will make grades in the middle ranges. Hence the curve shows a characteristic bulge in the middle and a tapering off toward the extremes. The measurement of many of our attitudes similarly results in a normal curve. In the case of the attitude of self-confidence, for example, most children have met both situations with which they are adequate to cope and situations which they cannot handle. As adults, therefore, they fall somewhere on the middle of the scale. A few people, however, have met an unusual combination of terrifying experiences and are very timid. And a few have met only situations which have fortified their self-confidence.

The normal curve contrasts with the J curve found in the measurement of institutional ways. Whereas the former shows the balancing of many factors, the latter indicates the loading of an unusual combination of factors. Institutional ways arise from situations in life which are loaded for almost all people. The measurement of these conformities gives an asymmetrical

curve which reflects this emphasis in our culture upon one type of experience. It is as if we loaded our dice before tossing them. Recording the tosses of unloaded dice gives a normal curve; a similar record for loaded dice gives an asymmetrical curve.

2. The J Distribution an Expression of a Particular Loading of Factors

The J-shaped distribution shows not only a loading of factors, but also a loading of factors concerned with extreme scores. A less drastic loading of factors would give a skewed normal curve. The difference between the J curve and the skewed normal curve is that in the former we find no cases on one side of the modal position (the position which has a plurality of the cases).

The tremendous piling up in one step, or category, is of course implicit in the very notion of uniform behavior. Why is it, however, that so many studies of common attitudes and practices reveal the particular manner of piling up known as the J distribution? In other words, why do the few people who vary from common standards show less of the accepted standard rather than more? The J curve means a variation only in one direction, and in the above studies the people who vary instead of going further than the conforming majority do not go as far.

There are two reasons why people vary in only one direction from common practice. In the first place, the uniform standard may be a social requirement which entails effort and sacrifice. Men conform because of various reasons but there is no point in making a greater sacrifice than is demanded. The law requires that motorists shall come to a full stop before a traffic stop signal. A few motorists will violate the legal requirement, but only a very exceptional individual will go further than the law demands and shift to low gear one hundred feet from the corner to make absolutely sure of stopping at the sign.

A second reason for the J-shaped distribution is that there

is often no way of going further than institutional or legal requirements. The proper form of conduct for American men is to remove their hats as the flag goes by. It is impossible to be more proper than proper, although there are degrees of impropriety. Similarly is it with the pronunciation of words. There are various degrees of mispronunciation of the word *girl*, but there is only one correct pronunciation. Since one cannot be more correct than correct, scales for measuring institutional responses can show no steps over and above the standard of what is right and proper.

3. The J Distribution Holds Only for the In-Group

The concept of the institutional way, it will be recalled, is not synonymous with the concept of the uniform way. The study of uniformities in belief and conduct includes both the folkway of wearing clothes common to all civilized men, and the performance of the holy water ceremony common only to members of the Catholic Church. Research in the social sciences has been largely concerned with behavior common to limited groups of people. Sociologists have employed the terms *in-group* and *out-group* to differentiate between the insiders of the *we-group*, from whom certain uniformities in behavior can be expected, and the outsiders from whom these particular uniformities cannot be expected. A certain password, a particular handgrip, and specific ideas and ideals, for example, will be common only to the members of a given lodge. When these common beliefs and practices are the subject of study, all members of this lodge are regarded as the *in-group* and the rest of the world the *out-group*. When we shift our study to another lodge, the first lodge will now be part of the *out-group*.

The J distribution will be found only when the measurements for conformity to a given standard are applied to the members of the in-group for whom that standard has a meaning. The people in the out-group will either be non-conformers or will have no attitude or behavior on the issue in question.

It would be impossible to place non-Methodists on Schanck's scale of Methodist attitudes toward their bishop's selection of preachers for their local church. The complete non-conformity of a small group of people in Zambrowsky's study of the holy water ceremony prevented her results from assuming a genuine J-shaped distribution. The greater part of these non-conformists, however, were probably non-Catholic visitors to the Cathedral, i.e., members of the out-group.

We must guard against the fallacious circular reasoning, known as begging the question, in relating the J distribution to the in-group. For example, if the J distribution of conforming behavior holds for the in-group, this may be because we are defining the in-group in terms of the J distribution. If we throw out cases as not belonging to the in-group simply because they do not fit in the J distribution, then we have no other criterion for membership in the in-group than the J distribution. In such an event, it would not be correct to use the in-group and the J distribution as anything but identical concepts. In many cases, however, another criterion does exist, namely, the ideology of an individual of belonging to or believing in a group or institution. Thus we can first classify people by their identification with a group ideology as members of the in-group, and then measure some aspect of behavior related to this ideology. This was the procedure followed in the study of the small community of Elm Hollow. People were first classified as Methodists and non-Methodists on the basis of their identification with the Methodist Church. Then their religious behavior and beliefs were measured with the resulting J-shaped distributions.

4. The Practical Significance of the J Distribution: A Measure of Institutional Strength and Stability

The J distribution has the practical importance of furnishing a measure of institutional strength and stability. Religious, economic, and political institutions crumble and decay, and new institutions arise to displace them. Such changes can be predicted in part by careful measurements from time to time

of the extent of conforming behavior. The more the distribution approaches the J form, and the steeper the curve, the stronger the institution. Where the J form is interfered with by many non-conformers, who are nevertheless members of the institution, the institutional behavior in question is endangered by a split within the ranks. While casual observation often reveals such tendencies, the exact recording of cases is far more accurate in determining the permanence of the institution.

Figure 8 compares Catholic students, Jewish students, and students of no religious affiliation on their beliefs concerning the nature of the deity (3). The distribution curve for the students of no church affiliation shows a great spread of opinion, suggestive of individual variations due to difference of experience and temperament. The Catholic students are represented by a J distribution, suggestive of the influence of one powerful stimulus in controlling the entire group. The distribution curve for the Jewish students is skewed slightly to the religious side of the scale. The influence of the Jewish religion appears in this skewing, but the failure of the curve to assume a J form is indicative of the weakening of that influence. In other words, this measurement of religious attitudes reveals the Catholic Church as a stronger institution in its hold upon the present generation than the Jewish Church.

5. The J Distribution Not True for all Institutional Ways

Although institutional behavior when measured frequently assumes the form of a J distribution, it cannot be concluded that all institutional ways will follow this particular pattern. Other possibilities not only exist from a logical standpoint, but have been empirically established. In respect to certain beliefs and certain activities, the uniformity may be so great that everyone is found in the same position on the measuring scale. There may be no dissenters or non-conformers to furnish the tail of the J curve. Generally when the national anthem is sung everyone rises to his feet. In his study of Elm Hollow, Schanck found instances where everyone conformed. For ex-

ample, all lodge members without exception agreed that they would admit non-members to the lodge hall only when meetings were not in session.




FIG. 8. CATHOLICS, PROTESTANTS, AND JEWS COMPARED IN RESPECT TO SPREAD OF OPINION IN EACH GROUP CONCERNING NATURE OF DEITY.

(From D. Katz and F. H. Allport, 3, p. 265.)

6. The J Distribution Does Not Differentiate between Voluntaristic Behavior and Regimentations

By itself the J distribution is a measure of uniform behavior, but it is not an indication of whether the uniformity represents voluntaristic or regimented behavior. By definition, regimented conformity is a complete compliance in a specific situation through the inhibition of opposed reaction tendencies. The measurement of the regimented compliance, therefore, gives the same picture as if the behavior were voluntaristic. In order to find out whether the conformity is regimented or voluntaristic, we must seek other measures which will reveal the inhibition in the regimented response.

Inhibition is manifested in a number of ways. (1) It is often accompanied by emotional behavior. The motorist in a hurry to meet a train is forced to stop by a red traffic signal. The inhibition of his haste is accompanied by the emotional response of swearing or gritting his teeth. (2) Inhibition is also revealed by a display of the inhibited tendencies when the repressing forces are relaxed. For example, the Italian citizen who in public may hail Mussolini with the Fascist salute, in private may agitate against him. Sometimes, however, the inhibition is so deep that it is not shown by emotional outbursts or by a direct display of the inhibited tendencies. (3) The repressed forces then affect behavior in many indirect ways. To keep down his religious doubts a man may be overzealous in his support of all of his church's activities. Or he may project his doubts into an acquaintance and accuse the acquaintance of heresy.

Emotional behavior, the direct release of inhibited tendencies, and the indirect effects upon conduct of repressed forces all afford a means of discovering the regimented nature of conformity. The use of emotional behavior for this purpose is difficult, however, since most studies of social events must be conducted outside the psychological laboratory, and often emotion is too well concealed to be observed accurately without the controls and apparatus of the laboratory. The indirect effects

of inhibition are also of limited usefulness because they are difficult to detect and to quantify. Nonetheless, the careful investigator can often discover significant indications of the regimented nature of certain uniform behavior by studying the emotional and indirect manifestations of inhibition. The method most successfully employed thus far, however, has been the observation of the direct release of the inhibited tendencies. The technique here is to watch the same individuals who rigidly conform in one situation, in other situations. Especially is this approach valuable if the investigator can compare the behavior of individuals in public with their corresponding behavior in private.

F. H. ALLPORT'S FOUR-FACTOR THEORY OF CONFORMITY DISTRIBUTIONS

To account for the characteristic form of the distribution curve found in the measurement of institutional ways F. H. Allport has postulated the mutual operation of four factors: (1) conformity-producing agencies, (2) common biological tendencies, (3) personality traits, and (4) simple chance. The conformity-producing agencies are responsible for the steepness of the J curve, personality tendencies and chance factors produce the spread, and the biological tendencies may make for either a heightening or flattening of the curve (1).

The conformity-producing agencies comprise the institutional controls. They include external negative sanctions, such as punishment if a law is violated, propaganda directed by institutional leaders, social approval and disapproval, and positive sanctions such as the rewards obtained from membership in an institution. All these agencies work to pile up the cases at the position representing the institutional requirement.

Biological tendencies are the direct and primitive responses of man to his raw physical environment. They comprise the activities necessitated by natural appetites such as eating, drinking, sleeping, exercising, and wearing clothes for protection against the cold. They include, moreover, the natural in-

ertia of human beings to do no more than they have to do. It is possible for an institutional requirement to coincide with a biological tendency, but this is the exception rather than the rule. There is no social need to institutionalize a common biological tendency unless it is redirected or altered in some way. In those cases where the institutional requirement does not demand much modification of our natural activities, biological tendencies operate with conformity-producing agencies to throw cases toward the mode and so to heighten the J curve. In most situations, however, the natural inertia of men is opposed to the requirements set up by the institution. To appear at work every morning at eight o'clock in all kinds of weather represents a real effort for most people. They tend to backslide. Biological factors thus produce a flattening of the J curve. Their mutual interaction with conformity-producing agencies prevents the distribution from assuming the form of a single mode and explains why there are seldom any cases beyond the mode.

Differential personality factors consist of the many variable traits of human beings. One man is timid, honest, punctual, and mediocre. Another is courageous, unreliable, conceited, and brilliant. These differences in personality make-up are obscured by the concentration of most people into one or two positions in their institutional behavior. Nevertheless, they are still operative and account for the spread which the J curve shows. They are one reason for the tail of the curve. Personality factors, according to Allport, also are responsible for the fact that we have a distribution at all. They furnish the materials for the distribution. They constitute a differential for the relative effects of conformity-producing agencies and biological tendencies.

Chance, or the operation of factors irrelevant to the situation, also plays a role. Simple chance gives a flat distribution with no greater piling up of cases in one category than in another. Chance thus accounts for some of the cases found at the tail end of the J curve. A man may start out for church in ample

time to be at the morning service, but a punctured tire may make him late.*

The Significance of the Allportian Theory for Social Psychology

The fact that studies of the same type of social phenomena, institutional ways, yield a characteristic distribution curve holds great promise for social psychology. Physical science is based upon the regularities of occurrences in the natural world. Students have despaired of a science of social events because the social world has seemed to present little constancy or regularity. The discovery of the J-curve distribution suggests a stability in social relationships which is capable of quantitative analysis into dependent factors. F. H. Allport has indicated the nature of the forces at work to produce the J distribution. It remains for future research to write the exact quantitative formula which will assign the proper weighting to the factors involved. Then it might be possible to measure the factors independently and predict the exact form of institutional behavior without the large-scale recording of responses entailed in Allport's studies. Moreover, we might be able to predict the stability of an institution if we knew the weighting of the factors which determined it. For example, institutional ways which resulted from a fusion of biological, personality factors, and conformity requirements would be more enduring than institutional ways produced through a heavy loading of the factor of conformity agencies.

*In illustrating the mutual operation of these four types of factors Professor Allport has used the analogy of a sand dune produced by the wind blowing particles of sand against a boulder or other obstruction. The wind is comparable to the conformity-producing agencies; it piles the sand high against the obstruction. The force of gravity, like the biological tendencies, works against this effect, and some of the sand particles slide down the dune and spread it out. The obstruction, like the personality factors, furnishes the differential against which the effects of the other factors can operate. This illuminating analogy is perhaps useful for purposes of exposition, but it contains a dangerous fallacy. A distribution curve is a mathematical summation of measurements and should not be thought of as a form existing in geometrical space with physical forces playing upon it.

SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF INSTITUTIONAL WAYS

Another approach in the quantitative study of institutional ways is the gathering of sociological statistics concerning the size and strength of various groups and subgroups. Thus a statistical map of a given section of society or a certain geographical locality will show the kinds of groups, their active and passive membership, their material holdings, the proportion of the total population contained within their organizations, the age and sex distribution of their members, the comparison of this year's data with other years', and the overlapping of group memberships. In addition to group statistics of this kind there may be an enumeration of group-ways in terms of some objective criterion such as church attendance.

Two unusually thorough and penetrating sociological investigations have been made of the institutional ways of the same American city (fictitiously known as Middletown) by R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd (4). These studies are not so much statistical compilations as living pictures of our social order. They contain, moreover, an explicit account of the impact of the depression years upon the culture of a relatively small industrial city dominated by middle-class values. Here, however, only the first of these studies will be examined and only from the standpoint of the quantitative study of institutional ways.

In 1924, of Middletown's thirty-odd thousand people 43 out of every 100 were primarily occupied with the problem of earning their living. Almost half of the population was thus involved in industrial or commercial institutions. Eighty-five per cent of this group worked for others, only 15 per cent being independent operatives. Although almost four hundred ways of earning a living could be enumerated in this small city, its people can be divided roughly into a working class and a business class on the basis of whether they address their economic activities to things and materials or to people. Of every 100 gainfully employed, 71 could be grouped in the working class and 29 in the business class. Four out of five of Middle-

town's business and industrial population were males. Twenty-eight per cent of the gainfully employed women were married, and these were largely in working-class occupations. Wives of business men did not continue to work for money after marriage. As compared with previous years, the number of working-class married women gainfully employed was on the increase. For the working-class population the age upon entering industry is between two and five years higher than in 1890. Child labor is no more, but youth occupies a dominant position in the working class, because earnings are higher in the twenties than in the forties. The age distribution of the industrial plants does not follow the age distribution of the general population. It is heavily loaded toward the younger end.

In the business institutions of Middletown the business man follows "his appropriate set of rituals under the rules prescribed by 'business' . . . subject to almost as many restrictions as the machine dictates to the worker who manipulates its levers" (4, p. 45). A good part of his activity is given over to credit transactions and marketing arrangements. The economy of Middletown is largely a credit economy. The worker buys on credit; the merchant is financed by the banker. Legal institutions have grown to define and adjust the complex relationships of the credit system. The educational institutions are less well adapted to the business set-up, for the great majority of the high-school students of working-class parents want to enter working-class occupations.

Members of the working class must be at work anywhere between six-fifteen and seven-thirty o'clock, chiefly seven; most members of the business group start work at eight-thirty. Almost three-fourths of the working-class housewives are up by five-thirty; the majority of business-class housewives rise at seven or later. Even before the depression of 1929-1935 the "shutdown" and "layoff" was a recurrent phenomenon in Middletown. It affected the working-class group more than the business group. The great growth of transportation facilities has separated the economic segment of the worker's life from his other activities. He and his fellow workers no longer live

together in the same neighborhood near their factory. In 1923-1924 in six Middletown plants employing over 4,000 workers there was a chance for only 1 man in 424 to be promoted. During that year the median income of a working-class family, including the earnings of all its members, was a little under \$1,500.

A similar detailed treatment is presented of Middletown's educational, religious, and other group activities. The statistical data are used to document and implement the authors' thorough description of the town. Obviously the statistical charts which result from sociological investigation have a large place in the measurement of institutional ways. They furnish the groundwork for further measurement of the psychological aspects of institutional behavior. They give us the actual *content* of social organization on the basis of which its *processes* can be studied. In addition they yield material of immediate significance for social psychology. For example, the actions and thoughts of the workers of Middletown cannot be adequately understood until we know the simple fact that their chances of promotion based upon a count of actual cases are 1 in 424 in a two-year period.

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CHAPTER IV

SPECIAL FORMS OF UNIFORM BEHAVIOR: TABOO, RITUAL, AND VERBAL STEREOTYPE

Folkways, mores, institutional ways, and fashions are divisions of uniform ways according to their functioning in the social pattern. In addition to these broad classifications, social science uses the more specific terms of *taboo*, *ritual*, and *verbal stereotype* to describe particular uniformities. Sometimes these items are included under the broader headings already discussed, sometimes not. The research findings and the psychological knowledge concerning taboo, ritual, and stereotype are great enough to necessitate a separate chapter for their consideration.

TABOO

Though taboo is a universal phenomenon which has existed through all history and in all societies, it was the Polynesians who had the word for it. Anthropologists, in studying the customs and practices of the Polynesians, were impressed with the numerous and involved prohibitions called *taboo*. They described these phenomena under this Polynesian name, and the word spread through the languages of civilized peoples. The speed and facility with which the word found its way into many foreign tongues attest the universality of the phenomenon.

A taboo is a prohibition which depends for its enforcement upon a deep-seated fear, or horror, in the individual. It always appears in the negative form: *thou shalt not*. A pure case of taboo falls outside the systematized, rationalized restrictions called morality. The violation of a taboo is such a dreadful act that no reasons need be given for its existence. To ask the

why and wherefore concerning a taboo is like questioning the rising of the sun.* The consequences of the infraction of a taboo, which the individual fears, are not the penalties imposed by his group but the evil results intrinsic to the act of violation itself. It is true that external sanctions are frequently invoked against the guilty individual, but this should not be misunderstood. The natives who ostracize or kill one of their number for the infringement of a taboo do so because they fear that they themselves will suffer through contagion of guilt from the violator of the sacred prohibition.

Not all fears can be regarded as taboos. The phobias with which the abnormal psychologist deals (as the fear of closed places) are individual phenomena. Taboos are universal for the group. Nor are all common fears taboos. Under extreme conditions of stimulation all men, owing to their common biology, will show the same avoidant or coenotropic behavior. Taboos are not simple avoidances of natural forces. They may sometimes originate in such avoidance, but they are reactions to natural forces as these forces are socially interpreted. A primitive people who live near a river which frequently overflows its banks may develop taboos about their activities relating to the river. These taboos are not realistic precautions which take account of the safety of the group in a completely practical fashion. They are blanket prohibitions which make for wholesale avoidance of a mysterious spirit. The taboo in this instance is an avoidance of a natural danger in terms of the way in which that natural event is understood according to the cultural background of the natives.

A taboo may be more completely defined as a negative sanction, common to a group of people, its uniformity having a social as well as a biological basis, and its efficacy depending upon internal compulsion rather than external coercion. Taboos at one time or another in human history have covered

* Thus Freud writes, "They [taboos] are not traced to a commandment of a god but really they themselves impose their own prohibitions; they are differentiated from moral prohibitions by failing to be included in a system which declares abstinences in general to be necessary and gives reasons for this necessity" (9, p. 31).

all fields of life applying to objects, actions, conditions, places, and persons. They have been especially prevalent in respect to the vegetative functions of man such as eating, drinking, elimination, and sex activity, in respect to property, and in respect to official personages. A few examples of taboos may indicate something of their nature and of their universality.

Food Taboos

Most peoples have deep-seated aversions to some foods, or to the manner of their preparation or consumption. It is common to find a blanket prohibition against certain animals or their products. Thus a widespread food taboo in Asia is described by B. Laufer as follows:

Ancient Asia with its European annex is split into two large, sharply defined economic camps, as regards the production and consumption of milk and other dairy products. The entire East-Asiatic world, inclusive of China, Korea, Japan, Indo-China, and all Malaysians, does not take animal milk for food, and evinces a deep-rooted aversion toward it: and this was the state of affairs even in remotest times. On the other hand, all Indo-European peoples, the Semites, the ancient Scythians, and all nomadic tribes of northern and central Asia, as Turks, Mongols, and Tibetans, are all milk drinkers, and were so in early historical times. The remarkable feature about this case certainly is not the bare fact that the East-Asiatics abstain from milk—for the aboriginal tribes of America and Australia and others, simply for lack of milk-producing animals, do exactly the same—but the essential point is that the Chinese and their followers adhere to this practice, despite an abundance of milk-furnishing domestic animals in their possession and despite long-enduring intercourse with neighboring milk-consuming peoples, whose habits and mode of life were very familiar to them [23, p. 29].

In addition to blanket food taboos which outlaw a whole class of edible substances, there are many elaborations and refinements of prohibitions about food. The Australian natives deny themselves many foods on the basis of such factors as age and sex. In general the taboos work out so that the best foods are reserved for the older people. In some tribes a pro-

gressive emancipation occurs for the men, so that at attaining certain age levels more things are available. "After the third of these periods, for instance, a man could eat fish, after a fourth, honey, after a fifth, whatever he liked" (22, p. 1115). Among the Papuans, a Melanesian group, the delectable items of diet are taboo to the women and hence are consumed exclusively by the men. In the Andaman Islands the warriors are favored by taboos which forbid the rest of the population from eating the foods regarded as strength-giving.

These customs seem odd and amusing to us, but American culture is not without its own food taboos. We have a horror of dog meat and horse flesh, to say nothing of our repugnance to eating creatures like snakes, which crawl along the ground. Moreover, we have many taboos about the way in which foods are to be prepared and eaten. We insist that most meats be cooked and that silverware be used in eating rather than hands and fingers. In northern Abyssinia the natives show even more delicacy, for they eat in privacy shielded from the public view by sheets hung over them. This is not so much a matter of delicacy as fear of the pollution of what is taken into the body by the evil gaze of an unfriendly person. Similarly, some tribes drink through a tube instead of bringing the liquid directly to the lips from the container.

Sex Taboos

Generalizations about the social behavior of men which hold for all times and all people are exploded by the anthropologists almost as rapidly as they can be formulated. Yet it seems safe to assert that no society is known to science in which there have not been some sex taboos. All cultures place restrictions on the relations between the sexes. The most widespread taboo is that of incest, which prohibits the mating of blood relatives or of individuals belonging to the same totemic group (that is, claiming descent from the same animal ancestor). In fact, the general rule among primitive peoples is exogamous marriage, or marriage outside of the group. This does not mean that natives must go outside of their tribe to marry, but that

they must go outside of their kinship group or clan. Marriage itself is defined in terms of taboos. Though in certain primitive societies there is considerable freedom before marriage, taboos are common about sexual conduct after marriage. In their comparative study of customs Sumner and Keller state, "The preliminaries to marriage, the wedding-ceremony, the marriage mark, the treatment of adultery, the lot of the widow, the practices surrounding pregnancy and childbirth—all these are encircled and permeated by the taboo. . . . So too are the relations within the family, for the taboo defines rights between its members. . . ." (22, p. 1131).

In certain respects sex taboos are property taboos. Where the status of women is that of property, the taboos are similar to the restrictions about other possessions which insure monopoly rights. On the whole, however, the relationships between the sexes are not a simple matter of property rights. Woman as a strange creature, whose physiology differs from man's and who gives birth to children, has been an object of suspicion, of respect, and of fear. The taboos that have grown up about sex are due in part to the differences between men and women. In some primitive groups the women are taboo to men when the men are engaged in preparing for a hunt or building nets for a fishing expedition. The magic of the feminine sex must not be given an opportunity to bring ill luck in the hunt. Sometimes women are not even permitted to touch the weapons of the men. Fear of effeminacy through association with women is found not only in nature peoples but even in our own civilization. It is the popular belief that boys who associate with girls a great deal may develop feminine rather than masculine characteristics.

Property Taboos

The use of taboo to fortify property rights has obvious advantages. Private property means that all others but the rightful owner must be enjoined from possession of the article. External coercion is used to protect the individual's title to his possessions, but the fear of transgression itself is an even more

effective means of protection. Long before formal laws, police officers, courts, and prisons were employed to bolster up the property system, it received its sanction through the instrumentality of the taboo. In Melanesia the taboo is widely used to maintain the owner's rights to territory and produce. In west Africa, crops are made secure from pillage by the use of amulets whose gods the natives fear. The placing of various magical charms or symbols on one's property is a frequent resource among primitive peoples. In Samoa a representation of a sea-pike or a white shark is left by the owner to protect his fruit plantation. By imitative magic the would-be transgressor can expect to be pierced by a sea-pike or seized by a shark. Our own criminal machinery is still aided greatly by the common taboos against stealing. Probably the majority of the American people are prevented from taking the property of others by an inner compulsion rather than by the police.

Taboos apply not only to property but also to its production. In the days of the old mediaeval guild it was taboo for any but the proper craftsman to work at a given skill. It was sacrilege for the layman to attempt to compete with the silversmith. In this way a closed corporation or virtual monopoly in a craft was brought about. In western European cultures men for years have made their occupations taboo to women. American women have broken down this taboo and have successfully entered the professions and even politics. Nevertheless the taboo is dying hard and is still upheld by many men and women.

Taboos on Personages

The chiefs and high priests of a tribe are generally the subjects of many taboos and restrictions. Often their bodies are sacred and may not be touched by the common man. Sometimes the very objects they touch become sacred and must be avoided by the rank and file. The dangerous power of laying down taboos may also be a function of the chief. Among one nature people the chiefs could prohibit the use of a food or a drink for any period they choose. The rationalization of this

practice was that the sources of the natives' food needed to be protected. Thus if the supply of breadfruit grew low the fruit trees would be tabooed for twenty months so that they might regain strength. Or if the fish were beginning to give out a part of the bay would be laid under a taboo until the supply could replenish itself.

The privileges and powers bestowed upon rulers through the taboo might make an aspiring world-controller jealous. But this tremendous leverage of the chiefs and priests has limitations due to its very nature. The chief as the carrier of taboos is a dangerous person and needs to be hedged about with the consequences of his mysterious sanctity. Thus he is not permitted to live the life of the ordinary mortal. In west Africa one of the native kings was not permitted to leave his house. He could not even rise from his chair and had to sleep in a sitting position lest his rising affect the wind and so disturb the course of ships. Frazer has commented on the subject of rulers and their taboos, "A king of this sort lives hedged in by ceremonious etiquette, a network of prohibitions and observances, of which the intention is not to contribute to his dignity much less to his comfort, but to restrain him from conduct which, by disturbing the harmony of nature, might involve himself, his people, and the universe in one common catastrophe. Far from adding to his comfort, these observances, by trammeling his every act, annihilate his freedom and often render the very life, which it is their object to preserve, a burden and a sorrow to him" (8, p. 7). It is small wonder, then, that in some primitive tribes the successor to the priest-kings throne has to be prevailed upon by physical force to accept his crown.

The Psychological Nature of Taboo

Taboos owe their efficacy to the dread or horror the prohibited act arouses in the potential offender. Obviously fundamental psychological mechanisms must be at work to account for the common occurrence of these deep-seated fears. Without anticipating completely the detailed consideration of funda-

mental mechanisms of behavior, which follows in Part II, we may attempt here a brief description of the psychology of the taboo at a less scientific level. Two general psychological explanations have been advanced, both of which are necessary for an understanding of the extensive nature of the taboo. The first emphasizes the ambivalence of emotions and is set forth by Freud in his stimulating book *Totem and Taboo*. The second theory makes fewer assumptions and attributes taboos to simple fears of real dangers and imaginary fears due to association with real dangers.

The Freudian Explanation of Taboo. Freud points out that the very meaning of the word taboo has two opposed connotations. Tabooed objects, or persons, are at once sacred and dangerously unclean. They are untouchable both because they are consecrated and because contact with them will pollute. The attitude which tabooed objects inspire is thus a mixture of admiration and fear. The taboo of the woman, for example, is an expression of the fear of her black magic and of her power to tempt men. On the one hand, primitive men are attracted to her; on the other hand, her femininity and bearing of children prove her to be something of a witch.

Another example of the ambivalence of the taboo appears in M. Opler's thorough study of two Apache Indian tribes (17). The Apache like other primitive people have many taboos about death. The Apache burial is executed with the greatest possible dispatch. All personal belongings of the deceased are buried or destroyed. His name must never be mentioned, and this taboo is especially binding upon near relatives. They are terrified lest the ghost of the departed return and produce "ghost sickness" which may result in death, and the most dangerous ghosts are the ghosts of near relatives. Yet the relatives who inspire such dread after death are the object of the most affectionate regard during life. Members of the same family constantly help one another and can refuse one another nothing. The Apaches "will tell you that an Apache loves his kin—a great deal more than the white man cares for his relatives, they may add significantly" (17, p. 91). Here then

is an instance of a sharp contradiction in the attitudes of the Apache. "On the one hand he had been urged throughout his life to assist, and, in turn, to depend upon his relatives in all matters, to support them, whatever the consequences to himself, and even to avenge all wrongs inflicted upon them. Yet it was also within the traditional pattern to believe that these same people become, *par excellence*, a source of morbid fear for him" (17, p. 83).

Since the double meaning of the term taboo can be shown in actual cases to involve a contradiction in attitude toward the tabooed object or person, Freud argues further that it rests upon a conflict of motives. The prohibition represents the parental or social injunctions which have become part of the individual. The prohibition cloaks, however, a deep-seated tendency to possess the forbidden fruit. This desire has been repressed into the unconscious, but attains sufficient indirect expression to reveal the individual's ambivalent attitude. For this reason we find so many taboos centering about sex, property, and possession. Men are strongly attracted to the forbidden things which they fear. The holy dread of the taboo grows out of the individual's unconscious recognition that he himself is guilty of desiring the *verboten*. "Psychoanalysis here confirms what the pious were wont to say, that we are all miserable sinners" (9, p. 121).

Freud supports his theory by the following observations: (1) It is difficult to obtain an explanation for a taboo from the people who accept it. When reasons are offered they are obviously farfetched and fictitious. The motivation behind the taboo is unconscious. This accords with the notion that there is a guilty desire for the tabooed object or person, which the individual has suppressed. The individual will not explain the true basis of the taboo to a questioner, because he has long since banished the cause from his mind.

(2) The taboo is contagious in nature. When a woman is under a taboo, anything she touches becomes taboo. The violator of a taboo becomes himself taboo. The taboo about the deceased spreads to include his very name. The contagion of

the taboo is due to *displacement*. *Displacement*, a common occurrence in mental life, is the tendency for a repressed wish to become transferred to new objects. The unconscious desire for the forbidden object is blocked by conscious wishes. Therefore, it seeks to escape by turning to any substitute object which is connected in any way with the taboo. It is checked in turn by the spread of the taboo to the new outlets. Anything related to the prohibition has "the capacity of reminding man of his forbidden wishes, and . . . of tempting him to violate the prohibition in the service of these wishes. . . ." This is especially true in the case of a violation of a taboo. The example of the transgressor may tempt others to follow suit. "He is therefore really *contagious*, in so far as every example incites to imitation, and therefore he himself must be avoided."

(3) The act of touching is often the core of the prohibition known as the taboo. Similar compulsive prohibitions are found in certain neuroses in which the patient cannot bring himself to touch certain classes of objects. A study of these cases shows that the compulsive prohibition covers an unconscious desire to possess the forbidden article or associated objects. "Though the secret meaning of a taboo prohibition cannot possibly be of so special a nature as in the case of the neurosis, we must not be astonished to find that touching plays a similar role in taboo prohibitions as in the *délire de toucher*. To touch is the beginning of every act of possession, of every attempt to make use of a person or thing" (9, p. 57). Freud also sees a similarity between the taboo and compulsive neurosis in displacement, unconscious motivation, and obedience based on internal sanctions.

Opler broadens the Freudian theory of ambivalence to include other conflicts in life besides the one between sex and socialized wishes. He explains the contradictory attitude of the Apache toward their relatives as the result of the Apache conditions of life (17). To cope with the meager food resources of their environment the Apache were spread thinly over a wide territory with the central unit of their social organization the extended domestic family. The family as the effective

social unit was tied together by many bonds of cooperation and mutual obligation. In it there was absolutistic control over the younger members by older kin. This situation bred not only affection and helpfulness between relatives, but hostility and hatred as well. Usually this resentment was inhibited and the family preserved a peaceful front to the observer. The unconscious hostility appeared in the lack of complete uniformity among the Apache in their terror of the dead. Where the best of relations had existed between father and son, the son had no great fear of his father's ghost.

Taboo as the Reflection of Simple Fear. Though the Freudian explanation of ambivalence accounts for many of the complexities of the taboo, not all taboos necessitate such an involved explanation. The word taboo does not have the double connotation of sacred and unclean in all cultures. Among the Polynesians the unclean and sacred taboos are definitely differentiated from one another (16). Some objects are taboo because of their holiness and others because of their possibilities of polluting the individual. They are both known as taboo because of the danger of contact with them. It must be admitted that this discrimination may be a development from an earlier undifferentiated usage. Nevertheless there may be common fears which are simply a result of experience with harmful things and natural dangers, concerning which people have inadequate knowledge.

The child early learns to avoid and fear material objects and natural processes which produce pain and discomfort. Where the nature of the cause of injury is unknown, primitive men imputed it to spirits and ghosts. Prohibitions were thus placed about events, conditions, and localities as a safeguard against supernatural forces. Fear is not always augmented by a guilty conscience based upon desire. Primitives live so close to the ragged edge of existence that they are at the mercy of elemental forces. A storm, drought, disease, a flood, a severe winter, a torrid summer affect them harshly. Hence arise their fears of these forces and anything which is associated with evil events.

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The psychological effect of belief can become a reinforcing agent for the taboo. Once individuals accept the taboo, their fear of evil consequences in the event of its violation can actually produce dire results. Fear can bring on illness and even death. Ghost sickness among the Apache is characterized by fainting, inability to eat, choking sensations, trembling, and headache—all effects which can be brought about by intense fear. In fact, a number of observers assert that fear of a violated taboo has resulted in death. Instances of this sort will confirm the natives in their belief of the powerful spirits to whose wishes they must conform. Moreover, disease and accident are frequent, and taboos are also found in great numbers. Therefore any evil can be traced to some taboo which the individual may have violated by chance.

Taboo and Social Control

The nature of taboo is suggestive of its tremendous possibilities for social control. Every ruler finds it a distinct asset to keep alive the taboo which makes his source of authority and his edicts unquestioned and sacrosanct. The belief may be the divine right of kings, the immunity of high office, the doctrine of sovereignty, or the perfection of a constitution. To make a symbol so sacred that it needs no justification and requires no external coercion is one secret of the art of governing. Taboos in most cases are not the deliberate machinations of rulers, but they can be maintained and extended in the interests of social control. The restrictions in the taboo, which so fetter a king that he is king in name only, do not vitiate the utility of the taboo as an instrument of social control. The real governing may be effectively carried out by the people who use the king as a puppet and manipulate him as one of many taboo symbols.

An instance of the functioning of a taboo for purposes of social control can be seen in the mysterious secrecy surrounding the facts of childbirth. L. Hollingworth has pointed out that the guardians of the social order are wont to taboo all mention of the pain and the danger of childbearing (12). Until recent

years statistics on maternal mortality were suppressed or ignored. The processes of birth were not regarded as fit subjects for conversation. On the other hand, an idealized version of the joys of motherhood was set up, glorifying the relations between mother and child. To guarantee a surplus population for industrial expansion and competitive national development, however, the "natural, normal, wonderful maternal instinct" was not enough. It needed taboos on such unpleasant topics as the drudgery of child rearing, the risks of child bearing, and methods of birth control.

Those groups in society which find the operation of specific taboos to their benefit will of course propagandize for their maintenance. Men clung as long as they could to those sex taboos which redounded to their advantage. In primitive groups the medicine men are favored by many of the tribal taboos, and they are important agents in drilling these taboos into the rising generation. The caste system of India depends upon a system of taboos which perpetuates the dominance of the Brahmins. The upper classes in England have solved the servant problem by tabooing for their servants personal disrespect or impertinence. And it is not difficult to construe the effort of a servant to improve his hours and wages as an impertinence.

The universality of the incest taboo has puzzled scholars. It is found among peoples so primitive that they can have no knowledge of the effects of inbreeding.* Although incest taboos doubtless have a complex motivation, they are maintained partly because they constitute one means by which the powerful sex drive can be controlled. G. B. Vetter has pointed out that the incest taboo does not rise out of an instinctive repugnance, but is the result of social teaching (26). The elders of the group preserve peace and guarantee their own interests

* "There is, however, no known group," states W. I. Thomas, "in which marriage is approved between brother and sister if we except some cases where such marriages were undertaken by dynasties for the preservation of the royal blood (Egypt, Sumeria, Peru, Hawaii, etc), some of African Chiefs who are 'above the law,' and some technical evasions . . ." (23, p. 179).

by regimentation of the young. Naturally, then, the strong sexual impulse, a constant potential source of friction and of diversion of the young from their appointed tasks, has been universally controlled. Moreover, the control of the mating drive by the elders of the group has the further advantage of developing intergroup cooperative relationships. E. B. Tylor goes so far as to make this the basis for the incest taboo, since the positive note of this prohibition is exogamy, or marriage outside of the kinship group. In point of fact the exogamous marriage system in primitive communities does produce alliances between clans and systems of mutual obligations between them. A more individualistic interpretation of the incest taboo has been advanced by J. Bentham, E. Westermarck, and E. B. Holt. Before puberty children of the same family play together and develop many habits of affection and hostility toward one another which interfere with romantic attachment after puberty. "Individuals accustomed to see each other and to know each other, from an age which is neither capable of conceiving the drive nor of inspiring it, will see each other with the same eyes to the end of life" (4, p. 182). It is highly probable that this factor is at times an important one, but it fails to explain the strength of the incest taboo. If individuals automatically become exogamous, then there would be no need for the teaching of the taboo.

RITUAL

Ritual, or ceremonial, is *standardized overt behavior of a non-logical sort*. It is non-logical in the sense that it is not the result of reflective thinking. It satisfies emotions, but does not afford a logical solution. It consists of a fairly elaborate pattern of overt behavior. Thus ritual refers not to ideas but to actions. Moreover, these actions are standardized. They are performed by every member of the group alike. Ordinarily we think of ritual only in connection with primitive groups which have long ceremonials in respect to their hunting, their religion, their agriculture, and their war-making. Our society, however, is shot through with ritualistic performances. Our

social etiquette is a ritual. So, too, are our academic processions, our college songs and cheers, our wedding ceremonies, and our funeral rites. A great deal of ritual still clings to our legal procedure, and our medical practice is not altogether free from ritualistic elements.

An interesting example of an elaborate ritual is to be found in the preparations and conduct of a Jicarilla Indian raid on the horses of a Plains tribe (18). The procedure is a mixture of technological or practical routine and pure ritual.* When the Jicarilla needed horses, they sought the permission of their local chief to conduct a raid. A raid leader was selected and an evening named for the preliminary dance. "On the appointed evening the onlookers gathered at the dance grounds and one by one those who wished to join the expedition rose and danced. The dancing warriors were dressed in characteristic manner and had their faces painted in a stylized fashion. This dance was in the nature of a vow; one who joined the dance was committed to the venture and could not withdraw without decided loss of prestige" (18, p. 209). After the dance, preparations for the raid followed. The raiding warriors were pledged to continence. The men set off on foot four days before the full moon, so that they might have light for their journey. "At home, a woman chosen to represent each man . . . obeyed many restrictions in matters of dress, food, and behavior to insure his safe return and the success of the entire party." The men were dressed in old clothes and carried an extra pair of moccasins resting at the pit of the stomach, since they thought moccasins so placed would still hunger pangs.

* Ritual must be distinguished from elaborate routines of a strictly utilitarian nature. R. Benedict in her discussion of ritual in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* states: "Ritual according to the accepted usage of the term does not include acts of routine provision of physical necessities. Traditional ways of building a house or of grinding and leaching acorns may be elaborate and exacting, but they are technological not ritualistic. Ritual is always extra-necessitous from the technological point of view; it has reference, for example, to the act of killing slaves to bury under the house posts or to fertility ceremonies that employ the symbolism of eating or of impregnation to further the growth of the fields" (Vol. 13, p. 396).

Equipped with lance, bow and arrows, and rawhide rope, they traveled rapidly until the second morning. The leader now daubed his followers with white clay and their activities were thereafter much restricted. They could look only toward the east, drink only through hollow tubes, and speak only in a special "raiding language." In enemy territory the leader reconnoitered, located the horses of the enemy, and quietly drove a number of them toward his men. Each man secured a horse. Before driving off the herd, the men thrust their spears into the ground and left them, an expression of their contempt for the enemy.

Illustrations of ritual from primitive groups and ceremonial from our own culture could be multiplied indefinitely. The elaborate procedure of a formal wedding, the stereotyped behavior in funeral rites, the standardized ceremony of the baptism are too well known to necessitate description. Keeping in mind familiar examples of ritual, let us proceed to an analysis of its psychological nature. Five characteristics should be noted: (1) the enduring basis of ritual is its satisfaction of emotional needs; (2) ritual affords the individual a sense of control in perplexing situations; (3) ritual is primary in that it precedes logical justification; (4) an established ritual broadens the base of its supporting motives; and (5) ritual is habit-forming.

1. Ritual and the Satisfaction of Emotional Needs

Ritual is generally found about the emotional events in life. Death, marriage, birth, and puberty furnish the occasion for elaborate ceremonies in most societies. The beginning or end of a significant event or process is marked by ritual. Before the group embarks upon war, before a new president takes office, people indulge in ceremonies. The successful conclusion of an activity like the completion of a college course or the victorious ending of a war finds its release in ceremonial practices. Ritual, therefore, can be said to be the overflow of emotions into overt behavior. Emotions are occasions of great internal stress and strain. Energy is produced at a great rate and tends to be dis-

charged not in thought but in action. When we have a common outlet for these emotional tensions we have ritual. The standardization of patterns of release for pent-up feelings is a long social process. In our culture there are so many rituals to be observed that we frequently have little emotion to discharge in the accepted pattern. Hence we may regard ceremonies as lifeless forms which are imposed upon us by some mysterious force known as society. This view is essentially incorrect. Rituals endure because some people do derive genuine satisfaction from their observance.*

2. Ritual and the Feeling of Control

Ritual is more than the overflow of emotional tension. It is an activity which gives the participant a feeling of control over the situation. Any action in an emotional crisis is better than sitting still. People feel better if they can do something about it. In ritual, moreover, they are doing precisely the right thing about the situation because everyone else is taking the same action. In addition, ritual is sanctified by the leaders, be they chiefs, medicine men, kings, or statesmen. Having participated in a common activity sanctioned by his leaders, the individual feels that he and his fellows have some control over the problem. The primitive group, facing drought, hold an elaborate ceremony to appease the rain gods. They come away from it satisfied that the situation is under control. In a similar fashion the little superstitious rite of the baseball player in shifting around his cap before stepping up to the plate gives him confidence for the impending duel with the opposing pitcher.

* The emotional significance of ritual in the social life of the group has been well expressed by A. Goldenweiser in his *Anthropology*. "And, as in religion, the final touch is added by ceremonialism. Periodically, in a setting of thrill, ecstasy, and terror, the human battery is recharged, ideationally and emotionally. More effectively, perhaps, than any other single factor, this ritual reliving of the cycle of participation places it far beyond the range of analysis, doubt, or criticism. To this effect a share is contributed by symbolism, more often than not the symbolism of art. In the world of ritual colours, shapes, patterns, masks, times, rhythms, and words, all carry their vicarious message, and the message, once more, is the cycle of participation, the mystic complex" (p. 423, F. S. Crofts, 1937).

The feeling of control growing out of ritualistic performances has a certain logical justification in that many ceremonies are not pure ritual. They may include practical and useful elements as in the Jicarilla raid where the men started out four days before the full moon and took the right amount of equipment for the job. In the mind of the Jicarilla, however, the whole performance is necessary and right. He has not analyzed out the rational from the non-rational elements. Nor do we in our ceremonials. Old-fashioned methods of fumigation after disease were sometimes pure ritual. A foul substance, odious to our nostrils, was used, but it was not necessarily the specific disinfectant for the particular disease germ. The fear of contagion of the dreaded disease led to action, and the standardized approved action was fumigation by a chemical which affected us if not the microbes. Scientists have gradually analyzed out the logical from the non-logical aspects of many rituals, but in daily life we do very little of such analytical thinking about the ceremonials we observe. Nor does the scientist, for that matter, save in his limited specialty, and not always does he do a thorough job there.

The non-rational elements in the ritual are not wholly useless. They may be futile from a logical point of view but not from the standpoint of the psychology of the individual. His increased self-confidence and feeling of control help him at times to meet his problems. The Indians who followed their raiding ceremony exactly were emboldened in their final crucial test. This utility of ritual is very limited, however. Belief and confidence help men, but confident belief does not change the nature of the external world. All the faith in a fumigation rite is useless, if the chemical employed is not a specific against the disease germ. And the false confidence in the control over the environment through ritual may sometimes lead to calamity.

3. The Primary Nature of Ritual

Ritual as an action pattern for the expression of emotions implies that it precedes logical justification. Ritual comes first

and verbal justification second. We do the right thing and then prove to ourselves that our actions were right. The reason given for ceremonial behavior, therefore, is rarely the correct explanation for it. In justifying our actions we advance respectable reasons and idealize our motives. Once a ritual has been going for a long time the rationalizations will be well worked out and people can easily fall back upon them. For example, the members of a fraternity justify the initiation ritual by a plausible statement about the necessity of putting initiates through an ordeal to make them appreciate the honor of belonging to the fraternity. Very little is said, however, about the advantages of controlling pledges before initiation or about the sadistic tendencies which can be released in this socially sanctioned manner.

Though ritual does not represent rationally thought out behavior, it is not purely a random overflow of emotions. While almost any activity may relieve emotional tensions, men generally take that action which is suggested by something in their past experience. And their ability to fit it into the general pattern of their lives by means of a particular rationalization helps to establish the action as an habitual method of dealing with the situation. A primitive people who have had their crops destroyed by a storm are motivated by fear to the particular act of offering propitiatory sacrifices to the powerful spirit responsible for the devastation. Now this ritualistic act is a random method of meeting the problem compared to a rational scientific analysis. It is not purely random, however, in the sense that any other activity would be equally effective for the individuals concerned. Their specific experiences and beliefs determine for them a means which seems suitable to the occasion.

4. The Broadened Base of an Established Ritual

After a ritualistic pattern has developed, it can be fed by an increasing variety of motives. Once a public standard means of satisfying emotional needs appears, it can be maintained by other than the original need. Ritual often involves display,

since it is overt behavior performed by many members of the group. Self-exhibitionism becomes a factor in its continuation. People take part in a ceremonial not out of the original motive behind the performance but because they can be seen and admired. Sometimes the ceremonial works the other way. The audience watch the principals and attain their egoistic satisfaction vicariously. This is true of most college commencements. The show is generally staged for the admiring parents by the school administration. Students are glad to mark the end of their college course ceremoniously, but they have their own celebrations for this purpose.

The broadened base of an established ritual contributes greatly to its survival in a changing social world. When some of its followers desert the old standard because of new solutions for the same problem, it is still maintained by people attracted to it for extraneous reasons. Many religious rituals have survived in our day, though the deep religious emotions upon which they were based have lost their intensity. People keep up the ceremony, nonetheless, because it gives aesthetic pleasure, social recognition, social stimulation, or some other satisfaction. One of the old motives in the christening ceremony was the concern and fear for the newborn infant. Christening saved the child from eternal damnation and launched it auspiciously on its life voyage. Some present-day parents, not deeply religious, continue to follow the christening ceremony. They are eager to avoid any possible stigma being attached to the child through the unconventionality of its parents. The joyous resolution of the emotions surrounding childbirth are also expressed for them in the form of this public ceremony.

A common misconception is that the reason for continuing customs is to be found only in their origin. The ceremony is regarded as useless in its present functioning. It keeps going automatically, it is assumed, because some time in the dim past there was a cause for it. This doctrine of survivals misses the essential truth that no ritual can continue unless it has some psychological utility. Its existence is to be found in the present

motives satisfied, not in the speculative reconstruction of its historical origin. The shift in the emotional basis of the ritual has been one source of the fallacious doctrine of survivals. Since the original motive no longer seems operative it is assumed that the custom keeps going by its own weight. The new motives are not taken into account.

In spite of the additional motives which may support an established ceremonial, it must be admitted that often an old ritual survives only because its original motivation survives. The rituals found about birth, puberty, marriage, and death have lasted centuries largely because these emotional events call for a public release of psychological tension. A comparative study of rites and customs shows many similarities between widely divergent cultures, if the analysis is deep enough to lay bare basic mechanisms. We miss the essential identity in the old and new forms of ritual because we take the accepted rationalization for it at face value. Our social etiquette is justified on the grounds that it makes for ease of social relationships. It is explained in terms of historical accident and precedent. If these glib accounts of etiquette are uncritically absorbed, the student will be puzzled at the diversity of social manners in various periods and at the seeming lack of motivation in many current customs. As a matter of fact, however, many polite social forms function now and always have functioned to mark off the lordly, who have the leisure to acquire the amenities, from the lowly who lack such opportunity (25). (See Chap. IX for a more complete description of this fact.)

5. The Habit-Forming Nature of Ritual

The most effective way of building up a habit is through actual performance. Discussion of the logical possibilities of problem solution does not ingrain habits. Action does. It is not enough to point out to an individual the procedure to follow in an emergency. In the school, children are put through fire drills so that in the event of an alarm their response will be habitual and automatic. Repeated drill means

that the necessary motions become associated with many sources of stimulation and so habits are formed. Ritual since it is a standard pattern of action tends to be repeated and to become part of the habit system of the individual. A device for further increasing the hold of ritual is to make it rhythmical. Primitive ceremonies are often accompanied by a chant. Or they assume the form of a dance. Rhythm facilitates rapid habit formation.

Social organization depends upon ritual for stability. People trained in routine action patterns such as marching, singing, and saluting are not good material for programs of social change. They may accept new ideas, but when the old symbols and stimuli are flashed before them the old ritual is again elicited. The technique for quelling a disturbance among trained animals or quieting the crowd behavior of humans is the use of familiar stimuli which are tied to long-associated routine performances. Soldiers routed in battle have had their disordered ranks reformed by a well-known leader whose authority and commands reinstated old drills. Fire panics have been averted by such stratagems as the singing of hymns. In W. G. Sumner's opinion, "No creed, no moral code, and no scientific demonstration can ever win the same hold upon men and women as habits of action, with associated sentiments and states of mind, drilled in from childhood" (21, p. 61).

Ritual as an habitual action to meet emotional needs lends itself admirably to purposes of social control. The technique is to take an emotional wish fairly common in a given society and furnish an easy means for its expression. People readily accept the rite and become emotionally tied to everything connected with it. They are then in a position to be controlled by anyone cunning enough to make use of these long-standing emotional habits. A simple illustration of control through ritual can be seen in the establishment of "Mother's Day." In our civilization the word mother is a powerful symbol, associated with strong sentiments of love and gratitude. The generous desire to do something for one's mother is seized upon by commercial interests who play up one day as a ceremonial

occasion for securing their wares as appropriate gifts for mother.

THE RELATION BETWEEN RITUAL AND TABOO

Ritual is intimately bound up with taboo. Ritual is often the positive side of the taboo. Whereas taboo describes the actions which cannot be performed in an emotional situation, ritual describes the acts which can. Ritual, moreover, may provide the way out when taboos have been broken either through accident or intent. Relief is afforded by a ritualistic performance which takes the form of an expiatory or purification ceremonial. The fact that rites exist for removing the dangerous guilt of violated taboos brings into clear focus the ambivalent attitude toward tabooed objects. Men fear such objects, yet provide themselves an expiatory means if their attraction for the forbidden fruit should overcome their repugnance.

Primitive cultures have simple methods of purging taboo-guilt in that they call for direct physical treatment. Cleansing with water and purification by fire are common rites. It is reported that after a Pima Indian had killed an Apache, he had to live alone in the woods, bathe frequently, and carry a lump of clay on his head as a sign of mourning. At the end of seventeen days he and his weapons were solemnly purified in a public ceremony. Our use of holy water and our baptismal rite have their counterpart in simpler cultures in which sacred water protects against sin or washes away the sinful violation of a taboo. Magical transference is a more subtle way of escaping the consequences of taboo-infracton. An animal may be sacrificed in place of the guilty individual after a ceremony in which the guilt is transferred to the animal.

The blanket and inclusive nature of many taboos can lead to socially embarrassing consequences. Among the Maori of New Zealand the construction of canoes as well as other occupations of men are taboo to the women. The products of these • occupations are also objects of avoidance. Yet it is necessary for women as well as men to travel in canoes. In this social

dilemma a way out appears through a ritual. A woman of high rank and herself sacred steps into the canoe first. Since she is sacred she is not harmed, but since she is also a woman the canoe is now safe for other women (16). In this ingenious manner, rituals can be used to avoid social conflicts which may arise through the extensiveness of particular taboos.

It is consistent with the nature of ritual that a purification ceremony can consist of motions which do not cleanse but which are a vent for people's excitement and anger. No drastic measures are taken, but men's emotions are relieved. This is our customary procedure in removing corruption in the body politic. An evil is uncovered and people become excited. The ritual begins with the appointment of an investigating committee. The committee meets at great length, holds many hearings, and uncovers a wealth of damaging material. The results are publicized, a few minor offenders are disciplined, and everyone is satisfied save perhaps the editors of the *Nation* and the *New Republic*. The nation has been purified and the corruption continues in another form.

VERBAL STEREOTYPES

Taboo and ritual are the negative and positive aspects of the action patterns common to a group. Uniform ways, however, are not limited to actions. Men verbalize their behavior, and the words which justify, supplement, and replace deeds are often the standard property of the group. The most widespread verbalizations in a culture are the names for everyday objects and their characteristics and similar uniform designations resulting from a common language. At a more complex level, in which judgment or opinion is involved, we find uniform beliefs and ideas known as *stereotypes*. The highest level, which calls for reasoning, shows less uniformity of verbal response.

The word *stereotype* comes from the printer's art of making paper-pulp molds of the form which contains the type and cuts for the newspaper page. Molten lead is poured into the paper-pulp mold, and the leaden plate thus obtained is used for strik-

ing off the printed copies. W. Lippmann has applied the term stereotype to the field of ideas and opinions, because of the rigid character of our mental processes which mold the material of experience into fixed channels. "For the most part," writes Lippmann, "we do not first see and then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture" (15, p. 81). And he goes on to say:

They [stereotypes] are an ordered, more or less consistent picture of the world, to which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts and our hopes have adjusted themselves. They may not be a complete picture of the world, but they are a picture of a possible world to which we are adapted. In that world people and things have their well-known places, and do certain expected things. We feel at home there. We fit in. We are members. We know the way around. There we find the charm of the familiar, the normal, the dependable; its grooves and shapes are where we are accustomed to find them [15, p. 95].

Experimental Studies of Stereotypes

Experimental studies have confirmed Lippmann's contentions about the nature and extent of stereotypes. In one fairly crucial test S. A. Rice demonstrated the stereotyped character of opinions about public figures (19). Rice presented pictures of nine people, found in the daily news, to undergraduates and grange members for identification. The subjects were informed that the pictures represented a European premier, a prominent Bolshevik, a United States senator, a labor leader, two manufacturers, a financier, an editor-politician, and a bootlegger; and they were asked to identify these people. They did considerably better than chance in their identifications, but often this large degree of agreement in naming the pictures was erroneous. For example, the Bolshevik was labeled as a United States senator twice as often as he was correctly identified. Apparently the mistaken judgments, which were

greater than chance, were due to some characteristic of the picture which fitted into an existing stereotype. The Bolshevik was confused with the United States senator because he had a Van Dyck beard and wore a wing collar. Further proof of the stereotyped basis of judgment appeared in a second experiment, in which new subjects were asked to rate the pictures on the basis of intelligence and craftiness. In this test the pictures were correctly labeled by the experimenter in advance for one group, incorrectly labeled for another, and not identified at all for a third. The results showed that students tended to attribute intelligence and craftiness to the men on the basis of their social status and occupational calling. The reader can verify these results by taking newspaper pictures of criminals and pictures of men rescued from some disaster with their hair in disorder and without conventional neckwear. The pictures minus their legends can be presented for identification to a group of subjects. The inability to distinguish the criminals shows that our judgment of a criminal type is based upon certain unconventionalities in appearance.

Racial and National Stereotypes. Scientific studies of racial and national differences show few, if any, distinctive characteristics which would mark off one national group from another. The net result of the research in racial psychology is the finding that tremendous variation exists in the mental and physical traits of the people of every ethnic grouping. Racial differences which have been found are differences in statistical averages, not differences between pure types. The overlapping in the distribution of a trait for two nations is so great that the anthropologist finds it difficult to discover the typical Nordic or the typical Mediterranean, to say nothing of national types within these major groupings. The variation within a national group reported by the scientist contrasts strikingly with the unanimity found in people's ideas of other nations and races. Investigators of American attitudes toward other social and national groups disclose striking agreement. The agreement is the more remarkable in that it transcends the regional divisions of the United States, as the following studies indicate.

A social distance scale was given to a group of 110 California business men and schoolteachers by E. S. Bogardus (6). The subject checked the degrees of intimacy to which he was willing to admit members of various races. There were seven steps in the scale: to close kinship by marriage, to my club as a personal chum, to my street as a neighbor, to employment in my occupation, to citizenship in my country, as visitors only to my country, and exclusion from my country. By weighting these seven degrees of intimacy Bogardus obtained the following preferential rating of 23 ethnic groups:

Canadians	22.51	Armenians	6.16
English	22.35	German Jews	5.45
Scotch	20.91	Greeks	5.23
Irish	19.38	Russian Jews	4.94
French	18.67	Mexicans	4.57
Swedes	16.20	Chinese	4.12
Germans	14.95	Japanese	4.08
Spanish	14.02	Negroes	3.84
Italians	8.87	Mulattoes	3.62
Indians	7.30	Hindus	3.08
Poles	6.65	Turks	2.91
Russians	6.40		

A different technique was employed by L. L. Thurstone in measuring the racial preferences of 239 students at the University of Chicago (24). By careful statistical methods Thurstone obtained a more accurate placing of the races in preferential order. Nevertheless, his results, given below, show a marked similarity to the preferences found by Bogardus on the Pacific Coast.

American	0.00	Russian	— 4.10
English	— 1.34	Pole	— 4.41
Scotch	— 2.09	Greek	— 4.62
Irish	— 2.18	Armenian	— 4.68
French	— 2.46	Japanese	— 4.93
German	— 2.55	Mexican	— 5.10
Swede	— 2.90	Chinese	— 5.30
South American	— 3.64	Hindu	— 5.35
Italian	— 3.66	Turk	— 5.82
Spanish	— 3.79	Negro	— 5.86
Jew	— 3.92		

Only seven of the twenty-one ethnic groups are to be found in the upper half of this scale, and these aside from Americans consist of northern Europeans. As in the study of Bogardus, southeastern Europeans are placed quite low in the order of preference. They are regarded, however, as somewhat more desirable than Orientals. The Turks and Negroes occupy the lowest rungs of the ladder.

Other studies of racial attitudes have confirmed the agreement in prejudice found in the Bogardus and Thurstone investigations. For example, J. P. Guilford conducted a comprehensive survey of the judgments of eleven hundred college students (10). The attitudinal preferences of students at the University of Washington, the University of Nebraska, the University of Kansas, Northwestern University, the University of Florida, and Wells College were very much alike; but students at New York University did depart from the accepted pattern. This exception is easily accounted for, since the majority of students sampled at New York University were of Jewish parentage.

The constancy of the pattern of ethnic preferences throughout the country is obviously not a function of actual experience with members of the racial and national groups. Since these groups contain all types of people we should expect greater variability in the preferences expressed. The standardization of racial attitudes, therefore, can be interpreted as the stereotyped result of social teaching. To discover whether a stereotyped picture of these ethnic groups accompanied the likes and dislikes expressed for them, D. Katz and K. Braly asked one hundred students to assign descriptive adjectives to ten peoples (13). In spite of their lack of first-hand knowledge of a number of ethnic groups, students found little difficulty in characterizing them in various ways. Moreover, there was high agreement among the students in their characterization. The Germans were regarded as scientifically minded, industrious, and stolid. Italians received the common description of the supposedly hot-blooded Latin peoples; artistic, impulsive, quick-tempered, and passionate. The characterization of the

Negro followed the picture of the *Saturday Evening Post*: highly superstitious, lazy, happy-go-lucky, ignorant, musical, and ostentatious. The Turks were described as cruel, very religious, treacherous, and sensual. Since the great majority of the students had never known any Turks, it is likely that their picture of the Turk has been stereotyped for them by stories of Armenian massacres and earlier accounts of the terrible Turk as the foe of Christian Europe. Another bit of evidence for the stereotyped nature of racial attitudes was the finding that acquaintance with a racial group did not increase the degree of agreement concerning its characteristics. Students agreed less about the qualities of Americans than they did about the Negroes, Germans, Italians, and Jews.*

An interesting confirmation of the stereotyped attitudes toward racial and national names comes from an experiment of D. Young (28). After a course in race relations, students were asked to rank various races and nationalities according to their innate ability. The rank order obtained approximates closely the above preferential rating of ethnic groups, even though the subjects were not asked to give their preferences for the various peoples. There is little evidence for any ranking of races

* That our uniform conception of a foreign people follows our stereotypes as much as it does their real characteristics is indicated by the differing conceptions of the same national type in different countries. La Piere and Farnsworth in their *Social Psychology* cite H. Nicholson's account of the varying picture of the typical Englishman in Germany, France, and America thus: "To him [the German] the average Englishman is a clever and unscrupulous hypocrite; a man who, with superhuman ingenuity and foresight, is able in some miraculous manner to be always on the winning side; a person whose incompetence in business and salesmanship is balanced by an uncanny and unfair mastery of diplomatic wiles; a cold-blooded, prescient, ruthless opportunist; a calculating and conceited egoist . . .

"The French portrait of the Englishman is the picture of an inelegant, stupid, arrogant, and inarticulate person with an extremely red face. The French seem to mind our national complexion more than other nations. They attribute it to the overconsumption of ill-cooked meat. They are apt, for this reason, to regard us as barbarian and gross. Only at one point does the French picture coincide with the German picture. The French share with the Germans a conviction of our hypocrisy. . . .

"To the average American, the average Englishman seems affected, patronizing, humorless, impolite, and funny. To him also the Englishman wears spats and carries an eyeglass . . . (pp. 214-215).

on the basis of innate ability. Hence the high agreement between this ranking and the preferential rating indicates that students were prejudging races according to their emotional stereotypes.

Occupational and Political Stereotypes. National and racial prejudices are among the most universal stereotypes in our culture and hence the most obvious to investigators. Nonetheless, a number of studies, some of which follow, have not missed the fact that we judge occupational calling, type of education, social status, economic position, and political affiliation in much the same way. Nor do we stop here. People are not only classified and prejudged as carriers of the essence of a pure group type, but ideas concerning social, religious, moral, political, and economic matters are fitted into existing molds of thought and are not modified to accord with objective reality.

A similar consistency to that found in racial stereotypes appeared in W. A. Anderson's study of the attitudes of college students toward various occupations (2). Students of agriculture, engineering, textiles, science, and business agreed closely in ranking a large number of occupations according to their contributions to society. The religious, medical, and academic professions headed the list, with the banker in fourth place. The ditch digger was relegated to the last position. Salesmen were rated above factory operatives. In a further study Anderson had the occupations ranked according to social prestige and economic return as well as social contribution (3). The correlation coefficients between economic return and social contribution and between social prestige and social contribution were fairly high. That this agreement is not the result of objective judgment is suggested by J. Davis' investigation of the occupational values of Russian school children (7). Here agreement was also found, but the Russian children were at variance with American students in their appraisal of the worth of the various vocations. The Russians valued productive labor highly and saw little of merit in banking or in the legal profession. The agreement within one culture and the disparity

between cultures is consistent with Lippmann's thesis of the social molding of ideas into fixed patterns.

The evaluation of political party names is likewise more a matter of emotional set than of rational consideration of political affairs. In the spring of 1934, G. W. Hartmann compared the feeling-tone displayed toward party labels with the specific wishes of people in regard to governmental policies involving significant social and economic problems (11). He found that the parties which stood for a collectivist society such as the Socialists and Communists were the least liked. On the other hand, the farmers and workers (who were interviewed) endorsed more items from the programs of these parties than from the programs of the more conservative organizations. In an earlier study G. W. Allport encountered the same type of phenomenon (1). In the election of 1928, students professing liberal attitudes still preferred to vote for the conservative candidates. A similar discrepancy between emotional stereotypes and specific attitudes was reported by R. Stagner in a study of fascist opinions (20). In this case the subjects showed strong disapproval of the label Nazi Germany, but approved of many of the proposals which make for fascism. For example, many of those who reacted unfavorably to the term Nazi were strongly in favor of smashing the labor unions, making radical agitators the scapegoats for our ills, and turning away from parliamentary methods to dictatorial leadership for the solution of our problems—all steps in a fascist program.

That political party preference is a matter of prejudgment rather than reason has been demonstrated by G. W. Allport. Of a group of nearly 400 college students he found that 79 per cent voted for the party of their fathers. In the 1928 campaign he questioned students concerning their political information, their political preferences, and their political prejudices (1). A prejudice score was determined by the average judgment of twenty-five professors of social science concerning the amount of prejudice indicated by each answer. Anti-socialistic and religious prejudices were important factors in the determination of voting preferences. In general, students making high

prejudice scores made low scores on the information questions. The greater the information, moreover, the greater the political liberalism of the student.

The low esteem in which politics as a profession is held by many Americans is well known. Its stereotyped nature appeared in an extensive investigation of the prestige value of public employment in Chicago conducted by L. D. White (27). People were given a list of comparable positions in private companies and public service for evaluation. For example, they were asked which position they regarded more highly, the post of electrical engineer in the Western Electric Company or the post of electrical engineer in the City of Chicago. The prestige value of city positions was high among the foreign-born and the young, but low among native-born adults. Yet the answers to questions concerning their personal experiences with city employees were quite favorable. Apparently the general American attitude that politics are corrupt has stereotyped reactions toward governmental employment, actual experience with public employees to the contrary notwithstanding.

The Psychological Nature of Stereotypes

The stereotyped nature of much of our perceiving and thinking is a psychological commonplace. The very term perception in psychology means the interpretation of sensory stimulation according to the canons of past experience. We do not receive photostatic copies of the external world in an ordinary act of perception. The mind is a dynamic affair, and it goes out to meet the world, as it were, and to shape and organize that world according to its own nature. And its nature is already determined by its biological structure and its previous contacts with reality. New events are fitted into old molds; a minimal cue is perceptually seized upon and filled out according to its associated meanings. These facts of perception established in the experimental laboratory with physical stimuli hold just as truly for the verbalized social world. Of the thousands of possible stimuli which the social scene presents we select out a

few skeleton patterns and subjectively complete them by additions from our previous experiences.

The economy of effort in stereotyped perception and thought has been emphasized by many writers. If we tried to react to our world by a full consideration of its objective nature, we would spend the whole day in a single action in a single situation. To get anything done it is necessary to assume that the present pattern of stimulation is essentially the same as a previous configuration and act accordingly. At the breakfast table we put sugar in our coffee without bothering to make sure that it is really sugar. We classify people we meet into arbitrary types without taking the time to find out about them. Between these two acts there is a great gap, but it is one of degree, not of kind.

✓ A difference in kind between stereotyped perception of natural objects and the verbal stereotypes of social thought can often be found, however. With natural objects we tend to have some experience of our own as the basis for our stereotyping. With the social world we tend to do our stereotyping on the basis of what we are taught by our elders. "We are told about the world," says Lippmann, "before we see it. We imagine most things before we experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception. They mark out certain objects as familiar or strange, emphasizing the difference, so that the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar, and the somewhat strange as sharply alien. They are aroused by small signs, which may vary from a true index to a vague analogy. Aroused, they flood fresh vision with older images, and project into the world what has been resurrected in memory" (15, p. 90).

A study of anthropological material led the scholar L. Levy-Bruhl to the conclusion that primitive people think less logically than civilized men (14). This prelogical type of thought is characterized by what Levy-Bruhl (after Durkheim) termed *collective representations*. *Collective representations* are complex mental states (similar for the members of the group) in

which the sensory impressions from the external world are fused with emotional and motor elements. The sensory impressions, moreover, are so determined by the impulsive and emotional elements that the primitives obtain an erroneous and fixed conception of natural processes. The primitive mind, therefore, remains impervious to experience. In short, Levy-Bruhl was describing the stereotypes of nature peoples. His great error lay in assuming that the mind of civilized man functioned in any other fashion. Critics have ridiculed Levy-Bruhl's thesis. Though correct in their contention that primitive men are as logical thinkers as civilized men, many of these critics have missed the essential point that man is not primarily a logical creature. Hence they have failed to utilize the contributions of Levy-Bruhl in the study of social stereotypes.

Levy-Bruhl has written interestingly about the mystic participation by which objects, people, and events influence one another in the human mind. Primitive man, and for that matter civilized man, sees objects, people, and events as charged with mystic properties. Many natives will eat the liver or other internal organs of an animal because they believe it will endow them with courage. The members of some African tribes will seek to injure a man by stabbing his shadow. In Loango, the soil is regarded as possessed of a mysterious essence and "there issues from it a vital influence, which permeates everything, which unites the present with the past." The objection which many primitive folk have to being photographed is that some of their very being goes into the portrait. One observer who used his camera extensively quotes a native thus: "I know that this man put *many of our buffaloes in his book*, for I was with him, and we have had no buffaloes since to eat, it is true." (Cited in 14, p. 47). Civilized man is more sophisticated about the magical qualities of the physical world, but he, too, imputes mystic attributes to natural objects. Many farmers have the same reverence for the soil as the source of all life as do the primitives. We speak softly and respectfully in the presence of the dead, as if the dead could hear. We burn effigies of our enemies. Mobs will tear the garments from the

back of a prominent or notorious personage to obtain a souvenir of his greatness. Many American women have almost as great a magical notion of the mechanism of motor cars as that ascribed by James Thurber to his mother, who believed driving without gasoline fried the valves.

How is the stereotyped nature of thought and perception related to mystic participation? The essential secret of the matter is that through the stereotype, or collective representation, man sees an identity in nature, or in society, where none exists. The stereotype is an indiscriminating construct which assimilates varying types of experience into the same pattern on the basis of a minor resemblance or a fallacious similarity. In this manner the primitive mind reacts in the same way to a man's shadow as to his physical presence. In this manner the civilized mind sees in a souvenir some quality of the man or event for which it stands. The corollary of this process is that men will hold absurd and contradictory views, since stereotypes are not governed by the sharpness of inclusion and exclusion of scientific concepts. The fictitious identity seized upon by the mind may result in the bringing together of two ideas mutually opposed from the standpoint of logic. The Bororo of north Brazil believe that they are parakeets (red parrots) and human beings at the same time. In a similar fashion civilized men, under no delusions as to their mediocre abilities, will sometimes regard themselves as supermen in their role as members of a great institution. Likewise some of the contradictions already mentioned between specific attitudes and general emotional stereotypes result from the lack of objective analysis.

Collective representations are the reason for the difficulty men have in understanding other cultures. In every society a different set of customs and institutions has developed because of the particular history of its people. The rising generation in any culture, therefore, becomes mentally stereotyped according to the pattern of that culture. Out of the many possible complex interpretations of the universe, one simplified version becomes the property of a given society. When its members attempt to understand and evaluate the people of another so-

ciety, they are balked by the different categories and orientation of the foreign culture. The following statement of Levy-Bruhl applies not only to our attempts to interpret primitive mentality but also to our approach to other civilizations and other historical periods besides our own: "The social *milieu* which surround them [the primitives] differs from ours, and precisely because it is different, the external world they perceive differs from that which we apprehend. Undoubtedly they have the same senses as ours . . . and their cerebral structure is like our own. But we have to bear in mind that which their collective representations instil into all their perceptions" (14, p. 43).

It is highly probable that if Levy-Bruhl had devoted as much consideration to social beliefs as to ideas about natural processes he would have seen little difference in logical thought between primitive and civilized man. The world of natural objects and processes is constantly impinging on us and furnishing an objective basis for breaking up and improving our stereotypes. In this field great progress has been made, and an analytic attitude toward nature is common in our society. In the field of social relationships, however, less opportunity of a realistic evaluation of our ideas presents itself in everyday life. The absurd stereotype of the cruel sensual Turk, common to American culture, persists because Americans do not commonly encounter Turks. They take over this picture from highly selected sources of information and never meet experiences which would upset the notion. Other social stereotypes remain entrenched because the process of checking them is too involved and difficult a task for the ordinary citizen. His beliefs, for example, concerning the superiority of his political party are not easily proved or disproved. The encouraging side to the story is that a great deal of social and racial prejudice is antipathy toward verbal labels, which may not be as great in practice as in theory. When an individual flies the flag of the out-group, he is discriminated against. But if he appears without a conspicuous label he is accepted. Fraternity members in spite of their prejudice often admit students of southeastern

European parentage, provided that the student is not marked by a very foreign name or by foreign mannerisms.

The discouraging aspect of the picture is that many stereotypes serve emotional and selfish interests, and, therefore, go deeper than the mere verbal response to a label. "The system of stereotypes may be the core of our personal tradition, the defenses of our position in society" (15, p. 95). There is a world of difference between the treatment which would be accorded a Turk and the treatment which a Negro receives in the United States in spite of the fact that surveys of racial stereotypes place both groups in the same undesirable position. Natural labels are not only easy ways of classifying people. They are often symbols around which individuals can organize to better themselves at the expense of other groups. For this reason experience with people of other nationalities is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for breaking down racial prejudice. E. B. Bolton in an experimental study has demonstrated (1) that there is no relation among southern students between intelligence and prejudice toward the Negro, (2) that there is no relation between knowledge of the social problems of the Negro and prejudice toward him, and (3) that southern students have no antipathy toward the Negro as servants or tenants, so long as the proper social distance is maintained (5).

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CHAPTER V

ATYPICAL WAYS

Thus far we have been trying to give psychological order to the mass of social regularities encountered in everyday experience. Uniform ways have been dissected, according to their functioning in the social pattern, into folkways, mores, institutional ways, and fashions. Special forms of uniformity have been broken down according to their psychological nature into taboos, ritual, and stereotypes. Uniform ways constitute the typical, the expected, social events in a culture.

Everyday life, however, is replete with surprises. The milkman, who has delivered milk every morning with a monotonous regularity, suddenly goes on strike. The peaceful life of a town is upset by a bank robbery. The overworked business man has a nervous breakdown and crawls around on all fours like an infant. A scholar goes insane and plays at being a great detective. The smooth functioning of the schoolroom is disturbed by the child who will not salute the flag. A motorist drives through a red light and smashes into a truck. A girl confounds her family by marrying a Turk. The heir to millions faces disinheritance for his public utterance of radical ideas.

In addition to these departures from accepted practices there are large areas in life in which variability is the rule rather than the exception. These areas are not covered by codified standards of uniform conduct. Once school is out, students may be found playing tennis, reading novels, taking part in informal discussions, attending a theatre, writing home, courting their girls, playing cards, or even studying in the library. Some of these practices, such as studying, may be institutionalized, but the time and manner in which they are

pursued show great individual variation. Only a certain range of these actions, however, is considered atypical or abnormal.

The Classification of Atypical Ways

To understand this large heterogeneous body of atypical ways, it is necessary to find some clues for grouping them into related types of phenomena. One of the earliest practical methods of dealing with deviant behavior was the rough distinction between actions and ideas that seemed *dangerous* to existing social organization and actions and ideas which were *unusual but harmless*. A few hundred years ago the criminal, the insane, the radical, the feeble-minded, the heretic, and sometimes the genius were all treated alike. They were simply thrown into dungeons. Since they were all non-conformers, they all constituted something of a threat to the authorities and were summarily dealt with. Variant ways which were apparently harmless were dismissed as eccentricities. This first uncritical classification, which served the practical purpose of preserving the institutions of the day, did admit degrees of quantitative gradation. It was simple logic in punishing a man for non-conformity to differentiate between degrees of non-conformity. Actions and ideas which threatened the fundamental structure of the social order obviously merited more drastic treatment than actions and ideas which merely had a high nuisance value for the people in power. The ideal was to make the punishment fit the crime.

Now an interesting fact in life is that there is a point where quantity goes over into quality. The recognition of the quantitative differences in non-conformity led in time to a recognition of qualitative differences between deviant actions. The insane on the whole are a less dangerous group than the criminals. Hence there developed a recognition of the qualitative differences between the two groups. Other qualitative distinctions were made between political offenders, the feeble-minded, the insane, and the criminal. Such qualitative distinctions lead to a study of the individual as an individual rather than to

conformity and non-conformity. They take us directly into the field of personality. The present legal treatment of non-conformers is a curious confusion of the old point of view of protecting the *status quo* from its enemies and the newer point of view of considering the non-conformer as an atypical personality.

We can avoid this confusion by defining the approach according to which atypical ways will be discussed. It is not our purpose in this chapter to treat variant ways as manifestations of personality. Maladjustment as a personality problem will concern us later. Neither uniform ways nor variant ways are personality concepts. The idea of uniformity and variance arises from a cross-sectional analysis of society. It is a comparison of single items of behavior of many people, whereas personality is a longitudinal study of the individual. Our present approach to the study of variant ways is based upon what the man on the street observes in his everyday experience. He witnesses the doings and sayings of many people which can be compared as to their similarities and differences. The differences, or variant ways, as well as the uniformities previously described, can be classified at this cross-sectional level.

Atypical behavior can be grouped into three main classes: *non-conformity*, *abnormal variations*, and *unique ways*. *Non-conformity* is the failure to meet the standard requirements of the mores or of the prevailing institutions. *Abnormal variations* consist of those ideas and actions which are not contrary to the mores or to institutional ways, but which nevertheless are departures from a range of behavior which includes the majority. Both non-conformity and abnormal variations are quantitative gradations from a norm, or standard. The non-conformer is the man on the tail end of the J curve of institutional conformity. The man who shows an abnormal variation is found at both ends of the normal curve which measures individual characteristics (see Fig. 11). *Unique ways*, however, are not the unpopular positions on scales of measurement. They are not quantitative departures from the majority. They are new and distinctive acts and ideas. They include inven-

tions and discoveries. The motorist who stays within the speed limit but who "rides his clutch" is showing an abnormal variation in the manner of driving. The professor, however, who backs his car all the way to town in an absent-minded moment exhibits unique behavior. Unique ways are difficult to place upon a graded scale because they are not so much differences in degree from a given norm as they are novel forms of response.

NON-CONFORMITY

There are as many kinds of non-conformity as there are institutions and distinctive patterns of mores in a culture. In our society the most inclusive and often the most spectacular type of non-conformity is crime. Crime is a deviation from our legal and political institutional ways. The state, as the most comprehensive of our institutions, buttresses the school, the family, industry, and commerce with legal sanctions, so that any significant act of departure from institutional patterns can be classed as breaking a law. Where legal penalties do not stand behind institutional requirements, their violation is generally considered an anti-social action. Crime is likewise regarded as anti-social, but not all anti-social behavior is criminal. To violate the rules of a university is not to commit a crime but to take part in an anti-social action.

Institutional ways pertain to both *conduct* and *belief*. Deviations from institutional standards of *conduct* are *criminal* or *anti-social*. Deviations from institutional standards of *belief* are generally regarded as *radical*. Radicalism is a matter of ideational non-conformity. In many societies unorthodox ideas are proscribed by law. Then their utterance constitutes a criminal act. In practice, however, the distinction is worth maintaining, because criminal acts are easier of definition and detection than the possession of heretical beliefs. It is easier to convict a man for what he does than for what he thinks. Furthermore, there is a very real difference between an overt act of non-conformity and the expression of anti-institutional ideas. The American legal tradition has permitted freedom in the

expression of ideas, though a number of states now have criminal syndicalist laws. The Supreme Court, however, has held such laws invalid to the extent that they penalize the holding and expression of beliefs which do not definitely culminate in overt acts.

Ideas which are more conservative and more reactionary than institutional standards are in a sense deviations from social uniformities. As a rule, however, they are not glaring examples of non-conformity because it is impossible to be more institutional than the institution. Conservative opinion would make the institutional mode more rigid. Reactionary opinion would redefine the purpose of the mode in the direction of earlier historical problems. Conservatism and reaction can become non-conformity when a country has radically changed its institutions, as Soviet Russia has. Even in this instance we think of the conservative as a non-conformer, only because we have kept the specific rather than the generic meaning of the term. To be exact, the actual conservative in Soviet Russia is not the man who seeks to overthrow communist institutions but the man who seeks to make them more rigid. The same behavior in a different context alters its meaning.

Non-conformity may be a violation of the folkways and the mores as well as a departure from institutional norms. The failure to comply with the folkways is in most cases labeled an *eccentricity*. Before bobbed hair was the fashion for women, the girl with short hair was called eccentric just as the man who wears his hair long today is thought queer. Eccentricity is a failure to follow the majority in relatively inconsequential matters. The eccentric action in question may not be inconsequential to the individual himself, but it is not a significant source of interference with other people.

The non-conformity which is a violation of the mores is a more serious affair. Whether it is an overt act or an idea, it is by definition immoral. Modern civilized societies fortify the patterns of the mores with institutional sanctions, so that non-conformity is often illegal or anti-social as well as immoral. For example, many sex offenses are violations of the law as

well as infractions of the mores. In all cases they represent non-conformity to the institution of the church.

In brief, non-conformity is *criminal* when it is an overt act against legal institutions, *anti-social* when it is an overt act against non-legal institutions, *radical* when it is a deviation from institutional ideas, *eccentric* when it is a departure from the folkways, and *immoral* when it is a violation of the mores. In these distinctions we are not speaking primarily of the non-conformer, the criminal, or the radical as a person. We are talking about ideas and actions in which people differ, not about their fixed personality characteristics. Cross-sectional analysis will not give predictions about particular individuals. At the most it will yield general principles about factors associated with uniform and variant ways.

Research Studies of Non-Conformity

I. CRIME

No form of non-conformity has received as much sociological study as crime. A large incidence of crime means of course that basic institutional patterns are breaking down. The stability in social relationships which men need to earn a living, carry on a business, and educate their children is undermined when uniform ways are abandoned by large numbers of the population. Research in this field indicates that even at the level of cross-sectional analysis certain generalizations are possible concerning the high incidence of crime.* They are all

* The seriousness of the problem of crime is stated for the economically minded in a recent textbook as follows: "The Wickersham Commission estimated the cost of administering criminal justice in this country to be not less than \$350,000,000 a year, to which should be added \$120,000,000 for insurance and private protection against crime, another \$300,000,000 for indirect losses involving the potential productivity of prisoners and law enforcement officers and unknown but enormous amounts representing direct losses to victims" (p. 30 of *Social Organization and Disorganization* by S. A. Queen, W. B. Bodenhafer, and E. B. Harper, 1935). The total number of crimes and offenders is not known, but in the year 1932 some 650,000 persons were reported to the United States Bureau of Investigation as charged with various offenses, not including traffic and motor vehicle violations, thus substantiating the contention of the criminologist, J. L. Gillin, that this is the most criminal country in the world.

applications of the central principle that our conformity-producing agencies are doing a bad job. This should be an obvious conclusion, but it has been obscured by theories of a criminal type, of the natural depravity of man, and more recently by psychoanalytical doctrines of the abnormal mechanisms in criminality. Though certain crimes are the work of abnormal minds, the greater bulk of the offenses against the law are due to (a) the lack of effective primary groups in modern society and (b) the weakness of the formal machinery of legal sanctions. There is no instinct in men which makes them conform to institutional requirements. Conformity is the result of social teaching, of the satisfactions ensuing from following the rules, and of punishment resulting from their violation. Non-conformity is always regarded as a mysterious problem, though as a matter of fact men would all develop into non-conformers if they were not regimented into set patterns from childhood, or if the problems of the objective world did not clearly indicate a common adjustment as the most satisfactory method of meeting the fundamental wants of the individual.

(a) *The Relation of the Primary Group to Delinquency.*

The decline of the primary group in American society is well illustrated in the diminishing role played by the family. Institutional agencies have taken over many of the functions of the home. Where once the child's life was spent largely within the confines of the kinship group, it is now split up into fragments, each fragment belonging to some institution. In an older era the moral and technical training of children and their recreational and social activities all centered in the home. The educational system has increasingly taken over the training of youth. At the present time the nursery schools are even relieving mothers of the care of two-year-olds. Technical and trade schools give youth its technological skills. The Boy Scouts and similar organizations furnish an institutional outlet for children's play activities. Furthermore, the parents are also taken out of the home by their own institutional commitments. Fathers are so busy earning a living and satisfying their various

group obligations that they have little time for their children. Mothers are also drawn out of the home into economic and other group activities. In the last thirty years the number of gainfully employed married women has increased fourfold. The changes in the family have been greater in the city than in the country. One study found that whereas 85 per cent of country children accompanied their parents to church, only 40 per cent of city children did likewise.

The loss of primary-group training is one reason for the increase in crime. Institutional controls function most effectively when they can gear into the teaching of a primary group. Children learn generalized conformity and obedience in a kinship group, a neighborhood group, or a community, but they tend to acquire undifferentiated and vague responses of obedience in institutional settings (1). In institutions the child is taught respect for various abstract symbols which have little content in his own life. In the primary group, people who know the child intimately can teach him the meaning of the ideals of the group. The effect of the face-to-face situation of the kinship group is to make its pattern a fundamental part of the child's make-up. The institutional, or secondary, group affects the child less deeply. For example, the ideal of honesty can be made a concrete thing in the home by utilizing the meaningful experiences of the child's daily life. In the school it is too likely to be an abstraction, to which the child learns lip service. In addition, positive motivation toward social goals is developed more easily in the primary setting, whereas in the institutional situation negative sanctions such as fear are the easiest devices.

Proof of the importance of the primary group in producing conformity is furnished by studies of the incidence of crime in rural and urban areas. In country districts crime is much less prevalent than in the city.* The ratio of commitment to penal

* We do not advocate as a result of this analysis a return to the rural community. Many social scientists, impressed by this problem, have done so. But history never turns backward. The way out of our difficulties lies not in retracing our steps, but in forging ahead through new paths. Undoubtedly in the days to come a solution of the problems of the modern world in terms of a new form of primary-group life, compatible with a machine age, will be discovered.

institutions for every 100,000 of the population is 25.1 in the city and 7.6 in the country (14).

Further evidence of the role of the primary group in inculcating obedience to social norms comes from studies of broken homes. Homes that have been broken by death, desertion, and divorce contribute more juvenile delinquents than normal homes. The actual percentage of delinquent children from broken homes has varied according to the group studied, sometimes going as low as 30 per cent, sometimes as high as 70. Of non-delinquent children it has been estimated that 25 per cent come from broken homes. J. Slawson in a careful investigation compared the incidence of broken homes in a group of more than 1,600 delinquent boys in New York state with a large control group of non-delinquents (29). Forty-five per cent of the delinquent boys came from homes broken by death, divorce, or desertion as compared to 19 per cent of the normal group. These results are in agreement with the findings of an English investigator, C. Burt, who discovered 2.25 times as many defective family relationships among 200 delinquent London children as among 400 normal children from the same districts (5). In the normal group the percentage of defective family relationships was 26; in the delinquent group, 58.

The high incidence of broken homes among delinquents has been overgeneralized to give an unduly heavy weighting to the objective factors of death, desertion, and divorce as causes of crime. Other factors are also important in the effectiveness of the family as a primary grouping. C. R. Shaw and H. D. McKay have shown that the large discrepancy in membership in broken homes between delinquent and non-delinquent groups decreases when the nationality and age of the two groups are held constant (27). Furthermore, the figures on divorce and death do not adequately or accurately mirror the degree of family discord and instability. Nevertheless, it is significant that such a crude measure as the "broken home" has consistently been related to juvenile delinquency.*

* When other indices of home conditions are taken into account the true significance of the family as an agency of social control appears. W. Healy and A. Bronner give this revealing summary of their data: "In the homes then, of how

In spite of the popular impression to the contrary, the foreign-born are not guilty of as many crimes as the native-born. The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement found that neither the percentage of convictions nor that of arrests was as great among the foreign-born as among the native white population. In crimes of personal violence the foreign-born almost approximated the rate of the native white, but in robbery and burglary the native white was convicted almost three times as often as the foreign-born, and in larceny the native white was convicted more than twice as often (4). On the other hand, the native-born children of foreign parents contribute more than their proportionate share to delinquency, according to most authorities. Typical of the findings on this point is the study of S. Glueck and E. T. Glueck. These investigators reported that in a group of 500 reformatory inmates there were two and one-half as many native-born individuals of foreign or mixed parentage as there were in the general population (10).

The greater frequency of crime among the first native generation of foreign parents and the lesser incidence among the parents themselves is highly suggestive. Immigrants to this country carry over a conformity to legal institutions learned abroad. Their children, reared in America, however, fail to acquire the same habits of obedience. Sociologists attribute this fact to the break-up of the immigrant family as an effective primary group. The parents are slow to learn the language and the new customs, which the children pick up with ease. The usual parent-child relationship is reversed, since the parent must turn to the child for information and advice. In addition,

many of our cases have there been what might ordinarily be called really good family conditions? . . . Specifically, if we ruled out the families in which there were such clearly unfortunate features of home life, poverty, great crowding, or very unsanitary surroundings, extreme parental neglect or extreme lack of parental control, excessive quarreling, alcoholism, obscenity, immorality or criminalism, mother away working, mentally diseased parent in the home, how many had we left? . . . Among 2,000 young repeated offenders, there were living under reasonably good conditions for the upbringing of a child 7.6 per cent" (pp. 128-129 of *Delinquents and Criminals*, Macmillan, 1926).

the old cultural values of the foreign home are often in conflict with American civilization. As a result, the child rejects the family teachings and fails to absorb American ideals in their place.

Another reason for the high rate of delinquency among the American-born children of foreigners is the type of urban area in which the foreign-born tend to live. The well-known consistent differences in delinquency rates in various areas of American cities led C. R. Shaw to study this phenomenon in the city of Chicago (26). Fairly well defined delinquency areas were discovered in the regions adjacent to the central business districts and large industrial centers. These districts "are in a process of transition from residence to business and industry and are characterized by physical deterioration, decreasing population, and the disintegration of the conventional neighborhood culture and organization" (26, p. 204). They are frequently old residential regions, deserted by the original inhabitants because of the encroachment of stores, factories, and traffic. That such transitional areas are the breeding places for crime has been confirmed by a survey of six other American cities, Seattle, Philadelphia, Richmond, Cleveland, Birmingham, and Denver (28). In all these cities there is the same trend for the rate of delinquency to decrease from the central business and industrial regions to the outlying residential regions.

Undoubtedly the economic pressure to turn to crime is greater in the transitional areas, but Shaw's researches prove that the breakdown of the neighborhood group is a genuine factor in delinquency. The neighborhood or small community grouping can function like the family to enforce the standards of conduct, demanded by governmental institutions, on the basis of face-to-face relationships. In the residential areas some form of neighborhood grouping can be found. In the transitional regions, however, the mobility of the population, the lack of physical facilities for wholesome recreation and proper living, and the heterogeneous cultural values all contribute to the absence of a primary group which might bolster estab-

lished institutions.* In the opinion of Shaw, ". . . with the process of growth of the city the invasion of residential communities by business and industry causes a disintegration of the community as a unit of social control" (26, p. 205).

For the generation growing up in these transitional areas the conventional neighborhood group is replaced by the boys' gang. Through this informal association of youth the highly variable types of non-conformity are sometimes reduced to a definite pattern of non-compliance to our institutions. To the extent to which delinquent activities are standardized in the gang, a new set of uniform ways emerges at war with old institutional patterns. As a rule such standardization is very limited, because the gang lacks the formal machinery and the stability of personnel to make it a full-fledged institution. Nevertheless in it the wayward youngster obtains the aid and encouragement from his like-minded comrades without which he could not go on. As a result of her observations as a referee in the juvenile court of Los Angeles, M. Van Waters has emphasized the group-determined nature of the delinquent youth's code (30). He is not a lone rebel but "dwells in some other island of social culture" in which he has the backing of some adults as well as colleagues.

(b) *Delinquency and Law Enforcement.* The second reason for the large proportions to which American crime has grown is the ineffectual functioning of our institutional machinery. The wise application of institutional sanctions might in some measure compensate for the decline of the supporting primary groups. The whole system of the administration of legal penalties, however, has not followed elementary psycho-

*It is also obvious that a boy who is raised in an interstitial area between two foreign groups, or a foreign and American, must be educated in a different fashion from the normal child to become a good citizen. Two groups present different codes, often incompatible codes. Instead of choosing one and rejecting the other, or, more difficult still, shifting from pattern to pattern as he changes company, he decides, no doubt, that neither is to be accepted with much conviction. Emphasizing either respect for the new or disrespect for the old will not accomplish the feat of making him a good citizen. To make him understand the reason for the difference in codes is a difficult problem and one that we have not succeeded in solving to a marked degree.

logical principles. Three purposes have been pursued at one and the same time with very inadequate fulfillment of any one of them. Punishment is employed (1) to protect society by the confinement or execution of criminals, (2) to protect society through its deterrent effects and (3) to reform the criminal. The fundamentals of our system of penal administration have been shaped by the first two purposes. Superimposed upon this system have been the comparatively recent attempts at rehabilitation of the delinquent. Parole, probation, the indeterminate sentence, individual treatment of the offender, an improvement of living conditions in the prison, and occupational therapy have been the main devices employed for reformation.

The hasty compromises between the proponents of punishment as a deterrent and the advocates of reformation have worked against either purpose being achieved. Rehabilitation measures like parole and probation are implemented so casually that they are often doomed from the start. They have to function within the framework of the older system with an inadequate budget, an understaffed and improperly trained personnel, and the opposition or interference of officials not interested in reformation. The return to crime by offenders actually on parole has led to a hue and cry against coddling criminals. Strictly speaking, however, probation and parole cannot be said to have failed in this country, because they have not really been tried. Just as the old system has cramped the new treatment in trying to reform the criminal, so the devices of probation and parole have hindered the deterrent effects of punishment because they have been exploited in political ways to free offenders.

The figures on recidivism (repeated crime) bring into clear focus the failure of the present penal system. S. Glueck and E. T. Glueck followed up the careers of 510 men who left a Massachusetts reformatory between 1911 and 1922 (10). Almost 80 per cent ran afoul of the law after their dismissal from the institution. The Gluecks in another study attempted to trace 1,000 juvenile delinquents from the Judge Baker Founda-

tion (11). They succeeded in locating 923 of the original 1,000. Of this number 88 per cent were found to have been guilty of new offenses. Seventy per cent had been arrested on an average of 3.6 times each during these five years. The evidence presented by the Gluecks supports the opinion of criminologists that reformatories and prisons are breeding places of crime. The great majority of habitual offenders are known to have started their criminal careers at an early age. A study of 145 prisoners by the New York Crime Commission found that the majority of these men began their delinquent careers as children. Our penal institutions confirm rather than lessen the criminal tendencies of their inmates.

The deterrent effects of imprisonment and execution have been vitiated by other factors besides the abuse of parole and probation. If punishment is to have a deterrent effect it must follow the offense invariably and quickly. In training animals and in rearing children it is obvious that penalties will not have the desired effect if they accompany the forbidden act only a fraction of the time. Yet in the administration of criminal justice an arrest is not made in a majority of the cases and a conviction more often than not fails to follow the arrest. The Illinois Crime Commission reported, "*The police do not catch more than 20 per cent of those who commit felony crimes.*" The New York Crime Commission in its 1927 report gave the percentage of arrests to burglaries as follows: Rochester 12 per cent, New York 14 per cent, Schenectady 17 per cent, and Syracuse 7 per cent.

An arrest, however, does not necessarily mean conviction and imprisonment. In American cities the ratio of arrest to conviction is either an indictment of the police for arresting the wrong man or an indictment of the prosecution or court system. The National Commission on Law Observance and Law Enforcement brought out the fact that, in New York City in 1926, 38 per cent of 8,144 felony cases resulted in a conviction of some sort but only 4 per cent were convictions of the crime charged (23). Similarly in Chicago the record for 13,117 felony cases was a conviction in 20 per cent and a conviction

for the offense charged in 4 per cent. Cincinnati showed a somewhat better record, but even here only 17 out of every 100 persons tried were convicted of the original charge. This failure of the prosecution to convict is typical of most American cities.*

The records of the police in detection and of the prosecuting attorney in obtaining convictions are due to inefficiency, to political influences, in some cases to actual corruption, and to the stretching of the legal system to make unlawful almost any action against an established institution. The problem of police inefficiency has been attacked by students of public administration with resulting improvements in methods and morale. Political pressure is more difficult to cope with, since the prosecutor's office in American politics is "a place where political careers have their beginning." The extension of legal penalties to many customs and institutional practices, not otherwise a part of the state, is also not easily amenable to reform. Any group which has an axe to grind tries to place laws upon the statute books. R. Fosdick attributes the integrity of the European police to the fact that they have a distinctive function which is possible of performance. In this respect they form a contrast to the American police. Speaking of the European situation, he comments: "The distinction between what is criminal and what is merely vicious is, on the whole, clearly drawn, and the penal laws are not encumbered with provisions the only purpose of which is to enforce by threat a given standard of morality. The functions of the police are not confused with those of the church, the school, and other organizations and influences. . . ." (7, p. 382).

Crime as a variation from state ways and government ways is a definite function of the strength of conformity-producing agencies. With the all-important primary groups of family and neighborhood on the decline and with institutional sanctions applied infrequently and injudiciously, men and women are not stereotyped into uniform compliance with the law. Especially are they inclined to depart from legal norms when

* Milwaukee is a notable exception.

positive incentives exist for violating the law. In times of unemployment and depression crimes against property rise. An investigation of the relation between employment and crime over a forty-year period in Massachusetts showed a consistent correspondence between degree of unemployment and frequency of vagrancy and robbery (32). V. Jones corroborated this relationship in a study of the effects of the recent depression. He found that during the depression, beginning in 1930, all crimes of theft among adults increased materially. This was also true of the depression of 1921. "Furthermore, by making year-to-year comparisons it was found in 9 cases out of 11 that when unemployment increased, theft increased; and when unemployment decreased, theft decreased" (16, p. 278). No definite conclusions could be drawn from the data concerning the relationship between drunkenness and crime.

2. RADICALISM

Crime is an egoistic variation from state-ways in the sense that it is generally an act of self-aggrandizement or an action which benefits the individual at the expense of his fellows. Radicalism is not anti-social. Radicals avowedly want to change the rules of the game. Criminals want the present rules so that they may get around them. Radicals voice their objections to the present rules but in practice observe them. Criminals violate the rules but prefer them unchanged unless they are caught. Warden Lawes of Sing Sing proudly points out that his prison population could be effectively enlisted to put down radical uprisings at any time (19). Mention has already been made of the fact that radicals deal largely in ideas. When they gain enough strength to put their ideas into action, we do not have a crime wave but a revolution, either parliamentary or violent. Since a culture rarely gives legal sanctions to its own destruction, frequently radicals are imprisoned. In Europe the distinction between them and criminals has been maintained by regarding the radicals as political prisoners. Sometimes they are accorded a better, sometimes a worse, treatment than criminals.

Since radicalism means a rebellion against common institutional stereotypes, the possibility is open that radical ideas are more realistic and objective in their description of social organization than current stereotyped beliefs. In particular, a radical outlook is likely to envisage with some accuracy the defects in present institutions. On the constructive side, however, radicalism may merely represent another set of stereotypes. The radical account of social processes has been borne out by many social scientists. The old-fashioned history, long ridiculed by radical thought as a system of official rationalizations, has been viewed in a similar light by modern historical scholarship. The realistic interpretation of social forces as the interaction of struggle groups, motivated by human and animal drives, has likewise been taken over by social science. More unusual, perhaps, was the gradual smuggling into the platforms of the major conservative parties of the planks of radical groups calling for inheritance taxes, public control of public utilities, unemployment insurance, and other social measures.

Another reason for believing in the destructive effect of radicalism upon social stereotypes is the correlation between radicalism and critical education. Secondary schools have as their purpose the teaching of the ideological culture pattern. In college some effort is spent upon realistic analysis, and in graduate work a shift in emphasis definitely appears. D. Katz and F. H. Allport in their study of more than 4,000 Syracuse students in seven schools and colleges found the students in the Graduate School to be more radical than students in any of the undergraduate departments. Graduate students were consistently more liberal than the undergraduate body in religious outlook, in views on academic freedom, in ideas about sex, in social and racial prejudices, and in attitudes toward militarism. Among undergraduates, a progressive increase in liberalism and radicalism is in evidence from the freshman to the senior years, according to the investigation of G. Moore and K. C. Garrison (22). In their answers to questions related to politics, sex, individual freedom, economics, authority of tradition, international affairs, and interracial attitudes 37 per cent of the

seniors made liberal scores as compared to 27 per cent of the freshmen. Moreover, liberal-radical scores were found to be positively related to high scholarship.

The greater realism of radicals has been brought out in an experimental study of religious conservatives and religious radicals by T. H. Howells (15). Howells differentiated religious radicals from conservatives by their scores on a test of religious attitudes. From a group of 542 students he selected the 50 most conservative and the 51 most radical subjects. These opposed groups were then placed in a number of experimental situations and tested for suggestibility. In one test a picture was shown and after its removal the subjects were questioned regarding its content. Leading questions were used which suggested erroneous items. The conservatives proved considerably more suggestible than the radicals. In another test a simple task of skill was presented with positive and negative suggestions concerning its difficulty. The conservatives improved more than the radicals in response to the suggestion that it was easy. Still another situation involved the illusion of an electric shock, which the conservatives reported much more frequently than the radicals. In all the tests of suggestibility the radicals were more inclined to examine the facts for themselves instead of blindly accepting the experimenter's suggestion.

The greater independence of thought among radicals is also implied in the work of H. T. Moore (21). Moore obtained his radical and conservative groups by ascertaining students' acceptance or rejection of statements about international relations, industrial problems, and domestic politics. The subjects were also asked to evaluate various personal traits. An hour later they were given the same list of traits to judge again, but this time they were told how a majority of 1,000 college students had voted. To conform with majority opinion the radicals changed their minds in 18 instances out of a possible 147 opportunities; the conservatives changed 34 times out of 109 opportunities. This may seem at first glance an unnecessary experiment, since radicalism by definition is a departure from majority opinion. On second thought, however, it is evident that, though radical ideas are unpopular and conservative ideas

popular, it does not necessarily follow that people accept them because of their popularity or unpopularity. Conservatives may embrace opinions because they believe in them, and radicals may find their views popular in their own limited group. Moore's experiment, therefore, was necessary to prove the greater susceptibility of the conservatives to majority influence.

The repudiation of conventional stereotypes and the acceptance of radical ideas are due in great measure to a thwarting of men's basic desires. So long as people do not meet obstacles which interfere with their accustomed satisfactions, they cling to uniform habits of thought and action. It is true that radical doctrines are old enough for unorthodox views to be passed from father to son. Nevertheless, the more general explanation of radicalism is a blocking of the individual's road to the achievement of his desires. This thwarting can be of any kind. It may be a highly individualized type of experience or it may be fairly common. It does not invariably produce radicalism, but it is a necessary condition for the acquisition of heretical beliefs. Radicalism can, therefore, be expected to increase in incidence in the periods of social maladjustment. Inequality in itself does not give rise to dissatisfaction. In a stable society, inequality may be accepted by men as the natural course of human events. In a developing culture, however, the lower-income groups may be stimulated to improve their lot and to emulate their superiors. Then, if all hope of improvement is shattered by the closing of the doors of economic opportunity, radicalism grows apace. People are shocked out of their orthodox stereotypes and turn to new doctrines. Business crises and industrial depressions have been accompanied in our country by a spread of radical ideas.

In the depression of 1929-1935 O. M. Hall made a careful study of the effect of unemployment upon the opinions and attitudes of engineers (12). A group of 360 unemployed engineers, half of whom had been out of work for thirty-nine weeks or more, were compared with an employed group of engineers in respect to attitudes on controversial social issues, religion, and occupational morale. In order to find differences between the two groups which were due solely to employment status,

the group of employed men was matched with the unemployed group in respect to (1) age, (2) salary (in last job of unemployed men), (3) nativity, (4) education, (5) religion, (6) state licensing, and (7) marital status. The comparison showed that the unemployed were obviously shaken in their faith in the usual social and political stereotypes. Following are some of the differences of opinion on controversial social issues between the employed and unemployed engineers:

OPINION	PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYED MEN ACCEPTING OPINION	PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYED MEN ACCEPTING OPINION
There is little chance for advancement in industry and business unless a man has unfair "pull."	50	20
The traditional idea of "rugged individualism" in American industry should be maintained.	49	73
Most employers think only of their profits and care little for employees' welfare.	68	45
Any man with ability and willingness to work hard has a good chance of being successful.	54	77
Our system of government must take a good share of the blame for the depression.	65	43
It is industry's idea to drive you as hard as it can and give you as little as possible.	58	39
Our so-called democratic government is unfortunately controlled by great financial interests.	78	59
Industry's contribution to unemployment relief is mainly an attempt to keep unemployed men from stirring up trouble.	55	37
A revolution might be a very good thing for this country.	23	6
Religion is often used to keep the common people from protesting against intolerable economic conditions.	54	40

All the above differences are statistically reliable. They indicate an unmistakable radical drift in this unemployed professional group. Similar tendencies were found in the comparison of occupational morale of the two groups. Occupational morale was tested by questions concerning men's faith in hard work, ambition, and opportunity. Figure 9 shows the shift among the unemployed toward lower occupational morale. Seventy-five per cent of the unemployed engineers had poorer occupational morale than the median employed man. The differences between the groups would have been greater if it had not been that a fourth of the men employed at the time of




FIG. 9. OCCUPATIONAL MORALE OF EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED ENGINEERS.
(From O. M. Hall, 12, p. 34)

the study anticipated being laid off. Attitudes toward employers as a class were more bitter among the unemployed than among the employed. Sixty-eight per cent of the unemployed engineers were more antagonistic toward the employing class than was the median employed man. Religious attitudes, on the other hand, were not greatly affected by unemployment. Even here, though, there was a more unorthodox attitude among the men out of work. Hall also made a detailed analysis of occupational morale in relation to level of economic security. His evidence clearly indicates that high morale is correlated with a feeling of job security among the employed.

* Hall's findings concerning the impact of the depression upon men's attitudes have been confirmed by the extensive studies

of E. A. Rundquist and R. F. Sletto (25). These investigators summarized their data from 3,000 individuals in part as follows: "A comparison of employed and unemployed revealed that the two groups differ most consistently and most strikingly with respect to their attitudes toward the economic order. The greater discontent among the unemployed receiving public relief is not confined to any age nor to any educational or occupational stratum. If anything, those more favorably situated with respect to these variables are the more discontented" (25, p. 369).

The breaking down of conventional values under the impact of unemployment is all the more interesting in the light of S. P. Rosenthal's findings that the children of the professional class are even more conservative than the children of the propertied class (24). Conservative and radical scores were based on the subject's rating of degree of agreement or disagreement with 47 statements relating to (1) problems of unions and strikes, (2) problems of basic class antagonisms, (3) problems of governmental control, and (4) problems of freedom. Students from professional backgrounds were more conservative than the propertied group on three out of the four types of problems listed above. In respect to basic class antagonisms, however, the propertied class showed itself more conservative than the professional class. One factor in the greater conservatism of the professional group may be its lack of great holdings. Professional people have such a slight margin of security that they are apprehensive of any change. When they go under during a depression they accept part of the radical ideology but retain many of their old values. Thus they are fine material for a Fascist movement, as German history attests.

Unemployment creates a condition under which conventional ideas are discarded, but it does not in itself lead to a mass revolutionary movement. B. Zawadski and P. Lazarsfeld have analyzed in interesting fashion the autobiographies of fifty-seven unemployed Poles, collected by the Institute of Social Economy in Warsaw (33). They present the subjective moods and psychological worlds of the unemployed. Feelings of

TABLE II

RADICALISM SCORES OF STUDENTS OF DIFFERING SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

(After S. Rosenthal, 24, p. 44)

<i>Group I. "The Haves"</i>		
<i>Subgroup</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>R-Score</i>
Bankers	3	300
Wholesale merchants	7	301
Merchants	11	336
Real estate	9	347
Manufacturers	10	376
<i>Group II. "The Have-Nots"</i>		
<i>Subgroup</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>R-Score</i>
Skilled laborers	4	324
Salesmen	12	327
Farmers	3	330
Clerks	3	336
Non-skilled laborers	18	379
<i>Group III. Professionals</i>		
<i>Subgroup</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>R-Score</i>
Lawyers	6	291
Teachers	13	302
Engineers	19	304
Doctors	12	306

apathy, of degradation, and superfluoussness and an oversensitiveness are just as common as feelings of rebellion. The authors state: "The general impression which one gets in going through the biographies is that the experiences of unemployment are a preliminary step for the revolutionary mood, but that they do not lead by themselves to a readiness for mass action: metaphorically speaking these experiences only fertilize the ground for revolution, but do not generate it. They can easily lead to outbreaks of distress in the form of single acts, but they leave the mass inert, since they lead to ever-increasing mutual estrangement, isolation, dispersion, destruction of solidarity, even to hostility among the laborers, and in this way they deprive the mass of its power" (33, p. 249). The first expressions of radicalism under depression conditions are thus true variant ways. The mass movement mentioned by

the authors represents a further social stage in which radical attitudes become uniform ways.

What happens in prolonged depressions is the gravitation toward a radical movement of men of superior ability who otherwise would be trying to climb in the economic and social scale. These individuals become the leaders of the discontented and organize their dissatisfaction into a social movement. If the period of American industrial expansion is drawing to a close, as many economists think, we may expect repeated depressions and a permanent army of the unemployed. Class lines will be drawn so tightly that the abler elements in the lower-income groups will not be able to cross over to the privileged groups. They will remain in their own class and become its permanent champions. In this event we may witness a strong radical movement, well organized and based upon mass support. Then radical beliefs will no longer be classed as variant ways, for they will be standardized doctrines of great numbers of people.

VARIATIONS FROM THE NORMAL

In addition to the rigid requirements of institutions, and over and above the fixed pattern of the mores, we find in most societies a set of *flexible norms*. These norms are really central tendencies of behavior, statistical averages, which express the fact that most people think and act pretty much alike even outside of institutions and the mores. But since there is no external regimentation and little internal compulsion to produce complete agreement, people only approximate in greater or lesser degree the standard in question. A fair-sized minority cluster closely together and so define the norm, while others go beyond the norm, and still others fall short of it.

For example, on open highways where there is no speed limit a plurality of motorists may drive somewhere between 45 and 55 miles an hour. Many people exceed this norm, and many do not drive as fast. In the field of personal taste many flexible norms are to be found. The murder mystery has a large following and might constitute one central tendency in light read-

ing. But people vary in their preferences; some like at least six gory murders to a story whereas others are more interested in sheer detection. By *normal variations* we mean the cases which vary from the central tendency of the group in fields of desire, belief, and action not rigidly stereotyped by the mores and institutions. Judgment is not passed on whether these variations represent the aberrations of normal people. They may or may not be the things which normal people would do. They are merely variations from flexible rather than rigid norms.

Ordinarily these variations are the deviations from the mean of the normal or bell-shaped distribution (see Fig 11). The norm, from which they are departures, lacks the background of loaded factors productive of the J-curve which characterizes institutional ways and the mores. For this reason measurements of human reactions which give a normal curve are sometimes assumed to be measurements of personality. F. H. Allport in his analysis of the J distribution of conformity behavior advances the thesis that without conformity-producing agencies the responses of individuals to a given situation would be distributed normally (i.e., would give a bell-shaped distribution). And in his opinion this distribution is a reflection of personality factors. Evidence from an investigation by M. Dickens corroborates the thesis that, without institutional sanctions, behavior is distributed normally (2). Dickens observed the reactions of motorists at street intersections with traffic stop signs and without traffic signs. The institutional symbol of the stop sign gave a J distribution with the great majority of the motorists coming to a full stop. The street intersection without a stop sign gave a normal distribution with a minority stopping, another minority failing to slacken speed, and the majority slowing down (see Fig. 10).

Although the data of Dickens' study supports the notion that normal distributions are found with the removal of institutional sanctions, it does not establish the normal curve as a distinctive index of personality factors. The normal curve like the J distribution is essentially a cross-sectional comparison of

people. To know about their personalities it is necessary to study them over a long period of time or to take many measurements of their characteristics. The curves found in Dickens' study are statistical pictures taken at a single point in time. The behavior which the individual manifests at the moment




FIG. 10. BEHAVIOR OF MOTORISTS AT A STREET CROSSING.

(Modified from F. H. Allport, R. L. Schanck and M. Dickens, 2. By permission of the McGraw-Hill Book Co.)

puts him into a given class in the distribution. This behavior, however, may be governed by the fear of consequences, it may be the result of an accidental combination of physiological factors, or it may be a direct expression of his personality. To characterize it as a manifestation of personality or as a regi-

mented uniform way on the basis of the shape of the distribution curve is a daring procedure. Conformity to some institutions may go so deep in people that it is part of their personalities even though it gives a J distribution. It is wiser not to generalize concerning personality from the form of the distribution curve. If we are compelled to guess in specific situations, F. H. Allport's thesis will probably be right more often than it is wrong, to judge from the research study of a small community by R. L. Schanck. This study (already described briefly on p. 36) found that the townspeople expressed more of their personality wishes in private situations than in public situations. The private manifestations of personality, moreover, frequently assumed the form of the normal curve.

If the thesis of the normal distribution of social behavior as a distinctive index of personality measurement did hold rigidly, it would provide a neat criterion for the definition of abnormality as found in psychotic and neurotic conditions. Students of mental diseases have tried to define abnormality as a deviation from a given standard, or statistical norm. The statistical standard is based upon what the majority of people do and say. Obviously this criterion is inadequate, for it fails to differentiate among psychotics, criminals, radicals, artists, and geniuses. By specifically designating the type of norm, however, differentiation among these deviations is possible. This we have attempted to do in classifying atypical ways as departures from different types of norms. The picture would be nicely rounded out if criminalism and radicalism as non-conformity to institutional patterns could be paralleled by abnormality and insanity as variations from the flexible norms of the bell-shaped distribution. Logic and fact, however, cannot be distorted in the interests of an aesthetic outline. Psychological abnormalities, i.e., psychotic and neurotic conditions, are fundamentally a matter of personality disorganization. Their understanding is dependent upon a developmental study of particular people and not upon the cross-sectional comparison of many people in a single situation. Here only the deviations from flexible central tendencies in group behavior will be considered. These

abnormal variations may or may not contain instances of psychological abnormality.

The confusion which ensues from the failure to keep personality concepts apart from cross-sectional analysis is illustrated in the mistakes made in committing people to institutions for the mentally diseased. Since mental disease is a derangement of a specific individual, a person should be examined thoroughly before commitment to make certain that his symptoms are part of his mentally deranged pattern and not accidental variations from group norms. A. L. Kroeber tells, for example, of a Neopolitan cobbler whose sanity was questioned in an American hospital clinic because of his persecutory delusions about an old woman who made him ill. An Italian-American interpreter explained that the cobbler believed the woman was a witch who had cast the evil eye upon him. "The apparent delusion," writes Kroeber, "dissolves into a bit of superstition typical generally of the lower orders of Naples society. What is a normal belief there is a psychotic symptom in one of our hospitals" (18, p. 347). The superstitious beliefs of the cobbler were not a sign of emotional instability, as the delusion of persecution so often is. Thorough examination of the meaning of the abnormal symptoms in the life of the individual would prevent unjust commitment to mental hospitals.

Experimental Studies of Normal Variations

Research in the field of the variations from flexible norms has been very limited. Most investigators are concerned either with personality abnormality or with non-conformity, and the research findings which follow are the by-products of studies conducted for other purposes. G. S. Gates had 51 women students in psychology make introspective studies of their anger responses during one week (9). The experiences of anger reported ranged in duration from five minutes or less to one day. The plurality of instances fell into the ten-to-twenty-minute category, with a gradual diminution of cases to the day category. The type of responses made in the anger-situation varied

considerably. Of 300 reactions reported, 126 were gross bodily responses directed at the offending object, 84 were expressive movements, and 90 were internal bodily changes. Most of the responses directed against the offending object were of a verbal nature. Violence to the offender occurred in only three cases.

Punctuality is often an institutional requirement, but in certain situations it is not required and its variability increases. G. J. Dudycha recorded the time of arrival to breakfast at a college commons at which the doors ordinarily closed at 7:20 A.M. (6). By special arrangement they were left open ten minutes longer without an announcement of this fact being made to the students. Punctuality was also recorded at extracurricular activities such as band and choir rehearsal and at athletic contests and entertainments, as well as in more institutionalized situations. The greatest variability in punctuality was in attendance at extracurricular activities. The data show that almost half the students were from one to twenty-four minutes late. They came earliest to entertainments but were most often punctual to breakfast.

The question as to how much individuals do differ from one another has been investigated by D. Wechsler (31). His inquiry was primarily concerned with variations in human capacities, not with variations in social behavior. Since social behavior is based upon capacity, however, his results are presented here. In most anatomical, physiological, and psychological traits investigated, the highest score in a thousand cases was about double the lowest score. This generalization is in need of further verification, but the two-to-one ratio appeared consistently in Wechsler's measures. If it is true that in every thousand people selected at random from the general population the most emotional individual is twice as sensitive as the least emotional individual and the brightest man has twice the intellectual equipment of the dullest man, then our social standardizing processes should take this range of individual differences into account.

* An elaborate series of tests was employed by H. Hartshorne, M. A. May, and J. B. Maller to study the cooperative and gen-

erous reactions of school children (13). In one test, children had to choose between working for an individual or a class prize. Prizes were offered for the winners of a spelling contest, and the child could have his score applied either to a prize for himself or a prize for his class. A second test gave the class the opportunity to decide by vote the disposition of a money prize offered in interclass competition. The money could be disposed in one of the following ways: by giving the money to the best speller, by dividing the money equally among the class members, or by buying something for some hospital, child, or needy family. In a third test various incentives were used to motivate the children in learning a digit-symbol matching on four different days. The first day they were told that their achievement would not be rewarded; the second day the scores were to count toward winning money for the Red Cross; the third day their scores would count toward winning a prize for the class; and the fourth day they were told they could win individual prizes. Generosity was measured by a fourth test in which each child received a school kit from a friend of the school. The children were then asked for contributions from their possessions for less fortunate pupils. In a fifth test children were scored on their work in cutting out and collecting stories, jokes, and pictures for hospital children.

The results of these "service" tests for 800 children are summarized in Fig. 11, which gives the distribution of the total scores. There is a marked central tendency and a rapid falling off of cases toward either extreme. Very few children made low scores and very few high scores. Most children are neither intensely selfish nor extremely generous. Girls were slightly more cooperative than boys. In a given classroom, however, the sex in the majority tended to be more generous than the sex in the minority. Perhaps this is due to the socializing influence of numbers or to the fact that the majority group can afford to be more generous. Siblings (children of the same parents) were more like one another in service scores than children from different families. The same family background is an important factor in spite of the decline of the modern

family. Friends also resembled one another in their service scores; and classmates were more like-minded than non-classmates. Of especial interest was the finding that generosity and cooperation decreased as attendance at motion pictures increased.




FIG. 11. DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SERVICE SCORES.

(From H. Hartshorne, M. May, and J. B. Maller, 13, p. 109. By permission of (The Macmillan Co.)

Punctuality, cooperation, and generosity are examples of uniform ways which fall outside the province of the mores and of institutional patterns. True, they are taught in the home and the school, but not as the essential standards to which invariable conformity is required. They are taught more as the necessary arts of social living without which the home and the schoolroom would not be pleasant places. They are also learned by the child in his contacts with other children. Be-

cause of a variety of influences they appear early as social norms of considerable flexibility. The high uniformity, shown in Fig. 11, is exaggerated by totaling the scores from five tests. Responses to a single situation would be more variable.

The deviants from such gross norms are not thought to be lawbreakers, asocial individuals, or radicals, but simply people deficient in *social intelligence*. Actual tests have been created by psychologists who have more or less assumed such a viewpoint. An average position was discovered by taking the gross norms which characterized the majority, and any deviations were considered signs of low social intelligence.

The social intelligence test of F. A. Moss, T. Hunt, and K. T. Omwake contains items such as the following:

1. A business associate who has no authority over you tells you dictatorially to do a thing quite differently from the way you had intended. Which would you do?

———Do it his way without further ado.

———Ignore his directions and do it your own way.

———Tell him that it is none of his business and that you intend to do your own work your own way.

———Tell him to do the job himself.

2. You are calling on a close friend who has been ill for some time. It would be best to:

———Tell her of the good times you are having.

———Tell her of the doings of a number of mutual friends.

———Discuss her illness.

———Impress upon her how sorry you are that she is ill.

Select the one of the four suggested completions that makes the best joke:

1. The house painter making his maiden speech in the House of Representatives, said: "I'm unaccustomed to speak in public."

(1) "My place is on the scaffold." (2) "But I take my obligations seriously." (3) "But I can paint as well as the next one." (4) "My motto is 'deeds not words.'"

2. Antique buyer: "Even if it is genuine you are asking a terrible price for it." Seller: (1) "But look how wages and the cost of materials have gone up." (2) "There's not its equal in Boston." (3) "This is the same kind Queen Elizabeth used." (4) "Price is always determined by supply and demand."

There are no fixed penalties for being low in social intelligence. Public opinion is seldom leveled against offenders. They often develop reputations among their fellows so that their traits are subject to considerable gossip. Their atypicality may make them unsuitable for certain tasks or positions. One simply hopes, however, that they will learn to recognize social situations and the implications of social situations.

UNIQUE WAYS

Most social opinions and actions can be placed somewhere upon a scale of similar phenomena. The very generous action of a child in turning back most of the contents of his school kit is a quantitative variation from the less generous responses of his fellows. Even the non-conformity in criminal actions is an exaggerated manifestation of the backsliding common to most people. Occasionally, however, we are puzzled by a reaction which defies classification. It is obviously not a uniform way, nor can it be considered as a quantitative variation from any given uniform way. It has a unique quality which cannot be measured. The creative activity of the artist is often of this sort. Inventions and discoveries are also unique ways. Some sexual perversions likewise fall into this category. The unconventional lives of the wanderer and the hobo, "the men who don't fit in," yield instances of unique action.

Artistic Creation as Unique Activity

Artistic creation consists of the imaginative patterning of experiences into a communicable form. The artist is concerned with interpreting the emotional values of the impact of the world upon the individual. He sums up the whole emotional mood of a situation in a few strokes of the brush. Art does not seek to reproduce objective reality. Rather art seeks to present various aspects of reality as they are colored by human experience. The artist may try new angles of observation and interpretation to bring out significant meanings, previously unnoticed. Frequently, therefore, artistic creation represents

unique activity. This does not mean that unintelligible productions are works of art. A new form of artistic expression in spite of its uniqueness must be able to convey meaning, or it is not art.

Fresh ways of construing life are probably more a function of the social period than of art itself. A great deal of the art of an older period echoed the standardized traditions of its times. In an age of feudalism and monarchy, social relationships were highly stabilized. Art reflected the regularity and the stability of the social order in its slavish devotion to the imitation of models. The ideal in art was the copying of nature, not nature embellished by the artist's imagination in Aristotle's sense, but nature as it had already been portrayed by the classical masters (3). In the modern period, characterized by social change, artists no longer strive for mimetic realism. They search for new structurations of experience to give harmony to their disordered lives.

The impressionists reinterpreted the world in terms of color. The old emphasis upon form and composition was disregarded in the novel use of color. Blue was utilized to bring out outdoor shadows, and the broken-color technique was substituted for the gray-producing palette-mixing technique. "Impressionism," comments E. Freeman, "succeeded in producing a superficial realism, delicate and sensitive in color, but often not rising above the level of boudoir art in ideational content" (8, p. 418).

Cezanne stimulated modern art by incorporating the advances of the impressionists into a new integration of color and form in which ideas were presented by an exaggerated distortion. The logical outgrowth was contemporary abstract art. To present his meanings, the modern abstractionist simplifies, omits, and exaggerates. More and more of the concrete details are left out as irrelevant and extraneous. If the picture contains a woman, only enough is included to indicate that she is female. The final step in abstract art is a *reductio ad absurdum*. The attempt is to represent the essential qualities of things and processes without the use of concrete detail. The

radical abstractionist endeavors to express *movement* without objects which move and *tallness* without objects which possess height (8). It is really a revival of the old Platonic doctrine of universals, in which essential reality consists not in specific objects but in the universal idea of those objects. Thus the idea of tallness is the reality, not particular things which have height.

Another contemporary novel form of art is *dadaism*. The dadaists are artistic anarchists. They hold that modern civilization is false and futile and must be demolished. Their technique of destruction is ridicule. Each craftsman by this weapon is to destroy his own craft. The painter should paint pictures so nonsensical that people will see the folly of even trying to present meanings by color and line in two-dimensional space (8).

The unique artistic creations of our times stem from the need for personal integration and social understanding in the perplexities of twentieth-century life. Walter Lippmann, back in 1914, wrote:

Lost in the clamor of commercialism, many painters seem to insist that if they can't make themselves admired they will at least make themselves heard. And of course, if you live in a world of studios, drawing-rooms and cafés, amidst idle people in little cliques, you have to draw attention to yourself from the outside world in some other way than by decorating or interpreting human life. The modern artist can secure attention, but he can't hold it. For the world is so complex that he can't find common experiences and common aspirations to deal with. And because he can't do this, he can't become artist to a nation. He has to be satisfied with a cult. So he specializes on some aspect of form, exaggerates some quality of line, and produces art that only a few people would miss if it disappeared. Then he denounces the philistine public. [20, pp. 193-194].

The grain of truth in Lippmann's satirical outburst is the difficulty confronting the modern artist who wants a social philosophy valid for the experiences of the majority of people. In the realm of art new phrases are coined and novel methods make their appearance in a trial-and-error search for a *Weltanschauung* that will integrate into a unified picture the incon-

sistencies of modern social life. The new proletarian drama and literature and the socially conscious murals of Rivera and Orozco have met the problem by appealing to only one group in society—the workers. In this manner they have achieved a consistency and a point of view compatible with the experiences of a large section of society. Socially conscious art, however, is open to the charge of being a propagandistic rather than an aesthetic interpretation.

Discovery and Invention

Some writers distinguish between invention and discovery on the ground that the one involves a creative process and the other a passive finding of some existing object or relationship. Psychologically the processes are too closely akin to justify the use of separate categories. Inventions are original solutions to problems, but they are not wholly new ideas. They are a new combination of old elements or a unique application of an old principle. Inventions include more than technological discoveries. The formulation of a new law in science, the discovery of a new treatment of a disease, the finding of a new short cut in administrative procedure are all inventions. Although the basic psychological mechanisms involved in all inventions are generally the same and are similar to the processes of thought and learning, inventions can be considered atypical ways because they take the individual off the beaten track of social behavior. They take him, moreover, into unaccustomed and unique paths. Ideas and actions are generally termed inventions or discoveries when they are fairly abrupt or explosive in relation to previous contributions. A scientist, adding one or two more facts to his field of knowledge, is scarcely making a discovery. His contribution has to be sufficiently discontinuous with previous work, sufficiently unique, to be a discovery.

American culture has profited from many inventions and discoveries of older civilizations. Greek mathematics and Greek physics have made modern science possible. Roman law has become part of our legal system. A phonetic alphabet, without which we would be enormously handicapped, is the

work of the Phoenicians. The distinctive contribution of modern society has been its incalculable elaboration of material culture. Machinery and technical processes have conquered the physical environment. Now man's chief enemy is man. Many of the deadlier diseases have been checked. Childbirth need no longer be a dangerous event for the mother. The span of life has been increased. The rewards to be won from the efficient application of modern technology to raising the standards of living are great. In short, the crying need for inventions now is in the field of social science so that men can enjoy the fruits of the progress in material culture.

In primitive society, invention and discovery go on at a slow rate and in an uncontrolled manner. The infrequency of invention among primitives is not due to any inferior mental capacity, but to their lack of a complex culture base from which to start. The greater the social heritage of the group, the greater the possibilities of new combinations and permutations. In our society, invention of a technological nature has almost become institutionalized. Large industrial concerns maintain laboratories and hire specialists to produce needed technical inventions. In the field of medical research, the long social process of making significant discoveries is telescoped by the deliberate inculcation of diseases in experimental animals. The directed invention is more and more employed in all fields of life. If it becomes completely standardized, as it may, it will no longer be a variant way.

The stereotyped nature of our thinking is perhaps the greatest hindrance to discovery. We miss important relationships which are not difficult to grasp, because we unconsciously judge events in advance as we know they should be. This is the reason why many important discoveries and inventions have been the work of young men. Increased knowledge and richer experiences should give the old something of a monopoly upon intellectual pursuits. In our present culture, however, age brings a hardening of stereotyped sets, so that great discoveries have often come from men at the start of their careers. To overcome the effects of stereotyped habits, men will sometimes

prepare themselves in one field of knowledge and then go over into a related field. They are often able to see relationships in the new field which have eluded its scholars. Economists have thus made contributions to political science, psychologists to sociology, and physiologists to psychology.

As a reaction against the notion of inventions as the work of great men, a sociological theory has found favor which minimizes the importance of human beings in discoveries and stresses the importance of culture. A. L. Kroeber, for example, argues that individuals are relatively inconsequential in inventions and that inventions are the creature of culture (17). In support of his argument Kroeber lists many important inventions which were hit upon by two or more people at the same time. Oxygen was discovered by both Priestley and Scheele; its liquefaction credited to both Cailletet and Pictet. Both Alexander Graham Bell and Elisha Gray can be considered the inventors of the telephone. The nebular hypothesis can be ascribed to Kant as well as to Laplace. Within a year, four men independently of one another discovered anaesthetics. Newton's formulation of calculus in 1687 was independent of Leibnitz' discovery in 1684. Credit for the invention of the steamboat has been claimed for Fulton, Jouffroy, Stevens, Rumsey, and Symmington by their partisans. Talbot, Daguerre, and Niepce penetrated the secrets of photography at the same time.

"When we cease," contends Kroeber, "to look upon invention or discovery as some mysterious inherent faculty of individual minds which are randomly dropped in space and time by fate; when we center our attention on the plainer relation of one such advancing step to the others; when, in short, interest shifts from the individually biographic elements, which can be only dramatically artistic, didactically moralizing, or psychologically interpretable, and attaches whole heartedly to the social, evidence on this point will be infinite in quantity, and the presence of a majestic order pervading civilization will be irresistibly evident" (17, pp. 220-201).

This sociological emphasis in the understanding of inventions is undoubtedly sound. There is no need, however, of going

beyond the social psychology of a people responding to environmental forces to explain its inventions and discoveries. The fact that a given contribution was made by more than one individual at the same time is no reason for assuming that individuals are unimportant. Discoveries are contingent upon the psychology of individuals. When John Jones, the brilliant quarterback, is injured in the big game, he may be adequately replaced by his substitute, Bill Smith. Nevertheless it would be erroneous to say that John Jones and Bill Smith were unimportant in the winning of the game. Inventions and discoveries are the result of psychological processes as they operate in a specific environmental setting and need not be referred to "a majestic order pervading civilization."

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CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL INTERACTION

The social world, as we know it in our everyday experiences, is not completely described in terms of uniform ways and variant ways. In this description we visualize the orderly patterns of a culture, the extent to which they are complied with, and the total range of human life which they cover. The resulting picture is *static*. It tells us more about what a society is like than how it got that way. It informs us about structure but not about process. True, by analyzing the nature of uniformity and variability and by relating variable and common actions to other factors we can obtain a more adequate understanding of the *functioning* of the social order. But social functioning can be and often is directly observable to the man on the street. Indeed the dynamic interplay in group activity is the primary fact which strikes us in ordinary experience.

People, in following the mores of their group, are influencing one another and in turn being influenced. They may be cooperating or competing with one another. In violating the mores, a minority may be in open conflict with the majority. The relationships between human beings appear in a constant state of flux. The lawyer starts to browbeat the witness in a cross-examination. The frightened witness covers up and gives little information. The lawyer changes his tactics and the witness likewise assumes a different attitude. In group activity there is a constant reciprocal influencing of behavior. A group is distinguished from a mere aggregation of individuals by the interplay among the members. It is this mutual affecting and being affected which characterizes all social relationships. The sociologists R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess have written

an account of society around the processes of *social interaction** (14). They distinguish among four types of interaction—competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. Cooperation has been added to this list by a majority of writers.

Social interaction can be depicted in two ways. Its basic mechanisms can be analyzed from a scientific standpoint as will be done in Chapter X, or it can be presented at the level of everyday life. The latter method will be employed here. In this approach the forms of social interaction are viewed according to the end result of their functioning. In other words, they are regarded telically or purposefully. Thus they can be labeled by such sociological terms as cooperation, conflict, or assimilation. Cooperation and assimilation are names to sum up the effect of group activity. They may both involve the basic mechanisms of suggestion and imitation. For this reason the sociological concepts of interaction can be used in social psychology only at the risk of introducing subjective evaluations into social data. The risk is not great, however, if we remember that in this section we are taking our materials from everyday life in order to deal with significant problems. We are reducing these materials to the behavior of individuals for purposes of psychological understanding. Accordingly, the attempt will be made to find an objective basis for the telic concepts of social interaction.

A first step toward this goal is the limitation of the processes of social interaction to the mutual stimulation and reactions between individuals in a group. The wide sociological use of interaction to refer to the relations between groups and between nations as well as to the face-to-face contacts of people has

*In this, they follow the older sociological treatments of Gumplowicz, Ratzel, Simmel, and Small. They also endorse the position of Cooley whom they quote as follows, "Society is a complex of forms or processes each of which is living and growing by interaction with the others, the whole being so unified that what takes place in one part affects all the rest. It is a vast tissue of reciprocal activity, differentiated into innumerable systems, some of them quite distinct, others not readily traceable, and all interwoven to such a degree that you see different systems according to the point of view you take" (14, p. 421).

stripped the concepts of competition, conflict, and cooperation of much of their meaning. The psychological processes whereby the United States cooperates with other nations in carrying on a war are so many and so complex that it is a major error to speak of them as if they were the same process of cooperation which occurs within the family group. Yet Park and Burgess subsume under the concept of competition such widely varying events as the struggle for existence among plants, race suicide, the struggle for world markets, delinquency and dependency. By social interaction we shall mean only the sustained give-and-take between individuals physically in one another's presence. The specific processes of interaction will be differentiated according to the directional aspect of the sustained activity.

COMPETITION

Sociologists generally distinguish between *conflict* and *competition*. E. C. Hayes has attempted to make the differentiation more exact in the following manner: "Competition is a relation between activities which exists when the success of one activity limits or prevents the success of the other activity. Conflict is a relation between activities which exists when one activity impedes or destroys the other activity. . . . In competition it is the result—the success—of one activity that affects the other. In competition the direct aim is the success of the actor; indirectly it may result in the failure of the competitor, but in conflict the direct result of the action of one person is to impede, prevent, or destroy the act of another" (7, pp. 337-338). For example, a running race is a competition; a fist fight is a conflict. This distinction may seem difficult to maintain in practice. Conflict often appears to be a particular form of competition as in sports like football or boxing. Sometimes, too, the clashes between armed men are related to the competitive striving for material possessions. These examples are certainly mixtures of competition and conflict. In general, the difficulty is not so great, if we regard interaction in terms of its effects and not in terms of the motives behind it. Com-

petition as a form of social interaction is one thing; as a complex social motive it is another.*

Competition as a form of social interaction is the mutual influencing of competitors in their pursuit of parallel activities. Competition is thus not as direct a type of social interaction as conflict or cooperation. In a competitive situation the individuals are reacting primarily to the goal and secondarily to one another. The parallel activities pursued need not be identical in their course. If they were, the only effect of competition would be upon the speed of the individual as in a foot race. In discussion groups and on many social occasions competition exists for the center of the stage. Individuals try everything from amusing personal anecdotes to caustic criticism of the ideas of others to focus the attention of the group upon themselves. Competition does not always increase the quantity or improve the quality of the individual's performance. Occasionally individuals are inhibited and demoralized in the competing group.

· Competition and Individualism

Competition is not a simple expression of the individual's selfish and anti-social tendencies. Competition implies a certain agreement among people about the rules of the game. The completely individualistic person is not a competitor, because he is relatively unaffected by group influences. Competitors accept in advance the fundamental assumptions on the basis of which they strive for coveted rewards. A competition in which these social rules are violated tends to go over into conflict.

The necessity of limiting competition to prevent its becoming anarchistic conflict is frequently overlooked by the supporters of the laissez-faire doctrine. This old doctrine, which stood for the freedom of industrial and commercial undertakings from all restrictions, is constantly revived in different

* See Chapter IX for a discussion of the motivated aspects of rivalry and competition.

guises. The theory is that unlimited and free competition in economic activities furnishes its own checks against abuses and that governmental interference upsets its harmonious functioning. The fact is that true competition is always a social game played according to limiting rules. The basic rules in the case of our economic competition are so long established that we are not aware of them. In the days when *laissez-faire* was supposed to be operative, competition was not untrammelled. Competitive business on a large scale became possible through the rise of national states which had the police power to compel obedience to the new rules of private enterprise. The freedom to compete in the production and exchange of commodities could exist only when all men respected legal title to private ownership and when all men were willing to sell their services in the labor market. The real problem is not the question of an all-or-none policy of regulation of private business. The real problem is the extent to which economic activities need to be regulated and controlled in the interests of the public, or the extent to which these unconscious rules must be made conscious as in national planning. It is like the problem of new rules in football. The way in which the game should be regulated is a debatable matter, but the need for some rules is obvious, if there is to be a game at all. "Competition," it has been well said, "if carried to its logical conclusion, ends in the annihilation of competition."

Competition in a Primitive Group

Competition of one kind or another is found among all peoples, though its extent and the particular fields in which it appears vary widely from culture to culture. Our society with its highly developed competitive practices forms quite a contrast to a culture like that of the Bathonga of South Africa (6). The economic pursuits of this people are carried on with a minimum of competition. Fertile land is abundant, and every man can generally have more of it than he wants to cultivate. His wives do the actual farming, it may be noted. Though

land and food are individually owned, there is little individualistic display of possessions. Furthermore, the use of food is communal. It is the custom for each housewife to send a portion of her cooking to the other families of the community. Fishing is one economic pursuit in which competition does enter. Nevertheless fishing is a collective enterprise and the men do not try hard to outdo one another.

Since food and land are not difficult of procural among the Bathonga, competition might be expected to appear more intensely in the non-economic activities. As a matter of fact the motivation is great for rivalry in the acquisition of wives. Actual competition within the primary group is held to a minimum by the Bathonga social structure, in spite of the polygamous practices of the group. The men cannot marry within the village, but every wife secured for a village increases its general prosperity, which is shared by all the villagers. Competition, therefore, is greater between villages than between the men of one village. Another factor in their social organization, which limits competition, is the important role of age status. Individuals owe their position in the tribe to their age and are allowed increasing privileges as they grow older. Younger brothers cannot marry before their older brothers. There is no point in fierce competition for the good things of life when they are achieved through status that comes with the passing of the years.

Competition in popular usage refers to more than social interaction. It includes the constant striving of men for greater wealth or greater prestige whether or not they are actually working in the presence of their competitors. In other words, their competitors are often not specific personalities but impersonal creatures who happen to be after the same objects in life. From the competitive primary-group situation children acquire generalized habits of competition. These habits can then be maintained without the stimulus of social interaction. Competitiveness as a personality trait, however, should not be confused with competition as a process of social interaction. Social interaction is primary and fundamental to the com-

petitiveness displayed by men in secondary-group situations such as large-scale industrial and political organizations.

CONFLICT

If the direction assumed by social interaction is immediate mutual destruction and injury, it is termed *conflict*. Conflicts vary in intensity from duelling to debating. War is too institutionalized and too involved a conflict to be considered as a form of social interaction. In civilized societies people tend to fight their conflicts vicariously by attending games which entail violence. Their own struggles are carried on at a verbal rather than a physical level. The resort to violence, however, is not uncommon when other measures have failed.

Physical Combat

Physical conflicts occur spontaneously in the play of children. The child is a bundle of wants and desires, and the expression of these wishes becomes socialized and tempered only through training. Children who want the same toy at the same time readily come to blows. Present-day American parents as a rule try to stamp out these aggressive reactions. The play group of the child directs them into specific channels. Little boys learn that their mates approve of their fighting if they use their fists fairly, and that their elders do not always disapprove. For girls there is no acceptable form of physical combat. Hence when girls do fight they resort to random methods from kicking to pulling hair. For the same reason girls learn to fall back upon verbal weapons earlier than boys. The use of fists for the settlement of differences between men is an English heritage. The old Continental tradition prescribes duelling with the sword and pistol as the proper method of combat. Personal combat functions to make the successful participant feared and respected whether or not it solves the immediate problem. It has declined in modern times because it has lost this function. Even underworld leaders need not be fighters, because they can readily hire professional strong-arm men.

Though fighting with pistols or fists is no longer fashionable, group violence continues as the quickest and simplest way for men to get what they want. Employers seek to break up picket lines in a strike by means of armed guards. Strikers attempt to prevent strikebreakers from taking their jobs by forcibly restraining them from entering a factory. Pitched battles ensue in which often the police participate. In a strike so much is at stake that arbitration is a difficult matter. For the employers to allow their factories to close down while the issue is arbitrated is to lose huge sums. For the employees, the factories must remain idle from the start if they are to win the strike. And losing the strike may mean for them the loss of their jobs. Though the violence in industrial conflicts is to be deplored, it is not a surprising phenomenon to the person who understands the psychology of the situation.

The Division into Two Sides in Conflict

Competition is social interaction oriented in *one* direction, toward the securing of more of the coveted object than will be attained by one's fellows. The courses pursued toward this goal are modified and accelerated by one's competitors, but their general direction remains the same. In conflict the direct opposition of two people means a contrasted duality of direction. Hence, when more than two people participate in conflict, they tend to be divided into sides. Otherwise the combat becomes a free-for-all fight of so many directions that it has little meaning. Thus we have the paradox of the highly individualistic nature of competition in which each man works for himself, and the socialized aspect of conflict in which people unite to fight against their common enemies. Even in spontaneous group fights people fall into two parties, though they may not know much about the cause for which they are struggling. A symbol of race or nationality, of economic class, of religion, or of political party will serve to rally men into opposed groups.

The Riot

One of the most serious riots in recent American history occurred in Chicago in 1919 between whites and Negroes. In the series of racial clashes, which lasted for 13 days, 23 Negroes and 15 whites were killed, 342 Negroes and 178 whites were injured, and about 1,000 persons were rendered homeless and destitute (3). The inception of the riots illustrates the psychology of group conflict.

A bathing beach, which flanked an area thickly inhabited by Negroes, had been used by both races; but each race had kept pretty well to one part of the beach and had observed an imaginary boundary extending into the water. A Negro boy on the afternoon of July 27, 1919, entered the water from the part of the beach used by the Negroes and swam and drifted over the imaginary line into the area used by the whites. "Immediately before his appearance there, white men, women and children had been bathing in the vicinity and were on the beach in considerable numbers. Four Negroes walked through the group and into the water. White men summarily ordered them off. The Negroes left, and the white people resumed their sport. But it was not long before the Negroes were back . . . with others of their race. Then began a series of attacks and retreats, counter-attacks and stone-throwing" (3, p. 4).

Stones were thrown at the Negro boy in the water, who was clinging to a railroad tie. A white boy swam out toward him, and the Negro boy left his tie, tried to swim away, but went down. The crowd sensed what had happened and quieted down while both whites and Negroes dove for the body for about an hour without success. During this time rumors spread through the crowd that the boy had been stoned to death. Several Negroes accused a certain white man of stoning the boy and demanded his arrest. A white policeman who was on the spot refused to make the arrest. "The report circulated through the crowd that the police officer had refused to arrest the murderer. The Negroes in the crowd began to mass dangerously.

At this crucial point the accused policeman arrested a Negro on a white man's complaint. Negroes mobbed the white officer and the riot was under way" (3, p. 4). For four days the rioting continued, and it even broke out sporadically for nine days after the forces of law and order had the situation in hand.

Investigations revealed underlying causes of friction between the two groups in the social and economic discrimination against the Negroes, in the depreciation of property values due to Negro occupancy and white prejudice, in the fear of Negro competition in industry, and in long-standing racial antagonism. The groundwork for a race riot was, therefore, well laid. If it had not begun at the bathing beach on July 27, it might well have started at another time and place. Nonetheless, the actual outbreak furnishes significant data concerning spontaneous group conflict. Four facts stand out in the Chicago race riot.

Four Generalizations about Riots

In the first place, the spreading of hostilities to include large numbers of people is greatly aided by a symbol which will easily differentiate the warring parties. Skin color readily distinguishes white from black. It enables people to identify themselves with their own side and to impute everything evil ever heard about the other race to any representative of it. This consciousness of kind makes an attack upon the symbol of one's race an attack upon one's own person. In planned group conflict, symbols are arranged in advance, but in spontaneous rioting an obvious distinction like skin color rapidly involves more and more people.

In the second place, hostilities once begun seem to feed upon themselves. Every act of violence leads to a counter act as violent or more violent. Two boys will start to argue. Words lead to dares. They start to push one another about and end by exchanging as hard blows as they can deliver. This process is exaggerated in group conflict because the pace is set by the more emotional individuals on each side. First the whites

ordered the Negroes off their part of the beach. The clash started with words. Finally some violent person started throwing stones. The action was taken up by both sides and culminated in hurling stones at the defenseless boy in the water. From stones the group took to other weapons. Many of those who had guns used them, before the riot was over.

In the third place, there is often a critical point in group conflict which determines whether the clash will subside or flare up into a deadly combat. In the Chicago riot the critical point was reached when the white policeman arrested a Negro. The drowning of the boy had temporarily halted overt hostilities. Though feeling was intense, no outbreak occurred until the police officer, after refusing to arrest a white man accused of murder, arrested a Negro. That was more than the outraged feelings of the Negroes could bear. What followed is tragic history.

It is often assumed that the best time to quench a riot is at its very inception. This is common sense and sound psychology. The circular reinforcement which the members of each side afford one another should be checked before it assumes serious proportions. The increasing severity of the reciprocal give-and-take is easier to halt before it reaches a fatal stage. Nevertheless, critical points in the chronology of a group conflict should not be overlooked. When one side has gone further than the majority of its members intend, it may be ready to call a halt. Judicious handling of crowds by skilled officials can avert many a pitched battle.

In the fourth place, rumor plays an important part in the intensification of group conflict. The exchange of hostilities allows no time for the critical examination and checking of wild reports circulated by the most suggestible members of the group. Emotions, moreover, are at too high a pitch to permit cool thinking. Impossible rumors are accepted and further exaggerated, before being passed on. And so the circular process of inflaming passions continues.

Physical Combat Replaced by Verbal Dispute

In spite of occasional race and strike riots it is safe to say that the resort to physical force to settle disputes in primary group situations is on the wane. In strikes, the mustering of physical force has become organized on both sides so that the clash of capital and labor is not a simple case of social interaction. Our laws have given the state a virtual monopoly on the use of violence, and this monopoly is broken only in exceptional instances by racketeering gangs and professional strike-breaking agencies. In personal relationships verbal conflict has replaced physical combat. The same formula applies to a great deal of argumentation as to the fist fight. It grows in a circular fashion. The difference in opinion leads to an exchange of criticisms which become more personal as they proceed. A purely intellectual criticism is interpreted as a threat at one's personal capacity. The return thrust is definitely personal and leads to an argument *ad hominem* and ends by the most scorching remarks at the individual's command, delivered in high-pitched tones. The pattern of mutual recrimination is easier to start than stop. Moreover, it develops a low threshold of resistance as it becomes habitual between associates and between relatives. Husband and wife acquire a set series of increasingly uncomplimentary exchanges in their quarrels. Sometimes the pattern is so well established that without intention they find themselves in the middle of a bitter argument.

The formalization of verbal disputes in the legal trial has changed the nature of the controversy. The clash of argument is no longer aimed at the humiliation of the contending parties. It is for the purpose of scoring points in the minds of the judge and jury. Hence it is closer to competition than conflict. Most group discussion partakes of the nature of competition or of conflict in spite of its purpose as social entertainment or as intelligent problem-solution. Even scientists in academic sessions will indulge in emotional exchanges which satisfy their egos but which do not clear up problems. Public debate is also a mixture of competition and conflict, though members of the

audience may go away under the delusion that they have heard both sides of the question.

Vicarious Satisfaction in Conflict

The psychological satisfactions which accrue from participation in violent conflict are obtained in our society vicariously. Physical combats are staged for huge audiences. The more violent the physical conflict, the greater the drawing power of the sporting event. A college football game will outdraw a college baseball game. A professional prize fight will attract more spectators than any other contest. The spectator can enjoy the defeat of the vanquished without the inconvenience or discomfort attendant upon the act of vanquishing or the humiliation of being beaten. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the only reason for the popularity of modern sports is the need for a substitute gratification for lack of personal physical strife. A great many other motives are involved. Furthermore, the desire to witness combative spectacles may feed largely on itself. People may not be seeking vicarious satisfaction but may have developed an acquired taste for modern sport events through their early school training and the ballyhoo of the press.

The Younger-Older Generation Conflict

During the nineteen twenties there was a pronounced younger-older generation conflict in America. Within the family the rising generation was frequently in open rebellion against their parents. Age conflict is common in many cultures and has always been present to a greater or lesser extent in our society. Youth comes into its mature physical and mental heritage while the reins of control are still in the hands of its elders. This ever-present source of conflict was intensified during the decade of the twenties by the rapid social changes growing out of the World War. Many of these changes were in the field of sex customs and sex taboos. The rising youth quickly acquired new values to which their parents remained

impervious. Older people can learn new ways, but they generally do not, because they already have set ways for getting along in life. The conflict between children and their parents is further intensified by the rapidly changing technology and the consequent changes in social structure. Where once the family was a social unit, today the young people fend for themselves. This brings about clashes, particularly in matters of courtship. The intensity of the younger-older generation conflict decreased during the depression, but it may flare up again in periods of rapid social change.

ACCOMMODATION

Accommodation is a form of social interaction in which the conflicting aims of people are adjusted through *compromise*, *coercion*, or *integration*. Accommodation arises out of opposition between people, as does conflict. In conflict there is an interchange of words or blows, the purpose of which is the injury of one's opponent. In accommodation the give-and-take between people is for the purpose of finding some working adjustment. It may follow a conflict which has ended in a stalemate with neither party achieving victory. Or it may replace conflict as a superior means of attaining one's objective. After all, the man who dissipates most of his time and energy in fighting is handicapped in his career as compared with the man who works out some livable relations with his fellows.

Coercion and the Master-Slave Relationship

In the process of conflict the two contending parties may be very unequally matched in either sheer physical prowess, economic power, social status, political influence, or intellectual and emotional capacities. The weaker party may be coerced into an arrangement dictated by the stronger. The establishing of this ascendant-submissive relationship is a type of accommodation. The ascendant party, after a period of fencing, finds the psychological weaknesses in his opponent's armor. He discovers the type of command or the emotional stereotype which

brings compliance. The technique may be to embarrass a sensitive individual, seize upon the clichés of the unsophisticated person, exploit the susceptibility to prestige of the suggestible, or take advantage of the indecision of the weak-willed. The submissive person yields, not because that is his only alternative, but because he gets a certain measure of satisfaction out of submission. Men willingly follow a strong leader because they like to have their decisions made for them.

The establishing and the maintenance of the ascendant-submissive relationship is not a one-way process. It is true social interaction because the conduct of the dominant individual is influenced and guided by the reactions of the submissive, although the initiation and main direction of the activity is the work of the ascendant party. An early recognition of this fact appears in the writings of G. Simmel, who in 1896 stated:

Every social occurrence as such, consists of an interaction between individuals. In other words, each individual is at the same time an active and a passive agent in a transaction. In case of superiority and inferiority, however, the relation assumes the appearance of a one-sided operation: the one party appears to exert, while the other seems merely to receive an influence. Such, however, is not in fact the case. No one would give himself the trouble to gain or to maintain superiority, if it afforded him no advantage and no enjoyment. This return to the superior can be derived from the relation, however, only by virtue of the fact that there is a reciprocal relation of the inferior upon the superior. The decisive characteristics of the relation at this point is this, that the effect which the inferior actually exerts upon the superior is determined by the latter. . . . In this operation, in case the subordination is really absolute, no sort of spontaneity is present on the part of the subordinate. . . . Such an extreme case of superiority and inferiority will scarcely occur among human beings. Rather will a certain measure of independence, a certain direction of the relation proceed also from the self-will and character of the subordinate.

Once more, the orator who confronts the assembly, or the teacher his class, seems to be the sole leader, the temporary superior. Nevertheless every one who finds himself in that situation is conscious of the limiting and leading reaction of the mass which is apparently merely passive and submissive to his guid-

ance. . . . "I am your leader, therefore I must follow you" said one of the most eminent German parliamentarians, with reference to his party [16, pp. 169-171].

Compromise

Compromise is the adjustment of the opposed wishes of people in which each contender gives up part of his demands. It is the common method of adjustment of differences when the two parties approach equality of power. The purchase of articles is often a matter of compromise with buyer and seller bargaining until they reach an agreement. Family differences are often settled in this manner. The method has been carried over into secondary groupings, where bargaining has its specialized agencies. Workers in a factory may be represented by a shop steward or committee whose sole function it is to bargain for the workers.

Compromise is the technique *par excellence* of the politician. Unrealized abstract principles mean little to him, and he willingly barter them away for concrete gains. His procedure is to be involved in so many deals that he can snatch his share of plums even though he yields part of the prize to others. Experienced hands at compromise always set their demands higher than what they expect to get. President Roosevelt wanted his New Deal legislation validated by the Supreme Court. Hence he proposed a drastic scheme for changing the Court by Congressional action. His proposal was defeated and he lost prestige through the defeat. Nonetheless certain New Deal laws were validated by the Supreme Court and two of the conservative justices resigned. The social scientist may never know whether or not the Supreme Court justices were affected by the President's proposal, but the court reform suggested by the President illustrates the tendency in politics to maneuver for a great deal more than can be attained.

Compromise is complicated as a form of social interaction when a third party is called in to referee or aid in the settlement of differences. Technically this is known as *arbitration*. In arbitration, interaction is no longer a direct give-and-take

between the contesting parties but an interchange mediated through the instrumentality of the third person. It is less likely under this circumstance to go from accommodation to conflict. The great difficulty with arbitration is the securing of a mediator who has the confidence of both sides in the controversy. This can be seen in strikes, which fair-minded pious people, a little out of touch with reality, believe can be beautifully settled through arbitration. The formula generally runs to the effect that a representative of the public interests should be the odd man on the arbitration board, composed of representatives of labor and capital. The fallacy in this reasoning is that it overlooks the nature of the public. The public is another combination of capital and labor. Every member of the body politic derives his income from wages, interest, or profits of some sort. Hence, a Diogenes search is needed to find neutral mediators for capital-labor controversies.

Compromise Not an Ideal Method

Compromise is rarely an ideal solution of differences between people. Each party, by giving up some measure of his real objective, compromises himself. There is no logical reason why the individual who is in the right should temporize merely because he is opposed. The sincere idealist who begins by compromising frequently ends in the camp of the politician. Solutions achieved through compromise, moreover, are often poor solutions, because they do not last. The husband and wife who compromise their opposed objectives in life unconsciously keep striving for the values which they agreed to give up. Some programs achieved through compromise will not work because of logically incompatible elements as in the case of the old and modern treatment of the criminal. The compromise effects an immediate psychological solution but not necessarily a logical one.

On the other hand, as Kimball Young points out, in a practical workaday world of change and balance, in which absolute truths do not exist, halfway measures seem to have a place (18).

"To operate on the all-or-none principle is impossible." A live dog may be better than a dead lion. To live is to temporize, and life is the process of salvaging as much as possible of one's principles from the wreckage of compromise.

Social Integration

The dilemma of the compromise poses a knotty problem for the social philosopher, which is still unsolved. In some instances, however, conflict can be resolved without either party's compromising himself. M. P. Follett has applied to social disputes the doctrine of discrimination and integration which E. B. Holt formulated in *The Freudian Wish* for the solution of individual conflict. *Social integration* is the adjustment of differences in which a discriminating course of conduct permits each contestant the attainment of his central purpose. It is a logical solution, not the patchwork of temporizing. In many disputes the clash occurs between opposed courses of action but not between fundamental motives. Instead of a hasty compromise in which each party yields something vital to himself, a solution may be possible by discovering the basic cause of the difference (5).

For example, a husband and wife may disagree about her pursuit of an independent career. The husband wants his wife to abandon her work, which seems to him a dilettante's puttering, and become a homemaker and mother. As a result of a compromise she takes time off from her work to have a child, and then they both divide their time between their careers and their home. Neither is thoroughly satisfied. More penetrating analysis of the problem might have disclosed that the wife's career was motivated by the natural desire for self-expression and attention. If the husband had been wise and supplied her with the necessary praise and the social approval of friends in her home activities, she would have been willing to forego a career. Or again, a father and son disagree about the courses the son shall pursue in college. The son wants to major in art, the father wants him to major in applied economics. The

father does not object to art, but he wants his son to be prepared to take care of himself after college. A compromise solution would be to take some courses in art and some in applied economics. An integration of both their wishes might be found in the son's selection of architecture as his field of study. His artistic needs can be met in this way and at the same time he is acquiring a practical calling for earning his living.

As a general rule, integration calls for more detailed analysis and motivational understanding than most people are able and willing to bring to bear upon their differences. A minor difference leads to conflict, and the conflict results in accommodation and compromise. Too much emotion has been generated for an objective probing into the heart of the problem. Not all disputes, however, can be solved by integration. When one pie is set before two hungry men, compromise is the most feasible expedient. Between the fascist and the communist neither compromise nor integration is possible. Nonetheless, problems abound for which the method of integration holds great possibilities. Many of these problems lie in the field of family and friendship relations.

ASSIMILATION

When the effect of social interaction is the exchange of ideational and action patterns, it is termed *assimilation*. In integration a new course of conduct emerges. In assimilation there is an incorporation by one or both parties of the other's habits and thoughts. Assimilation occurs through the mechanisms of imitation and suggestion. It is one phase of the problem of social learning, since it is the term for the fact that people acquire one another's ideas and habits through association. Friends of long standing will show the same phrases of speech, the same attitudes and values, and sometimes the same mannerisms of thought and behavior. Married couples also exhibit the effects of assimilation. Husband and wife acquire one another's facial expressions, and for this reason are sometimes said to look alike.

Sociologists have stressed the importance of sympathetic *rapport* between people as a condition of assimilation. Competition, conflict, and accommodation all imply opposition, whereas assimilation occurs when harmonious relationships have been established. The realization of this fact came about because of the failure of Americanization programs to captivate foreign-born groups. Immigrants from other countries, even when they had no objection to American ways, were not going to have Americanization forcefully thrust down their throats.

The acculturation of foreign groups in the United States has been the sole type of assimilation studied by the school of interactionology. For one thing the assimilation of the foreign-born was a very practical problem; for another, it was a spectacular instance of the exchange of customs and traditions between people. W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki demonstrated that very rapid assimilation of the foreign-born was demoralizing to them (17). The discarding of old values and the taking on of new ways without an appreciation of their meaning produced mental and moral deterioration in the immigrant. So the slogan became "Cohere to coalesce." If the immigrant were to be successfully Americanized, he must have the advantages of the group support of his countrymen, in order to find himself in a new and strange world. As a matter of fact, the acquisition of American ways was brought about in the first instance by other factors than interaction as a primary group process. Immigrants were placed in new jobs, in new material surroundings, and they changed their material culture before they changed their other habits (2). They bought American mechanical devices for the home before they learned American stereotypes.

The assimilation of foreigners is not a one-way process. American civilization today contains many elements which are the contribution of the various nationalities that have gone to make it up. The enslaving of a people has been known to result in the masters taking on some of the customs and values of the slaves. The folksongs and spirituals of the Negroes have become part of the cultural heritage of all America.

COOPERATION

Cooperation has been defined as "the act of working together to one end" (11). Cooperation resembles competition in that individuals are reacting primarily toward a common goal, and secondarily toward one another. In cooperation, however, the reactions toward one another assume greater importance than in competition and are different in nature. In competition the individual is spurred on by the action of a rival to further individualistic effort. In cooperation he adjusts his efforts to synchronize with the behavior of his fellows. Cooperation differs from accommodation in the respect that accommodation is a direct interchange without reference to a common objective.

It has frequently been assumed that competition and conflict are the most fundamental aspects of human nature. It has further been assumed that cooperation is a late process of advanced civilization which even the most civilized people can be expected to exhibit but a fraction of the time. In support of this view we are referred to the biological doctrine of the survival of the fittest and the constant competition among the individuals of a species to survive. Anthropological evidence and the comparative studies of animals prove, however, that cooperation is as firmly grounded in the psychology of social life as competition. The glorification of competition is merely a bit of ethnocentrism which has oversimplified biological theories to rationalize our own competitive practices.

Cooperation among Animals

The effect of a harsh environment in which animals and primitive men have an unceasing struggle against such unfavorable natural forces as famine, drought, and frigid weather is to produce cooperation as often as competition. Without mutual aid the chances of survival are greatly diminished. The factor of sex also brings about cooperation, especially in the care and rearing of children. In many animal species both parents are known to cooperate in the feeding and protection of the

young. The Russian naturalist P. Kropotkin has written on this subject: "... wherever I saw animal life in abundance, as, for instance, on the lakes where scores of species and millions of individuals came together to rear their progeny; in the colonies of rodents; in the migration of birds which took place at that time on a truly American scale along the Usuri; and especially in a migration of fallow-deer which I witnessed in the Amur, . . . in all these scenes of animal life which passed before my eyes I saw Mutual Aid and Mutual Support carried on to an extent which made me suspect in it a feature of the greatest importance for the maintenance of life, the preservation of each species, and its further evolution" (9, p. 2).

Animals will quickly come to one another's support against a common enemy. A cry of warning or of fear will bring his fellows to the aid of the distressed animal. W. Köhler reports that when he punished an ape, "the whole group set up a howl, as if with one voice." Some of his chimpanzees were more active in support of the punished animal than others. "It was, in particular, little weak Konsul, who would run up excitedly, and, in the way little chimpanzees have of expressing their wishes, with a pleading countenance, stretch out his arm to the punisher, if the ape was still being punished, try to hold one's arm tight, and finally, with exasperated gestures, start hitting at the big man!" (8, p. 287). Berger reports that elephants help one another when injured (1). When an elephant falls, wounded by a bullet, some of its companions pass their tusks under its body while others wind their trunks about its neck in an effort to set the wounded creature on its feet. Prairie marmots will also assist their wounded companions back to their burrows.*

* W. Köhler supplies us with this touching picture of the chimpanzees' concern for an ill friend: "But just as considerable—though transitory—interest is shown, when an isolated creature's wailings can be heard or seen, so also I noticed the strong effect on the others, when they once saw with their own eyes the signs of weakness and illness in one of the little chimpanzees. At the beginning of his fatal illness Konsul was once lying helpless on the floor, with his eyes closed. Rana, who happened to be passing by asked him in the usual way to accompany her. . . . As he hardly moved, and immediately sank back again, she grew

Cooperation among animals has not only been observed by scientists; it has also been demonstrated by experiment. M. P. Crawford trained young chimpanzees individually to secure food in three problem situations, and then modified the apparatus so that it was necessary for two animals to coordinate their efforts to obtain the reward. One problem consisted of pulling a box toward the animal's cage by means of a rope. After individual training, the box was weighted too heavily for a single animal to move and two ropes were attached to it. At first the animals pulled in haphazard fashion at the ropes. Then the experimenter entered the cage and pulled on one of the ropes while the ape pulled on the other. The apes began to grasp the problem. "Bula did not come to the cage door when I came in, but went directly to the grille. She pulled a couple of times on both ropes together, then moved over and gave me a place to sit down. I took one rope and she the other. She waited a moment until I was set in pulling position and then began to pull" (4, p. 23). The coordinated activity of the two apes did not appear, however, until after the experimenter had pulled or pushed the box with them, at the same time calling out "pull." He then ceased helping them, save by giving the verbal cue, to which they responded in unison. A second stage of accomplishment was reached when the apes needed no cue from the experimenter but attained coordination through watching one another. In a third stage, an

attentive, first lifted his head, and then putting her arms around the little fellow, carefully lifted his weak body, and seemed by her bearing and her look so deeply concerned, that there could be at this moment, no doubt whatsoever as to the state of her feelings. When some days later, during which he had been isolated, she again saw the poor creature in a very wretched state, she seemed only to shy away. But again, one day when he seemed a little better, the little fellow was once more let out into the open, where the others were gaily eating green stuff. He dragged himself to them, but after taking a few steps he suddenly fell to the ground with a piercing cry of fear. Tercera was sitting some way away, chewing. She sprang up, her hair standing on end all over her body with excitement. She reached him in a few strides, walking upright, her face filled with the utmost concern, her lips protruding with sorrow, and uttering sounds of distress; she caught hold of him under the arms, and did her best to raise him" (8, pp. 285-286)

animal would solicit his partner to join him at their common task by whimpering, gesturing, or grasping him by shoulder or elbow. If one partner would tire of the work, the other would often bring him back to it by such solicitation.

The cooperative activity of the apes in this experiment was not spontaneous in its origin. Whether it would have been hit upon by the apes themselves, it is difficult to say. Two facts appeared which suggest that the apes might have learned cooperation without tuition. (1) In an early session the animals did pull in a light box by themselves through working in unison. This rhythmic behavior broke down when a heavier box was introduced. (2) Even before the experimenter entered the cage, one ape was observed to watch the activity of its partner. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the coordinated activity demanded in the laboratory problem is not a fair test of the cooperative ability of the animals in their natural world. That they were able to learn it readily under tuition indicates that it might be acquired in more natural environmental settings.

Cooperation among Primitive Peoples

Cooperation as a primary-group phenomenon is more thoroughly in evidence in primitive culture than in our profit economy. The individual in many primitive societies operates more as a member of his kinship group than as an individual personality. His personal psychological world embraces this group. Its interests are his interests. His belongings are clan property. His marriage is not an individualistic romance but a relationship between his clan and a neighboring clan. Among his kin there is a high degree of cooperation.

In a comparative study of thirteen primitive cultures M. Mead interprets three of them as competitive societies, four as individualistic, and six as cooperative (11). No simple correlation between natural environmental resources and cooperative and competitive activities was found to hold for all groups. The outstanding instance of correspondence between the natural environment and the dominant type of social activity ap-

peared among the Ojibwa of Canada. These people are characterized by a highly individualistic way of living in keeping with the sparse distribution of game animals, necessitating the wide scattering of the men for several months of the year. The Zuñi Indians and the Arapesh of New Guinea have responded to the scarcity of good land by the elimination of competition and the development of cooperation—perhaps a natural reaction to their difficult lot. On the other hand, the Ifugao of the Philippine Islands in a similar plight have developed competitive practices. Of especial interest to the student of society are the Kwakwiltl Indians, one of the richest of these primitive groups and yet the most fiercely competitive of all of them. Apparently the greater difficulty in eking out an existence in unfavorable environmental circumstances does not make the struggle for survival more competitive. Rather it means that man's natural enemy is not his fellow men but the natural environment. Another human being is an ally in the terrific struggle against a niggardly environment.

In our own society the same phenomenon can be observed. Cooperation and sharing are greater among the lower-income groups than among the higher. The worker's family is so poor that its members have to share the necessities of life. The housewives of this group think nothing of caring for one another's children in times of illness or misfortune. The individualistic middle class pay more for what they get in life, because they do not have to practice mutual aid, as do the poor. Hospitality is greater among the lower-income groups, where the taking in of a guest means that the host sleeps on the floor, than among people of means.

The Simultaneous Occurrence of Cooperation and Competition

It is difficult to characterize groups and cultures as cooperative and competitive because both processes can be found at work. It is more a matter of degree than of kind. Sometimes the same group activity will show a cooperative as well as a competitive aspect. Men may work toward a material objec-

tive, which they share when achieved. Yet at the same time they may be competing for prestige. We consider our society highly competitive, because we think of the many activities in which men strive to outdo one another for a greater share of the glory or of the profits. We overlook the tremendous number of cooperative enterprises upon which our whole social framework is based. On the side of production, men cooperate daily in coordinating their energies. It is impossible to run the smallest plant without the cooperative efforts of its personnel. So much is this true that we have thoroughly institutionalized the techniques for teamwork. Although Americans are known as great individualists, it is also true that they understand the advantages of cooperation as do few other people. In almost any situation Americans are quick to organize, to delegate tasks, and to synchronize their activities. We organize on any occasion and at any pretext. In fact, we are better at cooperative organization than at the selection of goals for the orientation of our organized efforts.

The Unique Aspect of Cooperation

In one sense, cooperation is a unique process in social psychology. It gives birth to results which are difficult to explain in terms of the psychology of the individual. The individual works harder in *competition* than in a non-social setting. Nevertheless his increased product is his own effort socially stimulated. Likewise in *conflict* the emotional incentive explains the individual's greater exertion. But in *cooperation* there is no mere increase of quantitative performance. The coordinated efforts of two or more people can produce results qualitatively unlike the applications of individual effort. *Competition* produces high *individual* returns. *Cooperation* yields the only true joint returns of group activity. This fact has significant implications for social theory and social practice. If there is to be a science of society beyond that of social psychology, it must be based upon the products of cooperative effort, not upon group activity as such. In practice the application is obvious that cooperative efforts will yield more than individualistic competition. A team of individual football stars has little chance

against a team of mediocre players drilled in cooperative teamwork.

The validity of cooperation as a principle of the betterment of the primary group can be misapplied in the institutionalization of the practice in large groups. Racketeers can organize a protective association in which all the producers in an industry are compelled to cooperate. The price of their commodity is then raised and the profits are pocketed by the racketeers. Similarly, workers can be persuaded to cooperate in a trade union to better their lot, but if their leaders do not represent their interests fairly their conditions may not be improved. In other words, in large-scale organizations the cooperative habits of people can be exploited, no matter how excellent the principle of cooperation may be. When we are asked to cooperate, therefore, it is always fair to raise the question: in whose interests. Relevant to this issue is the point made by M. A. May and L. W. Doob concerning the contradiction between our teachings of cooperation and our practices of competition. They write: "In the public schools of America we find this curious paradox: The basic structure of the system is competitive; but the ideals of cooperation are emphasized. As has already been noted, the competitive structure of the public schools is promoted by examinations, the emphasis on marks, the seating arrangements, preferential treatment of children, and athletic contests. In short, the set-up of the school is such that a large proportion of the daily activities of the pupils is more competitive than cooperative in nature. At the same time all of the human virtues and attitudes that are favorable to cooperation are stressed!" (10, p. 82). This paradox poses the problem of whether the social function of the doctrine of cooperation may not sometimes be to make people more easily exploitable.

SOCIAL INTERACTION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

The mores and institutional ways of a society are the products of social interaction, and in turn they limit and determine processes of interaction. In other words, uniform ways, and for that matter atypical ways, arise out of the struggles and ad-

justments of human beings who work out their solutions to life's problems collectively rather than individually. For example, conflict between two neighboring tribes results in the enslavement of the vanquished. The master-slave relationship becomes institutionalized so that any member of the conquering tribe has superior *status* to any member of the conquered group. *Status* implies a uniform attitude toward a position in the social pattern regardless of the personalities who might occupy the position. In turn, further interaction between a member of the slave group and a member of the master group is definitely limited by the status already achieved. The justification for regarding society from the static point of view in reference to its uniform and variant ways is that the results of interaction become crystallized into stable relationships. Illustrations of this general process follow.

Age and Sex Differentiation

Social interaction is one means whereby the uniform roles assigned to sex and age are established. It is not the only means, since propaganda and institutional measures are also effective. But the competitive and cooperative give-and-take of the primary group early results in the assignment of definite roles to its members. The most obvious differences within a small group are those of age and sex. These are seized upon in the division of labor for the parceling out of special tasks. Children and the very old can be given only light tasks. Youth has strength, but lacks the wisdom for positions of direction and leadership. In many societies four periods in life are recognized for the differential treatment of age groups, namely, infancy and childhood, adolescence or youth, maturity or adulthood, and old age. No rigid lines of demarcation distinguish these periods, of course. The more advanced the society the greater is the tendency to extend the absolute age limits of these divisions.

The status of childhood is one of dependence and subordination. Illogically, however, the child has often been held to adult responsibility in respect to crime. Special courts and treatment for juvenile offenders are a late development in our

civilization. In some primitive societies the role of childhood is one of play; in others the child must lend a helping hand. The period of childhood is generally used in some measure for the preparation for future roles. Adolescence begins with puberty changes, although not all societies make a sharp distinction between the prepuberal child and the adolescent. The role of adolescence is largely that of continued preparation for the assumption of later tasks. Among primitives the social period of adolescence is brief. The youth goes through initiation ceremonies shortly after puberty and becomes a full-fledged member of the tribe, although from the standpoint of physical age we might still regard him as an adolescent. K. Young has remarked upon an interesting contradiction in the status of youth in our culture (18). On the one hand, our young people are babied in the sense that they are protected well into physical adulthood by financial support. They are restricted from early marriages and from full participation in vocations by child labor laws. On the other hand, this lack of adult responsibility contrasts with their greater freedom from parental control. They know more of the world as adolescents than their parents did, and they have a great deal more freedom.

The assumption of adult responsibilities begins legally in America at the age of 21, though eligibility for some political offices begins later. Practically, however, individuals may take on the responsibilities of maturity much earlier or much later than the legal definition has it. For both sexes, among the lower-income groups adolescence is of shorter duration than among the higher-income groups. From society to society the age of adulthood and the responsibilities involved vary. The differentiation between maturity and old age is likewise subject to variation. The old men in some primitive groups occupy a dependent status. They lack the physical vigor for participation in hunting and war raids and yield their positions to younger men. Infirmary due to age may even be penalized by death. Often, however, old age carries with it the most distinguished age role. The elders rule the tribe and are the most respected individuals of the group. Since the nature peoples have no written records, the aged are the living repositories of

the knowledge and traditions of the group. Their function is to pass on this accumulated wisdom to the younger members. In China as in many ancient civilizations the dominant status of the aged has been carried to an extreme. The married sons, themselves fathers, render obedience to the head of the household. Patriarchal control and ancestor worship functioned for many centuries to preserve the Chinese culture from change. In America, we are coming more and more to draw an age line at which old people will have to retire from their posts. Some universities compel their professors to retire at 65, and the same limit is set by a number of industrial corporations.

Physiological sex differences have furnished the basis for the double set of social functions associated with the two sexes in all societies. But the social structure according to which men and women are assigned different roles should not be mistaken as the direct expression of human biology. A great deal of what passes for innate sex difference is really the result of a socially acquired pattern. The old belief in the higher intelligence of men has been disproved, and the greater emotionality of women has been shown to be a matter of cultural determination. The differences in physical strength, assumed to be innate since they were related to secondary sex differences, are likewise subject to environmental influence. In some primitive groups the women are the physical equals of the men and the differentiating secondary sex characteristics are not pronounced.

Nevertheless, most cultures are dominated by men, and this domination starts from the fact that women are incapacitated from active competition with men for the long periods devoted to child bearing.* Hence arose the specialization of occupa-

*Sumner and Keller observe: "No amount of reasoning, complaining, or protesting can alter the fact that woman bears children and man does not, and that the former is rendered periodically weaker than the latter, not only by reason of the accompaniments and sequels of child-birth but also because of more frequently recurrent incapacities incidental to female sex-life. Maternity is a disability in the struggle for existence, and a special peril. Even if woman and man were equal in physical strength and alertness at ordinary times, as seems to be the case among some primitive tribes, women would be periodically the weaker" (p. 112, Vol. I, *The Science of Society*).

tional function. Women were the natural caretakers of children. Men monopolized the more attractive pursuits of hunting and fighting and left the drudgery of agriculture and the preparation of food to the women. Physical sex differences thus gave a differential, around which the two sexes specialized and cooperated in the struggle for existence. Out of the difference in occupational role came differences in temperament and social attitudes. Hunting and waging war breed one type of character; domestic pursuits, another. Moreover, the active direction of affairs of the group by the men was reflected in the lower esteem and fewer privileges enjoyed by the women. With the development of machine techniques in modern society sheer physical strength ceased to be a very important personal attribute. Women could compete more effectively with men in industry. The result has been the gradual emancipation of women from their inferior status. The equalization is far from complete, but it has extended to educational opportunities and political rights. Notwithstanding this trend, the old division of occupations between the sexes persists. The professions, political offices, and executive positions in business and industry are still pretty much in possession of the men.*

Differentiation on the Basis of Kinship Groups

In addition to the specialized roles of sex and age groups primitive society is further segmented according to kinship groups. The mutual dependence of mother and child and the mutual dependence of the sexes has made the biological family a universal phenomenon. On the basis of family groups, primitive social organization defines many rights and obligations. An injury to one member of the family is an injury to the whole family and is correspondingly avenged by the family or atoned for by payment to the family. Hereditary positions

* A study by the Bureau of Business Research of the University of Michigan shows that men with high-school educations on the average earn more than women college graduates. The median salary of a group of 14,000 well-educated, experienced women in the higher occupation groups was \$1,548 a year. A woman who receives a salary of \$15,000 is a celebrity.

of leadership illustrate the importance of the family as a special unit in tribal life.

Since, according to the rule of exogamy, children find their mates outside of the immediate kinship group, the family in itself was a loose social unit. It became rigid when it evolved into the clan, in which each member bears the common group name. Thus marriage did not obliterate the fact that a girl of the Beaver clan remained a Beaver, even though she married a Wolf and went to live with his people. The clan became a much larger social group than the biological family and often included people not descended from the same ancestor.

The clans of a tribe for the most part were competitive units. Frequently they owned their own fields and their own fishing and hunting equipment. To some extent, however, specialization of function in religious, ceremonial, political, and economic activities proceed according to family and clan. Among the Winnebago Indians four of the twelve clans possessed definite political functions and three others performed minor political-social functions (15). The chief of the tribe was selected only from the dominant Thunderbird clan, which was entrusted with the task of preserving peace. The Thunderbird chief settled disputes, and his sacred lodge was a temporary place of refuge for wrongdoers. To the Bear clan was assigned the disciplinary and policing functions of the tribe. The Bear clansmen guarded the village and whipped and even killed transgressors. Among the Baganda of Africa some economic differentiation crept into the functions of the clans. The Mushroom clan made bark cloth and supplied the gatemarkers and gatekeepers of the royal enclosure. The Leopard clan took care of the temple but was otherwise exempt from forced labor. In addition there was elaborate specialization of social and political service to the king of the tribe.

Clan systems as a basic form of social patterning are a convenient framework around which cooperative and competitive activities can be organized. They furnish a division of groups which lends itself to a division of function. The extent to which specialization takes place according to the clan system

depends upon the whole social history of the tribe.* Moreover, many kinship groupings, as well as our modern social divisions, do not follow kinship lines. Associations may develop in accordance with territorial contiguity or social interests.

Class and Caste Differentiation

The various roles and statuses assigned to sex, age, and kinship groups arise in part from the impact of social interaction upon natural distinctions. The important groupings of class and caste are less related to natural distinctions. Nor are they the product of primary social interaction. This is the rationalistic error in many theoretical reconstructions of social history, which have it that class divisions arose from the natural differences in men's abilities in their competitive struggles. The element of truth in this notion is that in a small group men of superior ability may have a chance to make their presence felt. In the main, however, class lines developed from the struggles between groups already organized according to age, sex, family, or territory. Classes have their beginnings in secondary group conflict, not in primary social interaction.

Class differences originated in conquest and confiscation (13). Nomadic warlike groups came into conflict, and the victorious group made slaves of its captives. Or a nomadic group swooped down upon an agricultural tribe and conquered it. The vanquished people were too numerous to be assigned to the victors as individually owned slaves, so they remained on their farms as a subject people. The conquering group settled among them and became the ruling aristocracy and exacted tribute. The simple class division into conquered and con-

* Thus A. A. Goldenweiser writes: "The variability in functions is equally conspicuous. There are great differences in the way a sib system is interwoven with the rest of culture. The variations are striking. Among the Tlingit and Haida the clan system enters into nearly all aspects of life—art, mythology, economic pursuits, politics, ceremonialism. Among the Iroquois the clans are the carriers of the all-important socio-political functions of the League. The Zuffi clans, as Kroeber has emphasized, merely stand for a method of counting descent" (p. 305, *Anthropology*, F. S. Crofts, 1937.)

querors in time became complicated by economic developments. The top ranks of the dominant class scorned manufacture and trade as occupations fit only for the lowly. A rising middle class monopolized these pursuits, and the nobility found their military prowess undermined by those in possession of capital. The complicated historical process, however, was throughout not the struggle of individuals fighting one another with their own native individual equipment. It was a struggle between institutions, that is between men organized in social groups. The corollary is that position in society was due not to inherent individual ability, but to the individual's membership in a particular class. When his class triumphed, as did the middle classes in the French revolution, he gained. When his group met defeat, his status fell.

Undoubtedly class position has sometimes been attained through individual excellence. In the words of C. C. North: "Individuals have always, as individuals, shown themselves stronger than the prevailing system, and have broken through it. We have many historical examples, and must be convinced that many more cases have always existed, in which individual persons have triumphed over the system that they have found about them, and have taken the position to which their natural abilities entitled them. But it is the system that we have been describing, and these exceptions have been negligible in comparison with the millions who have conformed to it" (12, p. 225).

Caste is the most rigid form of social class. In a caste system the lines are so tightly drawn that the individual cannot escape from the group into which he was born. Moreover he must marry into that group, so that there is no escape for his children. In India there are four main castes: the priestly caste (the Brahmins), the warriors (Kshabuya), the agriculturalists (the Vaisya), and the service caste (the Sudra). Each caste is further subdivided into many ranks. The pariahs are a group excluded from all castes. In Indian society, rights and privileges are distributed according to caste status. In general, class is a horizontal division of society; clan a vertical division of the

population. In the case of caste, however, kinship and class coincide.

Psychologically, all class and caste systems rest upon the attitudes of deference and obedience drilled into the individuals of inferior status. The rigidity of caste is thus only the rigidity of men's habits. It can give way to change whenever men meet crises which jar them out of their customary ways of life. It can change when the rising generation is not thoroughly educated to accept the social pattern. To elicit the attitudes and habits of deference the members of the upper caste carry external symbols of their position. They may wear a distinctive type of dress. A more effective social differentiation is the cultivation of distinctive modes of action and speech in the upper group. This makes crossing over into the dominant class extremely difficult. Within a class there are relations of equality. Common experiences, common vested interests give the members a fellow feeling that makes for cooperation and mutual aid. Class consciousness is a form of what Professor Giddings termed "consciousness of kind." Just as the lower classes defer to the upper, so do the members of the dominant class expect homage and service from those beneath them socially. In short, caste and class are carried more in psychological habits than in the objective world.

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CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The dynamics of social interaction negate themselves in social stratification, as has been indicated in the closing pages of the last chapter. Patterns of thought and action crystallize out of the collective adjustments of men as they cooperate, compete, and conflict with one another. For the most standardized of these patterns the term *social institution* has come to be widely used. An institution is not a thing or a force capable of being physically manipulated. It is a conceptualization of behavior and attitudinal relationships which have attained some measure of formalization and hence of permanence. Though standardization is one aspect of the institution, universally agreed upon, many social scientists restrict the term further by employing it to designate only formal organization of an elaborate sort. In this chapter we shall follow this limitation by describing the pattern of the highly developed institution. This description will then be applied to that great institution, the Roman Catholic Church of the Middle Ages.

The highly developed institution generally comprises relationships covering three types of elements. First of all is *the public*, or *the rank and file members* of the institution. We are not dealing with the members of the public as whole personalities; we are considering only certain common segments of their attitudes and actions. In the words of C. H. Cooley, an institution "is made up of persons, but not of whole persons; each one enters into it with a trained and specialized part of himself. Consider, for instance, the legal part of a lawyer, the ecclesiastical part of a church member or the business part of a merchant. In antithesis to the institution, therefore, the person represents the wholeness and humanness of life . . ." (5,

p. 319). Secondly, there are *the leaders* and *officials*. Unlike the public, the institution may be for them a totally inclusive group, that is, they may express their whole personalities in it. Cooley's statement holds for the rank and file members, but a high-ranking church official, for example, may give himself completely to his church interests. Thirdly, *the physical plant* and *equipment* of the institution must be considered. Buildings, land, tools, machines, apparatus of all kinds are the most obvious aspect of an institution. When we think of a university we think of its campus, its stadium, its laboratories, its library, its various buildings. When we think of a church we think of its cathedrals, its monasteries, its homes for the unfortunate. This aspect of an organization is so noticeable that it receives far more attention in the popular mind than it merits.*

I. THE PUBLIC

The main relationship in the institution is between the public and the leaders. It is essentially a buyer-seller relationship. The common needs and fears of the rank and file are ministered to by the leaders, who in turn profit by the support of the members. The service rendered may be real or fictitious, but it meets some real or psychic need in the public. Institutions, in other words, range from organizations which function efficiently in the interests of all, to organizations which are purely exploitative. The existence of the institution means that the individual cannot satisfy his needs directly and immediately. They must be satisfied through following the formally charted routes of the institution. The institutional life of the

*In addition to the public, the leaders, and the physical plant, the student should also be aware of the social context in which the institution is found, specifically the pattern of attitudes in members of the out-group. Since the institution is carried in the habits and attitudes of its members, it is definitely affected by the acceptance, expectations, deference, or hostility of people who do not belong. For example, students may start a new fraternity on a college campus. It often takes three or four years for members of the older fraternities to consider the new organization a fraternity. The members of the new group themselves do not feel their organization a real fraternity partly because of the attitudes of the rest of the student body. Not infrequently, therefore, the new fraternity dies prematurely.

rank and file can thus be considered in relation to (*A*) their common needs and (*B*) their common routine actions which supposedly meet these needs. This also involves (*C*) a general attitude of conformity toward institutional symbols and (*D*) the acceptance of an ideology which justifies the whole pattern.

A. Common Needs and Fears

The fundamental needs and wishes of individual human beings are the bedrock upon which the institution rests. Whenever we are puzzled by a sociological account of an abstract institutional entity transcending mere individuals, we should turn to the present members of that organization and study the basic motives it satisfies. The J curve of conforming behavior is produced not alone by propaganda and external coercion. Its frequent occurrence is due to the fact that human beings are sufficiently alike to have many problems and motives in common. The wants and fears which people share are the raw material for institutionalization.

Specific human needs do not correlate perfectly with particular institutions, but history shows a rough correlation between types of organization and types of motives. The family is obviously built around sex needs and historically represents a solution of both the sex problem and the economic problem of self-maintenance. The first economic unit was the family. Industrial and business organization arose to meet material needs, though in advanced cultures such organizations also satisfy more derived motives. The church developed around the fear of the unknown and the desire to appease and control it. Just as industrial organization grew out of the struggle for existence with the real world, so the church developed out of the struggle with an imaginary environment. "Religion," asserts J. Lippert, "is the struggle for existence prolonged beyond the grave" (8). The state represents the specialized use of force to maintain the functioning of economic institutions. It is also based upon the fear of external aggression and the fear of one's fellow men. If we were not afraid of robbers and of anti-social individuals, we would not need the police. If we were

not afraid of foreign foes, we would not need an army. If we were not afraid of interference with accepted property relations, we could dispense with much of the machinery of the state. Governmental institutions, in contrast, are collective adjustments for problems common to everyone in a society, such as health and sanitation. Educational institutions in general function to maintain and strengthen the other institutions of society.

B. Routine, Conforming Behavior

The routine conforming behavior of the public includes standardized overt behavior, or *ritual* and observance of institutional *taboos*. Ritual and taboo can be found outside formal organization, but no highly developed institution is without its ceremonials and its tabooed objects, people, and practices. With the exception of the physical plant, ritual is *the* most apparent aspect of an institution. It is the external sign of its internal strength. Institutional ritual does not mean that every member of the public plays the same role. The ritualistic pattern may be fairly complex so that certain subgroupings take supplementary and reciprocal parts. Institutional taboos protect either the leader or the symbol of leadership from criticism.

Ritual and taboo function together to keep the public in the formal pathways prescribed by the institution. It is difficult at times to muster the energy to meet routine tasks. People tend to backslide. When ritual fails to hold them through its own attractiveness, taboo prevents them from backsliding too far. Thus people are motivated positively to take the right course through ritual and negatively to avoid the wrong actions through taboo.

The routine conformity of the institution covers more than ritual and taboo. Many simple actions are demanded of the public which lack the emotional release of the ritual. There are also more elaborate patterns, often, of a technological sort which are not ceremonial in nature. Ritual is generally self-motivating in its relation to emotional tensions and other needs. Many of the technical routine procedures in the institution de-

pend upon external sanctions of force or of material reward. The core of institutional behavior is ritualistic, but around this core are standard procedures of a less compulsive sort. Indeed, no need would exist for elaborate organization with leaders, symbols, and ideology, if the institution did not progress beyond pure ceremonial.

C. The Attitude of Conformity

In addition to the specific conforming behavior in respect to traditional rites and taboos there is a generalized attitude to accept the orders or suggestions of leaders when these leaders speak in their capacity as duly constituted authorities. This generalized attitude of conformity also leads to falling in line with fellow members who are taking a certain course of action. The conforming nature of mankind has been seized upon to explain all uniformities in behavior—institutional and non-institutional. Unless the attitude of conformity is analyzed it is mere tautology to affirm that we are sheep because we behave in a sheeplike manner. Institutional conformity is rooted in at least five reasons.

1. It is much easier to follow the suggestion of the leader or the action of one's fellows than to work out one's own solution. People conform with traditional practice when confronted with a problem because conformity saves them time, energy, and thought. The formal code of the institution presents a ready-made answer. Army life with all its drawbacks is comforting to many men because all their decisions are made for them.

2. In actual experience with individual solutions people frequently find that it is more economical and efficient to follow leaders. If everyone follows the same pattern, confusion is avoided. We all realize that certain rules of the road deserve implicit obedience for our own convenience and safety. Traffic rules in life are likewise essential. Adults also realize that there is a greater return from efforts expended collectively than from individualistic activity. More is produced under social direction than through uncoordinated expenditure of energy.

3. In most institutions non-conformity is punished. Members are disciplined through censure, fines, suspension, and the threat of expulsion for not obeying the leaders. The leaders are especially organized for enforcing sanctions. The official penalties are often backed up by the public opinion of the rank and file. If we do not conform we meet with social disapproval.

4. Through identification with a larger group we enhance our egos. We conform because in so doing we become part of a great university, a great church, a great nation. We can claim as our own the accomplishments of our fellow members and our leaders.

5. In our society, institutional conformity is also a matter of conditioning. From early childhood we have been raised in groups and have done things in unison. The kindergarten teacher has her pupils sing together, clap together, march together. The sight and sound of others applauding a speaker, obeying a leader, or following an institutional command are conditioned stimuli for us to follow suit.

A number of these reasons assume that the institution is sufficiently well established for an *impression of universality* concerning its symbols to be common through the rank and file. People will conform for purposes of ego-enhancement or for greater rewards if they believe that everyone else in the group is behaving in similar fashion. If they do not think that a practice is universal, they do not see why they should lead the way. By universal is meant not the whole of mankind but *the universe with which they identify themselves*. And this is often a very limited group. Now the impression of universality may easily become an illusion of universality in a large institution. Because of the large number of members and because the members are not brought into personal relationships with many of their fellows, a condition of *pluralistic ignorance* often obtains. People will stay in line because their fellows do, yet, if they only knew that their comrades wanted to kick over the traces too, the institutional conformity of the group would quickly vanish. Hence it is good tactics for institutional leaders to avoid a showdown, if the opposition is beginning to gain strength.

During the prohibition era the forces in favor of prohibition never wanted any objective check on public sentiment. They tried to kill off straw polls on the subject of prohibition. As a consequence of their tactics even the politicians were fooled by an illusion of universality of opinion in favor of the Eighteenth Amendment. When an objective check was made, however, prohibition collapsed like a punctured balloon.

D. Institutional Ideology

The use of stereotypes to justify man's actions has already been discussed. When stereotypes and rationalizations become elaborated into a consistent pattern they are known as an ideology. The public not only *act* as members of the institution. They also *believe* in its ideology. Institutional ideology is the official presentation of the history, the philosophy, and the purposes of the organized group. The state, for example, has its nationalistic legends with glorified accounts of its origin, panegyrics of its heroes, and exalted pictures of its ideals. Political parties likewise eulogize their founders and idealize their programs. The ideology of the Democratic party presents it as the party of Jefferson and Jackson, the champions of the people against special privilege and against the tyranny of centralized government.*

The nature and function of ideology has attracted the attention of many serious students of society, though they differ in the terms they employ to designate the phenomenon. V. Pareto, the Italian economist and social philosopher, has called men's verbalizations *derivations* (12). According to his view the essential factors for understanding human beings are the constant needs and mechanisms of behavior which he terms *residues*. Derivations are the pseudo-logical explanations for justifying residues. Men act in accordance with their residues. Ideology does not motivate men; it gives them fine reasons for doing what they would do anyway. Pareto objects to most so-

* According to K. Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*, the term ideology came into popular use when Napoleon contemptuously labeled the philosophers who opposed his imperial ambitions "ideologists."

cial science because it accepts derivations as the true story of social events. History, sociology, and political science give us the rationalized superstructure of society, but religion in practice bears little relation to theology, applied law is unlike jurisprudence, and morality in practice differs from the official moral codes. Pareto's position on ideology has been summed up in this one sentence: "Ideas except scientific discoveries are of very little importance in social life" (3).

A somewhat different emphasis is placed upon ideology by G. Sorel in his treatment of social *myth* (14). Sorel was interested in the way in which a system of ideas expressed the ideals and aspirations of a group of people. Such a system might be "a partial reality or the product of the popular imagination." But this, for Sorel, was not the important point. Whereas Pareto had dismissed ideology as a tissue of fictions and rationalizations, Sorel showed the dynamic and directive influence of myths. The early Christians went singing to their deaths secure in their belief in the apocalyptic myth, according to which Christ was to return, the pagan world was to be destroyed, and the kingdom of the saints was to be inaugurated. Without the belief in this myth, they would not have become martyrs. Similarly, the myth of the general strike in the Socialist movement has a real function on the ideological level, if it "contains everything that the Socialist doctrine expects of the revolutionary proletariat." The picture of the general strike is a source of great strength to the Socialist movement, "if it has embraced all the aspirations of Socialism, and if it has given to the whole body of Revolutionary thought a precision and rigidity which no other method of thought could have given" (14, p. 136).*

* In a similar vein R. Niebuhr writes in his *Reflections on the End of an Era*. "In the mythology of communism, capitalism is the principle of evil itself, analogous to the devil in the mythology of orthodox Christians. The complexities of history never reveal or justify these over-simplified abstractions; but it must be admitted that they are potent in arousing those passions which are necessary for, or at least inevitable in, the forces of history which destroy the old and construct the new. If a higher degree of objectivity should provide more discriminating judgments there is always the possibility that they will lame the nerve of action" (p. 88, Scribner's Sons).

The use of the word myth by Sorel in place of the more sober term ideology may seem confusing. This is because myth is generally employed to refer to the ideas of a group of people other than our own. Myths, which are obviously labeled as such, come from the folklore of a far-off people. Hence we think of myths as interesting, quaint tales of an imaginative, naïve folk. These tales are real, however, to their owners, who would regard many of our cherished beliefs as curious myths. Myths are related to fairy tales and art in that they crystallize man's wishes on an imaginative level. Unlike fairy stories, however, myths are beliefs. Art admittedly represents a fictitious world. In art the individual pretends and plays that *if* the world were of a different nature, certain events would take place.* In myth the individual really believes that a certain event has happened or will happen. This belief, furthermore, is held with great emotional fervor.

The functional role of myth, which Sorel stresses as against its useless character in Pareto's analysis, is confirmed by B. Malinowski's study of the Trobriander Islanders. "The myth," writes Malinowski, "comes into play when rite, ceremony, or a social or moral rule demands justification, warrant of antiquity, reality and sanctity" (9, p. 28). "Myth functions especially where there is a sociological strain, such as in matters of great difference in rank and power, matters of precedence and subordination, and unquestionably where profound historical changes have taken place" (pp. 58-59). For example, the Malari clan which now holds the highest rank among the Trobrianders buttresses its position by a myth concerning humanity's origin. Man, the natives believe, originally lived underground. He emerged through holes in the ground such as grottoes or heads of creeks. In general the different clans

*To the child who believes it, the fairy tale is of course a myth. Children frequently have a difficult time learning to differentiate between the fictions of stories and the fictions which adults regard as real. In his play, *The Good Fairy*, Molnar presents two individuals who have never learned this distinction. The heroine regards all the accepted fictions of social institutions as of the same stuff as fairy tales and treats them accordingly. To her, everything is a matter of pretending. To her lover, on the other hand, all things, even the institutional fictions seldom accepted, are real.

emerged from different holes, but one special spot witnessed the emergence of the totem animals representative of a number of clans. Immediately upon coming up from underground the totem animal of the Malari clan asserted its superiority over the other animals. By this myth the Malari justify their place as the ranking clan.

To civilized man this tale makes little sense, but to the natives whose culture is dominated by totemism it appears a cogent reason for Malari superiority. Similarly, the doctrine of Apostolic succession would mean little to the Trobriander, but at one time it was a vital belief of many Christians. Even today in western European culture, favored positions in society are justified by the myth of the correspondence of biological with social inheritance. Somehow nobility and position in society are assumed to be determined by the chromosomes.

The interpretation of ideology as serving a real function though determined by more basic factors goes back to the writings of the dialectical materialists. They held that ideas arose in the first place from men's actions in a real world. Thus K. Marx and F. Engels contended: "we do not start from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as described, thought of, imagined, and conceived in order thence and thereby to reach corporeal men; we start from real, active men and from their life processes and show the development of the ideological reflections and echoes of this life process. . . . Morals, religion, metaphysics and all other ideology and the corresponding forms of consciousness thus no longer maintain the appearance of independence" (11, p. 212). But once ideology arose from men's struggles in a real world, it was then used as a weapon to fight the battle of material interest. Men are not only made by their history; in turn they make their own history. Ideas are not Platonic universals. They derive from man's attempts to adjust to his world and become tools in that very process.

We can conclude concerning the nature of ideology that there is no greater error than to accept at face value the account of men's actions and motives which appear in their myths. To this extent Pareto is correct. But we must also con-

clude that myth or ideology, in spite of its non-scientific character, affects social behavior because men accept it. Men would not bother to rationalize their wishes in ideological form if it did not bolster up and direct their wishes. Without an ideology with its convincing justification for certain action, men might not act at all or might act differently.

Four Features of Institutional Ideology—The ideology of institutions shows characteristic features. The following four characteristics hold for most highly organized groups: (1) a belief in the institution as a reality transcending its members, (2) a belief in the superiority of the institution to other institutions, (3) an absolutistic belief in the righteousness of the institution's aims, and (4) a belief in the inevitability of the institution's success.

1). The belief in the institution as an entity over and above the individuals who compose it is known as the *institutional fiction* (1). It is common to all organizations. Loyal Republicans regard their party as something more than the behavior relationships of mere men. To them it is the Grand Old Party. University students regard their institution as a superpersonal organization. Americans, similarly, reify the idea of the American nation. The nation is an overperson imposing its wishes upon individual members, performing acts, and receiving allegiance from its citizens. The acceptance of this idea by the members of the institution is one of the most significant aspects of social behavior. Without such acceptance highly organized institutions would break down. One of the main differences between institutional and non-institutional behavior is that in institutional behavior individuals consider themselves part of a superior organization which somehow directs and sets the standards for the individual.

Experimental proof of the importance of the institutional fiction is to be found in a study by D. Katz and F. H. Allport of the student institution, the fraternity (7). Two alternative statements were presented to fraternity members concerning the nature of their fraternity and the student was asked to check the one which most nearly corresponded with his view.

The first statement expressed the transcendental reality of the group and depicted the fraternity as an institution having a pseudo-independent existence and imposing its standards upon individual members. The second statement reduced the fraternity completely to the behavior and values of individuals. More than two-thirds of about 2,000 fraternity students accepted the institutional fiction of the fraternity. The attitudes of both the institutionally minded and the individually minded fraternity groups were then compared with the attitudes of non-fraternity students on a number of questions relating to college life. On many issues the more realistically minded fraternity members were actually closer to non-fraternity members than to their fraternity brothers who accepted the institutional fiction (see Table III). In other words, this study showed that where the fiction of the personified group breaks down, the behavior differences which distinguish the fraternity man from the non-fraternity man tend to disappear. The belief in the group as an overperson rather than as a number of individuals is like the old belief in ghosts. In spite of the non-existence of ghosts the fact that people believed in them resulted in individuals acting *as if* there were ghosts. Similarly is it with the fraternity and other institutions. Even though the fraternity does not exist as an entity, the belief by fraternity members in its existence as an overperson makes them behave *as if* there were such an entity as the fraternity. On the other hand, the few realistically minded fraternity members who did not accept the group-fiction notion of the fraternity acted and believed in many respects more like non-fraternity members than like fraternity members.

There are a number of sources of motivation which explain why the institutional fallacy is so readily accepted by individuals. F. H. Allport has given the following account of the emotional basis of the nationalistic fallacy:

The elementary feelings, emotions, and attitudes which have already been developed within the family circle can be transferred to the sight or sound of nationalistic symbols such as the flag, the pictures of the presidents. . . . Not only are our feelings

*MEDIAN SCALE POSITION OF FRATERNITY INSTITUTIONALISTS, FRATERNITY INDIVIDUALISTS, AND NEUTRALS ON THIRTEEN ITEMS
(Medians of the individualists which vary from the institutionalists in the direction of the neutrals are printed in boldface type)

ITEM NUMBER	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM		NUMBER OF STEPS IN ITEM	MEDIAN STEP-POSITION		
	First Scale Step (Step 1)	Last Scale Step (Step 5 or 7)		Fraternity Institution- alists	Fraternity Individu- alists	Neutrals
19	Athletic participation for all, no varsity teams	Entire emphasis upon varsity teams	7	2 73	2 60	2 56
20	Athletic losses would not affect Syracuse	Athletic losses would destroy reputation and merit of Syracuse	7	3 08	2 95	2 69
21	Fraternities should be abolished	Fraternities should be encouraged in every possible way	5	2 90	2 81	2 42
22	No neutrals have a chance in campus activities	Fraternity membership makes no difference in campus activities	7	5 05	4 86	4 41
23	No neutrals have a chance in college social life	Fraternity membership makes no difference in social life	7	5 05	4 76	4 27
24	Fraternities should include all students	Fraternities should include only the socially elect	5	2 14	2 10	0 93
32	Complete freedom of expression for faculty	Rigid supervision of professor's ideas	5	1 15	1 08	0 98
39	Student supervision of student morals	Administrative supervision of student morals	5	2 21	2 26	2 34
41	Cribbing as bad as cheating	Cribbing is the thing to do	7	2 76	2 60	2 13
36	"Daily Orange" should be under no control by administration	"Daily Orange" should be under rigid supervision of administration	5	2 01	1 65	1 94
35	"Daily Orange" is under no control by administration	"Daily Orange" is under rigid supervision of administration	5	2 43	2 45	2 40
42	No students at Syracuse crib	All Syracuse students crib	7	3 18	3 46	2 83
66	"Daily Orange" editorials express the opinion of all students	"Daily Orange" editorials express the opinion of none of the students	7	2 99	2 95	3 06

(From D. Katz and F. H. Allport, 7, p. 195)

conditioned through the use of symbols but our processes of thinking and imagining as well. . . . There is, furthermore, a deep seated tendency to rationalize a symbol, that is to discover some logical reason for feeling toward it as we do. We love the flag, therefore, not as a mere fetish, but because it stands for our country. . . . Thus do we build up a belief in the reality of the things for which our symbols stand. These "projected" realities are not regarded as the product of our emotions, but as something existing quite apart from us and above us. They are not created by faith; but they themselves create faith in that they are regarded as its justification. Without belief in them all rational support for our attachment to their symbols would be lost. In so far, therefore, as we love and cling to our symbols, we are unwilling to permit any question of the realities for which they stand. The attack upon radicals or questioning pacifists in time of war is thus psychologically akin to the earlier attacks upon religious heretics and atheists [J, pp. 141-142].

Another reason for the institutional fiction is that it serves as an effective rationalization to bridge the gap between conflicting desires and wishes, particularly between private and public wishes. Although not a genuinely satisfactory solution of personality conflicts, the fiction of the institution is an easy means by which the individual can gain expression for otherwise incompatible parts of his personality. A member of a fraternity, for example, may want to be fair and unprejudiced toward admitting new members to his fraternity and yet may be desirous of escaping the stigma of associating with Jews or Italians. He can rationalize these two desires by hiding behind the institutional fiction of the fraternity. He will blackball a member of an unpopular race not because of his own snobbishness, he claims, but because other people are prejudiced and he must protect the fair name of his fraternity.*

Our many institutions thus permit us to widen the scope of our behavior without losing our respect for ourselves. This is one reason why we are such great joiners. Joining this organization and that club seems to solve life's problems. But this is

* This example is factual and not hypothetical. Katz and Allport found this the most common rationalization given by fraternity members for discriminating against various national and social groups.

only one side of the picture. Once the individual has accepted the group fiction for his own purposes, he can be used for the purposes of others through the same instrumentality. The same logical flaw in the fiction that enabled him to escape responsibility for his own action also enables the leaders and officials to exploit the individual in the name of the institution. Since the abstract institution is superior to individuals it can demand sacrifices of individual members. The individual should serve the state, not the state the individual. This institutional ideology has reached its most exaggerated form in the Fascist state in which citizens are mere pawns who must be prepared to sacrifice everything for the state.

Frequently, the individual by accepting the group fiction has only sold himself into bondage. He no longer can pursue a discriminating course of conduct. And this is why we see so much contradiction in respect to institutions. Private and public behavior are often not brought together in a genuine integration but exist as conflicting parts of the personality bridged by the tenuous rationalization of the group fallacy. Hence results the ambivalence concerning institutions. People praise them and blame them, love them and hate them. Americans love their government but they also love to get the better of it.

2). *A second common characteristic in institutional ideology is the belief by its members in the superiority of the institution to other institutions.* Every organized group has its own literature of superiority. The present racial myth of the Nazis is an old, old story. There have been many varieties of the Aryan doctrine of racial greatness which antedate the present version of the National Socialists. And the myth of racial superiority is still older. The Jews were God's chosen people. The Chinese regarded other people as barbarians.* The Greeks even

* LaPiere and Farnsworth in their *Social Psychology* quote the observation of a Chinese scholar concerning his first meeting with white men: "These 'Ocean Men,' as they are called, are tall beasts with deep sunken eyes and beak-like noses. The lower part of their faces, the backs of their hands, and I understand, their entire bodies are covered with a mat of curly hair, much as are the monkeys of the southern forests. But the strangest thing about them is that, although undoubtedly men, they seem to possess none of the mental faculties of men. The most

gave us the term barbarians to designate foreigners, though they originally employed it to refer to the Persians. The rise of national states has been accompanied by the elaboration and formalization of doctrines of superiority. The history textbooks of the elementary school glorify the nation's greatness and picture its development as a succession of triumphs. When crushing military defeats must be admitted, they are explained away as the betrayal of the country by traitors. The implicit faith in national greatness pervades all ideological forms and even finds expression in poetry. For example, there are the famous lines of Rupert Brooke:

If I should die, think only this of me;
That there's some corner of a foreign field
That is forever England.

As P. Radin has remarked, this thought extends England's limits unduly (13).

The same fiction of institutional greatness is part and parcel of the ideology of all organizations. The political party, the church, the university, the high school, the fraternity all have their systematized rationalizations proclaiming their preeminence. High-school students blatantly assert their virtues by songs and cheers which literally say, "We are the best, We are the best!" Alumni magazines of schools and colleges more soberly amass statistics of the accomplishments of the institution and its members to document claims of superiority. Every fall, supporters of a small college football team arise to prove its championship caliber by statistical juggling of scores. Their team, A, beat Team B by seven points, Team B tied Team C, Team C beat Team D; therefore A is greater than C and D.

Along with the belief in superiority go legends about traditional heroes and great victories. In the case of the state its military leaders are immortalized in song and story, not always too exact in respect to the facts of the matter. In the case of

bestial of peasants is far more human, although these Ocean Men go from place to place with the self-reliance of a man of scholarship and are in some respects exceedingly clever. It is quite possible that they are susceptible to training and could with patience be taught the modes of conduct proper to a human being" (p. 261, McGraw-Hill, 1936).

the political party its politicians of the past are made into statesmen and are held up as symbols of the party's grandeur. The figures, so unsaintly that they cannot be covered over with synthetic glamour, are covered by the cloak of charity. They are forgotten. The ideology of a political party as carried in the heads of its loyal followers contains no record of the mud-lders and crooks of that organization.

3). Institutional ideology is also characterized by the belief in *the absolutistic rightness of its aims and purposes*. Its objectives are not goals which can be evaluated logically in relation to immediate time and place. They represent absolute justice and absolute right. They are eternal and sacred. Often the institution is regarded as of divine origin. Kings and emperors in the ideology of their political states were divinely ordained or were the descendants of gods. Even today the Japanese emperor, the Son of Heaven, is a divinity to his people. Every religious institution naturally is supposed to be the creation of its god. And few institutions are ideologically represented as the trial-and-error attempts at adjustment of fallible humans.

It follows from the sacred and absolute rightness of the institution that its fundamental aims cannot be argued or questioned. One can debate the best means for attaining these ends, but the ends themselves are above discussion. To question the basic institutional purposes is to be guilty of heresy. Leaders are often more sensitive to heretical outbreaks than to transgression of the overt routine of the institution. Members may fail to conform to some of the behavioral standards because of laziness or the pressure of other demands. But to oppose the ideology of the institution means that the heretic is at war with the institution.

The advantages of an absolutistic ideology for institutional officials are twofold. In the first place, it generates enthusiasm and emotional support. Practical proposals, as tentative steps for working out a solution of a problem, lack the intense, sweeping character of absolutistic phrases. In the second place, the grandiose nature of absolutistic ideology places it above the realm of immediate objective checks with experience. A more

prosaic program can be tested here and now. But to check divine justice and eternal truth in terms of the specific functioning of the institution in its observable aspects is illogical and a bit sordid. We separate in our minds the squalid daily struggles in the political arena from the ideals of the democratic state.

4). A fourth characteristic of institutional ideology is the categorical statement of *the inevitability of the success of the institution*. Here we have another instance of finalistic thinking. This belief in ultimate victory is more apparent in organized social movements than in conservative institutions. The Socialist party adheres to an ideology according to which the cooperative commonwealth is the inevitable next stage in social evolution. Capitalism digs its own grave. To oppose socialism is to oppose the movement of historical forces. In similar fashion other organizations postulate the certain success of their programs. The early Christians were sure that Christianity would conquer the pagans. Many Germans sincerely believe that Hitler is destined to consummate the imperialistic Nazi ambitions. Even college students occasionally believe that their team is a team of destiny which cannot be beaten.

These four characteristics of institutional ideology are evidence of its rationalized nature. Ideas based upon scientific experiment and upon logic do not assert the superiority of one group to another. Such evaluative judgments are foreign to objective science. In science, moreover, things are stated relatively, not absolutely. The unquestioned rightness of an institution, the inevitability of its success, are alien modes of thought to the scientist. Nevertheless the unscientific nature of ideology helps rather than hinders its dynamic effect upon social action.

II. THE LEADERS OF THE INSTITUTION

The leaders of an institution include both the officials and the influential members who hold no formal position. Institutional leadership is the reciprocal of the needs and habits of the rank and file. The relationship is a dynamic one. The

wishes and fears of the public are not static but are satisfied or intensified by the leaders. The factors of routine behavior and of ideology, discussed above, as attributes of the public, really develop out of this dynamic relation.

In general, attempts to describe leadership have taken two paths. The one method is to list the personal characteristics and motives of leaders. The other is to describe the techniques of manipulating and controlling men. Both approaches are very limited in their usefulness because of the complex social scene in which leadership occurs. A personality trait which is significant for leadership in one situation may be meaningless in another situation. A technique which works in one group today may not work in the same group tomorrow. The social context in which the leadership relationship occurs determines the relationship. Different social contexts and the accompanying social processes will be described in Part IV. Here we shall state certain generalizations concerning leadership with the qualification that they are not universal laws of social psychology but are fairly useful in understanding group organization. First, we shall discuss the leader himself, and second, the techniques of leadership.

A. Two Generalizations about Leaders

Two broad statements can be made about the leader in relation to his followers. The first generalization has been formulated by J. F. Brown as follows: "*The successful leader must have membership-character in the group he is attempting to lead*" (4). By *membership character* is meant the pattern of values, attitudes, and habits common to the group. The labor leader must embody the ideas and the way of life of the workers he represents. In many organizations, membership character is narrowly defined to mean technical affiliation. Some universities once made it a policy to select their presidents and their football coaches from their own alumni. Bishops in the church similarly are not outsiders. They come from the ministers who are known as good church men. Technical affiliation, however, is not as important as the psychological

similarity between the man and the group he is to lead. When the leading Eastern universities abandoned the policy of choosing their football coaches from their own alumni, they still selected men who in manner and attitude could well have been their own graduates. When the Republicans chose Herbert Hoover as their presidential candidate in 1928, they selected a man who lacked technical membership in their party, but a man who otherwise was as Republican as he could be.

Many examples of the efficacy of potent membership character can be cited. When a political party runs a candidate for office in a particular district, it tries to get a man with whom that district can identify itself. Representatives of big business who reveal their true membership character have little chance of carrying the working-class wards. Hitler's success as a leader is largely due to his reflecting the aspirations and experiences of a great many Germans. His life summed up the common experiences of many of his followers. He bitterly resented Germany's defeat in the World War, he hated the success of the Jews in business and in the professions, and he envied the advantageous position of the capitalist. The remarkable thing was that one man could so typify the emotions of so many people.

The second generalization as formulated by Brown is: "*The leader must represent a region of high potential in the social field.*" Though the leader is of the group, he is also superior to it. Stalin is Comrade Stalin of the same rough dress as his followers, but he keeps himself segregated in the Kremlin. This is a familiar principle in social psychology, and it will be discussed later in relation to identification (see pp. 326-328). People are not satisfied with identifying themselves with some one who is no greater than they are. Membership character furnishes a common link, however, by which the superior qualities and position of authority of the leader can be vicariously enjoyed. Clarence Darrow, the criminal lawyer, captivated local juries of farmers, who came prejudiced against the city attorney with the great reputation. But Darrow appeared before them in his shirt sleeves with his hair falling in his eyes.

He talked in their homely idiom, and only when they had identified themselves with him did he turn on his high-powered oratory.

B. Techniques of Leadership

Realistic students of social behavior from Aristotle through Machiavelli to Pareto have contributed to the description of the techniques for managing and manipulating men. These techniques may be grouped into three classes: (1) techniques of repression, (2) propaganda techniques, (3) techniques of action.

I. TECHNIQUES OF REPRESSION

Aristotle discussed repressive measures under three heads. (a) *The ruler sows mistrust among his people.* He foments quarrels among them. Friends are embroiled against friends. The leader cannot be overthrown "until men begin to have confidence in one another" (2). The ancient policy of *divide and rule* is still widely used in political institutions in which the successful leader splits his opposition by fostering factionalism. Modern industrialists prevent strikes by playing up the antagonisms between different racial groups in their employ.

(b) *A policy of terrorism is maintained.* Those who are too high are lopped off. The leader humiliates his subjects; "he knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody." Independent men are put to death or shorn of power. The people are further intimidated by a system of spies. The Nazi dictatorship has made abundant use of this type of repression. People of spirit have been broken or killed. The courage of the majority has been sapped by an efficient spy service.

(c) *The people are kept impoverished and powerless.* Taxes are multiplied, and the people are kept so poor that they are obsessed only with their poverty. History tells us that revolts and revolutions do not come from the most destitute classes. Rebellion generally takes form in a group which has something, but which wants more. Aristotle's contention is that a

man cannot rise and fight, once he is down and a repressive foot is kept on his neck.

2. PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

The techniques of the modern propagandist are fortunately coming to be widely known. Five common procedures will be mentioned. (a) *Publicize the services and accomplishments of the institution.* Since the institution is an indirect means of satisfying wants, people are not always aware of how much or how little they derive from the organization. Repeated and vivid advertising of institutional achievement, therefore, is often as important as achievement itself. The "G men" of the Department of Justice captured the popular imagination because their actions were dramatically presented to the people in a well-handled publicity campaign. The people, moreover, had their fears continuously stimulated by the appearance of lists of public enemies.

(b) *Give the public a good show.* Often the services of the leadership are too meager or too uninteresting to publicize. Then, the device of amusing the people may be employed. Before the depression this was one of the widely used methods of political leaders. The mayor of a large city sold himself to his public by making the front page regularly in some entertaining manner.

(c) *Create a common enemy.* People will remain united in support of their leaders, if they find themselves confronted by a common danger. Where there is no such emergency, it can be created by propaganda. A hated group is singled out as the common foe. They are made the scapegoats for every calamity. In Germany the Jews have long served the Nazis as an object against which to direct the wrath of the people. In the United States the Communist is the bugaboo, but Communism has been invoked as the common danger so often that it has lost its efficacy as a unifying symbol.

(d) *Keep the ideology of the institution constantly before the public.* The ideology of the institution justifies institutional actions and practices. It invests them with the reason of the

emotions. People need to be constantly reminded of the glories and ideals of their organization. Since the real world does not furnish this reminder explicitly, a constant verbal barrage refreshes their minds. Furthermore, if ideology is persistently held before the public, it seems as natural and as necessary as the air they breathe.

(e) *Appeal to more than one motive.* Institutional leaders hold their followers by appealing to a variety of motives. If the dominant purpose of the organization is economic, propaganda is also directed toward ego motives. A modern industrial concern will not only seek to persuade its employees of its fair wage policy, it will also try to bring about an ego-identification with the institution itself. Political parties are notorious for promising everything to everybody. The church continues to survive as an important institution because it has broadened its base to include aesthetic, recreational, educational, and social wishes. The psychology of this technique is not only the capture of more people through a broad appeal; it is also the securing of a more thorough allegiance from one individual through *funneling his many interests into one channel.*

3. TECHNIQUES OF ACTION

Propaganda is the manipulation of people through verbal symbols. Men are also controlled by deeds. A number of these devices have been mentioned under techniques of repression. To this list we shall add four methods which are not primarily intimidating in character. (a) *Buy out the leaders of the opposition before it becomes formidable.* "Buying" refers both to the giving of actual monetary rewards and to corrupting the purposes of the opposed leaders by satisfying any of their personal motives. The rising young men, who gather about them the discontented, are put upon important committees. They are given minor positions within the institution. Their talents are utilized and rewarded. Pareto has written interestingly about this process of absorbing the outstanding spirits in the rank and file in his discussion of the *circulation of the elite*. The dangerous, ambitious young men

in the lower classes can be incorporated into the ruling class. This has the double advantage of depriving the lower classes of leadership and of strengthening the upper classes with new blood. On the other hand, danger lurks in this procedure. The old leaders tend to take in young men like themselves of whom they can be sure. Thus the institution is overloaded with officials of one type and lacks adaptability. Or if they take in young men unlike themselves, the danger is that the new leaders instead of being assimilated will capture the institution.

(b) *Have the public pay for institutional services in as painless a way as possible.* Tax luxuries, but do not tax bread and salt. An indirect system of taxation has the advantage that people do not know how much they pay. Do not levy membership dues solely as dues. Give the members some specific return at the time they pay their fees. Many scientific societies give a subscription to a magazine to dues-paying members. The Ku Klux Klan exacted a heavy toll from its rank and file by the simple expedient of charging high prices for the robes and insignia of their organization. If people had been asked for this money merely for the privilege of belonging, they would have refused.

(c) *Keep alive the institutional taboos and multiply the rituals.* Though taboos are prohibitions internalized within the individual, they do not become interiorized automatically. Children must be trained in a manner which will give them feelings of guilt. Institutional leaders are often actively interested in the education of the youth, for the institutional program will not gear into adult habits unless a basis has already been laid. Ritual is likewise of primary importance, and the shrewd leader insists upon the ceremonials of his organization being maintained. In this overt display of the strength of the institution, individuals are socially facilitated in their allegiance. One ounce of genuine participation, moreover, is worth many pounds of passive acquiescence. The leader also multiplies rituals. He devises a ceremonial for every important event in life, so that he holds his followers through many ties. The Nazi party in Germany almost from the beginning used active

participation in singing, marching, and cheering. Since their coming to power they have ritualized almost every phase of German life.

(d) *Render genuine service to the public.* One method by which the leader may retain his following is by simply performing the services he is supposed to perform. The official can do his job so well that the people find him indispensable. This method above all others should be the means *par excellence* for winning positions of importance and for holding them. Unfortunately, however, the pedagogue is too likely to write of things as they should be, not as they are. Nonetheless, since we have given due emphasis to techniques of intimidation and of deceit, it is not altogether out of place in social psychology to acquaint students with this ancient principle of rendering service.

III. THE PHYSICAL PLANT AND EQUIPMENT OF THE INSTITUTION

The physical equipment of the institution is significant largely as it is related to the psychological factors of attitude and habit. Institutional functioning depends, however, upon physical materials with which to work. It is true that institutions have been known to exist for long periods of time with a minimum of physical equipment. The Jewish Church survived after the Jewish nation had been destroyed, its churches burned, its property taken away. It survived through a compensatory emphasis upon ritual and ideology for what it had lost physically. Exceptional circumstances of oppression greatly aided the persistence of Jewish religion after the loss of its physical base. In general, however, institutions depend heavily upon buildings and material equipment. The physical aspect of the institution has three uses: (A) it creates attitudes of respect and deference, (B) it centralizes and concentrates control, and (C) it aids in rendering service to the public.

A. Creation of Attitudes of Respect and Deference

Great buildings and extensive grounds are the visible symbol of a great institution. The fiction of the institution as a super-personal reality is aided by magnificent structures which single individuals and sometimes a single generation of individuals could not have produced. Men come and go, but the continuity of the institution is preserved in its most obvious form in the buildings which endure for centuries. Hoary traditions, which bolster up the sanctity of the institution, demand ancient edifices. Similarly, the physical symbols of office impress the public. Judicial robes, priestly garments, and military uniforms serve to set apart their wearers as something more than individual human beings.

Universities as institutions of learning are not exempt from the tendency to identify an organization with its physical plant. Since people cannot see scholarly values, they prefer handsome buildings. More than one student has selected his alma mater on the basis of its campus. When people contribute money to a college, they want their contribution to show. Hence it is easier to raise money for university buildings than for any educational purpose of the university.

In primitive groups religious societies awe the uninitiated with masks and noise-producing instruments. Part of the mystery of the organization is carried by the costumes and instruments which are unfamiliar to non-members. The Church during the Middle Ages maintained feelings of awe and mystery among the untutored peasants by the grandeur of its cathedrals. The serf who came from his miserable hovel to a gorgeous stone structure with stained-glass windows could well believe he was in the House of God.

B. Centralization and Concentration of Control

Control of the public and of the non-members can be exercised through physical equipment. The state through its monopoly upon armaments has at its disposal the most primitive and the most unanswerable of arguments. Any organized

group possessing armed force is likewise able to coerce its opponents. A goodly share of the national budget of almost every modern state is expended for armament. The greater the naval, air, and land armament, the greater is the state, according to present-day practice.

Ordinarily, however, institutions do not include in their equipment instruments for violent control. They do possess apparatus and buildings which centralize power. The modern institution has its own printing plant, its own assembly halls, and in some cases even its own radio station. The opposition within an institution has a difficult time getting its case before the people, for it lacks not only the political machine but even the actual physical machinery and media for reaching the public. Furthermore, the possession of land and buildings brings revenue. The economic power of an institution is one of its most potent weapons. Universities through this means often control the small towns in which they are located. During the Middle Ages the Church owned between one-fifth and one-third of all the land in Europe. Even today the churches are still firmly entrenched partly because of their vast material holdings. In 1926 in the United States the churches owned land, buildings, and property to the amount of twelve billion dollars.

C. The Use of Physical Equipment to Serve the Public

The avowed purpose of the physical plant and equipment of the institution is to perform a specialized service for the people. The university needs classrooms, libraries, and laboratories to carry on its educational function. The city government needs offices for its employees and equipment to carry on the public functions of fighting fires, keeping the thoroughfares open in storms, protecting people against disease, etc. Industrial institutions are largely buildings and masses of machines to facilitate production. Unquestionably present-day institutions with their technological apparatus operate to give a higher standard of living and a greater variety of services than history has ever known. Civilized man still, however,

has not separated out the utilitarian functioning of the institution from its exploitative aspects. The hope for such a separation lies in the physical equipment as it functions to serve the people. An objective check-up is always more obvious in relation to technology than to ideology. As we become more technological we may turn our realistic thinking to other phases of the institution than its material equipment.

THE ROMAN CHURCH OF THE MIDDLE AGES AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN INSTITUTION

The Roman Catholic Church has been so successful an institution that many modern organizations have modeled themselves after it. The very language descriptive of institutions is replete with phrases taken from the pattern and methods of the Church. The present German state can be better understood after a study of the Roman Church. At the height of its power the officials of the Roman Church controlled almost all the Western world, and in some essentials the Church has not changed for a period of almost 2,000 years. We shall consider it here as it functioned during its greatest days from the point of view of the psychology of the institution. Our discussion will follow roughly the outline already sketched, save that the third major heading of physical plant will not be included.

I. THE PUBLIC

A. The Needs and Fears of the Public

It is possible to distinguish three types of needs and fears upon which organized religion is based. After institutionalization develops, the Church may expand to cover other wishes, but it owes its origin to these three factors: (1) The fearful dependence of men in the face of unknown forces, (2) conflict due to feelings of guilt, and (3) the vicarious satisfaction of thwarted desires.

1). *Fearful Dependence.* We are inclined to underestimate the importance in previous ages of what has been called *ghost fear*. Primitive peoples lived in an environment full of perils.

Starvation, disease, storms, and natural disaster cast a horrible dread of unknown evil over the primitive mind. The nature peoples were helpless before forces they could not control or understand. Primitive man like civilized man projected his own mental content into his environment. He peopled his world with spirits, demons, and ghosts which resembled human beings without having their troublesome physical limitations. To these mysterious, animated forces of his own creation he attributed the causes of calamities and of his good fortune as well. Out of these ghosts and spirits developed the gods.

Western Europe until the modern era was likewise under the spell of the fear of the unknown. The world for Europeans during the Middle Ages was a far different world from the world we know. It was a world in which the devil lurked in every corner, in which God intervened in men's affairs with miracles, and in which the evil in deed and in heart might expect to be smitten down at any time. Even in modern times the fear of the unknown persists. It takes the less extreme form of awe, a realization of man's inadequacy to cope with the forces of the natural world. No matter how hard man works, no matter how well he plans, he cannot control the universe. A superior force is, therefore, predicated and personified. This fearful sense of dependence explains the half-ashamed attitude of many men toward religion. They feel it unmanly to admit their fear and their dependence.

2). *Mental Conflict Due to Guilt.* Religion is also based upon a conflict between man's socialized desires and his more egoistic urges. This is especially true of Christian religions which teach the doctrine of original sin. Christ died to atone for the sins of man. The feeling of guilt is thus intensified by the church, but it has its roots in the process of socialization in which children learn to follow the ethical code of the group. Children are punished and shamed by their parents even though the parents may not be religious. Conviction of sin is often the result of an unconscious feeling that one has alienated his parents. Since no one is 100 per cent pure in heart, no matter how circumspect in action, people feel themselves mis-

erable sinners. The Church made the most of the conviction of sin and offered a positive way out of the conflict to the believer. Actions of a self-sacrificing sort, which generally benefited the church, held out salvation for the troubled individual. The resolution of moral conflicts was accomplished through the symbolism of the church. The Deity is the symbol of the father; the mother image appears as the Church herself. Membership in the Church, therefore, means the restoration to alienated parents.

3). *Satisfaction of Thwarted Desires.* The life which men live is never completely satisfactory. We are disappointed and balked at every turn. Religion is one province in which men's wishes come true. The idea of immortality, for example, has its wishful basis. There is no emotional comfort in the idea that we are in this world a few short years and then we are no more. It is not flattering to the ego; nor is it easy to face the cold facts of death when a loved friend or relative dies. The fulfillment of our wishes is seen, too, in regard to justice. In this world, the wicked do not always get their just deserts. The scheming rascal too frequently comes out ahead of the decent, honest person. Disease and disaster strike impartially the good and the bad. It is comforting, therefore, to think that in an afterworld justice will prevail. The refuge afforded by the church has been well stated by E. D. Martin: "Standing in the midst of the confusion and sordidness of the world, it appears to be the presence of another and better world. To the weary it is rest, to the sorrowing, consolation, to the helpless, strength, to the despairing, hope. There is relief from a world that is too much with us. Here because we all seem to believe what everyone wishes to believe, a special environment is created, in which the wish for a more congenial existence may for the time possess the function of the real" (10, p. 246).

B. Ritual and Conforming Behavior

In the beginning Christianity was a simple faith without elaborate ritual. As it grew it acquired many ceremonials and complex symbolism. Mere faith ceased to be the hallmark of

a good Christian and overt indications of conformity were required. Ritual aided the growth of the Church in two ways: (1) in the increasing number of functions ritualized and (2) in the nature of the functions ritualized.

I. THE INCREASING NUMBER OF FUNCTIONS RITUALIZED

The story of Christianity is in large measure the story of the formalization of a personal faith into a superstructure of imposing dimensions. One by one the acts which originally were individual manifestations of belief became standard and compulsory. The early Christians made it a practice to recite the Psalms every day. Individual prayer was a form of personal conversation with God. To encourage individuals to pray, however, the stereotyped prayer of Our Father was taught. Festivals and church holidays grew in number. The use of holy water appeared, and sacred relics and places began to multiply. Pilgrimages to sacred places became part of the routine of devout Christians. The seven sacraments were formulated to conduct the faithful through the major events of life. The worship of Mary the mother of Jesus as a common ceremonial dates from the fourth century.

The extension of ceremonialism appears in the saint-worship developed in the Church. It grew out of the idolization of the early Christian martyrs. The day of the martyr's death was made the occasion for a festival. The martyrs became saints, and to this list were added individuals known for some pious deed or for some suffering on account of the Christian faith. The list grew so long that every day in the calendar belonged to one saint or more. Every district, town, and country had its saint. Prayers in behalf of the saints changed to prayers to the saints for protection.

"Closely connected with saint-worship," the historian Flick tells us, "was the universal use of sacred relics and a belief in their miraculous power" (6). Early in the history of the Church, relics and images were popular. The buying and selling of relics became a regular business. Laws had to be

passed forbidding the cutting of the corpses of martyrs into pieces for sale. Bishops, however, were not allowed to dedicate a church without sacred relics. "All Christians believed in relics for it was an impious thing to doubt."

In short, the ceremonial and symbolic aspects of the Church were so ramified and so elaborated that individuals growing up in the Christian faith were tied to the Church by many bonds of routine habit.

2. THE NATURE OF THE FUNCTIONS RITUALIZED

The Church held its followers through ritualizing the important events of life in a special way. It placed sacraments about the significant occasions of birth, puberty, marriage, and death. A sacrament is a rite which is regarded as unusually sacred, the rite being considered the outward visible sign of an inner grace. *Baptism* was a symbolic washing away of the guilt of original sin. It was absolutely necessary for salvation. Converts to the Church went through an elaborate ceremony, for which they were prepared by a long course of instruction. *Confirmation* occurred around the time of puberty. Since the child was now of age, physiologically speaking, he had to be further inducted into the Church. *Marriage* also became a sacrament. Unless the union of two people was ritualized by the Church, they were not married in the eyes of the Church members. *Extreme unction* was the sacrament given to the dying. The priest anointed the believer with oil, thus removing all vestiges of former sin. The importance of ritualizing the important emotional events in life has already been described (see pages 70-76). It is difficult for the individual to break away from an institution which solemnizes his marriage, baptizes his children, and closes the eyes of his parents in death. By setting up compulsory rituals at the gateways of life the Church, moreover, should increase its numbers. All children of Church members are made secure to the Church by baptism and confirmation. Then if the Church member should marry someone outside of the Church, the non-member must either

embrace the Church or agree to have his children reared in the Church. By this arrangement, the Church theoretically should never lose its members. Finally if a member strays from the flock during life, there is always the approach of death to bring him back for the last sacrament without which salvation is impossible.

An especially interesting sacrament was that of *penance*. If the individual fell from grace, he could still attain salvation. This was effected through a ritual which involved the ministration of the priest. The sinner confessed, expressed his repentance, and received absolution after he did penance. The ritual of penance was a clever device which allowed for the weakness of human nature. Leaders can set standards for institutional conformity, but people for a hundred and one reasons will sometimes fail to conform. A severe policy may only alienate a great many individuals, whereas a duly charted route back to forgiveness keeps them in the fold. It is always well to leave a loophole for a certain amount of non-conformity on unimportant matters. Confession also makes a staunch supporter of the guilty individual who otherwise would repress his guilt and become a bitter enemy of the institution. Furthermore, in actual practice the contributions exacted as penance enriched the coffers of the Church.

C. The Ideology of the Church

The ideology of the Roman Catholic Church has given rise to volumes of controversy. Our interest here is not in theological dispute, but in the processes by which that ideology became widely accepted. Four reasons stand out for the significance of the ideology of the Church: (1) the centralization of ideology in one authoritative source, (2) the absolute righteousness of the ideology in the minds of Church members, (3) the monopolistic control of ideological sources, and (4) the promises which the ideology held out to the people.

I. THE CENTRALIZATION OF IDEOLOGY IN ONE AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE

The source of the ideology of the Church became centralized in the office of the Bishop of Rome. From the doctrinal point of view this meant that there was one church and one correct belief. Practically it meant two things: the concentration of power in the Bishop of Rome and later the Pope, and a unity and efficiency of action. The doctrine of one Catholic Church came in part from the intense struggle against various forms of heresy. The early Christians had been divided into sects by their disputes over the correct faith. The prestige of Rome as the center of the civilized world aided the bishops of Rome to achieve a centralization of ideology.

In claiming for themselves sovereign jurisdiction over the church the Roman bishops elaborated a clever ideological argument. Their contention, known as the doctrine of Apostolic succession, had it that Jesus appointed the apostle, Peter, to be his successor, that Peter established the Church in Rome, and that Peter passed on his leadership to the Bishop of Rome whom he appointed as his successor, and who in turn passed it on to his successor. The cleverness of the argument lies in its appeal to the divine origin of the Roman Church, its plausibility to the people of the time, and its logical implications. Since the Christian religion has only one God, why not one central Church, with one interpreter of the true faith. The members of the Church gradually yielded, therefore, to the leadership of the Bishop of Rome.

The practical advantage of this centralization was that it kept the doctrines of the Church pure. Even before the height of the papal power, the Bishop of Rome insisted upon rigid orthodoxy. As a result there was one clear ideological line which people had to accept. If every local group had been allowed to make its own doctrinal interpretation, ideological deviations would have been followed by deviations in matters of overt conformity. Today the fascist dictatorships have gone to great lengths to centralize and unify their ideology. It is

much easier, however, to achieve this centralization in the field of religion than in the field of politics and economics. In religion, ideology can be kept stable and undeviating, because it deals with another world and does not encounter the contradictions of daily struggles in this world.

2. THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF CHURCH DOCTRINES

As in most institutional ideology, the doctrines of the church were absolutistic in their correctness. They were divinely inspired and permitted of no argument. Papal bulls were authoritative pronouncements which called for implicit obedience. They were obeyed partly because it was eminently satisfying to people to know that if they followed the Church they could not be wrong. Practically this finalistic thinking had two consequences. In the first place it hastened the conversion of the heathen by inspiring all good Christians to become missionaries. If your religion is the only means of salvation, it becomes your duty to save non-believers in spite of themselves. To this day there are religiously minded people who cannot escape this logic. At any rate the conception early developed that the spread of God's Kingdom was a holy war. The Church grew in numbers through the zeal of its missionaries in converting the heathen to the one true faith.

In the second place, the absolutistic character of the ideology of the church led to justifying the means by the end sought. Since the Church was right, anything which furthered its cause was right. In fact, one Church historian writes of this period: "Forgery was a common thing in those days, and it was generally believed that all things which upheld the doctrines and prerogatives of the Church of God were allowable" (6). Institutional leaders who are not hampered in the means they may employ are in a position of tremendous advantage.

With one authoritative source for ideology and with implicit faith in its rightness the logical conclusion was papal infallibility. The Pope came to be recognized not only as the true interpreter of religious doctrines but as the interpreter who could make no errors. No other institution has ever used its

ideological leverage as effectively as the Church. The present dictatorships have achieved an unlimited and centralized type of authority, but they lack the rationale to convince their people of the logic of the procedure. In the Roman Church the doctrine of Papal infallibility was plausibly and convincingly worked out.

3. THE MONOPOLISTIC CONTROL OF IDEAS BY THE CHURCH

The Church was not only the source of authoritative pronouncements in the field of religion, but Church officials, clergy, and monks had a virtual monopoly on all forms of learning and thought. The elaboration of men's ideas in interpreting the world was a function of organized religion in the Middle Ages. It was only in the monasteries, as a matter of fact, that learning was kept alive. The Church was protected from the damaging influence of ideas contrary to its teaching which might have emerged from other institutions. It had no rivals for its hold upon men's minds. Scientific doctrines had only the barren soil of the church-controlled monastery or university in which to grow. And the Church officials persecuted as heretics any individuals presenting ideas dangerous to its ideology. It is significant that, when the hold of the Church was broken, it was a revolt from within, not a storming from without. In the Protestant reformation it was the monks and clergy within the institution who rebelled.

The monopolistic control of ideas made for the stability and power of the Church, but on the other hand it made for a lifeless set of doctrines. Ideas arose and were accepted not out of trial-and-error adjustment to the realities of life, but out of the internal need for systematization within the official ideology. In the scholastic period the learning of the monks was diverted to sterile problems and the solution of futile questions. This static ideational system could endure only in the feudal period, which itself was static. As soon as the feudal order gave way to an economic system of change and development, life went on and left the lifeless ideology of the Church high and dry.

4. THE PROMISES HELD OUT TO THE PUBLIC

The misery and wretchedness of human existence have already been mentioned as one of the factors which made possible organized religion. The Roman Church during the Middle Ages appealed to the people because in its ideology the masses found refuge from their troubles. The lot of the great majority of the people in the feudal era was an unenviable one. They were oppressed by their feudal lords. The serf, though not a slave, was chained to the land. He had to turn over a good share of his produce to his lord, and he was subject to almost any indignity or injustice which his lord might visit upon him. His level of subsistence was low. Disease and famine swept the land. From their sufferings the people turned eagerly to an ideology which furnished solace and comfort. The Church doctrines emphasized the insignificance of existence in this world as compared to the life after death. Suffering here and now was an advantage for securing future blessings. No matter how miserable a man found this world, he was promised eternal happiness after death, if he consistently tried to do right.

The compensations in an after-life for present hardships were specifically worked out. The feudal order was a system of fixed status. The peasant, who occupied the lowest rung in the ladder, could not hope for an improvement in status on this earth. In the Kingdom of God, however, he was equal to the highest lord. No matter what the Church did in practice, in theory the Church stood for the brotherhood of man. Before the coming of Christianity the Greeks and Romans had believed in a future life in which most people led a neutral and shadowy existence. The Christian religion made clear and definite this old vague notion of immortality and gave the people a specific picture of what they could expect in the next world.

II. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ROMAN CHURCH

Some of the techniques of the Church leaders have appeared in the foregoing discussion of ritual and ideology. Symbols, rites, and ceremonies were extended to cover many phases of the individual's life, and rites of especial sanctity were placed at strategic points in life. An absolutistic, authoritarian ideology grew up which logically led to the notion of one Church, and one interpreter. Many other aspects and devices of leadership are worthy of description, the following five of which have been singled out for discussion: (*A*) a centralized bureaucracy, (*B*) functions reserved to officials, (*C*) selection of leaders according to ability, (*D*) the intensification of the distinction between the in-group and out-group through the device of excommunication, and (*E*) monasticism as a device for self-reform and self-criticism.

A. A Centralized Bureaucracy

The Roman Church early developed what is called today a bureaucracy, i.e., a large group of officials set apart from the people who derive their living from the institution. An organization with a large number of paid workers whose income depends upon the growth of the organization is very much of a going concern. Though Christianity started as the religion of the people, a wide gulf soon came to separate the laity from the clergy. The sacrament of ordination was added to church ritual, and this sacrament formally set apart the official of the institution from the rank and file. Ordination conferred the power and privilege of forgiving sins and of performing the miracle of the mass.

A differentiation in the ministry itself set in. The bishop was elevated above priests, and the Bishop of Rome was elevated above all bishops as God's chosen representative on earth. As the church grew, the hierarchy within the Church became more complex, but the essential outline remained the same. Authority was centralized in the hands of the pope. Every official knew where he stood in the hierarchy. He knew to whom he had to defer and from whom he could expect defer-

ence. The unity in ideology was paralleled by a unity in practical organization. "In organization," Flick writes, "the Church had changed from a democracy to an absolute monarchy, from many local centers of authority to one great world power based on an imperial hierarchy, from communism to paternalism, from decentralization to centralization, from apostolic simplicity to worldly grandeur, and from a spiritual organization to one largely political" (6).

B. Functions Exclusively Reserved to Officials

The corollary of setting apart the officials from the rank and file is the bestowal of exclusive functions upon the officials. The priests stood as the only mediators between man and God. The many essential rituals could be performed only by the clergy. They alone could administer the sacraments. The religious needs of the people were emotionally tied to the ceremonies and symbols of the church. Hence when they expressed these needs they were compelled to avail themselves of the services of the priests. The clergy became a closed corporation. An analogy can be made to the American Medical Association, save that present-day physicians are more jealous of their prerogatives. Motivation did exist in the Roman Church for people to accept the priests as their mediators. Rituals were so many and so complex that only the priest knew how to perform them, just as today we need to hire a lawyer to take us through the intricacies of our legal procedure. In the Church, moreover, a potent additional motive for accepting the system was the relief from individual responsibility. Whereas the Protestant answers directly to God, in the Catholic Church the individual answers to his father confessor. Catholicism is, therefore, a much more psychologically satisfying religion for most people.

C. The Selection of Leaders According to Ability

The Catholic clergy constituted a closed corporation only in their monopolistic role as God's representatives. Admission to the clergy, however, was often open to the intelligent and the

industrious. One reason for the permanence of the Roman Church as an institution was its selection of leaders according to ability. Though corruption has at various periods been rife in Catholic officialdom, superior intellectual endowment has generally been one basis of promotion. Outstanding men are moved up in the hierarchy. Opportunities also exist at the bottom of the clerical ladder for the laity to enter the priesthood. Boys with no money but with brains have been allowed and at times encouraged to study for orders.

This policy of recognizing ability has given the Church able and enterprising leaders. It has kept up the morale among the officialdom. Men are discouraged and lie down on the job when their best efforts go unrewarded. It is also true that opening the doors to promising young men prevents them from becoming the leaders of the discontented. If there is a recognized avenue for genuine ability, less motivation exists for ability to seek to overthrow existing forms.

In addition to the recognition of ability the Church also insisted upon thorough training for its future leaders. Not every enthusiastic person could take priestly robes. The candidate had first to pass through a period of schooling and rigid discipline. Catholic orders and later Catholic colleges were models of formal training. Even in the modern period this insistence upon training is strikingly in evidence, if we compare Protestant and Catholic churches. In 1926, slightly over one-half of the Protestant ministers in the United States were untrained or poorly trained in the sense that they were not graduated from college or from a theological seminary. The number of untrained Catholic clergy is negligible in comparison.

D. The Intensification of the Distinction between the In-Group and the Out-Group through the Device of Excommunication

The church officials evolved a powerful sanction to keep their people loyal in the weapon of excommunication. Excommunication cast the offender out of the church and cut him off from the sacraments which alone could insure salvation. Mem-

bers of the church, moreover, were debarred from giving him food or shelter or even associating with him.

Excommunication was an interesting psychological means of establishing a rigid dichotomy between institutional loyalty and institutional treason. People tend at times to waver in their loyalty. If it were solely up to them, people would be only lukewarm in their institutional allegiance. Since the world is so full of a number of considerations, many of us would like to sit on the fence and be neither blindly loyal nor completely negativistic. We want to be able to say what items of the institution we shall accept and what items we shall reject. But institutional devices do not give us this choice. They force us to be on one side of the fence or the other. *Loyalty is made into an all-or-none affair.* Excommunication was an extreme form of this procedure. The individual either conformed on essentials or was thrown out as a traitor. No one was allowed to sit on the fence. The individual either came into camp and was good or he was cut off with a drastic finality. Once in the traitor class of the excommunicated, every means of power of the institutional leaders was turned against the unfortunate outcast.

E. Monasticism as a Device of Self-Reform and Self-Criticism

The Roman Catholic Church was a great institution partly because it contained within itself a source of reform, of purification. As institutions grow old, the fiery zeal and sincere conviction of the early leaders are frequently replaced by a corrupt bureaucracy which never has had to face sacrifice or the prospect of becoming martyrs. Although this did happen in the Roman Church, it was checked by the purifying factor of monasticism. Monasticism was an institution within an institution. Religious orders developed in the church of an ascetic, self-denying nature. Their members were monks. They might be wandering monks, or they might live in a monastery. They were sincere and devout Christians. The proof of their sincerity is evidenced by the fact that they had to give up all

their worldly possessions to the Church when they went into the monastic order.

Monasticism reformed the Church from within in many ways. It checked the abuses of the officials because it fed into the personnel of the Church a stream of pious men. Many priests and bishops and even some popes came originally from monkish orders. In addition, the monks offset the worldly, self-seeking actions of many of the Church officials by offering the people a living example of the ideals of Christianity. They administered charity and took care of the poor and the sick. They were also the proselyters and the missionaries. They did the converting of the heathen. In still another way they maintained the Church by acting as a brake upon growing political institutions. Their unworldly character prevented them from rendering homage to the local political unit and building up its strength.

The persistence of the institutional pattern of the Roman Church through centuries thus cannot be ascribed to any single factor. The church endured because it satisfied the needs of people in a non-scientific age, because the symbols and ceremonies of the Church were linked the emotions of men and women from childhood, because there were no counterattractions to compete with the Church, because the Church through penance and confession sanctioned the return to grace of the transgressor, because unrepenting non-conformers were harshly dealt with, because the leaders were well trained and well motivated, because the Church contained within itself a device for self-reform. The student of social science can find an interesting parallel between the Nazi State and the old Roman Church. Step by step the Nazi leaders have followed the institutional pattern outlined in the history of the Church. They have had the advantage of modern technology to hurry the process. On the other hand, they have the disadvantage of a dynamic economic order to contend with, as against the static feudal system of the Middle Ages. It is a safe prediction, therefore, that with all the tried and proved devices of institutional construction they are nevertheless building on quicksand.

SUMMARY OF PART I

In this section we have recorded and analyzed the phenomena which unfold before the eyes of the man on the street. We have ordered these data to a simple pattern of uniform and atypical behavior. Uniform activities and divergent ways have been examined carefully and further classified according to their psychological functions. The collective processes of adjustment such as cooperation and competition have been described. Institutional patterns, as the stratification of the dynamics of interaction, have been outlined. In short, the social world which the layman knows has been presented. It has been conceptualized, furthermore, as the thoughtful layman himself might organize it. We are far, however, from exhausting the possibilities of a study of social events. The man on the street like every observer is naturally limited in his point of view. The approach of the clinician, who sees the social world in terms of personalities, and the approach of the social engineer, interested in the total context of social relationships, must also be considered to complete the story. For a more fundamental insight into social behavior, however, it is now fitting to examine the mechanisms of human action as they have been established in experimental science. Part II is devoted to this problem.

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PART II

THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES

CHAPTER VIII

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

From a realistic point of view all social phenomena reduce to the behavior of individuals. A nation waging war against another nation or the gradual development of a language are events in which human beings are interacting. An understanding of the nature of human behavior is, therefore, a prerequisite for the understanding of political, economic, and other social occurrences. Since man is an animal, he must be understood at the level of biology before he can be understood as a member of the great society.

The problem of man's behavior really poses three fairly distinct questions. (1) 'What is the essential nature of human behavior; with what kind of a mechanism are we dealing?' (2) How does this mechanism work to give the variety and complexity of reactions known as human conduct; in other words, how does behavior develop? (3) What makes the mechanism go; what drives or pushes men to do things? The first two problems will be discussed in this chapter; the third problem will be considered in Chapter IX.

I. THE MECHANISM OF BEHAVIOR

The Stimulus-Response Formula

All behavior consists of the physical motions of a biological organism responding to forms of physical energy called *stimuli*. These movements are mediated through the nervous system. A stimulus impinges upon a sense organ. This stimulation gives rise to nerve impulses in the nervous system. The first nerves to be activated are the sensory nerves which go from

the sense organs to the spinal cord and brain. In the spinal cord or brain the sensory nerves are in functional connection with central nerves, which in turn are in functional connection with motor nerves which run from the brain and spinal cord to muscles and glands. The nerve impulses are first conducted over the sensory nerves to the central nerves, and from there over the motor nerves to the muscles and glands. The result is the contraction of a muscle or the secretion of a gland.

The essential mechanism of man's behavior can be summed up as, (a) the stimulation of a sense organ, (b) the conduction of impulses by the nervous system, and (c) the activation of muscles and glands. These three processes will now be considered in more detail.

(a) *The Receptors and Stimulation.* Sense organs, or *receptors*, are specialized structures for the reception of particular forms of energy. The ear, for example, is stimulated by the mechanical motions of air waves and the eye by light waves of various lengths. Instead of the five traditional senses man possesses at least eleven. The skin alone contains four specialized receptors: one for warmth, one for cold, one for pressure, and one for pain. In addition to the auditory receptor in the internal ear there are semicircular canals which are stimulated by changes in the position of the head. In the visceral organs are sense receptors which mediate such experiences as hunger and sex. And finally, man possesses a muscle sense. Within the muscles, tendons, and joints of the body are embedded *proprioceptors*, or sense organs, which are stimulated by the movement of muscles.

The sense organs which lie within the body are frequently overlooked by those who cannot understand how all behavior is initiated by stimuli. The fact that there are proprioceptors in all muscles means that it is impossible for the organism to lack stimulation as long as it is alive. As long as the individual's heart continues to beat and his lungs to breathe, he receives a continuous stream of nerve impulses from the muscles of the heart and chest. As long as there is life, there is activity, therefore stimulation, and therefore continued activity.

We also frequently overlook the constant or fairly constant sources of stimulation in our external environment. As long as our eyes are open they are stimulated by light waves. Our ears are continuously being simulated by sounds and noises. Similarly, there is the pressure of clothes on our skin and many other fairly constant stimuli. The central nervous system is thus under a virtual bombardment of nerve impulses even during periods of relative inactivity.

(b) *The Nervous System and Conduction.* A general view of the nervous system shows two central masses of nervous tissue continuous with each other, from which radiate nerves to all parts of the body. The two central masses are the brain and the spinal cord. The nerves radiating to all parts of the body are sensory and motor nerves. Sensory nerves conduct into the cord and brain; motor nerves conduct out from these centers. The structural unit of the nervous system is the neuron, or single nerve cell. Every nerve consists of a bundle of these neurons, which resemble fine threads. The neuron is a single fiber for the greater part of its length, but it breaks up at both ends into branches.

The main function of the nervous system is the conduction of nerve impulses. The nerve impulse is both chemical and electrical in nature. The passage of nerve impulses over a nerve is not equivalent to the passage of electricity through a free conductor. A more accurate comparison is the ignition of a chain of gunpowder, since nerve impulses are a function of the energy of the nerve.

The functional connections between nerves are called *synapses*. These synapses consist of the interlacing of the end branches of two or more neurons. The neurons do not fuse but retain their identity as separate cells. Nevertheless they are close enough at the synaptic junction for nerve impulses to pass across from one fiber to another. It is a question whether single synapses ever occur in the nervous system. Multiple synapses at which several fibers stand in possible functional connection are the rule. Since there are billions of neurons in the human nervous system, the possible pathways for nerve

impulses to take seem almost unlimited. At any rate, we have here the structural basis for the amazing complexity of human behavior.

Because neurons do not actually join together at the synapse, nerve impulses meet a certain amount of resistance in getting across from one fiber to another. The passage of nerve impulses across a given synaptic junction has the effect of lowering the resistance for subsequent nerve impulses. The lowered synaptic resistance is at first a temporary phenomenon. At the moment of the passage of nerve impulses and for a brief time thereafter the synapse is electrically charged. Impulses which normally would not cross a synaptic junction now can get across. A given action thus leaves an open pathway in the nervous system for a very brief time. Impulses set up by stimuli different from the stimulus arousing the original action may now take this pathway.

If the temporary state of electric charge is sustained by successive impulses for a considerable period of time, or if the same synapse is repeatedly charged at different times, the resistance at the synapse is permanently lowered. This permanent change is illustrated by those habits of the individual which become "set like plaster." The exact nature of the synaptic change is not yet known. The actual growing toward one another of the branches of adjacent nerve fibers is one explanation. Experimental evidence for this view has been reported in embryonic tissue, but no direct evidence exists for such growth in the adult nervous system. Another view postulates chemical changes at the synapse, but even less direct experimental proof has been forthcoming for this theory. Whatever the physiological explanation, the fact remains that pathways in the nervous system become channelized through use.

When nerve impulses do not break through the synapse, they may lower the synaptic resistance so that impulses which follow them fairly quickly may get through. Impulses may also *summate* simultaneously to break through a synapse. If two neurons which both discharge impulses into the same synapse should be excited at the same time, the excitation may pass the

synapse though the excitation of one of the neurons would have been insufficient to overcome the synaptic resistance. This phenomenon is called *summation*.

A nerve fiber is never continuously active. After a passage of nerve impulses it is refractory to further excitation for a very brief period of time. Thus nerve impulses reaching a fiber when it is in *refractory phase* are not conducted by the fiber. They have the effect, moreover, of prolonging the refractory phase. A nerve fiber can be kept inactive as long as nerve impulses bombard it at a rate in excess of the time necessary for its recovery. The extinguishing of nerve impulses due to this overcrowding is known as *Wedensky inhibition*.*

Wedensky inhibition explains physiologically the cessation of otherwise continuous responses and accounts for the failure of the organism to respond in certain situations. If the organism reacted positively to all excitations, our movements would lack coordination. In some instances opposing muscle groups, contracting equally at the same time, would keep our bodily members in a state of rigidity. The phenomenon of inhibition through overcrowding is one means whereby many impulses are cancelled out in the total neural pattern with resulting fineness and discrimination of adjustment.

(c) *The Effectors and Response*. The effectors consist of muscles and glands. Muscles are of two kinds: striped (or skeletal) and smooth. The striped muscles are the means by which the organism adjusts to external stimuli. The smooth muscles are largely concerned with vegetative activities such as digestion, circulation, and excretion.

The mechanics of response are illustrated by those skeletal muscles which are attached to bones. A muscle activated by a nerve impulse contracts or shortens. This contraction serves to pull the bone to which the skeletal muscle is attached. The

*Other physiological explanations besides overcrowding have been offered to explain inhibition. One theory postulates a chemical inhibitory substance which affects the synaptic and myoneural junctions. While this theory may be proved true in the future, inhibition due to overcrowding has been demonstrated experimentally.

bony skeleton can be compared to a system of levers, and the changes in the position of the body are brought about by muscles pulling the levers.

Striped muscles usually go in pairs, one muscle of a pair having a function antagonistic to that of the other muscle. For example, the flexor muscle bends the arm at the elbow; the extensor straightens it. The direction and extent of the movement of a bodily member depend upon the ratio between the two tensions exerted by the antagonistic muscles. If both muscles of a pair of antagonists are equally active at the same time, no movement will result.

A condition of slight contraction called *tonus* is maintained in muscles most of the time. It is due to a constant supply of nerve impulses not great enough to activate all the fibers of a muscle. Muscular tone accounts for the readiness of an individual to respond differentially in various situations. Muscles that are partly contracted are more ready for movement than relaxed muscles. An exaggerated example is the runner set on his mark for a hundred-yard dash. In different situations we assume different postural sets. The defensive football player who expects a line plunge on the coming play has a different set from that of the player who expects an end run. The degree of tonicity in different muscle groups is an important part of the attitudes and orientations we take toward our environment.

Glands are classified as duct and ductless. The duct gland secretes substances through a tube or duct, for example, the tear glands and the salivary glands. The ductless or endocrine glands have no special outlet, their products passing directly into the blood.

The main function of the glands is concerned with the growth and maintenance of the body. The endocrine glands, moreover, have a close relation to the normality and abnormality of human behavior and will be considered in more detail in the chapters on personality. The chemical products of the glands (hormones) supplement the actions of the nervous system.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIOR

The physiological basis of behavior thus far presented describes the physical mechanism of man's reactions, but it does not explain the particular forms which human behavior assumes in particular situations. Man does not just react; he behaves in complex and meaningful ways in relation to his changing environment. How does behavior become definitely related to environmental forces, so that frequently, given the stimulating situation, we can predict the response? And how is behavior modified so that a fixed habit can be replaced or altered?

Biologists have attempted to answer these questions by postulating inherited pathways in the nervous system which equip an organism to cope with its environment. These biological doctrines of innate traits and instincts are the result of abstracting the human organism from the environment in which it has developed. Many psychologists who deny the instinct hypothesis still cling to its implication: namely, that the human being can be regarded as an object of study without reference to the world which has produced him and of which he is a part.

In place of the doctrine of inherited or preformed nervous pathways, psychology now views man as the product of a developmental interaction between the organism and its environment. In this development two general types of processes can be distinguished: *learning* and *maturation*.

Learning and the Conditioned Response

The human organism acquires habits and modifies its behavior through some form of *associative learning*. Psychologists from the time of Aristotle have emphasized the principle of associative learning. The modern and objective statement of this principle is known as the *conditioned response*. The famous experiment of Pavlov upon the salivary reactions of dogs furnishes the classical illustration of the conditioned response. If a dog is stimulated by the ringing of a bell at the

same time that he is given food, and if this procedure is repeated a number of times, the ringing of the bell alone will start his mouth watering. In this manner a substitute or indifferent stimulus (the ringing of a bell) comes to call out a response (the secretion of saliva) which originally was evoked by the appropriate stimulus of the sight or smell of food.

One plausible physiological explanation of the conditioned response has it that nerve impulses aroused by the indifferent stimulus find their way out over the motor pathway activated by the appropriate stimulus. The impulses aroused by the indifferent stimulus take this pathway because it offers less synaptic resistance than other pathways. And it offers less resistance, because the synapses involved are electrically charged at the moment as a result of the impulses passing over them from the appropriate stimulus.

The applications of the conditioned response which first occur to us are likely to be occasional and rather spectacular instances. We immediately think of the child who is given castor oil in orange juice and who later refuses to drink orange juice. Or we recall the advertiser presenting his tonic for growing hair together with a picture of a scientist in the laboratory. He hopes that the acceptance accorded to science will be transferred in some measure to his product. Or we remember words which call out responses of avoidance such as *un-American* and *Communist* and their use in connection with more neutral words like *unemployment insurance* with the subsequent emotional avoidance of the neutral word.

Conditioning, however, is not a process limited to a few striking situations. It goes on so constantly that we neglect its common occurrence and its indispensable part in all human behavior. Without conditioning, the child would not develop eye-hand coordination. Indeed the coordination of all bodily movement involves the conditioning of the component reflexes in the pattern to proprioceptive and external stimuli. The appreciation of the spatial world about us is based upon the association of the various types of exploratory responses we make toward it. The size of a visual stimulus is meaningful,

because, conditioned to the retinal image, are movements of the eyes and of the other bodily members. More important for social psychology are the social habits built up through the conditioned response. The American Indians were marked off from the English Colonists less significantly by their physical appearance than by the differences in conditioned responses acquired in different social environments. Even within our own culture, social stimuli will evoke widely varying reactions from the child brought up in the public-school system and the child reared by a private tutor.

The conditioned response as illustrated in Pavlov's experiment on salivation needs elaboration. In its bare outline the example of Pavlov's dog may give the impression of a simple nervous system activated by two isolated stimuli and innervating one or two isolated reflexes. The nervous system of all higher animals, however, is so complex that at any one moment in time thousands of stimuli are activating it. Among these stimuli, moreover, are many which have already a number of conditioned pathways of discharge. Therefore, when we bring an animal into a laboratory or seek to train a child, the frequent simultaneous presentation of two stimuli is not always sufficient for the one stimulus to acquire the assumed single motor outlet of the other stimulus.

The complexity of learning in relation to the conditioned response is shown by a rat experiment of L. H. Warner (8). Rats were placed in a cage, the floor of which consisted of an electric grid. Escape from the cage was possible by crawling under a fence or jumping over it. A buzzer was sounded as the substitute or indifferent stimulus one second before the electric shock was administered. After a period of training the sound stimulus was used without shock. Five of the eleven rats in the experiment responded to the shock by hurdling the fence, and after the training also jumped the fence at the sound of the buzzer. Four of the experimental animals, however, responded to the electric shock by scampering under the fence and after the training responded to the buzzer by jumping over the fence. In other words, the specific response of scampering

under the fence had not been conditioned to the substitute stimulus of the buzzer in these four rats. Instead a new activity, the hurdling of the fence, appeared when the buzzer was sounded.*

If we look only at the isolated acts of crawling under the fence or jumping over it, we fail to see how the conditioned response describes the learning which took place. Such a view, however, assumes no previous conditioning on the part of the rat. Both jumping over and scampering under the fence may well be responses previously conditioned either to obstacles or to proprioceptive impulses from the muscles active in escape. Hence the animals can use either response when confronted with the fence, and the specific response employed may be a function of elements in the situation irrelevant to the experimenter's purpose. As a matter of fact, two of the rats in Warner's experiment used the jumping response interchangeably with the crawling response. Sometimes they jumped over the fence in response to the shock and crawled under it at the sound of the buzzer, but at other times the buzzer produced the jumping and the shock the crawling.

Learning, even under laboratory conditions, is a complex process. Although the conditioned response is the simple mechanism to which learning can be reduced, nevertheless

* Many other experiments demonstrate that few acts of learning are so simple that they involve only the conditioning which the experimenter is trying to produce. These results have led some students to discard the conditioned response completely in their theories of learning. This is equivalent to throwing out the baby with the bath, as E. R. Guthrie shows. (Cf. his *Psychology of Learning*, 1935, New York.) And on this point G. H. S. Razran writes, "If the thousands of associations involved in learning a language, playing the piano, writing a book, loving one's wife, and the like were to proceed with the rate and pattern of the conditioning of a snail to a shock, a fish to food, or even the pupil of an eye to a buzz, human life would have to be extended for thousands of years. Undoubtedly, with the continuous increase in complexity of organismic structure and pattern, and particularly with the advent of consciousness and language, conditioning units multiply, concatenate, and coalesce, mechanisms become more delicate, labile, and elusive, and total conditioned behavior of course less simple, certain and predictable. But all this does not nullify the common basis of these phenomena" (from *Conditioned responses: an experimental study and a theoretical analysis*, *Archives of Psychology*, 1935, 191, 7-8).

almost any act of learning involves more than the establishment of a single conditioned response. The new activity to be learned, moreover, is based upon many conditioned responses out of the animal's past which are not subject to control by the conditions of the experiment. Then, too, the total pattern of stimulation is never completely under laboratory control, so that the learning takes place subject to inhibiting and facilitating effects which are not a part of the experimenter's plan. Thus the not infrequent failure to produce conditioned responses experimentally does not destroy the validity of the conditioned response as a principle of learning.

The Reflex Circle. Associative learning, or the conditioned response, is the general principle operative in all habit acquisition and modification. There remains, however, the problem of the way in which the conditioned response contributes to the development of the many specific adjustments which the growing child makes to its environment. The first specific application of the conditioned response in the genesis of behavior appears in the *reflex circle*.

If we start with a nervous system in which no preformed pathways exist, nerve impulses aroused by stimuli may well spread through many pathways and produce random responses. As yet no definite functional connection exists between any sense organ and any muscle. Once a muscle is contracted, however, by random impulses, the resulting series of events is no longer random (2, p. 37-40). Within the muscle contracted is a sense organ which is stimulated by the contraction. Nerve impulses from this stimulation now flow into the central nervous system and find a very definite pathway of discharge, because the most open pathway is the tract just used by the impulses causing the first contraction of the muscle. Hence the new impulses discharge over these very motor nerves and cause a further contraction of the same muscle. After a number of repetitions the sensory nerves from the muscle will come to acquire a synaptic connection with the motor fibers innervating this muscle. This form of conditioning is called the *reflex circle*.

Reflex circles are not limited to responses perpetuated by proprioceptive stimulation from the muscles active in the response. Any response which stimulates the organism to continue that reaction is a reflex circle. For example, the child's utterance of the sound "da" stimulates its own ear. The resulting nerve impulses are discharged over the most open motor pathway, which is the pathway just used in the utterance of this syllable. Therefore, the child continues to repeat the sound. Another form of the reflex circle involves cutaneous stimulation. In embryonic development the child's fingers accidentally touch the palm of the hand. The cutaneous excitation thus set up finds outlet over the pathway of flexing the fingers. Hence the fingers are flexed all the harder. "Such is the origin of the 'grasping reflex' which is so useful through all the later life" (2, p. 39). The reflex-circle type of conditioning accounts for many of the early adaptive responses of the organism such as lip closure, jaw closure, the extensor thrust of the leg when the bottom of the foot is touched, and the tactual exploration of objects and surfaces.

Adience. The reflex circle gives to many of the responses of the child the significant quality of seeking more of the stimulation which called them forth (2, p. 41). This quality E. B. Holt has called *adience*. It can be seen in the approaching, manipulating, and exploratory reactions of both child and adult. Its mechanism is the reflex circle. For example, the child whose hand comes into contact with the surface of an object will continue to press against the object or to run his hand over its surface. The pressure he exerts, or the exploratory movement he makes, furnishes him stimulation which feeds these very responses. They will, therefore, be maintained until other processes in the nervous system break them up. Obvious illustrations of adience can be seen in the dog pushing its head against the hand of its master, the cat rubbing against almost any object, the little girl caressing her doll, or the little boy tearing his toys apart.

Holt writes:

By and large, certainly, the reflex-circle principle equips the organism from an early period of its life with an overwhelming number of reflexes which go out to meet the stimulus, get more of it, repeat or reproduce the stimulation: which are in short adient. . . . For it is observable that the fundamental character of the normal organism, both in infancy and in adult life, is an out-reaching, outgoing, inquiring, examining and grasping one. . . . So characteristically is the infant positively thigmotactic, cuddlesome, clinging and confiding, the child curious, imitative and venturesome, the youth inquiring, full of initiative and heedlessly aggressive, the adult (now at last more cautious, but still) forward-looking, forward-pressing, acquisitive and predatory—that in common speech the very word “responsive” is never used for an avoidance response. Without this underlying positive responsiveness of the organism, the “instincts” of imitativeness, curiosity, acquisitiveness and the character of general initiative could never arise [2, pp. 41-42].

Avoidance. Although adient responses are the normal reactions which children acquire to most objects in their environment, children also learn to avoid or withdraw from certain harmful stimuli. Avoidant responses are learned in the following manner. The infant may crawl into an open fireplace and be burned. Ordinarily the stimuli of contact with objects causes a further movement of the child's body for more contact. But in this case the excitation produced by the burn is so intense that the rapid and continuous stream of nerve impulses keeps in refractory phase the motor pathways which produced the movement toward the fire. By Wedensky inhibition (see page 219) the movement for more contact with the fire ceases.* The intense excitation, moreover, breaks over synaptic junctions into many pathways. The result is that the child wriggles and writhes in random fashion. One of these random movements may accidentally remove the child from the range of the stimulus. The intensity of the stimulation is thereby abated but the injured skin continues to send sensory impulses into the central nervous system. These impulses are discharged over the most open pathway, or the pathway in-

* The child does not always injure itself before it withdraws from intense stimuli. Inhibition may occur before the hand is actually burned.

nervating the response just made, the random movement which took the child away from the fire. This avoidant response becomes further conditioned to the sight of fire and later to the words *fire* and *hot*.

Chain Reflexes. The reflex circle is a perpetuation of the same response through stimuli produced by that response. The *chain reflex* consists of a series of different responses each of which stimulates, or causes to be stimulated, the next response in the series. A memorized poem is a chain reflex. The sound of each word is a conditioned stimulus for the utterance of the next word. Our routine habits of dressing, starting and driving a car, eating, and walking to school and work are largely chain reflexes. Similarly skills like piano playing, extracting square roots, and typewriting consist of chain reflexes.

In the chain reflex each act is a conditioned response to the stimulus produced by a preceding act. The tying together of a series of movements through conditioning to make a permanent habit necessitates a number of repetitions of the same sequence of responses. Some constant feature either of the environment or of the organism is thus a necessary condition for the establishment of a chain reflex. The constancy in the environment may be the fixed spatial arrangement of our world such as the permanent landmarks on our route to school in the morning. Or the constancy may come from the definite temporal order of events which must be pursued to attain an objective as in the case of the successive acts to be carried out in starting a car.

The organism itself furnishes a third source of constancy for the acquisition of chain reflexes in the sense organs contained within the muscles. It is possible for us to find our way about in our own home at night without visual cues. Taking two steps to the right furnishes proprioceptive stimulation which may be a conditioned cue to make a right angle turn.

A great deal of the culture of a society is carried in terms of the chain reflexes of its members. These chain reflexes are learned anew by every generation. To the extent that environmental changes have occurred, the younger generation will not

acquire precisely the same habits as its forebears. In a primitive society with no written records, customs are very obviously carried in the form of overt motor chain reflexes in the many elaborate rituals and ceremonials.

Response to Relationships. The conditioned response as the principle of habit formation and behavior development is limited by the undeniable fact that man, and for that matter the infrahuman species, responds to relationships. The conditioning process is the acquisition of a new motor outlet by a specific sensory excitation. A stimulus comes to evoke a response, because it happened to activate the organism at the moment that a given motor pathway was active. But experiments and everyday observation prove that individuals respond to the relations between stimuli as well as to the specific stimuli themselves.

For example, W. Köhler trained chickens to expect food from the brighter of two papers (5). Grain was placed upon both papers, but the hen was allowed to eat only from the bright paper. When the habit had been established, Köhler kept the light paper and in place of the dark paper substituted a still brighter paper than the original light one. Here was a crucial test of the nature of the training. If the habit were the result of a simple conditioned response, then the hen would be expected to go to the original bright paper, that is, to the conditioned stimulus. As a matter of fact, in 70 per cent of the trials the chickens selected the new stimulus. In other words, they went to the brighter of the two stimuli rather than to the conditioned stimulus. Similar experiments in form and color discrimination confirm Köhler's contention that the relationships between stimuli are important determinants of behavior.

That men respond to the relations between the parts of a stimulating pattern does not invalidate the conditioned-response principle. Conditioning to specific stimuli is a commonplace phenomenon. But the universality and adequacy of a simple conditioned-response theory of learning is seriously challenged by Köhler's experiments. A number of assumptions must be

added to the behavioristic interpretation to account for relational discriminations. It is possible that the response to relations is superimposed upon responses to the absolute values of the original stimuli. For example, in the experiment with the hens on relative brightness the bright light may arouse a greater motor pattern than the dark light. The animal learns to respond to the difference between the proprioceptive backflow from these two sets of responses. When the absolute values of the stimuli are changed, there is still the differential proprioception to guide the animal to the brighter light. This explanation is in keeping with the fact that response to relationships breaks down when the absolute values are radically altered. It is, however, a speculation rather than an established fact. It is advanced merely to indicate that we need not abandon objective interpretations simply because all the complex workings of the human machine have not yet been solved.

The Patterning of Behavior. The analysis of human conduct into reflexes blinded many of the early behaviorists to the obvious existence of *organized patterns* of response. The actions of men can be broken up into reflexes for purposes of abstraction and generalization, but nerves and muscles in their functioning are organized into a complex unity. The organism does act as a whole. From birth on, thousands of stimuli activate the sense organs at any one moment, and the resulting activities in the nervous system are necessarily in functional relationship. Experimental research has shown that even spinal reflexes are affected by other processes taking place in the nervous system. The scratch reflex in the dog is augmented by additional stimulation applied to the dog's back and inhibited by a painful stimulus (7).

The responses of the organism become organized through experience into integrated wholes. Three obvious factors which contribute to this integration are: (1) a nervous system all the parts of which are in potential functional interconnection, (2) the constancy of the objective world, and (3) the unity of the object towards which behavior is directed. The first factor makes possible the occurrence of the processes of inhibition,

facilitation, and conditioning between the many currents of nerve impulses. Since the body cannot move in opposed directions at the same time, competing innervations are canceled out and compatible innervations reinforce one another. Moreover, excitation from many sensory sources can converge on one pathway.

The second factor, the constancy of the objective world, gives time for the organization of responses to develop. The nature of external objects and their relations to one another for the most part remain unchanged over a period of time. Hence the developing individual can build up a pattern of consistent, unified responses toward them. The hurdler develops his integrated skill of skimming over the hurdles through practice with obstacles of the same height in the same type of situation. Where the environmental situation is in flux and presents many inconsistencies, no well-organized behavior can develop. No human could learn to hurdle if the gravitational forces affecting his jump and the visual field of the hurdles and the track altered radically from day to day. It will be recalled that the native-born child of foreign parents, who grows up in two social worlds incompatible with one another, is often demoralized in his adjustments to his fellows.

The third factor, the unity or oneness of the object toward which behavior is directed, is also important. Stimulation produces adient or avoidant behavior, that is, behavior directed toward or away from the stimulating object. Most objects furnish a single source for many types of stimulation. Thus the adience of a child toward a toy is fed from a number of different experiences, all of which originate from the one toy. Its bright color, its intriguing noise, its tactual properties, the kinaesthetic experiences from manipulating it are all naturally referred to the same object. The reference of many experiences to a single objective source provides a means of unifying behavior.

, This is not to say that single items in experience are added together in piecemeal fashion. Since many stimuli occur simultaneously and many reactions are possible, organization occurs

from the beginning of life. The newborn infant does not respond to its world as a mere bundle of reflexes. It exhibits a diffuse pattern of reactions, often uncoordinated. The refinement of these first crude patterns is the work of experience. And experience is more than the summation of isolated acts. It consists also of the regrouping and differentiation of primary action systems.

Sustained Reflexes. Stimulus-response psychology with its mechanistic principles is often taxed with picturing man as a simple automaton. Man is apparently explained in terms of forces acting upon him from without with complete disregard of his role as an active agent. This criticism overlooks the concept of *sustained reflexes* as developed by E. B. Holt (2).

Many specific adient and avoidant responses acquired through conditioning are maintained not as nerve traces, but as active reactions for long periods of time. These responses are generally sustained at such a low level of tension that they do not produce readily perceptible overt actions. They are sustained, moreover, through circular reflexes, i.e., the contracted muscle fibers stimulate the proprioceptors, which in turn keep the fibers contracted. The child who has been burned by fire may sustain an avoidance of the fireplace even when he is nowhere near it.

Generally our sustained reflexes are so mildly innervated that they need reinforcement from other stimulating sources before they dominate our behavior. Nevertheless they actively influence our interpretation of our world and our orientations toward it. The child with the sustained avoidance of fire may show the effect of this avoidance in the imaginative games he plays. In popular language we say that he is bothered by the idea of fire. Sustained responses orient the individual toward his environment and make him alive or alert to the many aspects of the world in which he lives. They also give that subjective character to the nature of man which makes it difficult to predict his reaction in a given situation, if we do not know the story of his development.

Reference has already been made to the *motor set*, or readi-

ness of the organism for a certain type of response due to the tonicity of various muscle groups (see page 220). No sharp line can be drawn between this concept and that of sustained reflexes. *Motor set* is more descriptive, whereas the term *sustained reflexes* tells more of the mechanism involved. Moreover, the tendency is to use *motor set* for a general state of preparedness of the organism produced by some preceding external stimulus. *Sustained responses*, on the other hand, are specific reactions, many of which are simultaneously maintained. Both concepts explain the apparent spontaneity and self-initiated aspect of human behavior.

Simultaneously Sustained Reflexes. The individual at any one time sustains not one but many reflexes. Responses to the various aspects of a situation become mutually interconnected through conditioning. This consolidation of reactions into a pattern is the rule rather than the exception. Since many stimulations are received at one and the same time, the responses to which they give rise are readily tied together. "It will be noted that one of the results of this interconditioning process is that whatever the object which the eyes happen to respond to, the head and body will tend to turn toward, the hands to be extended toward, and the locomotor apparatus will tend to carry the whole organism toward that object" (3, p. 33). Thus the individual will sustain a whole pattern of reactions, and in this manner he takes account of the full import of objects and situations not present to the senses. The consolidation of simultaneously sustained reflexes is the objective aspect of mental imagery. In the mind's eye one conjures up a picture of a familiar scene. The important objects, their spatial relations, their coloring, and other attributes will be supplied by the pattern of sustained responses.

The period for which the same responses are maintained varies greatly. Sooner or later their sustaining reflex circles will be broken up by other activities in the nervous system. Repeated external excitation will revive them. The intensity at which they are maintained also varies from the mildest tonic state of the muscles to gross motor activity. A single cue will

often be enough to restore to full vigor a total pattern of consolidated reflexes otherwise functioning at a low level of tension. For example, we sometimes discover to our discomfort that the utterance of an innocent word calls out a prolonged and violent discourse from an acquaintance—a complex patterned reaction which bears little logical relation to the provocative word. In this case the individual had a sustained group of responses, carried in unobservable tonic reactions, which needed only a conditioned cue to appear in full force.

Trial and Error and Chance Success. The conditioned response in itself is not a complete description of the learning process. The response which is to be conditioned must first be evoked in approximate temporal contiguity with the substitute stimulus. Before we can condition an animal, we must be able to produce the response which we are seeking to condition. In laboratory experiments on conditioning the situation can be simplified by selecting reflexes which are fairly easy to evoke. Salivation can be readily induced in the dog by the smell of food. Thus it can be conditioned to the new stimulus of the bell. In a sense this is equivalent to the rote memory learning of humans.

Both men and animals, however, meet problems in their everyday learning in which the correct response is not singled out in advance. More than half the battle rages around the task of finding the response which is to be ultimately conditioned to the new situation. In the acquisition of avoidant responses, it will be recalled, many random movements occurred which did not remove the infant from the source of the harmful stimulation. The intense excitation continued, however, until some random movement proved successful (or until the infant perished). In other words, the infant learned avoidance of fire because it possessed many possibilities of reaction, one of which happened to prove successful. This appearance of many responses from the organism's repertoire of action is so characteristic of problem-solving that the common psychological term for learning is *trial and error and chance success*.

The highly adaptive behavior by which man controls his

natural world and adjusts to his fellows is achieved only through many trials and many errors. "We learn by doing" is the fundamental postulate of progressive education. The necessity of a background of trial-and-error experimentation for the acquisition of skill and knowledge is such a commonplace fact that we tend to overlook its theoretical importance. In practice, however, we frequently recognize this principle. In a difficult sickness people prefer the experienced physician to the novice. They do not care to be the material for the trial-and-error learning of the novice.

The trial-and-error nature of learning is obscured, however, by the *abridged* and *implicit* nature of many of the trials. Where originally the infant must run both its hand and eyes over an object to obtain a tactual-visual perception of size, the child can use eye movements alone for the judgment. This *abridging* of response patterns, in which a part of the activity takes the place of the whole action, characterizes the development of behavior. When confronted by problems the individual need not run through complete patterns of action before the right one is hit upon. We must not be misled, however, into assuming that trial and error is not taking place, merely because each trial is not being worked out in full detail for our casual observation.

Implicit reactions are really reactions so abridged that they are difficult to detect without such instrumental means as the action current technique. They, therefore, obscure the trial-and-error nature of learning even further. These slight muscular contractions furnish a highly economical means for an exploratory solution of problems. It is customary to refer to learning through implicit trial and error as *thinking*, but no rigid line of demarcation can be drawn between learning and thinking. The apparent immobility of the thinker is an immobility only of gross motor habits. Responses are taking place at a low level of tension, as electrodes placed in his muscles would attest.

• Our language reactions are an excellent source of substitute implicit responses. Subvocal talking can be readily used to

often be enough to restore to full vigor a total pattern of consolidated reflexes otherwise functioning at a low level of tension. For example, we sometimes discover to our discomfort that the utterance of an innocent word calls out a prolonged and violent discourse from an acquaintance—a complex patterned reaction which bears little logical relation to the provocative word. In this case the individual had a sustained group of responses, carried in unobservable tonic reactions, which needed only a conditioned cue to appear in full force.

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The highly adaptive behavior by which man controls his

natural world and adjusts to his fellows is achieved only through many trials and many errors. "We learn by doing" is the fundamental postulate of progressive education. The necessity of a background of trial-and-error experimentation for the acquisition of skill and knowledge is such a commonplace fact that we tend to overlook its theoretical importance. In practice, however, we frequently recognize this principle. In a difficult sickness people prefer the experienced physician to the novice. They do not care to be the material for the trial-and-error learning of the novice.

The trial-and-error nature of learning is obscured, however, by the *abridged* and *implicit* nature of many of the trials. Where originally the infant must run both its hand and eyes over an object to obtain a tactual-visual perception of size, the child can use eye movements alone for the judgment. This *abridging* of response patterns, in which a part of the activity takes the place of the whole action, characterizes the development of behavior. When confronted by problems the individual need not run through complete patterns of action before the right one is hit upon. We must not be misled, however, into assuming that trial and error is not taking place, merely because each trial is not being worked out in full detail for our casual observation.

Implicit reactions are really reactions so abridged that they are difficult to detect without such instrumental means as the action current technique. They, therefore, obscure the trial-and-error nature of learning even further. These slight muscular contractions furnish a highly economical means for an exploratory solution of problems. It is customary to refer to learning through implicit trial and error as *thinking*, but no rigid line of demarcation can be drawn between learning and thinking. The apparent immobility of the thinker is an immobility only of gross motor habits. Responses are taking place at a low level of tension, as electrodes placed in his muscles would attest.

* Our language reactions are an excellent source of substitute implicit responses. Subvocal talking can be readily used to

represent many of our overt activities. Not all thought, however, is the functioning of our linguistic habits. Any abridged response can serve as an implicit trial in the solution of a problem.

The Emergence of Behavior from the Combined Action of Two or More Reflexes

Mechanistic accounts of man frequently stop at the description of isolated reflexes. They rarely reach the level of behavior at all. The response psychology of E. B. Holt, however, shows how behavior, or conduct (or mind if you will), *emerges* from the combined action of two or more reflexes (4). It has long been known that the combination of two forces gives rise to a resultant force which has properties not found in the component forces in isolation. Hydrogen and oxygen when combined in a two to one ratio produce water, an *emergent* with characteristics not discernible in hydrogen or oxygen. In a similar manner, many reflexes functioning simultaneously lead to the emergence in the biological organism of integrated behavior. Man's behavior appears as a function of objects and situations and not as so many single reflexes called out by separate stimuli.

In his *Freudian Wish*, Holt illustrates the difference between the single reflex and the combined action of two or more reflexes by reference to a hypothetical water animal. Suppose that a small water animal has two eyespots each of which is connected by a nerve with a fin on the opposite side of the body. Thus light striking the right eye will activate the left fin and send the animal rotating like a rowboat with one oar. "That is all that one such reflex arc could do for the animal." But since the animal is assumed to have two reflex arcs, light falling on the left eyespot as the animal turns will set the right fin working. The combined action of the two reflex arcs will propel the animal toward the light. One reflex arc thus merely sends the animal spinning like a top, a process comparable to the release of energy in an inanimate object like the firing of a gun. The simultaneous operation of two reflexes, however,

directs the activity of the animal toward an object in its environment and in this way gives its behavior the purposive appearance so characteristic of living creatures.

The emergence of behavior as a function of objects and aspects of the environment has far-reaching implications for social psychology. In the first place, it shows the inadequacy of attempting to explain man solely as a biological organism composed of nerves, muscles, and glands. The specific environmental forces in which man develops must also be carefully studied. Physiology tells us only that man can be conditioned to various stimuli. It has little to say about the specific habits which specific men have built up in relation to particular aspects of their surroundings.

In the second place, it means that a legitimate field for the study of human beings exists on the emergent level of behavior or conduct. Man's activities as a function of complex environmental arrangements can be described on this level much more readily than they can be described in terms of the component reflexes. Consider, for example, the actions of a football player who catches a pass, pivots out of the arms of a defensive half-back, cuts diagonally to the sidelines, straight-arms another defensive player, and dives over the goal line. Now if a foreign visitor who has never seen a game of football before wants an explanation, we do not try to describe the many stimuli and the many reflexes in the touchdown run. Instead we point to the goal line and explain that the object of the game is to carry the ball over this line. The pivoting, dodging, and straight-arming on the part of the runner all become comprehensible when the runner's behavior as a function of the football situation is understood. And so it is with most social behavior. Once we see the objects toward which people respond, or the goals toward which they are oriented, we can understand and predict their conduct.

Why, then, is it necessary to have a knowledge of reflexes and the physiology of the nervous system? This problem arises whenever we deal with the relations of parts to the whole. As long as the whole functions satisfactorily, we are not concerned

about the parts. We even forget that there are parts. The moment, however, that a machine breaks down, we turn to the component parts to get it working again. Or, if our usually dependable expectation of an event is upset by a glaring exception, we start to analyze and get at the parts. Suppose, in the example given above, that the football player had dashed for the wrong goal. Now we are concerned with single stimuli and single reflexes. In his whirling and dodging what visual cue set the runner off on the wrong tack? Since the whole is nothing but the combined interaction of the parts, the best prediction and control of the whole come from a knowledge of how the parts get put together.*

Maturation

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of learning in accounting for the essential nature of man, but in itself learning is not the complete story of the development of behavior. Even if we had complete control over the learning processes of the child, we could not impose any pattern of behavior upon it. Obviously, before a child can learn to walk he must be possessed of the necessary muscular and neural equipment. Though learning does play a part in the development of the neuromuscular system, a process of growth or *maturation* is also important. Maturation may be defined as the development of the organism which results from physiological processes other than the functioning of the nervous system.

An obvious phase of maturation is the growth of the neuromuscular system through environmental forces which do not act as stimuli to the sense organs. Normal embryonic development depends upon the proper conditions of temperature and

* Considerable confusion exists on this point, especially in the social sciences. Those who are interested only in functional description hold that analysis to a lower level is of no help in prediction. The crux of the matter is that, in respect to social facts, analysis has often failed because it has been very incomplete. Without a knowledge of the essential component parts, prediction on the basis of analysis is out of the question. This does not invalidate the superiority of prediction on the basis of analysis; it merely illustrates the complexity of social phenomena and the failure to apply analysis at this level.

nutrition. Monstrosities can be produced in the embryo by changes in temperature or by alterations in the chemical constitution of nourishment. Maturation, therefore, cannot be regarded as the unfolding of inherited potentialities. The type of creature which unfolds through maturation is partly determined by the type of environmental forces in which it develops.

Another important phase of maturation is the interplay of the various parts of the body in foetal development. For example, in the embryo the various parts exert chemical and physical influences upon adjacent parts. This interaction is illustrated by the growth of the eye. The eyebud, an outgrowth from the rudimentary brain of the embryo, influences the development of the nearest skin tissue. This skin thickens and forms the lens of the eye. If the eye is transplanted at a certain stage of development so as to lie under the skin of the abdomen, the abdominal skin will become the lens of the eye. "The eye-bud," writes R. S. Woodworth, "once it has made a start in differentiation, becomes a center of influence upon surrounding less differentiated cells, and dominates the development in a particular region at a particular time" (9, p. 162).

A leading question of course is the problem of how the first differentiation occurred in the single cell from which life starts. This original differentiation may be due to inheritance. Or it may be due to the external forces such as temperature, gravitation, etc., acting differentially on various parts of the cell. Or it may be the product of both causes. It is not vital to the purpose of this text to inquire further into these first causes. We do know that, once differentiation has started, the different parts influence development through their interaction.

The limits which maturation places upon behavior and learning have been demonstrated by a number of experimental studies on both animal and human subjects. In general, these studies indicate that training in a given activity to be effective must wait upon the appearance of the appropriate stage in maturation. Children cannot be successfully pushed to attainments radically in advance of their maturational level. Ex-

tensive practice at a very early age may produce slow laborious improvement which is easily reached by very little training at an older age.

M. B. McGraw, in her study of the twins Johnny and Jimmy, gave Johnny extensive training in many motor activities such as roller-skating, climbing up slides, jumping, and manipulating graded stools to reach an object. Jimmy was given much the same training at an older age. In a number of the activities Jimmy took less training time than Johnny to achieve the same level of performance (6).

Although maturation helps to account for the growth of a human being with nerves, sense organs, muscles, and glands, it does not explain specific forms of behavior. By and large, the maturing of the organism does not so much predetermine the appearance of a particular act as it makes possible all kinds of behavior (1, p. 45). 'Maturation sets the stage for all kinds of drama from light comedy to heavy tragedy, but learning determines the particular play. Maturation equips the human being with eyes, but learning determines whether he will see space *synthetically* like the modern painter who perceives the whole in terms of light, shape, and color, or *distributively* like the practical person who sees separate objects in terms of their uses.

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CHAPTER IX

THE MOTIVATION OF BEHAVIOR

For years, academic psychology, apprehensive of the magical uses of the terms purpose, drive, and motive, slighted the problem of human motivation. The classical school of systematic introspection painted a colorless picture of the human mind, utterly at variance with the fact that man loves and hates, desires and fears, struggles for his bread, and fights to the death for words like home, mother, and country. Even the early behaviorists were more concerned with the way the human machine works than with the forces which drive man to act. It is small wonder, then, that the Freudians for a time swept everything before them in their daring attempts to get at the basic motives behind human conduct. Rooted in the practical field of therapeutics rather than in experimental science, the Freudian system spun ingenious, if speculative, theories in an interpretation of its many valid observations. For all its sins of hasty overgeneralization the Freudian movement has contributed greatly to the progress of modern psychology through its emphasis upon the motives of men.

One other movement in psychology which has been largely concerned with motivation should also be noted. The hormic psychology of William McDougall starts from a conception of man as a purposive creature instinctively striving toward goals. In his *Social Psychology* McDougall attempted to explain the dynamic nature of social phenomena by postulating a number of fundamental instincts (13). These instincts were conceived of as springs or sources of energy. When the instincts were inactive, man remained quiescent. When an instinct was aroused, man was possessed by excitement and activity. The energy of the instinct, moreover, was directed toward a specific goal.

Though commendable in its emphasis upon the motivational aspects of conduct, the purposive or hormic school has been discredited because of its vitalism and its mystical treatment of instincts.

One of the present tasks of psychology is to compensate for its long neglect of motivation without resorting either to the fanciful flights of poetic imagination found among the Freudians or to the supernaturalism of the purposivists. This chapter will attempt to summarize the progress which modern psychology has so far made in this direction.*

The Physiological Basis of Drive

Physiologically the general problem of what makes the human machine go is not a difficult one. The body moves as the result of the contraction of muscles. Muscles contract when activated by nerve impulses, which in turn arise from stimuli affecting sense organs. Though indispensable for the arousal of the reflex arc, stimuli in themselves do not furnish the energy for the response of the organism. Energy comes from the food we eat and the oxygen we inhale. This energy is stored in the body in muscles, nerves, and other tissues and is released through oxidation. Receptor cells, when stimulated, release energy in the neurons, and the neurons release energy in the muscle cells. In addition to the potential energy in the nerves and muscles, the blood stream is continuously supplying oxygen and nourishment to these tissues. Energy release and energy consumption are much greater in muscles than in nerves. Muscles, therefore, fatigue much more rapidly than nerves. Often our nerves can keep on working when our muscles are incapable of responding.

The rate at which energy is manufactured by the body and made available to the muscles is by no means a simple matter. To a considerable extent this rate is determined directly by internal physiological processes. The endocrine glands affect

* * A comprehensive summary of the experimental literature in this field is furnished in P. T. Young's recent textbook, *Motivation of Behavior* (19).

metabolism through the action of their hormones. Thus, thyroxin, a hormone produced by the thyroid gland, regulates the rate of oxidation in bodily tissues. When the amount of thyroxin in the blood stream rises above normal, metabolism is speeded up.

Endocrine functioning in turn is affected by at least two other factors. The glands are innervated by motor fibers and so are under nervous control. In addition the chemical composition of the blood, apart from its hormone content, regulates the activity of the glands. Nor are these factors independent of one another in their action. The functioning of the nervous system may change the hormone content in the blood, but the condition of the blood will give rise to nerve impulses in the nervous system.

The nervous system, moreover, controls the amount of energy available for muscular activity through its control of the heart, the lungs, and the blood vessels. In particular, the sympathetic or thoracico-lumbar division of the autonomic nervous system constitutes a special mechanism for preparing the body for great exertion. The autonomic nervous system consists of motor nerves which are extensively distributed throughout the body. They innervate smooth muscles and glands. When the sympathetic branch of this system is activated, many responses take place which make possible intense muscular activity. The blood is sent from the abdominal viscera to the heart, the lungs, and the limbs. In this way the muscles used in voluntary activity can be fed and repaired. The heart is speeded up and arterial pressure is increased. The passages in the lungs are widened for greater oxygen intake. Sugar, an optimum form of energy, is released from the liver into the blood stream. The normal processes of digestion are inhibited. And adrenin is released into the blood from the adrenal glands (3).

The discharge of adrenin into the blood stream produces all the responses described above. In other words, adrenin alone can give the same effects as the sympathetic nervous system. It thus serves to reinforce and prolong these energizing reactions. In addition, adrenin counteracts fatigue products in muscles and

enables a muscle to continue functioning for a longer period than normal. In general, moreover, the sympathetic nerves produce their effects for brief periods of time, whereas adrenin will maintain the same results for an hour or more.

The actions of the sympathetic nervous system have been described as if this system were a functional unit and all the energizing reactions took place at the same time. For the most part, the sympathetic system does function as a unit. Structurally, it is akin to the primitive nerve-net type of nervous system. Once nerve impulses get past the sympathetic ganglia they spread out over all the branching fibers. A diffuse pattern of response is the result, in which the heart, the lungs, the blood vessels, and the adrenal glands are all affected.

The Psychological Problems in Motivation

The physiological basis of drive is equivalent to the capacity of a manufacturing plant. It sets the limits within which motivated behavior occurs. Within these limits, however, remain many perplexing psychological problems. They are like the problems of industrial management. In other words, the psychological interest is not in the immediate energy which drives the machine but in the processes which release this energy. Why is a great deal of energy released at one time through the sympathetic system, or through some other mechanism, so that the person is intensely active in contrast to his inactivity at another time? More significantly, how does the energy released center the activity of an individual on a particular goal, i.e., why does it take the form of a consistent pushing of an individual in one direction rather than in another?

These questions lead us to a consideration of two phases of motivation. In the first place, the sources and conditions of stimulation must be studied. Since the process of energy release is initiated by stimuli, the conditions making for intense or persistent stimulation are of obvious importance. In the second place, attention should be given to the role of response in motivated behavior. How do pathways become integrated so that stimulation produces behavior directed toward definite

ends? Persistent and intense stimulation in itself might produce restless, uncoordinated activity. Moreover, if many mild, persistent excitations do not find an outlet over the same path they may in large measure cancel the effect of one another. In such a case the individual would appear unmotivated, whereas the very same stimulation in another person may be converged on a common pathway and result in great exertion.

These two phases of the problem of motivation are customarily discussed under the headings of *drive* and *mechanism*. *Drive* refers to the stimulating source of an activity; *mechanism*, to the directed pattern of responses built upon the stimulating source. The term *motive* is used to include both the drive and its mechanism (Shaffer, 15). For example, the contractions of the stomach walls in hunger are a source of stimulation to the organism, and hence a *drive*. The directed activity of the child in washing his hands and taking his place at the table are part of the *mechanism* by which he satisfies his hunger. This mechanism may appear, however, when the child is not hungry. Only when the food-approaching responses occur as a result of the contractions of the stomach walls do we speak of the hunger *motive*.

The Classification of Drives

Classifications of the mainsprings of human action have generally been unsatisfactory, because they have attempted to list not only the important drives but the important motives as well. Now the means by which drives are satisfied will vary from culture to culture and from individual to individual. Consequently books on advertising never agree in their list of basic appeals. It is more advantageous to classify the types of motivation on the basis of drives, i.e., on the basis of the nature and sources of stimulation affecting the organism. Within this classification the motives, or behavior possibilities, can be roughly indicated. Following are the main conditions and sources of stimulation which lead to motivated behavior: (1) organic needs or appetites such as hunger, thirst, oxygen want, and sex; (2) adient activities which furnish the stimulation for

their own perpetuation; (3) constant physiological processes such as breathing and constant environmental forces such as gravitation which furnish continuous or almost continuous stimulation to the organism; and (4) temporary but intense forms of stimulation such as punishment and injury.

1. THE APPETITES

The appetites, or internal drives, are tissue conditions which result in periodic stimulation of the nervous system. They include the organic needs for food, water, oxygen, sleep, sex, defecation, micturition, and lactation. The appetites give rise to stimuli of two kinds: mechanical pressures and chemical excitants. For example, stimulation through mechanical pressure occurs when the accumulating contents of a gland exert tension on the glandular walls, thereby stimulating the sense organs within these walls. Chemical stimulation is illustrated by oxygen-want. Deficiency of oxygen in the blood leaves an excessive hydrogen-ion concentration. It is not known whether such a chemical change in the blood stream arouses the nervous system directly through an effect on nerve centers or indirectly through stimulation of interceptive sense organs. It is established, however, that chemical products in the blood give rise to nerve impulses.

The primary importance of the appetites lies in their persistence and their recurrence. Figuratively speaking, they are imperative in demanding satisfaction. They pour a constant stream of impulses into the central nervous system, impelling the organism to constant activity. The persistent nature of this stimulation cannot be checked until the organic conditions which give rise to it are changed. Man can escape the intense stimulus of a hot radiator by moving away from it. The appetites, however, are part of his internal make-up, and they travel with him wherever he goes. Hunger, for example, is a nutritive deficiency in the body, which excites the nervous system through chemical stimuli and through the contractions of the stomach walls. As long as the nervous system is so excited, the organism is driven from within.

The appetites, moreover, are satisfied only temporarily. The organism can consume only a limited amount of food at one time. Hence hunger recurs and at fairly regular intervals. The recurrent nature of the appetites guarantees to man a constantly reappearing source of motivation.

When the environment provides an easy and continuous means of satisfaction for the appetites, they decline in importance as motivating factors. The stimulation which they provide subsides quickly as the appetites are appeased. Thirst and oxygen-want, for example, are too readily satisfied to bulk large as sources of motivation. When exceptional circumstances deprive men of water, however, thirst may drive them to commit




FIG. 12. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN STOMACH CONTRACTIONS AND OVERT BODILY MOVEMENTS.

(From T. Wada, An Experimental Study of Hunger In Its Relations to Activity. *Archives of Psychology*, 1922, No. 57, p. 29.)

In the above sample kymograph record the breaks in the upper time line indicate half-hour periods. In the middle line the excursions from the horizontal level indicate bodily movements. The lower line indicates stomach contractions.

murder. Hunger and sex are generally the more difficult appetites to satisfy in most societies and hence merit more detailed treatment.

The driving force of the unappeased appetites is sometimes expressed as the need for *tension reduction*. Learning is thus regarded as the process of finding release for tension. In a similar way anticipation, or preparatory set, which is involved in so many learning situations inside and outside the laboratory, can be viewed as a state of tension, according to the recent theory of O. H. Mowrer (14). In experiments involving a momentary painful stimulus the subject often reports a mounting feeling of internal tension, and objective records show a disturbance in breathing and increased muscular tonus. To escape from this state is the drive behind learning. The pre-

paratory set which the subject assumes is reduced by a reaction which the experimenter calls right or which the subject regards as right. "Symbolically induced sets can thus be conceived as sources of motivation which follow precisely the same laws as do hunger, pain, and the other so-called organic drives" (14, p. 75).*

The Elaboration of the Hunger and Sex Appetites into Motives

Hunger and sex have been seized upon by many writers as the explanatory forces behind all human conduct. Repelled




FIG. 13. EFFECT OF CASTRATION ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE RAT.
(From C. P. Richter, *Animal Behavior and Internal Drives*. *Quarterly Review of Biology*, 1927, 2, p. 329.)

by this animalistic interpretation, other thinkers have completely neglected these drives as basic sources of human motivation. Both extreme views fail to regard hunger and sex as motives. The one extreme emphasizes the final mechanisms of conduct and overlooks the original drive. The other extreme emphasizes the appetitive source to the neglect of the variety of mechanisms imposed by environment and culture. The complex social behavior of man cannot be understood without reference to the biology of drives. Neither can it be understood

** This theory has the advantage of reducing motivated behavior to the single principle of avoidance of tension. It is a question, however, whether it adequately accounts for those forms of behavior which E. B. Holt has called adient.

wholly as a function of physiological needs. It is explicable only if we take into account both the nature of appetites and the individual's means of satisfying them in relation to particular environmental factors. "Hunger is hunger," observes one writer, "but the hunger that is satisfied with cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different kind of hunger from one that devours raw meat with the aid of hands, nails, and teeth."

The appetitive drives become elaborated into motives as the result of trial-and-error learning. The first occurrence of an appetite pours into the central nervous system a stream of nerve impulses which may find an outlet over any motor pathway. Restless, random activity ensues. Gradually the useless movements become eliminated, and the responses which lead to satisfaction are fixated. In the infant the contractions of the stomach walls lead to many random activities such as crying, squirming, kicking, thrashing about of the arms, and turning the head. Movements of the head and eyes toward the source of food are soon selected out. Crying may remain if it is successful as a means of controlling the parents. As the child learns to talk, verbal responses begin to supplant crying as the effective device for securing satisfaction. It is only after the means for taking care of his needs are learned that the behavior of the individual takes on a purposive appearance. Thus P. T. Young observes, "Usually, if not always, purposive seeking implies the previous existence of a process of learning and past experiences by means of which the goal-oriented behavior developed" (19, p. 168).

The trial-and-error learning of the child, motivated by his appetites, is greatly facilitated by the guidance of elders and parents. Thus the manner of appeasement of the appetites depends in good measure upon the culture, class, and family in which the child is reared. At first the appetitive random activities are avoidant in the sense that the organism is impelled by persistent and intense stimulation. As learning proceeds, however, the individual becomes adient toward those objects which have served to satisfy his internal drives. An adient

mechanism has been developed on the basis of the original appetite.

The adient mechanisms, learned in the course of satisfying the appetites, often become important in themselves. External conditioned stimuli will call them out in the absence of the real appetite. The sight of food, or a stimulus associated with food, will call out eating responses originally a function of the hunger drive. It is a mistake, however, to regard these mechanisms as possessing the force of the original appetite, as if the conditioned response could transfer to them the stream of nerve impulses excited by organic conditions. Such adient patterns either motivate themselves on the reflex circle principle, or pick up some other source of conditioned stimulation to keep them going in the absence of their original internal drive (see pages 261-262). F. H. Allport calls attention to the significance of the means developed for satisfying the appetites in later social behavior (1). The child who learns to get his food through the power of his lungs will use this method for controlling his parents for any other want.

Social Implications of Hunger Motives

The difference in the specific ways in which a drive becomes elaborated into a motive is very significant for the prediction and control of behavior in any society. *If we know only the physiology of internal drives*, our prediction is limited to the statement that most people under conditions of extreme deprivation will become desperate to the point of almost any excess. Famine can produce cannibalism. Even under extreme deprivation, however, individuals will occasionally refuse a means of appetitive satisfaction that runs counter to their training. People have been known to starve rather than to accept the dole. *Knowing also the elaboration of drives into motives in a given culture*, we are in a position to understand normal social behavior as well as the exceptional conduct produced by a famine.

To offer bread to men when they are hungry is thus not a

sufficient means for keeping them contented. The bread must be presented in a manner which accords with the specific mechanisms already developed to appease the hunger drive. Otherwise a conflict will ensue between the old habits of appetitive satisfaction and the new method now offered. In this conflict men feel thwarted even though the pangs of hunger are allayed. The failure to appreciate this fact accounts for the amazed resentment of the charitable wealthy at the "black ingratitude" of the masses. On the other hand, the practical politicians generally recognize that hunger must be considered not as a mere appetite but as a motive. For example, the Nazis in Germany on their way to power enlisted the support of many of the unemployed youth of the country. These young men already had the charity of public soup kitchens to keep down the hunger pangs. The Nazis, however, established soup kitchens of their own under a more respectable title, and gave their followers uniforms which entitled them to food in their own barracks.

Hunger, like the other appetites, is more powerful in impelling men to action when the means for its appeasement are difficult to procure and the possession of the means insecure over a period of time. In primitive cultures, therefore, hunger as a drive plays a more important role than in advanced societies. This distinction does not hold for all individuals in a society, because societies do not advance as units. Nevertheless, a nutritive deficiency leading to hunger contractions is relatively less frequent among the unemployed in modern society than among those primitive groups which rely upon hunting for their sustenance. Comparatively little food is necessary to still the contractions of the stomach walls. The wage worker in modern society strives not so much for a minimum ration as for the particular foods to which he thinks he is entitled. Primitive man is driven more by want; civilized man by fear of want. Revolutions in western European culture can be traced less to physiological hunger than to the thwarting of the socialized mechanisms of the appetitive drives.

The Development of the Sex Motive

The elaboration of the sex drive into a sex motive follows fundamentally the same pattern of trial-and-error learning as in the case of hunger. Two important differences between sex and hunger should be noted, however. In the first place, sex as a full-fledged drive does not mature until puberty. The driving force of the sex appetite comes largely from the hormones of the gonadal glands. These glands begin to function some time between the ages of twelve and fourteen years, generally earlier in the girl than in the boy.

The Freudian school has been sharply criticized for treating the sexual behavior of children as belonging in the same category as the sexual behavior of adults. This criticism is well founded, because physiologically the sex drive before the maturation of the gonadal glands is not equivalent to the sex drive after puberty. Nevertheless, many of the adient mechanisms which later serve the sex appetite are built up long before puberty. They develop early for two reasons, one biological, the other social. The biological reason is concerned with the fact that certain areas of the body are richly supplied with cutaneous sense organs. These specially sensitive regions are the means *par excellence* for the development of adient responses. Adience develops most quickly when a response furnishes ample but not overstrong stimulation to the organism. Hence a sensitive area brought into contact with an external object will readily develop an adience for more contact and pressure. The importance of these adient mechanisms for the later expression of the sex appetite is apparent if it is considered that coitus is adience in its most complete form.

Another reason for the early development of sexually oriented behavior is the social conditioning to which the child is subjected. In almost every society definite institutions, traditions, and taboos exist concerning sex, marriage, and the family. The common habits and attitudes of his elders determine the direction of the child's sexual drive long in advance of its appearance. He not only learns that a person of the other sex

is the proper object of his affections, but also that a girl is to be courted according to certain customs. Nor is the child's social training wholly verbal. He is punished for some of the adient responses developed through accidental excitations of sensitive surfaces and laughed at for others.

A second difference between sex and hunger lies in their relative potencies as drives and as motives. Hunger is biologically a more imperative drive than sex as far as its appeasement is concerned. The hunger drive cannot be denied without immediate and inevitable disaster. The sexual appetite, on the other hand, may be completely denied without any biological ill effects as far as is known. The psychological consequences of sexual deprivation are generally harmful, but even this generalization applies in the long run and is subject to exceptions. As a motive, however, sex is more important than hunger in advanced cultures, precisely because it is less regularly and less readily satisfied. Let us consider these aspects of sex in more detail.

Sexual Abstinence

Sex is just as urgent a driving force as the other appetites in the sense that it keeps pouring nerve impulses into the central nervous system. It is a mistake, however, to assume that for this reason the failure to satisfy the sex appetite produces the same physical ill effects as does the denial of other internal drives. The tissue conditions in hunger, thirst, and oxygen-want are conditions of depletion. If the excitations they set up do not remedy these deficiencies by producing food, water, and oxygen, the body cannot be kept alive. The urges of defecation and micturition lead to the elimination of toxins which otherwise would poison the body. In the case of sex, however, the sex hormones in the blood stream merely continue to excite the nervous system.* In some cases it is possible that they may affect the endocrine balance. The many compensatory checks in the endocrine system militate against this possibility.

* In the male an additional source of the sex drive may be the tension exerted in the vesicle walls by the accumulation of seminal fluid.

The ill effects of sexual abstinence are psychological. If the individual has no well-integrated interests, the constant driving of the sex appetite may lead him into many conflicts. Moreover, the usual habits and attitudes which the child learns include many adient sex responses. As an adult, continence will thwart these constantly aroused responses. In addition, our social organization is built around the normal pairing of individuals in marriage. The person left out of this arrangement has a difficult problem of adjustment. A common effect of abstinence is either an obsession with sex or an overcompensated prudery.

The harmful results of sexual deprivation, however, can be exaggerated. Abstinence in itself does not produce mental disorder. Havelock Ellis quotes Freud on this problem as follows, "We must beware of overestimating the importance of abstinence in affecting neurosis." And Ellis comments tellingly, "Since Freud has never underestimated the importance of the sexual impulse in life his testimony on this point is of peculiar value" (5, p. 258). Ellis' own judicious conclusion is, "But it is not therefore to be denied that the difficulties of sexual abstinence, even though they do not involve any great risk to life or to sanity, are still very real to many healthy and active persons" (5, p. 259).

Sublimation

In many societies the satisfaction of the sex appetite is postponed for years after its biological maturation at puberty. Moreover, only one means for its satisfaction is socially countenanced. Some Freudians have assumed that, when the energy of the sex drive is not utilized for its own appeasement, it can be diverted into other channels. In this manner people supposedly can be motivated to great artistic and social achievements. This belief, known as *sublimation*, deserves discussion in connection with the point previously made that the lack of satisfaction of an appetitive drive makes it a more potent motivating factor.

An erroneous conception in the doctrine of sublimation is that of repression. The advocates of sublimation believe that

the transfer of sexual energy to another activity somehow satisfies or quiets the sexual appetite. This part of the doctrine is essentially incorrect. The sexual appetite is not stilled. Substitute activities do not alter the glandular conditions which constitute this drive. The appetite goes unappeased and continues to excite the organism.

The nerve impulses excited by the sexual appetite can be discharged over any motor pathway. It is quite possible, therefore, for achievement to be based upon the sexual drive. But merely because a continuing source of stimulation is provided the organism, it does not follow that the individual will be motivated in a purposeful, directed, or efficient manner. His energies may be dissipated in many random activities. He may lack concentration, turning from one pursuit to another. The person activated solely by an unappeased internal drive is seldom the reliable, consistent creator. He works productively by fits and starts. He is too continuously driven to have the physical and mental repose and balance necessary for sustained greatness. Nonetheless, the occasional flashes of brilliant endeavor and the eternal restless striving cannot be ignored as types of motivated behavior. Furthermore, in some cases the energy of the sexual drive is directed in definite and consistent channels. If the response mechanisms of the individual become thoroughly integrated in childhood, any source of motivation later will energize an organized rather than an uncoordinated attack upon life's problems. In such an individual, an unappeased sex need may be productive of high attainment.

2. ADIENT AND SUSTAINED RESPONSES

In his *Dynamic Psychology* R. S. Woodworth emphasizes the point that mechanisms once aroused become drives in themselves (18). A habit once established, he holds, is its own source of motivation. Casual observation confirms this view in part, but only in part. People often pursue activities not because of an internal drive, but for the sake of the activity itself. The individual who is forced to develop habits of thrift continues in his thrift when the original need is gone. Eating habits assert themselves without the driving force of hunger

pangs. Reports even have it that the Romans would voluntarily empty their stomachs by vomiting in order to gorge themselves again. On the other hand, many habits drop out just as soon as the drive motivating them is gone. It is the despair of the teacher that her nicely drilled pupils show none of their training outside of the schoolroom. And it is a commonplace of development that the activities and habits so vital at one stage of growth disappear and are readily replaced by new interests.

An interesting experimental attack upon this problem has been made by J. T. Cowles in his study of food tokens as incentives for chimpanzee learning (4). Five apes were trained to work for small discs which could be exchanged for food. At first an animal was allowed to exchange a single disc for food. Then food was withheld, until the animal had worked enough to accumulate a number of discs. The apes consistently worked for groups of as many as thirty discs before exchange. Now if Woodworth's thesis (that the mechanism becomes a drive in itself) were correct, we should expect the apes to work for these food tokens without receiving any food reward. When, however, discs of a different color were given the apes, for which no food was forthcoming, the apes lost their enthusiasm for their tasks. "There is considerable evidence," concludes the experimenter, "that the food-token was an adequate incentive for learning and retention only by virtue of its exchange for food" (4, p. 94).

Not all mechanisms, therefore, become drives in themselves. And many of those which appear at first glance as furnishing their own drive cannot truly be so regarded. They have a motivating background in an unrelated but constant conditioned source of stimulation (see pages 260-262). Some responses, however, do become drives in that they furnish the stimulation for their own perpetuation. *Adient* and *sustained* responses are of this nature.

Adience accounts for the repetition and extension of an action once begun. An activity in full swing is not easily halted. A distasteful chore is not so difficult if we can only get started on it. Although adience explains the continuing of an action

it fails to account for its inception. Adient habits need to be set off by some stimulating situation to which they are conditioned. Such habits are not self-initiated drives. They do furnish their own motivating power, but only if something else starts them.

As a matter of fact, almost any habit, whether adient or avoidant, will motivate itself if set going. Because many of our habits are of the nature of chain reflexes, one act will furnish or bring the organism into contact with the conditioned stimulus for the second act. For a complete pattern of activity to appear, the essential requirement is the appropriate stimulus for its commencement. For example, the retired tap dancer is sent into his routine, much to his annoyance, by the bar of music which formerly was the opening signal for his act. Habits function well enough as drives in the usual round of our daily activities. In going through his tasks a person is confronted with customary objects and situations which set off adient and avoidant mechanisms. If his environment is changed, however, and he fails to encounter the usual conditioned stimuli, these habits lie dormant. For this reason it is possible to reform criminals by placing them in a new environment. For the same reason it is extremely difficult to change their lawless habits if they go back to the surroundings in which these habits developed.

One type of response does not need the inciting effect of external stimuli. Reactions which are sustained over long periods of time continuously motivate themselves. Sustained responses are both mechanisms and drives. Since they are maintained at a low level of tension, they are not responsible for occasional great outbursts of effort or for the constant burning zeal of the fanatic. Rather they account for the continual mental alertness of the individual. They describe the active mind, not the strenuous way of life.

The Force of Habit

The foregoing discussion of mechanisms as drives seems to place less emphasis than is customary on the force of habit as

such. The reader may dissent and recall that justly famous quotation from William James: "Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone" (9, p. 121).*

Now James' statement as a figurative description is essentially correct. Habit is the conservator of society, but not necessarily because of its own force. Habits are the means by which people are chained to their accustomed tasks in life. The driving force, however, may come from other sources besides the habitual response itself. The impulsion may derive from the appetites, or it may come from other fairly constant sources of stimulation. A consideration of these constant sources of stimulation is, therefore, in order.

3. THE CONSTANCY OF ORGANIC PROCESSES AND ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES AS SOURCES OF CONTINUOUS STIMULATION TO THE ORGANISM

The study of perception shows that we notice change and novelty and neglect the constant and the commonplace. For this reason even psychologists in their observations of behavior have emphasized the temporary objects and changing aspects in situations which furnish stimuli to the organism. The ever-present types of stimulation have been overlooked.†

Constant sources of stimulation can be divided into two sorts: organic processes and external environmental forces. The

*The force of habit, however, has not protected the natives of the desert and the frozen zone from our invasions.

†The credit for pointing out the significance of these constant forces for an understanding of man belongs to E. B. Holt. Cf. his *Animal Drive and the Learning Process*, pp. 221-230.

organic processes which send a continuous stream of impulses into the central nervous system include the beating of the heart, the circulation of the blood, and breathing.* The beating of the heart excites the sense organs imbedded within the heart muscles. The receptors in the arterial walls are stimulated by the pressure exerted by these walls in pushing the blood through the circulatory system. The contraction of the chest muscles, involved in breathing, squeezes the sense organs within them.

Environmental forces and objects vary in the degree to which they continuously stimulate the individual. Any stimulation affecting the organism for a period of hours every day can be considered as a relatively constant source of excitation. During man's waking hours light waves almost constantly impinge upon the retinae of his eyes. The pressure of clothes upon his skin, especially as he moves parts of his body, stimulates cutaneous sense organs. Currents of air are often present to give further stimulation to the skin. In addition every environmental setting has its particular permanent features. Unless the individual is always moving, he is subject to the constant sounds, sights, and odors of a given locality. The city dweller's ears are assailed by continuous din and noise. The sailor at sea has the constant motion of the ocean and the smell of the brine. The farmer's activities may vary, but through them all run many of the same visual, olfactory, and auditory stimuli.†

Here then are some of the continuous internal and external stimuli which are a constant means of initiating energy release in muscles through the mediation of the nervous system. They

*The appetites are comparable to these processes. In general, however, they are recurrent rather than constant in their stimulating effects. The real difference between an appetite and the organic processes here considered, however, is one of intensity. The unappeased appetite continues to mount in intensity, whereas the organic process remains a mild source of stimulation.

†It should be remembered that a stimulus is a form of energy activating a sense organ. A sensation (conscious awareness) may or may not follow the reception of a stimulus. For the most part we are not conscious of the constant stimuli in our environment. Nonetheless, they do stimulate us, since our receptors are affected and nerve impulses pour in over the afferent nerves.

constitute important drives, the potency of which is seldom recognized. The most significant point concerning them is their elaboration into motives. These continuous or almost continuous streams of stimulation become powerful driving forces, if they acquire a definite motor outlet in one type of activity. If they have no well-channelized pattern of discharge, they have merely a *dynamogenic* or strengthening effect upon any activity in progress. In the former case they become attached to a specific mechanism; in the latter they feed any mechanism which happens to be functioning.

Cross-Conditioning

The manner in which a constant source of stimulation will be utilized is determined by the development of the individual. For an activity to become dominantly conditioned to some form of constant stimulation, it is necessary for this activity to be carried on in childhood and early youth for long uninterrupted periods. Since the stimuli which are to be conditioned are ever present, they will readily acquire many motor outlets. Hence the necessity exists for long periods of the same type of sustained behavior on the part of the child, if a preferential pathway of discharge is to be formed. Holt calls this process of conditioning an activity to a constant form of background stimulation *cross-conditioning* (6).

Through cross-conditioning, response patterns become motivated by stimulation unrelated to the pattern itself. For example, the child's continuous playing with toy soldiers is conditioned to stimuli from his breathing. The lack of logical relation between the actions of an individual and their cross-conditioned source is one reason for our failure to see the real motivation back of much behavior. We look in vain for some differentiating aspect of the present situation to account for an apparently inexplicable bit of conduct.

The *force* of habit, about which William James wrote so convincingly, very often comes from the cross-conditioned source rather than from the habit itself. Similarly, when Woodworth refers to the mechanism which becomes a drive, the ac-

tivity which can "become attractive on its own account," he is including responses which derive their motivation from constant, background stimuli. One test of the motivating basis of a habit is the extent to which it *characterizes* an individual. In spite of the wide variation in situations he meets, a person may still exhibit the same interests, ideas, and actions. These reactions which typify the individual are generally the mechanisms which get their drive from organic processes or ever-present environmental forces. Now, it is this behavior to which people refer when they speak of the compelling nature of habit. The real compulsion of these habitual responses, however, is due to cross-conditioning.

Cross-conditioning bears directly on many practical problems of motivation. The cross-conditioned person is one who applies himself industriously and consistently to the same tasks without the spur of external punishment or reward. Because constant forms of stimulation are tied to certain of his habits, he has a perpetual drive to keep going at these habitual activities in spite of unfavorable conditions of work. If his vocation can be based upon early cross-conditioned interests, his life work is more play than drudgery. Provided he has the ability, his productive achievement should be great. We usually characterize such an individual by saying that he finds self-expression in his work. The term "busman's holiday" refers to a phenomenon indicative of considerable cross-conditioning. For example, the lawyer takes a day off to relax. Unwittingly he finds himself a spectator in a court room where a case involving a neat legal problem is being tried.

If the individual develops without cross-conditioning or if his occupation is not closely related to his early cross-conditioned interests, he finds difficulty in concentrating upon his daily tasks. The ever-present forms of stimulation impel him, but not so much in the direction of his vocational problems as in many other directions. Other things being equal, his productive achievement lags behind that of the cross-conditioned person, and his attainments reflect a greater total expenditure of effort and energy.

Vocational cross-conditioning is more easily effected in a stable agricultural and handicraft stage of society than in an industrial era of mass production and mass education. James might have been less impressed by the force of habit if he had written in the present period of flux, of great social mobility, and of rapidly changing technology. In the first place, cross-conditioning is interfered with by mass education. In the second place, the needs of industry demand adaptable rather than permanent habits of skill. Inventions continually outmode old skills. In the third place, our rapid industrial development has prevented the drawing of rigid class lines. In periods of expansion some members of the middle class become wealthy and some workers cross over into the middle class. In periods of depression the members of the upper class decrease and shopkeepers and small business men drop into the group of wage workers. Thus the force of habit which binds men to their occupations and to their social stations in life is perhaps not as great today as it was in 1890. People are more restless, more chameleon-like, and less motivated in their daily tasks. In other words, a decrease in cross-conditioning means that the force of habit is less forceful.

4. TEMPORARY AND INTENSE STIMULI

Appetitive drives and cross-conditioning refer to recurrent and enduring forms of motivation. They account for the relatively persisting efforts of men. Few individuals, however, plod along at a regular and even rate. The tenor of purposive activities shows not only sporadic slight spurts but also occasional outbursts of great effort. These irregular increases in energetic performance can generally be traced to the effects of the amount and intensity of temporary stimuli. The problem can be regarded from three angles: (*a*) dynamogeny, (*b*) intensity of stimulation, and (*c*) the activation of the sympathetic nervous system by intense stimuli.

(a) Dynamogeny

The principle of dynamogeny is illustrated by a traditional laboratory experiment on the strength of finger flexion. A weight is attached by a string to the subject's finger. The subject bends his finger and tries to keep it completely flexed. The force of the suspended weight, however, gradually straightens out his finger as the subject becomes fatigued. If an additional stimulus is presented while the finger is being extended by the weight, the progress of the finger extension is temporarily arrested. The nerve impulses aroused by the added stimulus are discharged over the pathway of flexing the finger. The extra energy release in the muscle cells enables the finger to hold out a bit longer against the pull of the weight. Experiments show that a great variety of extraneous stimuli may be used for this purpose. The added stimulus may be the flashing of a light, the ringing of a bell, or the mere presence of another person. Dynamogeny thus is an increase in the strength of a response due to the addition of an apparently irrelevant stimulus.

The best dynamogenic effects are obtained when a specific response pattern is already strongly innervated. If nerve impulses from an added stimulus are to be discharged over a given pathway, it must be a very open or dominant pathway. The student listlessly poring over his books receives little dynamogenic benefit from his roommate's singing. It only distracts him. The absorption of the scholar, however, may be actually increased by extraneous noises. One variable in respect to dynamogeny is, therefore, the dominance of the activity in progress. Another variable is the nature of the added stimulus. Although a great variety of stimuli may prove effective, not every stimulus will have its excitation discharged over the active pathway. Impulses from stimuli which have strongly conditioned outlets of their own may activate these responses instead of augmenting the response in progress. In this case, in place of dynamogeny, conflict may result, or a new activity may take the place of the old.

The applications of dynamogeny to social psychology are largely concerned with the effects upon the individual of the

presence of other people. A good part of our lives is spent in the presence of others. Their numbers and their arrangement into groupings affect us. For this reason alone, we will behave differently by ourselves from the way we behave in social situations. The variations between social and individual behavior have other and more important causes, but the most elementary behavior differences come from the dynamogenic effects of the presence of people. The social applications of dynamogeny will be treated more fully under the heading of *social facilitation* (see pages 292-295).

(b) Intense Stimuli

Increased activity is often due to the intensity of the stimulus. The horse runs faster when driven by the whip and spur. In animal experimentation electric shock is used to facilitate learning. A generation or two ago chastisement was a common method of keeping the child at his books. The intensity of the response thus has some relation to the intensity of the stimulus. The relationship would be simpler if stimulating energy could be literally conducted through the nervous system to the muscles. Nerves, however, are not free conductors like copper wires. When excited they release their own energy as do the muscle cells. A more intense stimulus produces a stronger response by exciting more nerve fibers, by stimulating fibers when they are in relative refractory phase, and by setting up processes in the receptor which continue to excite the nerve fibers after the cessation of the stimulus. In these ways the intensity of the stimulus is represented in the nervous system by the total number of nerve impulses per unit of time (2).

Intense stimulation, moreover, may keep the nervous system active for a considerable time through actual injury to bodily tissue. Intense sunlight not only stimulates the thermal receptors in the skin. It also burns the skin and thereby excites pain receptors. The pain of the burn may linger until the skin tissue partly recovers from the injury. Even when the damage to bodily tissues is so slight that we do not consider it an injury, action currents from the damaged tissue may pour into the central nervous system for some time.

Although intensity of stimulation is reflected in the sensory nerves, it does not follow that it will be reflected on the response side of the reflex arc. As with all drives, the amount of stimulating input is not necessarily an index of the amount of the output in terms of response. The key to the problem lies in the organization and integration of central and motor pathways. Increasing the intensity of external stimulation may increase energetic performance, but it may also produce uncoordinated activity through the spreading of nerve impulses over many motor nerves.

The examples cited of intense stimuli have been examples involving avoidance. Does intensity of stimulation always drive the organism away from the source of the stimulus? In general the effect of stimulus intensity is to produce avoidant responses. Certain exceptions may be noted, however. In some individuals adient pathways are deeply channelized early in the development of the organism. Possibly sensitivity in such cases is below normal, owing to fewer receptors, particularly pain sense organs. At any rate, intense stimulation for these people calls out only adient mechanisms. From this type of background is fashioned the individual who seems "to eat up punishment," for example, the prize fighter who keeps boring in the more persistently, the more he is slugged.

Another exception occurs in the case of adient mechanisms which minister to the appetites. When the appetites are well appeased, their adient mechanisms may still respond to intense stimuli. In fact this applies to any habit which for the moment has a high threshold of excitation for one reason or another. Stimuli of normal strength will be ineffective, but intense stimuli will elicit the habit. This is true only within limits, since increased intensity will sooner or later produce avoidance.

(c) The Activation of the Sympathetic Nervous System by Intense Stimuli

Intense stimuli are less important for motivation in their effects upon the central nervous system than upon the sympathetic nervous system. Ordinarily nerve impulses do not

spread over into the sympathetic system. It is believed that sympathetic nerves have a higher threshold for excitation than other nerves. Continuous and intense stimulation, however, does break over into the sympathetic system. It will be recalled that this system is the means by which large reservoirs of bodily energy are released. It is man's biological equipment for meeting emergencies which call for extraordinary feats of strength and endurance. When it is thrown into action by intense stimulation, the individual is highly motivated. It is the basis for much of the behavior described as ritual in Chapter IV.

Although intense stimulation may be the original means of arousing the sympathetic system, the pathways become less resistant to certain stimuli through the mechanism of the conditioned response. For instance, a child catches his hand in a trap. The intense excitation from the injury activates the sympathetic system. On a future occasion the mere sight of a trap may throw the child into a state of wild excitement. In this way mild stimuli produce vigorous responses because of their original association with intense stimuli.

If the child is subjected to much intense stimulation in early life, say from the cruel treatment of parents, the sympathetic pathways may be thrown into action frequently. The result is a permanent lowering of synaptic resistances so that the sympathetic nerves become relatively open pathways. In the future any slight spread of impulses will arouse this system. The individual is continually being thrown into a fever pitch of excitement by situations which scarcely motivate the normal person.

Emotions

Emotion, certainly from the time of the James-Lange theory and to some extent even before it, has been associated with visceral disturbances such as the inhibition of digestion, the pounding of the heart, and changes in breathing, as well as with the violent and energetic behavior of the individual. When W. B. Cannon demonstrated that all these bodily reactions were produced by the sympathetic nervous system, it seemed a logical

step to identify emotion with the functioning of the sympathetic system.* The taking of this step, however, has not been easy. Difficult problems still bar the way, among them the question of the relationship between consciousness and emotion and the puzzle of the differentiation of emotional patterns. Abundant evidence, however, shows that the sympathetic plays a central role in emotional activity. Hence in this book the assumption will be made that when the sympathetic nervous system is in action, the individual is undergoing emotional stress and excitement.

The activation of the sympathetic furnishes a source of drive for the individual. It does not account for the direction in which the drive pushes man. The direction is determined by the habits of the individual built up through trial-and-error learning. The spread of nerve impulses into the sympathetic may energize a specific avoidance of an object or a situation, or an enthusiastic embracing of some problem, or a frontal attack upon a person or object. The diversity of emotions is partly due to the many mechanisms into which sympathetic drive is released. Such emotional terms as fear, anger, and joy refer both to internal drive and the mechanism to which it becomes attached. For example, fear is an avoidant mechanism fed by drive from the sympathetic system, while anger is an extreme adient response also motivated by the sympathetic.†

Reference has already been made to mild stimuli which excite the sympathetic nervous system and to the permanent lowering of sympathetic resistance. These problems can be profitably reviewed in the light of the assumption that the functioning of the sympathetic system has a great deal to do with emotion. Irrational fears and unreasonable emotional outbursts are directly related to the mild stimuli which through

* Cannon, however, would be the last to take such a step. Cannon believes that emotions are localized in a subcortical nerve center, the optic thalamus (3). This is an expression of an old but still respectable doctrine that consciousness is more related to the excitation of brain centers than to bodily response.

† This is the theory of emotions of F. H. Allport with the exception that Allport first differentiates emotions into pleasant and unpleasant on the basis of the antagonism between the cranial-sacral and sympathetic systems (1, Chap. IV).

conditioning can activate the sympathetic system. Fears range from common everyday avoidances to pathological phobias. The child whose hand was once caught in a steel trap may show a phobia for all steel instruments, particularly if in his original experience relief was not forthcoming for some time. The prolonged visceral upset due to the continuous intense stimulation thus became associated with the mere sight of the trap. Where adient mechanisms have been conditioned to the functioning of the sympathetic system in particular situations, the individual may fly into a rage over a trifle or enthusiastically acclaim an insignificant incident. Precisely because emotional reactions are set off by mild stimuli they are regarded as unreasonable and inexplicable. Once the history of the individual is known, the connection of the innocuous stimulus with an intense, emotion-provoking stimulus can be traced. The puzzle of unwarranted fears, silly enthusiasms, and illogical fits of rage (all rightly called childish) is thereby explained.

The permanent lowering of sympathetic resistance through frequent contact with intense stimulation also bears upon emotionality in people. A sensitive sympathetic system means that the person is easily excited not only by particular conditioned stimuli but by almost any stimulus slightly above normal in intensity. The frequent emotional upsets may be dominantly fearful, angry, or joyous in nature. The dog whose spirit is broken by a number of severe beatings is made permanently shy and apprehensive. A sudden movement, a loud sound, an upraised arm, or a flash of light is enough to send him cowering to a corner, his tail between his legs. A child whose parents often thwart it only to yield in the end to its temper tantrums becomes the adult who storms and rages through life. In contrast is the emotionally stolid person with a high sympathetic threshold who needs a very intense stimulus to excite him.

Are Emotions Disrupting in Their Effects upon Performance?

How are emotions related to motivation? How effectively do the energizing reactions of the sympathetic system drive the individual? In spite of the obvious biological utility of these reactions for emergencies it is frequently urged that emotions disrupt motivation. In fact some writers go so far as to define emotion in terms of disorganized and chaotic behavior. In support of this contention are offered cases of individuals unstrung by anger and demoralized by fear. A football coach sometimes sends his men into a big game so highly excited that the backs fumble, the timing of plays suffers, and the quarterback loses his head.

Emotional stress often has a disrupting effect upon performance precisely because of the great floods of energy made available to the organism. Nerve impulses bombard the central nervous system with such rapidity and in such numbers that an overflow into many motor channels occurs. The resulting activation of many muscles may break up a coordinated pattern of response. The individual tries to do everything at once.

The disorganizing effects of emotion do not take place, however, if the flood of nerve impulses can find their way out over a single deeply channelized system of motor pathways. If thoroughly ingrained habits are associated with the exciting situation, the individual may make excellent use of the drive in emotional excitement. This is the practical basis for the emphasis upon *form* in sport. Form is the standard, supposedly correct, procedure which the athlete is trained to follow. Once he acquires form, he has developed an habitual mechanism which will prevent him from going to pieces in competition. The greater the drive, the more effectively will he function.

An important exception must be made to the statement that thoroughly ingrained habits can stand almost any degree of drive. A great deal depends upon the nature of the habit. Gross motor habits can be very highly motivated with a cor-

responding increase in performance. Fine discriminating adjustments, even though they are habitual, are broken up in times of emotional stress. For example, the gross motor performance of the sprinter is speeded up by excessive drive, but the finely coordinated putting of the golfer is ruined by emotional excitement.

The reason for this difference is to be found in the total number of nerve fibers and the complexity of the neural pattern in the two types of habits. It will be recalled that a rapid flow of nerve impulses keeps a nerve fiber in refractory phase so that the fiber fails to conduct impulses (see page 219). In a gross motor habit many nerve fibers are involved in the same nerve tract. Therefore, even if some are knocked out by the overcrowding of impulses, the pathway will still function effectively. In a finer habit, fewer total fibers are involved. Hence the knocking out of a number of fibers is more serious. The openness of the pathway is destroyed and impulses break over into other pathways. Moreover, a more complex neural pattern underlies a delicate discriminatory habit. The temporal relations between the neurons essential for the functioning of such a habit are more easily upset by an intense continuous flow of nerve impulses.

THE COMBINATION AND INTERPLAY OF MOTIVES

For purposes of logical classification the four important sources of motivation have been discussed separately. In actual life, however, the individual is generally affected by more than one type of drive at the same time. For a comprehensive view it is necessary to consider the interplay of motives. Man's purposive strivings often reflect a harmony of motives; at other times they show a conflict of motives. First we shall consider conflict, and second the combination of motives as expressed in the familiar concepts of punishment and reward, social approval, social disapproval, competition or rivalry, and self-interest. These concepts are generally unanalyzed entities which refer to more than one source of drive and more than one type of mechanism.

The Conflict of Motives

The conflict of motives is really a conflict of mechanisms. Strictly speaking, drives in themselves never conflict, because drives are only the stimuli which activate the organism. The clash occurs on the response side of the arc. It is obviously impossible for the organism to move in opposed directions at the same time. Mechanisms which involve the use of antagonistic muscle groups are in conflict whenever their appropriate stimuli simultaneously impinge upon the receptors of the organism.

A distinction is generally made between *overt* and *internal* conflict. Overt conflict or struggle occurs when a mechanism is blocked by some external object or force. The hungry cat in the cage throws itself at the bars in an effort to get at the food lying outside the cage. Internal conflict is the opposition of two mechanisms simultaneously elicited. Overt struggle often results in internal conflict. After useless attempts to break through the bars of the cage, the hungry animal develops a conditioned avoidance of the bars. The sight of the food stimulates an adient response at the same time that the sight of the bars stimulates avoidance. The overt struggle has become an internal conflict.

The seriousness of conflict depends upon the intensity and constancy of the stimulation which impels the organism in opposed directions. In everyday experience minor dilemmas abound from the selection of cereal at breakfast to the choice between studying or going to the movies in the evening. On the whole such conflicts bear little upon the question of motivation. When, however, mechanisms motivated by intense or continuous stimulation clash, the conflict in itself seems to be an added source of drive to the individual. The thwarting of a cross-conditioned interest, the denial of appetitive satisfaction, or the blocking of emotional expression adds fuel to the individual's energy.

The denial of the appetites has already been considered. Here the unappeased tissue conditions continue to pour an

increasingly intense stream of nerve impulses into the central nervous system. The effect of thwarting an appetite is to increase drive. The inhibition of a cross-conditioned activity by environmental forces also produces restlessness and added energy. In this instance the constant source of stimulation is not intensified because of the blocking of its usual pathway of discharge. It is difficult, therefore, to account for the extra drive which the individual seems to possess. Probably impulses from the constant source of stimulation overflow into the sympathetic system, when their normal outlet is inhibited. If so, the energizing reactions of the sympathetic would account for the greater motivation present in this conflict.

The blocking of emotional expression itself constitutes another form of conflict which frequently acts as a spur to the individual. The person who is prevented from venting his anger at the moment may go through the day thoroughly aroused. The neurology of the phenomenon is complicated. The sympathetic apparently is stimulated again and again by impulses from some reflex circle representing an ideational or symbolic process. Moreover, many exceptions occur in which the inhibition of emotional expression tends to dissipate rather than to aggravate the emotional state. This is the basis of the injunction to count to one hundred, when angry.

For the most part conflict is a condition whereby drive becomes intensified. From the point of view of common sense this presents something of a paradox. The harmonious combination of motives obviously inspires men to greater accomplishment. The conflict of motives, therefore, should weaken the energies of men rather than act as a motivating condition. The paradox arises because we tend to confuse productive performance and drive. The stimulating source of drive is increased rather than diminished by the blocking of its usual mechanism. Since this mechanism is inhibited, the usual activity of the individual is disrupted. Conflict represents an interference with the normal pursuits of men and with the quantity of work turned out. In this sense it dissipates men's energies.

On the other hand, the overflow of impulses into many pathways, which occurs in conflict, drives the individual to many unusual and novel exertions. In fact the overflow accounts for the trial and error so necessary for learning and thinking. Without obstacles to block his progress, the individual goes about his accustomed tasks running through the same habits and thinking the same thoughts. Before he acquires new techniques or views his world from a new angle, his habitual adjustments must be jolted by conflict. Then, and only then, is there the random exploration which leads to discovery, learning, and ideation.

In brief, conflict furnishes the condition for inventions, original thinking, and creative art. Social change, technological advances, and revolutionary ideas and actions rest upon a conflict of motives. Similarly, much of the routine work of the world depends upon a harmony of motives. Society remains stable and conservative as long as the motives of its members find unified expression. The opposition of motives leads to trial-and-error experimentation.

Reward and Punishment

Pleasure and *pain*, the two subjective motivating forces of psychological hedonism, have reappeared in many guises. To the person interested in the practical aspects of motivation they are known as *reward* and *punishment*. Although there is no gainsaying the importance of these concepts for training animals, raising children, or manipulating men, nevertheless reward and punishment remain names for value-judgments rather than for scientific observations. Their use for practical purposes is limited as long as they are blanket terms covering a multitude of factors. It is worth while, therefore, to attempt an analysis of reward and punishment.

Reward refers to any stimulus which will call out an adient response, punishment to any stimulus which will call out an avoidant response. Rewards may thus be based upon any of the four types of drives described above, since all these drives can result in adient mechanisms. For example, the objective

of an appetite drive may represent a reward, as in animal experiments where the animal is fed after a successful performance. Or a reward may be the means for procuring appetitive satisfaction; i.e., it may even be a conditioned stimulus which indicates the individual is on his way to obtain such satisfaction. A reward might consist of an object or event falling within the cross-conditioned interests of a person. Again, it might be a situation productive of emotional excitement.

At first glance it may appear that rewards merit little consideration in a discussion of motivation. They owe their efficacy to the drives already present in the organism. Their importance, however, lies in the direction in which they orient developing mechanisms. The particular activities rewarded in a culture become the means by which the energies of the various drives are released. Since rewards help to select out the responses which become fixated in the learning process, they come to be the conditioned stimuli for evoking motives. What constitutes a reward is consequently a function of the particular natural and social environment in which the individual is raised. One of the greatest problems in the imperialistic penetration into primitive cultures is to make the natives work for the white man. All the rewards so effective in the white man's culture are insufficient in the beginning to enslave the native. Physical force and the undermining of the local economic system come first, and then the native may gradually acquire some of the tastes of a foreign culture.

Punishment is a more definitive concept than reward. Without a specific knowledge of the individual and his cultural background, it is difficult to predict what particular objects and situations constitute rewards. Punishment, however, can be defined in advance for all individuals as intense forms of stimulation. Whereas reward is largely concerned with mechanisms, punishment refers to drive. Nevertheless it is true that punishment also applies to mild stimuli which produce avoidance through conditioning.

The Efficacy of Punishment Compared with Reward

Because punishment is a drive in itself and reward must excite a drive to be effective, it is easier to motivate animals and men by punishment than by reward. It is easier in the sense that it takes less knowledge of individual differences. Just as the white man first uses physical force to bend primitive man to his will, so the experimenter uses electric shock to drive his animals toward the solution of a problem. Parents and teachers, too, find punishment an easier method for training children than reward. And only within recent years has reward crept into the administration of criminal justice in the form of probation and parole.

Punishment is more advantageous than reward largely from the short-run point of view. Its main advantage is that almost any intense stimulation will have an effect, whereas it takes a particular reward to make the individual respond. But punishment has decided disadvantages in comparison to reward. Consider first the cases in which it is used to stamp out traits of behavior. It is effective in breaking up the behavior through the overflow of intense excitation into many paths. Though it breaks up the unwanted act, it may also break up many other habits. It produces the sought-for-avoidance but only at the expense of causing other avoidances. For example, the child often acquires an avoidance of the parent who beats him, even more than he acquires an avoidance of the forbidden object. Furthermore, intense stimulation from punishment may overflow into the sympathetic system and bring about undesirable emotional fear and rage. Finally, the use of negative sanctions frequently leads to a constant increase of penalties. The severity of punishment in many cases has to be continuously increased. Repression tends to call for more repression.

The difficulties in the use of discipline are illustrated in Köhler's account of the resistant behavior of his apes to punishment (10). Pressure by the experimenter rarely produced any results when the animal was not interested in the problem.

Repeated punishments for indulging in forbidden activities were effective only when the experimenter was physically present. As soon as his back was turned, the animal proceeded to disobey. "If," Köhler tells us, "the chimpanzees have just been forcibly prevented from some activity which they like, but which has been forbidden them, and if one then hides oneself in order to see what will happen, it is very amusing to observe how they first look carefully all around in every suspicious place, and then, seeing no actual danger, gradually work up nearer to the place of the forbidden act, in order, soon, to begin most zealously to sin again, as though there were no such thing as a human being and no possibility of future reckoning" (10, p. 297).

Nevertheless punishment has its place in practical problems of training. It is better, for example, to break up a number of behavior patterns through corporal punishment than to permit the unheeding child to play in the middle of the street. Moreover, punishment loses many of its undesirable features when it occurs as a natural function of the situation. Just as the normal child learns to avoid fire without suffering trauma, so the judicious use of penalties by the parent can lead to avoidance of the forbidden object rather than avoidance of himself. To accomplish this the parent must be as objective and as constant in his application of sanctions as is the natural environment.

Perhaps the most important factor in the problem of the evil effects of punishment is the question of whether punishment is employed to prevent any expression of a motive or whether it is employed to redirect motivated behavior. If punishment is used to block completely certain motivated activity, it is successful only at the expense of emotional trauma. If, however, the purpose is merely to block one channel of expression, punishment can be efficacious without harmful effects. For example, it is one thing to punish children for playing ball in the street when no other place to play is provided. It is another thing to provide them with adequate playgrounds and then to punish them for playing in the prohibited area.

Punishment and reward can be discussed as independent factors in the interests of accurate analysis. In actual practice they are generally used to supplement one another. The most common motivation employed in animal experiments is an appetitive drive. The denial of the appetite constitutes a punishment since it leads to an increasingly intense stimulation. The animal is deprived of food for some time and then placed in a maze. The hunger drive keeps him running until he finally reaches the goal. Then he is rewarded with food. In the training of children, toys and candy are combined with scoldings and spanking to produce the desired behavior.

Social Approval and Social Disapproval

An aspect of reward and punishment of special significance to social psychology is the approval and disapproval of one's actions by his fellows. Few individualists are so rugged in their independence that they are not susceptible to the censure and praise of their colleagues. Even the artist who scorns the judgments of the philistine public nonetheless creates for an audience, if it be no more than the ideal public of his imagination (11).

Approval and disapproval derive their motivating effects from other punishments and rewards by means of associative learning—a fact ignored by the early social psychologists. The older writers were impressed by the mass acceptance of ideas and actions in fads and fashions and by the sheeplike behavior of people in that collective madness known as war. They postulated a herd instinct to explain these social phenomena. The sensitivity of the individual to what his neighbors say and do has its basis in the long period in which he is utterly dependent for his pleasures and for life itself upon those about him. Thus F. H. Allport observes: "During the first two or three years every event of importance to his well-being occurs through the ministration of other persons. Features, facial expressions, and vocal sounds are the regular accompaniments of these events. It is obvious, therefore, that, through the law

of the conditioned response, these social stimuli must acquire an early and universal significance in child life" (1, p. 76).

Although all children are responsive to social approval and disapproval differences occur as to the particular types of social stimulation to which they are most susceptible. Statistics show that the lack of normal parental care produces children less sensitive to the accepted social rewards and punishment, as we have already seen in Chapter V. Furthermore, the child's dependence upon others assumes different forms as he grows older. The early physical helplessness is gradually overcome, but the developing youth continues to lean upon other people for intellectual, emotional, and economic support for many years. Initiative and self-reliance can generally be traced to an early background of struggle in a fairly unprotected environment. In many cases the home loses its position as the center of approval and disapproval. Other social groupings take over this function. Sometimes the school becomes important, and sometimes the boys' gang successfully competes with the more orthodox agencies as the controlling source of social approbation and social censure.

A qualification must be made to the generalization that both approval and disapproval owe their efficacy solely to other rewards and punishments. It is true enough that a frown or a spoken prohibition call out avoidance only because they were once accompanied by some form of punishment. Social approval, on the other hand, can develop its own source of motivation on the principle of adience. The mother, touched by her baby's smile, responds with a smile. There follows a conversation of facial expressions and meaningless sounds between the two. The more the child smiles and gurgles, the more stimulation it receives from its reciprocating mother to continue this behavior. The child indulges in this activity for its own sake and not because of associated rewards. We recognize this fact by saying that the child wants attention. Approval, in other words, is often an imitation of the action approved. Hence it is a facilitating and motivating factor in itself.

The shift from the emphasis upon punishment to an em-

phasis upon reward in the home, the school, and even in industry is reflected in a similar increasing use of approval in contrast to disapproval. Experimental evidence confirms this trend. In a series of experiments on the effects of praise and reproof Hurlock found that for a single performance praise and reproof were about equal in increasing accomplishment, but for continued performance praise was more effective than reproof (7). In the single performance individual differences in reacting to approval and disapproval were marked. The brighter children were motivated more by censure, the duller children by approval. This may be related to the fact that bright children are accustomed to praise and can generally secure it without undue exertion. Dull children are generally reproofed even when they try fairly hard. Praise to the dull child is, therefore, an added incentive, as is reproof to the bright child.

TABLE IV

EFFECT OF VARIOUS INCENTIVES ON CONTINUED PERFORMANCE OF GROUPS OF DIFFERENT ABILITIES

(After E. Hurlock, 7, p. 156)

Groups	Third Over First Test, Per Cent	Third Test Over Control, Per Cent	Fifth Over First Test, Per Cent	Fifth Test Over Control, Per Cent
Control				
Superior	— 10	..	— 20	..
Average	4	..	00	...
Inferior	15	..	36	...
Praised				
Superior	37	47	43	63
Average	70	66	79	79
Inferior	107	92	140	104
Reproved				
Superior	13	23	14	34
Average	11	7	16	16
Inferior	53	38	43	7
Ignored				
Superior	— 8	2	— 13	7
Average	28	24	15	15
Inferior	42	27	43	7

In Hurlock's experiment on continuous performance, school children were given arithmetic tests on four successive days (7). Pupils from the fourth and sixth grades were divided into four groups of equal ability. One group was praised, another reproved, another allowed to remain in the room but ignored, and the fourth or control group sent to another room for the taking of the tests. The children in the *praised* group were called before the class and commended for their performance the preceding day. The names of the *reproved* group were read aloud and they were censured for their careless and inefficient work. While praise and reproof at first had an equal motivating effect, in the last three days the *praised* group clearly demonstrated its superiority. The *ignored* group which heard the other students commended and reproved did not do as well as either of these groups, but did do better than the control group (Table IV). The conclusion for practical application seems to be that disapproval is as forceful *on occasion* as approval, but that its continued use is not nearly as effective as the continued use of praise.*

Rivalry and Competition

Rivalry has often been regarded as the dominant social motive of western European culture. Competition, we are told, is the life of trade. Social reformers who seek to destroy economic competition are commonly accused of trying to change human nature. Psychologically, however, rivalry is far from a simple concept. It sums up many processes, the physiology of which is obscure. The following analysis, therefore, makes no pretense at completeness.

The motivating source of rivalry is emotional. The energizing reactions which help the individual in competition are

* Scientifically it is still too early to generalize about this problem because of the difficulty of equating praise and reproof. We can compare the effects of two poisons on the body and call one the more deadly, since we have measurements of the physical properties of drugs. Before we can equate amounts of praise and disproof we must have a measuring stick, the units of which apply as well to praise as to reproof.

largely from the sympathetic system. The mechanism in rivalry is always an adient response. Thus the emotional drive in rivalry is supplemented by adience. Rivalry is in its nature emotional because it has its origin in conflict. Competition arises from the direct clash of the adient responses of two individuals. If the struggle is not hopelessly one-sided the adient mechanisms of both individuals are partly blocked. The blocking, or conflict, means that nerve impulses break over into the sympathetic system and emotional excitement is the consequence.

The nature of rivalry appears more clearly if it is reduced to its most elementary form. Consider two children who want or are adient toward the same toy at the same time. Let us assume that rivalry is not yet present, i.e., that each child wants the toy for the toy itself and not because the other child desires it. Each child grasps the toy but is checked in his possessive efforts by the other. The thwarting or conflict affects the sympathetic system, and its reinforcing effects intensify the struggling responses. Finally, one child secures the toy. He is not only rewarded by the possession of it, but by the resolution of his conflict. After the repetition of this and similar experiences, he is conditioned to go after an object merely by the sight of another youngster making movements toward it. Moreover, he now seeks not only the other's treasure but also the defeat of the other child. The adience of his playmate needs only to be seen to arouse conflict and emotion within him. And the means for the discharge of this emotion and the solution of the conflict he has already learned. In short, the child sees other children as potential rivals.

What happens, however, to the unsuccessful child? In him the conflict is not yet resolved, and at the first favorable opportunity he will go back after the toy. His emotional drive, sustained by the unsolved conflict, may be vented in an attack against his playmate. On future occasions he wants the toys of others and also their submission to his adient acquisitiveness. Almost all children have both successful and unsuccessful en-

counters with their playmates. Their rivalry is based upon experiences of both victorious aggression and thwarted possessiveness.

The primitive form of rivalry in which the child tugs and pulls at an object to get it away from another youngster is soon socialized. The child learns socially approved ways of getting more than his playfellows. The sole use of a toy is granted to the child who is more obedient, or who shows himself more clever. Now this child, now that child is singled out for special favors if he outdoes his fellows not in sheer physical aggression but in social accomplishments. The adience of rivalry is directed towards the acquisition of all the socially approved habits of our civilization.

Two Extreme Conceptions of Rivalry

If the foregoing analysis is correct, rivalry is predicated upon two fundamental facts. It owes its origin, in the first place, to the individual's adient tendencies toward the many objects in his environment. In the second place, it comes into being through the nature of our social world. Not one individual but two or more individuals desire the *same* things. Strife, therefore, follows, and out of it emerges competition. Those who make of rivalry an underived entity and a universal instinct overlook the first fact. They conceive of rivalry as a competitive striving in and for itself. Those who regard rivalry merely as competition for external rewards fail to see the implications of the second fact.

These extreme views are both correct as far as they go. Rivalry for the sake of rivalry does exist. People will compete for no other motive than that of outdoing their fellows. This pure rivalry, however, is not an instinct but the finished product of developmental processes. We limit our knowledge needlessly if we disregard its history. Tremendous differences in societies arise from the different things for which men compete. The very existence of rivalry depends not upon an instinct of rivalry but upon the necessity of gratifying some

need.* The important part that scarcity and abundance play in the development of competition illustrates this point. The children of the rich are frequently lacking in ambition. Witness the saying, "It is only three generations from shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves." Rivalry does not develop over those things which are so plentiful that everyone can have his fill. Precious stones and rare objects, however, are always the center of competition.

Rivalry for Social Approval

Though rivalry can be found in a pure form, social conditioning generally supplies it with a specific content. The individual not only wants to outstrip his fellows, but he wants to outrun them in particular types of races. Nevertheless the dominant way in which rivalry expresses itself is in competition for social approval. The child wants more applause and approbation than is given to other children. Men vie with one another for the amount of public recognition accorded to their persons. In fact, fame consists in outdistancing all rivals for the lasting and universal respect of mankind.

The strength of the combined motives of rivalry and social approval is demonstrated in C. J. Leuba's experimental study of motivation in school children (12). One phase of this experiment furnishes a comparison of a candy reward with competition for approval in motivating fifth-grade children to do arithmetic problems. As a check upon the effects of these incentives, the children were given a number of trials in which no rewards were offered and no attention apparently given to their work. In other trials bars of chocolate were presented as rewards for accomplishment. Toward the end of the experi-

* O. Klineberg's observations on this point are pertinent: "... aggressiveness, as a trait of a particular society may be determined by a number of secondary causes. Material interest probably plays the most important part. On Chatham Island there were not many fights except over the possession of the flesh of whales and other sea animals. The Hottentots fought only when their neighbors tried to take their property from them. In parts of South Africa wars were over the possession of cattle, and several tribes refused to keep livestock so as not to tempt their enemies" (*Race Differences*, Harper & Bros., 1935).

ment, no candy was offered in a trial in which rivalry became the incentive. The children were divided into three groups and their names written on the blackboard. It was announced that the child who did the most problems in his group would be made its captain, "that his name would be underlined and a number 1 put in front of it; and that each of the other subjects would also have a number written in front of his name corresponding to his rank in the group. . . ."

The candy reward increased performance over the "no incentive" situation by 52 per cent. The competition for social recognition increased the output over the "no incentive" situation by 47 per cent. It is a commentary upon our competitive society that eleven-year-old children will work almost as hard for social recognition as for chocolate bars.

Thorstein Veblen has shown how the individual's desire for public recognition of his superiority is reflected in social customs. Conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption are the means for multiplying invidious distinctions among people. One function of good manners is to serve as an advertisement of a life of leisure. "Refined tastes, manners, and habits of life are a useful evidence of gentility, because good breeding requires time, application, and expense, and can therefore not be compassed by those whose time and energy are taken up with work" (16, pp. 48-49). Similarly, fashions reflect the prestige of leisure. When we were primarily an agricultural nation, for example, it was fashionable for women to be very fair. A tanned complexion implied working in the fields. Since we have become an industrialized nation, it is fashionable for women to appear tanned both in summer and winter. A fair complexion now implies working indoors. Sun tan, on the other hand, means the money and leisure to play outdoors in the summer and to spend the winter in southern resorts.

As communities grow in size and the population becomes more mobile, an increasing need arises for even more obvious and blatant signs of prestige. Conspicuous waste in the use of luxury articles meets this need. The fashionable woman's clothes, for example, are outmoded long before they are worn

out. "In the modern community there is also a more frequent attendance at large gatherings of people to whom one's everyday life is unknown; in such places as churches, theatres, ball-rooms, parks, shops and the like. In order to impress these transient observers, and to retain one's self complacency under their observation, the signature of one's pecuniary strength should be written in characters which he who runs may read" (16, p. 87).

The Varying Role of Rivalry in Different Cultures

It should not be assumed that, because rivalry appears at a fundamental behavior level, it must necessarily be the basis of all social motivation. It is one of many motives. It may occupy any place in society from the dominant position it enjoys in our civilization to the minor role it plays among the Zuni Indians and in Soviet Russia. Furthermore, the particular direction in which competition develops varies tremendously from culture to culture. In one civilization individuals compete with one another for material possessions; in another society people vie with their rivals in displays of lavish generosity. It is a mistake to universalize our cultural values and regard our own habits as unchangeable biological traits. A glance at other societies will show this error.

In Soviet Russia competition for material possessions is rigorously limited. No matter how hard the Soviet citizen works he cannot outdistance his fellow citizens in the acquisition of production goods, though he may increase his share of consumption goods. Group rivalry is substituted for individual rivalry, but even here the basic identification of the individual is with society and not with his local unit (17). Among the Zunis, cooperation rather than competition is the usual social practice. Individuals in whom the motive of personal rivalry is strongly developed are exceptions and are regarded as sorcerers. Rivalry among the Indians of British Columbia has as its usual mode of expression the giving away or the destruction of property. A person will humiliate his rival by giving a

feast or potlatch to which the tribe is invited. The more pretentious the feast, the more expensive the gifts, the more property burned; the greater the superiority the individual shows over his opponent.

Rivalry can thus be the central motive in a society or it can be subordinated to other motives. It can assume such varied forms as continual physical fighting, the acquisition of property, or the public bestowal of gifts. The position it occupies is determined by the long trial-and-error experience of a particular people in a particular environment. For example, the emphasis upon personal acquisitiveness in our culture is related to our economic history. The application of machinery to a relatively unpopulated land, rich in natural resources, yielded abundant returns. The poorest workers had the possibility of improving their lot, the middle class the prospect of becoming wealthy. Even if the majority remained poor, enough individuals through their energetic competitiveness did amass fortunes. They stood out as living examples of what could be done through acquisitive striving. In fact they became national heroes. Moreover social causation is circular. The predatory habits of an older generation helped to mold the acquisitiveness of the rising generation. Partly as a consequence of our rapidly developing industrial civilization with its rich plums for the enterprising and its minor rewards for the industrious, the dominant note in our national psychology came to be the overstimulation of ambition.

Self-Interest

An old controversy still rages over the question: Is man fundamentally selfish or fundamentally altruistic? Stated in these terms the conflict can never be resolved, for selfishness and altruism are evaluations which we make of the other fellow. People will not agree upon an objective criterion for these moral labels. It is more fruitful to take the scientific attitude toward the problem, and this attitude regards all behavior as self-interested in the sense that its motivation has a biological basis.

Self-interest is the final generalization which sums up man's adiances, avoidances, appetites, emotions, and cross-conditioned drives. Man's actions, therefore, are always an expression of his self-interest. The very breadth of this concept limits its usefulness in social psychology. Since it applies to all behavior, it fails to explain specific items of conduct. It does, however, tell us where to look for the explanation, namely, in the biological drives and their elaboration into motives in relation to specific environmental forces. And this is much more than we are told by the usual idealistic version of human motives.

The scientific statement of the self-interested nature of behavior is in direct opposition to the romanticism which has characterized social science since the days of Rousseau. The romantic doctrine believes in the inherent perfectability of man. The natural savage was essentially a splendid character who became corrupted by the hypocrisy and greed of civilization. Self-interest in the scientific sense, however, is not to be confused with the materialism of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham pictured man as a self-centered shopkeeper who keeps a profit and loss account and whose every act is determined by the balance between pleasurable and painful consequences. Though this portrayal of man is closer to the truth than the romantic account, it is nonetheless too oversimplified and too rationalistic a concept of self-interest.

The motives that guide men are various. The religious fervor of the pious, the attachment to standards of beauty of the artist, and the sacrificial devotion of the patriot are not motivated by a rational balancing of monetary profit and loss. But these religious, artistic, and patriotic values are not in themselves the cause of the individual's behavior, as the idealistically minded person would claim. These values have no inherent motivating force for men. Their motivation is derived from the fact that they have become the conditioned stimuli for evoking the various biological drives. They are the medium through which the biological nature of the organism expresses itself. And one man differs from another in the appeals which move him, not because he possesses a different biology, but be-

cause he has experienced a different environmental background.

In spite of the individual differences any cultural epoch shows a great similarity in the goals toward which men strive. This is because human beings, exposed to the same social environment, acquire many of the same conditioned responses. Thus the grain of truth in Bentham's picture of the shopkeeper is that he was describing a mercantilist age in which many men thought in terms of the balance sheets of their ledgers.*

The *subjective* description of self-interest is in terms of *ego drives*. According to this point of view men are regarded as striving for status to enhance their egos. To state it negatively, they avoid anything which makes for ego displacement—that is, people try hard to keep their notion of themselves at a level with their notion of what is praiseworthy. This description is unquestionably correct, but like self-interest it is too general a conception to be an adequate scientific explanation. In discussing the development of personality we shall have occasion to account more completely for the place of the ego in motivation.

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*Everything the writers have attempted to say about self-interest has been said so much better by E. B. Holt in these few sentences: "Indeed I deem it a truism that every animal motion, without exception, is self-interested. But on the other hand the proposition is too summary and general to carry us far into the *details* of human nature. There are factors of training and habit, of physical and mental morbidity, and the inexhaustible diversity of (self-) interests, which have to be taken into account. Moreover with the growth of intelligence the self, so far as conduct goes, to some extent expands; and men act *as if* their chattels, their rank, their parents, wives, children, and friends in varying degree, were included in their very selves" (6, p. 237).

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CHAPTER X

THE MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION

In describing the development and motivation of behavior the emphasis has been placed upon the responding individual. This emphasis has been in the interests of clear exposition. The reader has been frequently cautioned that an analysis of behavior must omit neither man nor the world about him. The human being is not a stick of dynamite to be exploded by any stimulus. He is geared to function in a specific environment. Behavior is located in space and time and not in a vacuum.

By far the largest part of the environment to which the individual responds is composed of other people. Man lives his life responding to and stimulating his fellows. These processes of social interaction have already been discussed from the standpoint of their practical import as cooperative and competitive devices in everyday existence. In this chapter we shall describe the psychological mechanisms underlying social interaction. Though these mechanisms refer primarily to the give-and-take between two or more people, in some instances they also include reactions to stimuli which as conditioned cues stand for human activity.

The various mechanisms of social interaction can be classified on the basis of the relation between the response and the stimulus. If an individual responds to the action of another by reproducing that action, it is called *imitation*. If he responds by intensifying his activity, it is called *social facilitation*. The behavior of others, or the mere presence of people, sometimes breaks down or represses the individual's reaction pattern. This process will be referred to as *social inhibition*. In many situations people are inhibited or distracted and, therefore, accept ideas or follow directions uncritically. *Suggestion* is the

name for this mechanism. Frequently, too, a man will behave toward an object, a symbol, or a person as if the object, symbol, or person were somehow part of himself. Such *identification* is illustrated by the patriot's love of his country. An insult to its honor is a personal insult to him. Identification is closely allied to *social projection* and may in fact be based upon it. *Projection* is the imputation to others of one's own reactions.

Not all these mechanisms are on the same level of complexity. Social facilitation is the reinforcing effect of a coacting group upon the behavior of the individual. The identification of an American with his country's flag is a more involved process which probably cannot be understood without reference to many previous conditioned responses. Moreover, imitation, suggestion, social facilitation, social inhibition, identification, and social projection do not exhaust all the possibilities of response which can be made in social situations. An individual may react in a highly discriminating manner which defies classification. Such individualized reactions are probably more complex than the behavior possibilities here recorded.

SOCIAL FACILITATION

Social facilitation is the term used by F. H. Allport to describe the increase in activity of the individual due to the sight and sound of others engaged in the same or similar activities (1). The mutually stimulating effect which people have upon one another is seen in its most extreme form in crowd behavior. In milder degree a similar facilitation occurs in most coacting groups. Workers in a factory produce more when working together than when working alone. People eat more and drink more in one another's company than in isolation. Needles fly faster and tongues wag more furiously in the ladies' sewing circle than at home.

Experimental Data on Social Facilitation

Quantitative data concerning the effects of social facilitation have been slowly accumulating in American and German

laboratories.* The bulk of the experimental evidence shows an increase of performance in the coacting group as compared to solitary work. In an extensive series of experiments F. H. Allport¹ demonstrated the facilitating effects of the group in a vowel-cancellation test, a reversible perspective test of attention, a multiplication test, and a test of word association (1). In the group situation four or five subjects worked together. In the solitary tasks the subjects were assigned to separate rooms. Rivalry was diminished by not permitting any knowledge or comparison of scores, by emphasizing the non-competitive nature of the experiment, and by forbidding a discussion of results.

In the vowel-cancellation test the subjects were given columns of newspaper material and were instructed to cross out all the vowels. In the test of attention an ambiguous flat line drawing of a cube was presented. One problem was to make the cube reverse in perspective as rapidly as possible. In another experiment subjects were asked to fixate a dot in the figure in order not to reverse the perception. The multiplication test consisted of a series of problems involving the multiplication of two-digit numbers. To secure a measure of the speed of free association subjects merely wrote down as rapidly as possible the successive words which came to mind for the short period of the experiment. In the experiment on vowel cancellation and reversible perspective 71 per cent of the subjects did more work in the group situation than when alone. Sixty-six per cent of the subjects likewise were facilitated by the group in the multiplication test. And in the experiment on word association 66 to 93 per cent of the subjects worked faster together than when alone.

The Nature of Social Facilitation

F. H. Allport has sought to limit the term *social facilitation* on the basis of its motivating source. An increase in per-

* For a summary of experiments on social facilitation as well as on other group effects see J. F. Dashiell, "Experimental Studies of the Influence of Social Situations on the Behavior of Individual Human Adults," Chapter 23 in C. Murchison, *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, Worcester: Clark University Press, 1935.

formance in the coacting group due to rivalry, he does not consider true social facilitation. Allport's position is that in rivalry the intensification of activity comes from emotional reinforcement and is not the direct effect of the sight and sound of others working. This direct effect is attributed to three possible sources: (1) The sight and sound of his own actions are conditioned stimuli to the individual for the perpetuation of his activity. Similar movements of other people furnish visual and auditory cues which are very much like this self-stimulation. "When multiplied many fold by the co-working group these conditioning contributory stimuli become important agents in facilitation." (2) "Attitudes of a more complex sort are also probable: knowing that those about us are to be doing the same task, we are disposed to work more rapidly *from the start*." (3) Meumann has suggested that, because of the distractions arising in the group situation, we overcompensate or work harder than we would normally.

Nevertheless in this book the term social facilitation will be used descriptively to refer to the increase in performance in the group *regardless of motive*. Two reasons justify this departure from F. H. Allport's definition. In the first place, the sources which he suggests for social facilitation show that he is not dealing with the *direct* effects of the sight and sound of others working. By definition the results which stimuli produce through conditioning and through complex attitudes cannot be considered the direct effects of the stimuli in and of themselves. If Allport recognizes a social facilitation motivated by a set for speed due to knowledge of the group situation, there is no reason for excluding social facilitation based upon rivalry. In the second place, it is practically impossible to eliminate rivalry from experiments on group effects. It can be reduced in importance as a motivating condition, but through long training the presence of others engaged in the same tasks excites a competitive attitude.* In fact, since rivalry

* LaPiere and Farnsworth have suggested that social facilitation may be nothing more than mild rivalry (*Social Psychology*, p 377). This extreme suggestion neglects the fact that individuals working alone have their competitive spirit aroused

is social in origin, the best stimulating situation for it is the actual presence of competitors. M. Sherif has warned us, moreover, that social facilitation may not be a basic psychological process, but a reflection of our particular culture (17).

Social facilitation as the intensification of activity in the group may have one or many motivating sources of stimulation. A number of writers have emphasized its dynamogenic basis. Working with other people furnishes more stimulation to the individual than solitary work. The additional nerve impulses are discharged over the most open pathway and in this manner reinforce the activity of the moment.*

Social Facilitation Applies to Overt Not Implicit Reactions

The facilitating effect of the group upon individual activity is confined to a speeding up of behavior. A person in a group goes through more motions and goes through them more vigorously than when alone. The same experiments which show a greater quantity of work done in the coacting group also show a poorer quality of performance in the social situation than in isolation. The accuracy and excellence of a task generally demand some discrimination and thought, and hence involve implicit reactions. In most cases the presence of others engaged in the same activities facilitates *overt* but not *implicit* reactions.

by the knowledge that others are busy at the same task. Then, too, Triplett has demonstrated that athletes make better records when they run together in a race than when they run against time, even though there is as much at stake in both situations (22). Individuals are thus more highly motivated when actually confronted with their competitors than when working in isolation with a knowledge of competitors.

*In the case of dynamogeny we are dealing with the *direct* effects of the social stimulation in the coacting group. If Allport had confined social facilitation to social dynamogeny the above criticism of his use of the term would be unwarranted. Nonetheless, there are distinct advantages in employing social facilitation to describe the phenomenon of the facilitating effect of the group rather than to refer to the motives back of this effect.

SOCIAL INHIBITION

We turn now to the inhibiting effects of the coacting group upon the activity of the individual. The fundamental condition for the production of inhibition is continuous and intense stimulation. The presence of others engaged in the same activity ordinarily is not overstrong stimulation for the gross motor responses of the individual, but it is overstrong for the implicit or the thought responses. On occasion also group activity arouses strong emotions and so may inhibit overt activity.

Most people believe that they can think better if left to themselves than with others about them. Creative work and critical thinking call for solitude. The presence of others, even if they are doing the same thing, furnishes continual distraction. We can compensate and throw more effort into our work to overcome the distraction, but the extra energy helps only the quantity of our production. Experiments on group effects confirm this generalization. In one experiment, subjects read philosophical passages and then wrote short arguments to disprove the passage (F. H. Allport, 1). The procedure was repeated with the same subjects and with different philosophical selections in the group situation and alone. The quality of the arguments produced was better for three-fourths of the subjects when they worked alone than when they worked in one another's presence. Social facilitation did appear in the group situation in the greater quantity of arguments produced under this condition.

The inhibiting effect of the group upon the thought process is not an inhibition of the amount of thinking, as the foregoing experiment demonstrates. The inhibition occurs in the pattern of implicit responses and the ordering of the pattern rather than in the number of single reactions. The additional stimulation in the group breaks up the sustained continuity of thought.

Overt activity as well as thinking can be inhibited if the group situation overstimulates the individual. In the many experiments in which social facilitation is the common finding,

there are almost always individuals who show social inhibition. The number of such cases increases as the conditions of the experiment permit a greater amount of competition. An experiment of N. Triplett demonstrates the inhibitory nature of the group situation for certain individuals (22). Triplett set for his subjects the task of turning a small crank by means of which a little flag attached to a cord was moved along a four-meter course. The forty children used in the experiment were given a number of trials alone and a number in group competition. In the latter situation the child tried to move his flag to the end of the course before the flag of his rival. When working alone the children were instructed to move the flags as fast as possible.

Although twenty subjects showed social facilitation, ten subjects made faster time when working alone than when competing with a rival. Triplett attributed the decrement in performance in the social situation to overstimulation. Clear-cut evidence for this hypothesis appeared in the experiment. In competition some children showed labored breathing, flushed faces, and a rigidity of the arm muscles preventing free movement. Sometimes the subject would lose control and after a decided gain would 'go to pieces' at a critical point in the race.

Triplett found striking instances of social inhibition because his experimental conditions were devised to arouse rather than to quiet the competitive motive. If the motivation had been increased still further, more than a minority of the children would have exhibited the effects of overstimulation. Individuals differ both in their sensitivity to various types of social situations and in their susceptibility to emotional excitement in almost any social setting. Some people are relatively overstimulated by any expressed or implied comparison of themselves with others. L. E. Travis has studied the effects of group activity upon stutterers (21). Ten stutterers were given a free association test in the "alone" and "together" situations. Travis tried to eliminate rivalry by forbidding a comparison of scores and by instructing his subjects not to consider the work a competition. Eight of the 10 subjects produced more written as-

sociations when working alone than when working together. This contrasts with Allport's experiment in which 14 out of 15 normal subjects wrote more in the presence of co-workers than alone. Evidence from other sources indicates that stuttering is largely an emotional and social maladjustment. Stutterers generally experience more difficulty in talking to strangers and to superiors than to friends.* It is not difficult to understand why this emotionally sensitive group should be inhibited in the coacting group even in their *written* responses.

We have taken as the social condition for facilitation and inhibition the coacting group—that situation in which everyone is engaged in the same type of activity. Other forms of social stimulation are often far more effective for increasing or decreasing the responses of individuals. Praise and reproof in moderate amounts are obvious instances of the facilitating effects of social stimuli. Extreme reproof and sometimes extreme praise are inhibitory. D. A. Laird has studied the effects of extreme censure (11). He obtained the cooperation of the members of a fraternity and had them put their pledges through a series of tests of motor performances. During the tests the fraternity members ridiculed, mocked, and reviled the pledges. Previously the pledges had taken the same tests under conditions of friendly competition. In general the scores were poorer when the pledges were censured than when they merely competed.

Social stimulation can inhibit the individual in three ways. In the first place, the direct effects of the amount of stimulation received from the group may be inhibitory. Such direct overstimulation occurs in crowds. Here the presence of many people shouting and milling about furnishes sufficiently intense stimulation to repress the customary behavior of the individual.

In the second place, other people inhibit us because of our past conditioning. In learning obedience, the child often has

* Thus Travis reports that of a group of 25 stutterers 12 have very little trouble when speaking alone, 12 no difficulty at all, while 1 has as much difficulty in both situations.

to repress the expression of his many attitudes and desires. The conditioned stimuli for this repression at first include the tone of the parent's voice, his facial expression, and his gestures. Later any sign of authority attached to a person may have an inhibiting effect upon the developing individual. As adults we are impressed and intimidated by official titles and symbols of power.

In the third place, we are inhibited in the group because of the arousal of emotions. Whereas emotions generally facilitate overt responses, they depress the thought processes. The presence of people whom we hate or fear upsets judgment and reasoning. We seldom argue logically when we are angry or afraid. One particular type of emotional arousal, frequently misunderstood, occurs in partly familiar social situations. It is most noticeable in children. The boisterous extraverted boy is very quiet his first day at school. Even adults find themselves ill at ease at social functions to which they are not accustomed. Habitual reactions are broken up in these instances not entirely by the novelty of the occasion. Because the situation is not wholly new, it calls out habits of adjustment which are now inadequate. It is this conflict between an old adjustment and its present inapplicability which makes the child cry and the adult become embarrassed.

IMITATION

Imitation is that relationship between stimulus and response in which the response reproduces or resembles the stimulus. Imitation is a universal phenomenon. It is the basis of all perception. It appears in the manifold social habits acquired by the child. It is a significant factor in fad and fashion, custom and tradition, crowd behavior and social institutions. Though we are here concerned with its social manifestations, imitation is not necessarily social. The child imitates non-human sounds and other natural stimuli in its environment as well as the behavior of people.

*The question has often been raised whether or not all outstanding resemblances between stimuli and responses should

be included under the term imitation. The infant's smile in response to a smile, or the child's yawn in response to a yawn, seem to be considerably removed from the deliberate effort of the novice to imitate the skill of the professional. The question can be met by distinguishing two types of imitation: *primary or simple imitation* which refers to the release of elementary mechanisms, and *generalized imitation* which refers to complex learning.

Primary or Simple Imitation

Before the scientific advances in child study and in psychology, imitation was thought to be an instinct—a part of man's biological inheritance. Now it is known that *simple imitation* is basically the setting off of conditioned responses already acquired by the individual. The reflex circle in particular is the mechanism which, figuratively speaking, is made to order for the phenomenon of simple imitation. The reflex circle consists of a response which furnishes the stimulus for its own perpetuation.* Hence it is in a sense self-imitation. And only a small step separates self-imitation from social imitation. For example, the child hears himself laugh, and the sound of his laughter feeds his continued gaiety on the reflex-circle principle. The sound of laughter thus acquires a motor outlet in the response of laughing. If now an adult laughs, the child obliges by echoing back the laugh. The child has imitated the adult.

Although a great deal of primary imitation is the setting off of reflex circles, imitation can also be the evoking of other conditioned responses. Individuals engaged in the same type of activity may not be imitating one another but they may be responding to the same common stimulus. After this has happened a number of times, however, they do become conditioned to the sight and sound of one another's actions. In

* J. M. Baldwin in his *Mental Development* published in 1895 pointed out this basis of imitation as the following passage indicates: "It (imitation) is what I have called 'a circular activity' on the bodily side—brain-state due to stimulating conditions, muscular reaction which reproduces or retains the stimulating conditions, same brain-state again due to same stimulating conditions, and so on" (pp. 264-265).

the future, therefore, they may respond imitatively to the conditioned stimuli of the activity of others. Even when we are not hungry, the mere sight of another person eating tends to call out our own eating responses. A similar phenomenon has been demonstrated in the pecking reactions of pigeons. A number of pigeons were placed in a cage without food but within sight of other pigeons which were eating. The pigeons without food started to peck futilely at the ground. They had been fed together so much in the past that the food-pecking response was conditioned to the visual stimulus of the pecking of another bird.

The proof of the foregoing description of imitation appears in the fact that children do not echo back sounds and movements which are not already part of their stock of conditioned responses. In an experimental study of imitation M. Guernsey found that infants and children mirror only certain responses (5). Likewise C. W. Valentine has reported that children do not imitate anything and everything, as we would expect if there were an instinct of imitation (23). One of the main reasons for this limitation of imitation in children is their restricted repertoire of action patterns. Parents soon discover that, if they are to get a response from their child, they must use the sounds he can already utter and the movements he can already execute. This is why mothers talk baby-talk to their infants. In other words, children do not imitate adults as much as adults imitate children, as the sociologist C. Cooley once observed. The compulsion to imitate, K. Koffka has pointed out, arises from the ability to imitate (10).

On the basis of the conditioned-response explanation of imitation we would expect the child to imitate his mother more than other persons. If the child's imitation is due to the frequent duplication of his actions by his mother, then specific aspects of the mother's appearance and behavior become part of the conditioned stimulus pattern for evoking imitation. To the extent to which another person differs from the mother in physical appearance, facial expression, or tonal inflection, to that degree the child will be unresponsive. For example, if

the child has learned to smile back at its mother's smile, the smile of a man with a goatee will scarcely call out an imitative response. Valentine's observations on children illustrate this point (23). He found that though young children imitated persons besides their mother, they imitated their mother more frequently.

The outstanding function which primary imitation serves in society is the selecting out of particular responses from the great range of behavior possibilities. As the child grows, he executes at random the many movements which his muscular structure makes possible. The specific reactions which finally become fixated are determined by the behavior patterns dominant in his social environment. The babbling child develops enough basic sounds to acquire any language under the sun. He learns to speak a specific language because only particular sounds and combinations of sounds are repeated in his culture. Through frequency and reward these articulations become the main sounds the child will make. And the same thing is true in almost all our social habits. The actions commonly seen and heard in the child's environment call out similar conditioned responses of his own. Other forms of his behavior are soon lost because the people about him do not mirror them. Imitation does not in itself produce the tremendous uniformities we behold in the behavior of men in all societies. It is a contributory factor in a circular process. Without uniformities in the social environment to begin with, imitation would be a less noticeable factor. The child brought up in a home where many tongues are spoken is apt to develop a polyglot language of his own.

• Generalized Imitation

Primary imitation does not account for all the imitations of children nor the greater part of the simulating behavior of adults. It refers only to the activities which the individual has already learned. Generalized imitation, on the other hand, goes beyond the specific acts present in the individual's repertoire to new forms of conduct. E. B. Holt has described two

factors which make for generalized imitation (7). One factor is the praise and awarding of favors by parents when the child exhibits some skill or act which is very like their own habits. This act is not a new one for the child. After many experiences in which he is rewarded for echoing back some saying or doing of his parents, however, he learns that he can win approbation by imitation. Then, he tries to put on new habits which resemble the activities of his elders. In this manner a generalized set to imitate develops. It is encouraged not only at home but also in the schoolroom, where the non-conformer is held up to scorn. Imitation of this sort is really trial-and-error learning. Before a response appears which really duplicates the stimulus, many unsuccessful trials have been made.

The generalized nature of imitation also results from the nature of adience. The tendency of the eyes to follow a moving object is not *specific* to the particular direction of a certain stimulus in motion. It is a *general* tendency to follow all moving objects in all directions. It is based on the principle of adience. The center of the retina, the fovea, is the area of the eye which gives clearest vision. Therefore, if the individual is to obtain more of a moving visual stimulus, he must keep turning his eye as the object moves so that the retinal image remains in the fovea. The eyes thus tend to imitate any movement taking place in the external world. Many authorities have made this internal mirroring the basis of perception.

A further fact of importance for imitation arises from the generalized adience of the eyes. The proprioceptive impulses from the eye movements acquire many collateral pathways of discharge to various muscle groups. If, in certain activities, the arms move at the same time as the eyes, the movement of the arms becomes conditioned to the movement of the eyes. Owing to this conditioning the child may imitate with its arms a movement it has never made before. The eyes adiently follow the new pattern of action. Since the arms are conditioned to follow the eye movements, the new action may be fairly well reproduced without trial and error (7).

SUGGESTION

Suggestion as a psychological process is exemplified in the following instances. (1) A keen but absent-minded chess player had the habit of whistling while he concentrated upon his game. On one occasion a friend accompanied his whistling of a march from *Le Prophete* by beating time on the table. Taking advantage of some notes common both to the march and to an air from *Madame Angot*, the friend shifted to the quicker and more staccato measure of *Madame Angot*. The absorbed chess player likewise changed his whistling from *Le Prophete* to *Madame Angot* without noticing the change. And when his friend reverted to *Le Prophete* the chess player also returned to the first air.*

(2) The advertising billboard pictures a maid answering a phone. She is reporting that the family of the house is out and hasn't been home much since the purchase of that new F— car. The car in question is one of the cheapest on the market. But the advertisement *suggests* by the implication of the uniformed maid that the people who buy this car are people of some social standing.

(3) The professional auctioneer often employs a technique which illustrates another type of suggestion. He announces that he will sell ten articles at the rate of one article a minute no matter what the bids. He takes out his watch and proceeds to make good his promise. The bidding is at first sluggish and the first two articles, though of considerable value, go at a very low price. The members of the audience begin to see they must bid fast and furiously unless they want their fellows to walk off with great bargains. The bidding speeds up and the last five or six articles are sold at ridiculously high figures.

(4) The hypnotist suggests to a subject that he is drowsy, that his eyelids are heavy, that his eyelids are closing. Gradually the eyelids droop. The hypnotist then commands "Rise" and the subject rises. Other suggestions, unless they run coun-

* Quoted by Boris Sidis in his *Psychology of Suggestion* from Ochorwitz's *Mental Suggestion*.

ter to very deeply entrenched habits, are also obeyed in docile fashion.

What common thread runs through these examples which justifies their being placed together in one category? The older psychology held that suggestion applies to all cases in which an idea or action is accepted or followed without being consciously and critically examined. Undoubtedly all the above examples fit into this description. It is nevertheless unsatisfactory as a definition of suggestion because of its subjective and all-inclusive nature. On the other hand, an objective psychology is faced with a difficult problem in defining a concept, the hallmark of which has been its relation to conscious processes.

The problem can be met if the thought process is conceived of objectively. Thinking, it will be recalled, is carried in terms of sustained implicit responses. During the process known as suggestion these responses are either temporarily *inhibited* or *dissociated*. Dissociation means that they are directed toward a stimulus other than that of the suggestion. Hence the individual responds in an uncritical manner.

When suggestion is due primarily to the inhibition of thinking reactions, it is called *direct suggestion*; when it is largely the result of dissociation, it is known as *indirect suggestion*. In the preceding examples the first two instances illustrate indirect suggestion, the last two direct suggestion. The chess player's critical thinking was concentrated completely on the game and hence dissociated from other stimulus-response processes. In this distracted state, the stimulus of the rhythm drummed out by the friend elicited a conditioned response of an imitative sort. The second example of the advertisement is again a matter of suggestion made effective by dissociation. The advertising billboard focuses attention upon the advantages of a car which is always in use. To the extent to which the reader reacts critically, he will discount this part of the ad. But preoccupied with the obvious phase of the propaganda, he unwittingly absorbs the suggestion of the social prestige reflected by the ownership of the type of car advertised.

Direct suggestion is evidenced in the responses of the members of the audience who bid rapidly at the auction. Their thinking responses are not diverted toward other problems but are inhibited by the emotional excitement of the situation. The presence of others bidding, the apparent necessity for quick action, and the aroused self-interest of the individual combine to produce an intense stimulation which destroys thought patterns. Similarly in hypnosis, the subject's symbolic trial-and-error reactions are inhibited. The inhibition here is due partly to the prestige of the hypnotist and partly to his use of monotonous stimulation conducive to sleep. With the quiescence of his critical faculties the subject readily obeys direct commands.

In other words, when an individual responds to suggestion, his response does not represent the integrated result of his reaction possibilities. He reacts not to the whole situation but to a particular part of it. His ideational responses (symbolic implicit reactions) are blocked out of the picture. This may be due to their actual inhibition by incoming nerve impulses, or it may be due to dissociation. The individual may be absent-minded, that is to say his thought processes are concerned with another problem while he overtly responds to the present situation. *Suggestion may be defined, therefore, as the reaction of the individual when his field of behavior is restricted by inhibition or dissociation.* The nature of this reaction may be imitative, or it may be the releasing of any other conditioned response.

The concept of suggestion as involving dissociation or inhibition has been held by many writers. P. Janet, an outstanding contributor to abnormal psychology, regarded suggestion as dissociation of consciousness. For the suggested idea to be realized, it must proceed independently of other ideas. This can occur most readily if the personal synthesis of the individual is broken down (9). In his early experiments on normal suggestibility, B. Sidis reported that distraction of attention, limitation of voluntary movements, limitation of the field of consciousness, and inhibition were among the necessary conditions for suggestion. When his subjects were able to inhibit

ideas and associations, the experiments gave positive results (19). I. P. Pavlov considers suggestion as the simplest form of the conditioned response. In suggestion, cortical inhibition abolishes all competing effects of contemporary stimuli and all traces left by previous stimuli, save the one conditioned reaction which is evoked (15). C. Hull believes that in true suggestion the individual's own symbolic processes remain passive. Hence "his muscles are relatively susceptible to the symbolic stimulation emanating continuously from the experimenter." The passivity of the subject's implicit reactions, Hull refers to as the "inhibition of symbolic interference" (8). P. C. Young holds that the method of suggestion involves the inhibition of all tendencies opposed to the proposed idea or action (24).

Factors Favoring Indirect Suggestion

An essential part of the process of indirect suggestion is the distraction of the individual's attention. The general conditions which make for distraction are three in number: cross-conditioned interests, routine habits, and low intelligence.

The individual with strong cross-conditioned interests sustains implicit responses mostly to his vocation or to his hobbies. This absorption in one type of activity makes him absent-minded in many practical situations in everyday life. Just as the chess player responded critically to the moves of his opponent but unthinkingly to extraneous stimuli, so the mathematical genius may accept without question the newspaper headlines to which he gives only passing thought. This is why many brilliant scientists are full of stereotypes and superstitions on social questions. The constant reiteration of suggestions in the social environment in which they are compelled to live has its effect upon narrow specialists.

Routine habits of speech and action favor indirect suggestion, but for a different reason. Once learned, habits involve no trial and error and are therefore said to be automatic. Walking, for example, goes on fairly independently of other responses. Conditioned responses of this sort are easily elicited

by indirect suggestion, since they are only slightly tied up with the individual's sustained implicit responses. All that is necessary to call them out is the appropriate conditioned stimulus in a situation in which the individual is attending to other problems. A man disguised in a woman's clothes may pass as a woman because it is our habit to accept the manner of dress as an indication of sex. The disguise is less likely to be detected if the man mingles with people when they are busy at some task or other. Then, later when he receives more attention, suspicion is not aroused even by his low-pitched voice, because of the prior acceptance of the suggestion concerning his sex.

Our routine habits of perception involve the supplying or filling out of the situation by our own creative responses. A minimal cue such as the superposition of one object over another in a flat drawing will give a perception of depth. The subjective additions which we constantly make to the actual stimuli are generally suggestions, direct or indirect. These reconstructions are sometimes accompanied by thought but more often are made automatically on the basis of previous experience. The psychology of deception as practiced by the prestidigitator is based upon long-established habits of perception. The skilled performer either inhibits or distracts the members of his audience while he feeds them suggestions which accord with their predetermined perceptual tendencies. The eye follows the pointing finger and so is misled when the prestidigitator directs attention to the hand not performing the trick.

As a rule, indirect suggestion works more readily for persons of low intelligence. The lower the mentality the less there is to be distracted in order to make indirect suggestion effective. The more intelligent the individual, the more critically alert he is to the many stimuli which impinge upon him. The relationship between indirect suggestibility and intelligence is complicated of course by other factors such as cross-conditioning. The cross-conditioned person accepts suggestions outside of the province of his own interests, whereas the individual of low intelligence is often susceptible to suggestion in any field.

TABLE V
Average Responsiveness of Children to Eleven Forms of
Suggestion as Related to Sex and Age

Ages	Sex	
	Boys	Girls
6	6.82	7.87
7	8.41	8.26
8	7.17	7.58
9	6.58	6.88
10	5.79	6.19
11	5.68	5.19
12	4.36	4.63
13	3.58	3.70
14	2.29	2.05
15	1.73	2.17
16	1.53	1.78
Mean	4.903	5.118

(From R. Messerschmidt, 13, p. 430.)

Experimental studies show that as children grow older they become less suggestible. In other words, as they develop a greater fund of experience and sustain more responses toward their environment they grow more critical. Table V shows the relationship between age and suggestibility found in R. Messerschmidt's comprehensive study (13). Messerschmidt used eleven tests of suggestibility, some original and some taken from previous experimenters. One test, devised by Binet, involved the presentation of twelve lines shown one at a time. Each line exhibited was longer than the preceding one with the exception of the sixth, eighth, tenth, and twelfth lines. These four lines were traps. They were of the same length as their immediate predecessors. Many subjects were misled by the suggestion of the progressive increase in the series and judged the *trap* lines as longer than they really were. Another test, also used by Binet, illustrates the suggestive nature of leading questions. Children were shown a picture and were then asked questions about it. Most of the questions were straightforward, but an occasional question assumed the presence of an imaginary object. For example, one question asked,

"In the picture of the crowd where is the little dog?" Actually no dog appeared in the picture, but some children specified its whereabouts. The results from these eleven tests (Table V) show that the greatest susceptibility to indirect suggestion occurs in the seven-year-old group. From this age on there is a progressive decrease in suggestibility scores to the sixteen-




FIG. 14. AGE DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSIVENESS TO POSTURAL SUGGESTION.
(From R. Messerschmidt, 13, p. 43.)

year group, the highest age level tested in the experiment. The same relationship between age and suggestibility was found in another experiment of Messerschmidt on postural suggestion. (See Figure 14.)

Factors Favoring Direct Suggestion

Any condition which tends to inhibit the implicit responses of men is a factor favorable to direct suggestion. The follow-

ing four factors, however, are mentioned most frequently: *emotional excitement, fatigue and drowsiness, the prestige of numbers and of quantity, and the prestige of authority.* We shall describe and analyze these factors on the basis of the three ways, already noted, in which social inhibition is effected.

Emotional excitement needs little further discussion since its inhibiting effects upon the thought processes have been described previously (see pages 297-299). Whenever individuals become emotionally aroused they are particularly susceptible to suggestion. The crowd situation stands out as an obvious example of the contagious nature of suggestion. In the crowd, thinking has been destroyed by intense external stimuli and by emotions raised to a fever pitch. Less spectacular instances of direct suggestion during emotional states occur daily. The individual says and does things in response to suggestions in fear, anger, and desire which he would not do or say otherwise. The professional magician makes a point of embarrassing his subject to make him follow a suggestion. For example, the magician asks the subject to pick a card from one of many extended in the hand of the magician. As the subject tries to grasp a card the magician sways slightly and the subject misses his objective. In his embarrassment he hastily makes another clutching movement, but this time at the very card which the magician is pushing toward him.

Fatigue and drowsiness are conditions in which implicit responses are broken down. It is not known whether this inhibition is due to a chemical effect of fatigue products upon the synapses or to a functional process based upon habit. At any rate, when the individual is relaxed and sleepy, he accepts suggestions more readily than in an alert waking state. The grilling of suspects by the police often depends upon fatiguing them until they respond positively to suggestions. "Sales resistance" is the ability to hold out against the blandishments and techniques of the salesman who, all else failing, wears down his victim's resistance. Some public speakers achieve their purposes through inducing a pleasant state of relaxation in their lectures by means of a mellow voice which rhyth-

mically flows on and on in balanced cadences. Weary automobile drivers have been known to turn off their route through the suggestion of a car turning ahead of them.

The Prestige of Numbers and of Quantity

Direct suggestion is often effected through the inhibiting effects of large numbers and great quantities. The large numbers may be numbers of people, or numbers of dollars, or numbers of books. The basic factor is quantity. Before it the thought processes of the individual become paralyzed. He stands in reverence and becomes blindly suggestible. The advertiser, the propagandist, the educator, when they seek to lull the critical spirit of man, resort to the magic of prestige of size and magnitude.

The inhibiting nature of size may go back to the child's inadequacy in coping with large and heavy objects. Moreover, the greater the number of stimuli which affect the child, the more intensely his nervous system is excited. This applies both to objects and people. When surrounded by people the youngster is receiving stimulation sufficiently intense to produce emotional responses. A further source of the efficacy of numbers lies in our democratic and materialistic civilization. In politics it is the size of the plurality that counts; in our economic life, the amount of a man's income.

The potency of numbers of people in making the individual suggestible deserves special notice. Experimental evidence, it will be remembered, indicates that the presence of others inhibits our thought processes. In this state of inhibition we tend to respond positively to verbal injunctions, to the actions of our fellows, and to other suggestions. Furthermore, it is not necessary for numbers of people to be actually present to make suggestion effective. Our thinking is inhibited even by verbal or pictorial reports of what the majority think and do.

The prestige of groups of people can be attributed partly to the same sources already mentioned in connection with size and quantity in general. More significant, however, are the consequences to the child of ignoring what others do and say.

He is taught that his model of conduct is to be found in group norms. All respectable people act this way; therefore he must. In addition, in his own childhood groups he learns the advantages of belonging to the in-group and the bitter lesson of being an outsider. In this way the mere statement of what the majority believes acquires a prestige value which paralyzes independent thought. People are suggestible not only in crowds but in audiences and even in the process of assimilating through the press and the radio information concerning the doings of others.

The Prestige of Authority

Size and magnitude yield only to the prestige of authority as inhibitors of reflective thought. The fallacy of argument by authority has long been exposed by logicians, but it still retains its efficacy in influencing men. *Prestige of authority* is a general term which refers to many forms of influence. The source of authority may be expert opinion, official pronouncements, religious symbols, the pomp and ceremony of an institutional practice, the sayings or doings of the socially elect, or even the printed word or the tone of voice. Obedience to authority is not necessarily prestige suggestion. If the individual complies with a command, realizing the futility of disobedience but questioning the wisdom of the order, his compliance is not due to suggestion.

Prestige suggestion is similar in origin to suggestion based on quantity. The mechanisms of thought in the developing child are easily overwhelmed by the superior forces with which he has to cope. Moreover, he is specifically discouraged from thinking and inquiring in many situations. To his elder's commands he asks the why and wherefore, only to be disciplined if he persists in his search for reasons. He is also inhibited by others because he has so few sustained responses of his own to guide him. And his emotions are played upon in an effort to make him obey both at home and in the school. Under the emotional stimuli of praise and blame his small fund of critical knowledge is rendered useless. Through conditioning, the

objects and people whom he hears extolled and reviled come to inhibit his thinking. Hence the particular forms of prestige which are effective for the individual depend upon the family, the neighborhood, and the society in which he is reared.

The efforts made in our educational system to teach the best that has been said and thought in our culture have been more successful in establishing the prestige value of names than in instilling true appreciation of the humanities. P. R. Farnsworth and I. Misumi studied the potency of artists' names in determining the judgment of the merit of pictures (4). They found that students rate a picture as more beautiful when they suppose it to be the work of an outstanding artist than when they believe it to be the work of an unknown painter. M. Sherif has demonstrated that literary passages are judged in good part on the basis of the author's name (18). In his experiment subjects indicated their preferences for sixteen authors by placing the names of the authors in rank order. A month later sixteen short passages, ascribed to different authors but really taken from only one author, were submitted to the same subjects for preferential judgment. The same procedure was repeated for three different groups of subjects, and all three groups tended to rank the passages according to their preferences for the names of the authors.

In spite of the frequency with which suggestion occurs in the life of men, it is not true that any suggestion will be effective even under the most favorable conditions. Suggestions which run counter to the well-ingrained habits and fundamental wishes of people are generally unsuccessful. Furthermore, the prestige of authority does not extend indefinitely to all fields of human action. We accept without critical questioning the pronouncement of an artist concerning a picture, but we do not heed his opinions about the political situation. Nevertheless there is a general tendency for prestige to carry over to matters where even rationalization cannot justify it. In addition in every culture a hierarchy of values can be found. The topmost values carry so much halo prestige that they influence widely unrelated matters. In many schools football

prowess is so esteemed that football heroes are chosen for all elective positions in student organizations. In our national life business success entitles a man to be heard as an authority on subjects ranging from constitutional interpretation to mathematical physics. But military glory outranks the prestige of the captain of industry. More than once in our history victorious generals have been elected president.

In one experimental study of halo prestige, students rated T. Roosevelt, Pershing, Hoover, Edison, Einstein, Lindbergh, and Morgan for their authoritative command of fifteen fields of knowledge (3). All of these men were regarded by the subjects as experts in the field of education. Five of the seven were considered authorities in government and statesmanship. General Pershing was placed only slightly below Einstein as a mathematician. Theodore Roosevelt stood out as the greatest all-around authority, and Pershing stood next.

In an interesting experiment H. T. Moore has compared the prestige of numbers with the prestige of expert opinion (14). Subjects first gave preferential judgments concerning linguistic expressions, ethical concepts, and musical combinations. Similar judgments were later obtained (1) under conditions in which the subjects knew what the preferences of the majority of the group were and (2) under conditions in which the supposed preferences of experts were indicated. Both majority and expert opinion produced more reversals in the likes and dislikes of the subjects than could be accounted for by chance. On the whole, majority opinion influenced more students to reverse their judgments than did expert opinion. Both of these prestige factors proved most effective in the field of ethical values and least effective in the field of musical taste. This finding would confirm those thinkers who believe that morality consists wholly of social norms.

Suggestion and Hypnosis

Two old popular notions of hypnosis still abound. To the credulous, hypnosis is an altogether supernatural and magical performance. To the skeptical, hypnosis is pure fraud and

trickery. Both views are incorrect. Hypnosis does occur and can be induced in most individuals without great difficulty. There is nothing mystical, however, about the process. If we were not so thoroughly imbued with the idea of the human being as a rational creature whose every act reflects his free will, we would see in hypnosis an event not essentially different from such prosaic acts as buying a hat, voting for the party of our fathers, or voicing our radio-made prejudices. *Hypnosis is merely a state of heightened susceptibility to direct suggestion.*

The methods for inducing hypnosis consist of the utilization of the factors already described as productive of inhibition. Drowsiness, for instance, is a condition for which the hypnotist strives. The subject is told to relax and is then given some form of monotonous stimulation such as results from fixating a small point of light. "If you want to hypnotize a subject, especially if it is for the first time," wrote Boris Sidis, "you must put him into a monotonous environment. You must prevent fresh new impressions from reaching the sensorium of the subject" (19, p. 58). By seating the subject in a comfortable position and asking him to relax and make as few movements as possible the operator has a good start toward inhibiting sustained thought processes. Thinking necessitates little overt activity, but it does involve a continuous play of muscular tensions. When the subject abandons his tense, alert attitudes he is susceptible to suggestion. The hypnotist also exploits all the habits of the subject which make the subject sensitive to the prestige of authority. Many successful operators, although they will not admit it, employ some technique for intimidating the subjects at the very start of the experiment.

One phenomenon of hypnosis which has interesting implications for social psychology is post-hypnotic suggestion. During hypnosis the operator gives the subject a suggestion which is to be executed some time after the hypnotic state. For example, the operator may suggest that the subject is to open a window at a certain time after hypnosis. When the time comes, the subject automatically proceeds to raise the window. When questioned as to his reason he replies that the room has been getting stuffy. His answer may be quite sincere. He has am-

nesia for the hypnotic state and so does not know the real motivation for his action. His explanation is called a *rationalization*, that is, the furnishing of a respectable reason but not the real reason. The same process occurs in social behavior all the time. Men's actions are based upon past conditionings which they have either forgotten or of which they never had knowledge. Thus Gabriel Tarde has written: "Both the somnambulist and the social man are possessed by the illusion that their ideas, all of which have been suggested to them, are spontaneous" (20, p. 77).

A corollary of post-hypnotic suggestion can be seen in the direction which reflective thought generally takes when it does occur. When people stop to think critically, they are more often concerned with errors in logic than with an examination of the original assumptions from which their reasoning proceeds. Yet the greater share of our errors in thinking arise not from faulty inferences and deductions but from inadequate and inaccurate observation of primary data—detective stories to the contrary notwithstanding. The development of medicine and the history of science are accounts not of brilliant feats of logical construction but of an endless rearrangement of first assumptions to accord with observed fact. And this is necessary, because once suggestions are accepted people rarely go back to question them.

Suggestion and Trial-and-Error Learning

Suggestion is essentially opposed to trial-and-error learning. In learning, the individual tests out his repertoire of relevant responses until he hits upon the solution to the problem. Out of the learning process appear new integrations of behavior. Suggestion generally consists of the exploitation of old habits. The repetition of particular suggestions, however, may tie an old habit to a new stimulus situation. In this way suggestion, too, can give rise to a new stimulus-response pattern. Nevertheless a wide difference exists between the new organization of behavior resulting from learning and the new pattern resulting from suggestion. In the former instance, the individual

has developed a number of specific rejections and acceptances to many aspects of the situation in question. He has mastered the problem. In the latter instance, it is as if only the end step in the procedure had been acquired. An old response has been conditioned to a new stimulus, but no fundamental reorganization of behavior has occurred.

The practical applications of this difference between suggestion and trial-and-error learning may be seen in the control and manipulation of men. When the purpose is to intensify present modes of behavior or divert them to closely related channels, suggestion is an excellent means for social control. But when the purpose is to alter radically the habits of people, suggestion is a very limited technique. Sweeping changes in behavior due to suggestion are more apparent than real. Even advertisers have recognized the importance of supplementing suggestion by logical argumentation in the presentation of new products. The same point is well illustrated in political propaganda. Where a political party advocates a genuine change in existing social habits, it fails to achieve its objective if it relies mostly upon suggestion. Its adherents won in this manner are easily recaptured by other movements. For example, the socialists and communists in Germany prior to the Nazi coup propagandized the people with suggestive appeals. They apparently achieved great success in the large numbers they attracted to their banners. The Nazis, however, capitalized these already established suggestions and by including the word *socialist* in their party name and by mouthing some of the same phrases captured many of the supporters of these opposition groups. The people could not tell the difference between the various leaders who spoke pretty much the same language. They had gone through no learning process which would have fundamentally changed their habits and enabled them to discriminate between radicalism and reaction.* Most revolution-

*It must be remembered, of course, that thinking and learning are not easily effected through the use of verbal symbols. For individuals to think and inquire they must confront problems in their own objective world. It is obvious, therefore, that radical propaganda of any kind can make no headway in a country in which the people do not encounter obstacles in achieving their life satisfactions.

ary parties, recognizing this problem, eschew large numbers in the beginning and prefer to work for a few tried and tested personalities. In short, suggestion is the technique for the perpetuation or mild revision of existing modes of thought; trial-and-error learning and thinking are necessary for fundamental mutations in our social living.

The Universality of Suggestion

So much is made in psychology of trial-and-error learning that we tend to underestimate the frequency and universality of the suggestion process. Few individuals are so alive to all aspects of a situation that they sustain responses to all important stimuli. People are easily distracted. Furthermore, the highly verbal nature of the social milieu in complex cultures favors suggestion as against trial-and-error experiences. The natural world of objects and things which compels realistic analysis is obscured by words, symbols, and ideologies. The realities for which they supposedly stand are too far removed from the life of the average individual for actual experimental testing. The factor of time alone precludes an examination of our entire verbal environment.

Though newspapers are no longer the authoritative source of suggestion that they were before the radio and movies, we still absorb many of our attitudes from newspaper columns. Particularly is this true where we have no knowledge or convictions opposed to the ideas suggested. In an experimental test of this fact A. D. Annis and N. C. Meier inserted several editorials in a university paper, half of which were favorable to an Australian prime minister and half unfavorable (2). One group of students was given the favorable editorials to read at successive class meetings and another group read the unfavorable editorials. Students not only showed immediate effects of the planted propaganda in their opinions, but a test taken four months later still revealed reliable differences between the two groups.

Propaganda and advertising admittedly rely upon suggestion as their main instrument, but education and other institutional

devices for social control are in reality based upon this non-reasoning process as well. Throughout the school system students are taught from textbooks which are held up as authoritative sources of knowledge. If it says so in the book, it is so. Examinations are written to test the students' fidelity in reproducing the written word of the text and the spoken word of the teacher. Our social structure is thus built through the instrumentality of suggestion. If people acted in an intelligent and critical manner a great many of our basic social practices would disappear. They owe their existence to the impulses of men early conditioned to authority and to numbers. Even the rationalizations for accepted usages are supplied ready made to the individual.*

The Relation of Suggestion to Imitation, Facilitation, and Inhibition

By now it should be apparent that imitation, facilitation, inhibition, and suggestion are not mutually exclusive processes. Suggestion is the broadest of these four concepts and may at times include the others. An inherent part of *direct* suggestion is social inhibition. Not all inhibition, though, can be regarded as a phase of suggestion. In suggestion only the sustained thought processes are inhibited, whereas social inhibition refers to the repression of any pattern of behavior by social stimulation. Once the process of suggestion has been initiated by inhibition or dissociation, the activity which follows may be the imitation of the stimulus, or the facilitation of existing behavior, or the calling out of any conditioned response. Imitation further differs from suggestion in that an imitated act may at times follow a reasoning process.

SOCIAL PROJECTION

An outstanding characteristic of human behavior is its external reference. One aspect of such external reference has been described under the term of *projection*. *Projection is the*

*For an enlightening treatment of the psychological nature of societies see A. Huxley's *This Brave New World*.

response of an individual to his own reactions as if they were part of the external world rather than part of himself. For example, the individual perceives a Gothic column as rising. The column does not rise of course, but the observer's eyes do move upward as they follow the lines of the column. This response is projected into the external world and the individual sees the column as rising.

Projection is a fundamental mechanism which is present in almost all behavior. The objective world to which we think we respond is only partly objective. It is altered by the many reactions we project into it. In the field of art, projection has been widely recognized as the basis of aesthetic appreciation. H. S. Langfeld, for example, has shown how our perception of the gracefulness of lines and the unity of composition depends upon our own responses which are attributed to the art object (12).

In social psychology we are primarily concerned with the projection of our own wishes and desires into other people. We read our own inclinations and attitudes into others, just as on occasions, when we are melancholy, the attribution of our own dejection to the world about us makes it seem a sad place. F. H. Allport gives the following excellent examples of social projection: "The bashful youth 'projects' his intense consciousness of himself into those about him and thus becomes embarrassed or timid. The swaggering individual and the adolescent, holding personal conversations in a loud tone of voice, regard others as sharing the admiring or sympathetic interest which they feel in themselves" (1, p. 307).

Projection and Social Interaction

Thus far in this chapter we have treated the effect of other people upon the individual as if social intercourse were a one-way process. We have described the inhibiting and facilitating effects of the group upon the individual and the way in which one person comes to imitate and follow the suggestions of his fellows. The individual, however, is not the passive recipient of social stimulation. If he were, how could the origin of

social customs be explained? They must start somewhere. Moreover, if everyone merely follows everyone else, how do customs change? The problem as stated is misconceived because the individual is not only affected by his fellows, but also is affected in terms of his own individual psychology. He responds to the conduct of others, it is true, but even when his response is imitative it is colored by his own individual desires. Hence individuals are not always equipotential or interchangeable as stimuli to their fellows.

The alteration of an idea or action by the personalities through which it passes is well illustrated in the rumor process. An innocent bit of gossip is distorted by the particular emotional biases and the specific inaccuracies of the individuals who hear and tell it.

Projection is one of the mechanisms which limit the stereotyping effect of the group upon the individual. Each man tends to perceive his fellows behaving in terms of his own desires and wishes. He reads into their utterances and actions what he wants to believe. Thus the effect of majority opinion is not so much the effect of what a numerical majority really think as it is the result of what each man thinks majority opinion is. Minorities always keep up their courage by assuming that their views are more prevalent than they really are. Almost every man who runs for office feels that he will be elected. Social projection applies not only to the misinterpretation of majority opinion but to the incidence and meaning of social events. To the communist the revolution is just around the corner, because he projects his own revolutionary desires into every incident of industrial difficulty. To the conservative foreign diplomats in Russia during the Revolution of 1917 the ascendance of the Bolsheviks to power was a sheer impossibility. Even after it occurred they refused to believe it, because they projected their own narrow social world into the entire Russian scene.*

* Cf. W. Hard, *Raymond Robin's Own Story*.

Projection and Conflict

Projection occurs the more readily if an individual has a basic conflict to resolve. If some of his desires do not conform to other wishes of his personality, he attains a temporary measure of release by attributing the discordant attitudes to other people. Once these desires are regarded as the characteristics of his neighbors, the individual can condemn them most violently. Freud and his followers have pointed out this mechanism in human conduct. Bernard Hart presents the problem clearly in the following words: ". . . the fault constitutes a complex which is repugnant to the personality as a whole, and its presence would therefore naturally lead to that particular form of conflict which is known as self-reproach. The personality avoids this conflict, however, by 'projecting' the offending complex on to some other person, where it can be effectively rebuked without that painful emotion which inevitably accompanies the recognition of deficiencies in ourselves . . . the more comfortable expedient of rebuking one's neighbors is substituted for the unpleasant experience of self-reproach" (6, pp. 119-120). And Hart gives these examples of projection: "People who possess some fault or deficiency of which they are ashamed are notoriously intolerant of that same fault or deficiency in others. Thus the parvenu who is secretly conscious of his own social deficiencies talks much of the 'bounders' and 'outsiders' whom he observes around him, while the one thing which the muddle-headed man cannot tolerate is a lack of clear thinking in other people. In general it may be said that whenever one encounters an intense prejudice one may with some probability suspect that the individual himself exhibits the fault in question or some closely similar fault" (6, pp. 118-119).

Projection and Insight

The more accurately an individual can judge his own traits or motives, that is the more insight he has about himself, the less he tends to attribute his characteristics to others. In an experimental study of projection in relation to insight R. R.

Sears had fraternity members rate one another and themselves on the traits of stinginess, obstinacy, disorderliness, and bashfulness (16). An objective measure of insight was afforded by the comparison of a student's self-rating on the trait with the average rating accorded him by his associates. Projection was measured by the average rating which an individual assigned to his fellows. In general, students who lacked insight into a given trait attributed more of that trait to others than did students who possessed the trait in equal measure but had insight. Subjects who were accurate in their self-ratings on a given trait tended to impute the opposite trait to their fellows. For example, students who realized their own stubborn dispositions were inclined to regard others as pliable and agreeable. Bernard Hart's statement that it is easier to condemn our own failings if we can project them into others was borne out by this study. The *insightful* people who did less projecting did not regard such traits as stinginess and obstinacy as reprehensible as did the people who lacked insight.

IDENTIFICATION

Social identification is a process which complements social projection. In projection the individual makes his own behavior part of the external world. In identification the individual reacts to objects and persons in the external world as if they were part of himself. In projection we impute our own responses to others; in identification we regard the feats of others as if they were our own. "We ran up four touchdowns against Yale" exults the undergraduate as he identifies himself with his football team. In spite of the difference between projection and identification, these processes have the same essential effect in the confusion they create between the individual and objective reality. When the process of projection is operative, the individual mistakes some of his own responses for the characteristics of external objects and people. When identification is the dominant activity, the individual mistakes part of the objective world for himself.

At least two forms of identification may be distinguished:

elementary identification and *social identification*. Elementary identification is shown by the workman who regards the tools he uses (but does not own) as part of himself. They constitute an addition, in a way, to his body. When he molds material with them they are an extension of his arms and fingers. Similarly, the jockey may feel an identification with the horse he rides. As it responds to his slightest movement, it becomes part of his own motor equipment. The owner of the horse who sits in the stands and watches *his* horse win a race, on the other hand, may show *social identification*. His personality has triumphed in the victory of his horse. Social identification often has an emotional basis; elementary identification is non-emotional adience.

Social identification grows out of the attempts of the child to adjust to the hard realities of his environment. Helpless in most of his efforts to make objects conform to his desires, the growing youngster finds in his parents a ready means for the fulfillment of his wishes. He can control them in some measure to make their mastery work for him. Their actions and qualities become his. The process is aided by the encouragement of the parents, who pretend that their ministrations to his needs is only part of the child's own efforts. The father suggests to his son that *we* shall do this, and proceeds to perform the given act himself.

If parents always acted merely as the agents of their child, identification might remain at the elementary level. Since they are not responsive to his every whim, and since they are masterful where he is utterly inadequate, the child turns to them for the vicarious satisfaction of his thwarted or emotional needs. Little children will brag to one another of the superiority of their parents, in so doing really asserting their own superiority. Both fathers and mothers of course help in this development, because they like to pose as ideal models for their offspring. And the ideal thus set up enables them to control their children more effectively. For example, if Johnnie is to be a strong man like his father, he must eat vegetables with an iron content. In other words, the conception that the child

builds up of himself is determined in part by his identification with his parents.

As the child matures he may lose these early identifications with his parents, but the mechanism of identification still remains. He will attach himself to friends and social groups and feel their triumphs as his own. The ego enhancement which adults experience through joining organizations and possessing objects is basically not different from childhood identification. Just as the youngster, inadequately equipped to control his world, can extend his subjective participation in it through parental identification, so can the thwarted adult overcome his inferiority by joining a powerful society or attaching himself to prestige-laden symbols. Doctrines of racial superiority offer the greatest balm to those individuals who are psychologically not too sure of their superiority. To sing one's own praises from the housetops is so obvious a mechanism that it often fails to deceive even the singer himself. But to glorify one's race fulfills precisely the same purpose and is not so readily detected. This is not to say that identification is to be found only in a few inadequate personalities. It is a normal process exhibited by all human beings. Nevertheless, the particular ego enhancements of people reveal their specific weaknesses, and the manner in which they identify themselves indicates the degree of insight they have into their own personalities.

It follows from the foregoing description that elementary identification is with real things and real people. Social identification, though involving some extension of the ego to include external reality, also contains identification with imagined properties of the external environment. The individual's conception of the organization or institution with which he identifies himself generally transcends the realities of the matter. To the objective observer, the member of a group merely allies himself with other people of somewhat similar interests. To the group member, however, the attachment is to a vague superindividual group spirit. Identification is the mechanism which explains the acceptance of the institutional fiction described in the chapter on social institutions.

Social identification as a rule needs some degree of elementary identification to make it effective. The notion of one's group as a superindividual entity cannot remain completely in the realm of abstraction. It needs to be brought into the world of things and people in order to conform to everyday habits of thought and action. The gap between the individual's conception of his group and its real nature may be bridged in two ways: (1) through an actual human being such as a leader and (2) through habits and objects which members of the group have in common.

The members of the group are greatly aided in their identification with the group as a whole through the instrumentality of a leader. He is another human like themselves, and yet he has many superior qualities which epitomize the strength and superiority of the group. To fulfill this function ideally, it will be recalled from our discussion of institutional leadership, a leader should be a rare combination of mediocre qualities and unusual talents. A great deal is made in politics of the advantage of selecting mediocrities to stand for election to high office so that masses of people can thoroughly identify themselves with the candidate. As a matter of fact, however, a candidate is even more popular, if in addition to the common habits of ordinary people, he possesses outstanding force of character and a brilliant intellect. Will Rogers was regarded as the typical American by many of his countrymen because he resembled the average small town citizen in appearance and in manner. Hence they could the more readily identify themselves with his shrewd wit and penetrating social insight.

Leaders thus do more than guide and manage their followers. They stand as a personal incarnation of the group's virtues. When leadership becomes institutionalized, we have the official. Sometimes all other functions are dropped from the official save his personification of the group's unity. An example of this is found in the limited, constitutional monarchy where the monarch has no power but stands as the living embodiment of the kingdom's integrity. Many organizations show the same process when they select a president who is

imposing in appearance and musical in speech. He is the "window dressing," while the real work is left to an executive secretary.

It has often been pointed out that a hereditary monarch like the King of England has an advantage over an elected ruler in respect to this one function of group identification. The hereditary nature of the office places it above the battle of partisan politics and permits a permanent emotional attachment to a real person who nonetheless represents the whole nation. The nearest that we approach such a concept in our country is in our allegiance to the Supreme Court. Since the Court is a body of men, it lacks the directness of the personal tie to human emotions which a king possesses.

Habits and possessions common to many people enable them to build up the notion of themselves as a group. Identification arises naturally in people who speak the same dialect or wear the same kind of clothes, or work with the same kind of tools. The owner of a home, who pays taxes, drives his own car, and accepts the traditional moral and intellectual codes easily identifies himself with other taxpayers and homeowners as part of what he deems the most important group in America—the middle class. Since common ways and common possessions lead to group formation of themselves, they are utilized as a technique for more formal group organization. Salutes, passwords, insignia, and even uniforms are the stock-in-trade of those who seek to build clubs, parties, or movements. Without their hoods and their secret rituals, the Ku Klux Klan would have been a much weaker organization. Similarly in Germany the Nazi leaders have made extensive use of uniforms, salutes, and acceptance of slogans to weld their following into a compact mass. In our colleges we see the same use of insignia. Fraternities have their pins, freshmen their caps, and even scholars their Phi Beta Kappa keys.

Both the leader and the common habits and possessions of group members form a link between the realities of people associating and cooperating with one another and the imagined conception of the group as a superindividual entity. They con-

stitute external symbols which epitomize group spirit. A symbol, obviously, stands for something more than itself. Now symbols can vary in the degree to which their representation departs from their characteristics as natural objects. The leader as a symbol is not completely removed from his character as a real person. Likewise is it with the community of habits and attitudes of group members. They give some concrete basis to people's ideas of the nature of the group. Other group symbols come to mind which are not so directly related to the real world. Uncle Sam is a personification of our national spirit with no actual counterpart in reality. Therefore, Americans interpret Uncle Sam in many ways in comparison to the interpretation which the English give their king. The Constitution is another symbol which is conceived of by most Americans in a fictitious manner. They have not read it, nor do they know its history,* but it is a vague symbol of the highest sanctity. Often the only meaning a symbol has is the fact that other people accept it. It stands for the group not because it pictures any other attribute of group members than their like-minded belief in it.

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*It is a favorite trick of radicals to exploit this fact. They quote from the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence and have their utterances taken as an attack upon Americanism.

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CHAPTER XI

SOCIAL STIMULUS PATTERNS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE

Imitation, suggestion, and the other mechanisms of social interaction can be understood only as processes involving both stimulus and response. When we speak of social facilitation, of imitation, or of projection we are interested in the responding individual as well as in the stimulating situation. There are occasions, however, when we shift our emphasis to the nature of the stimulus pattern and seek a generalized description of the types of stimuli particularly significant in social psychology. Three of the most important classes of social stimulus patterns are: (1) facial expression and facial features, (2) gesture, and (3) vocal expression. Since facial expression, gesture, and vocal expression constitute the stimulus side of language, the treatment of language will be completed in the latter part of the chapter from the point of view of its development in the individual and in the race.

1. FACIAL EXPRESSION AND FACIAL FEATURES

Facial expression is no small part of the total stimulus configuration to which people respond in the personal relationships of the primary group. Facial expression is often more important in determining a response than the particular words spoken. Mild criticism uttered with a sneer is more deadly than trenchant criticism expressed with a smile. Facial expression reveals emotional mood not betrayed by words. Even children know this and are adept at watching parental facial expression which accompanies commands and prohibitions. The stimulus value of facial expression is illustrated in the dance and in other aesthetic activities, in which the individual

cultivates a stereotyped repose of facial features. To show strain and emotion facially would detract from the appreciation of the aesthetic mood represented. Likewise the poker player and the professional boxer mask their intentions and feelings behind a set expressionless cast of the countenance. The significance of facial expression is epitomized in the famous phrase of Owen Wister's hero who said, "When you call me that, *smile!*"

The face assumes importance as a social stimulus pattern because it furnishes many and significant cues concerning the experiences and conduct of man. The directionality of behavior is often indicated by the line of regard of the eyes and by eye movements. People look in the direction in which they are going or in which they are moving their arms. Observation of an individual's face also aids in the comprehension of what he is saying. Then, too, the facial muscles are a ready outlet for the overflow of intense excitation during emotional upset. For this reason, the play of facial expression is a popular means of interpreting emotion. Charles Darwin (and Alexander Bain and Herbert Spencer before him) called attention to this phenomenon, which Darwin termed "the direct action of the nervous system." In 1872 Darwin wrote, "When the sensorium is strongly excited, nerve-force is generated in excess, and is transmitted in certain definite directions, depending on the connection of the nerve-cells and partly on habit. . . . Effects are thus produced which we recognize as expressive" (9, p. 29). Finally, the mobility of the facial muscles furnishes a means of communication of attitudes which supplements spoken language.

The Judgment of Facial Expression

The ability of people to name emotions from photographs of facial expression has been the subject of many experimental investigations. Unfortunately the consistency in the results of these experiments has been obscured by the failure of investigators to distinguish between two separate problems. The search for distinctive patterns of emotional response constitutes

one problem which bears indirectly on the significance of facial expressions as social stimuli. The agreement of people in naming a given expression comprises the second problem and is important in showing the standardized stimulus value of the expression.

In the former case the interest is in the correct recognition of the emotion depicted. For example, C. Landis took pictures of subjects undergoing emotional tension. When these pictures were presented to other subjects for identification, they failed to name correctly the emotions which the original subjects said they experienced (23). Similar experiments have shown that it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify all emotional states from photographs of facial expression. These results, however, do not vitiate the high agreement in naming expressions reported in many studies. People do respond alike to a given expression, even if they sometimes fail to read it aright. The expression frequently has a stereotyped meaning because it is communicative rather than emotional. As Landis himself points out, many expressions have been molded into an attitudinal language by the culture of the group. We learn to convey approval by a smile and doubt by a frown, and we may use these signs even when we do not experience the correlated feeling state.

If judgments of facial expression are considered from the point of view of the agreement of observers rather than that of the accuracy of naming emotions, the bulk of the experimental data indicates that people more often concur in their interpretations than they disagree. Darwin found that 14 out of 15 persons described the picture of a young actor simulating grief by the words "melancholy," "despairing sorrow," or synonymous terms. Similar high agreement was in evidence concerning other expressions, Darwin maintained, and his experiment was the first of a long series of researches on facial expression. A. M. Feleký in a more extensive investigation reported that the judgments of 100 subjects were in substantial accord concerning the expressions depicted in 24 photographs (13). Variation occurred in the selection of the exact term for

each picture, but the majority of the judgments for a given expression were bunched in the same grouping. For example, 36 subjects labeled one photograph disgust, 14 called it repugnance, 8 named it annoyance, 8 sneering, 7 dislike; and no other designation received more than 4 votes. Thus 50 per cent of the judges agreed on disgust and repugnance as the emotional state portrayed.

H. S. Langfeld presented 105 pictures, posed by a talented actor, to five subjects for identification of the expressions (24). In 32 per cent of the judgments the subjects gave approximately the same title to the pictures as the actor himself. This may appear to reflect little agreement among the judges, but it does not cover all instances of concurrence. It does not represent the agreement of the judges in those cases where they differed from the actor's title but agreed among themselves. Moreover, F. H. Allport found that the correct naming of the pictures increased when subjects were given a list of the titles and asked to select the correct one (1). He employed 14 pictures and gave partial credit for the selection of approximate titles. The average scores of his subjects ranged between 45 and 50 per cent—100 per cent representing perfect matching. A. F. Jenness has confirmed these averages but found that individual subjects ranged in their scores from 20 to 89 (18).

An advance in experimental procedure and materials appeared in the work of Frois-Wittmann, who contributed a new series of photographs designed to meet certain standards of uniformity (14). The model was clean-shaven, permitting the greatest possible evidence of the facial muscles; there were no gestures by other bodily members, and the head appeared in approximately the same position. Frois-Wittmann also was not concerned with the correctness of recognitions but considered the pictures as mere stimuli. In all, almost 12,000 judgments were obtained from 165 subjects. The median for the agreement on all pictures was 37.5 per cent, but this figure understates the amount of agreement since it does not give credit for approximate names.

C. C. Brigham has pointed out that, in lumping together

judgments of expression according to verbal labels, the agreement may be spurious (3). People may mean different things by the same term. For example, it may be incorrect to assume that an expression has the same stimulus value for two people merely because they call it *contempt*. Each judge may have in mind a different meaning for this word. W. S. Hulin and D. Katz, therefore, asked a group of subjects to group together the Frois-Wittmann pictures on the basis of the similarity of expression without the use of verbal label (16). Variability of judgment was more pronounced than agreement as a result of this procedure, especially since subjects were permitted to make as many groupings of similar pictures as they wished. Nevertheless there were a number of instances in which over half the subjects agreed in placing two pictures in the same group.

In spite of the variation in technique and in materials in the experiments on facial expression, many investigators are in accord concerning the relative identifiability of the various facial expressions. Laughter has been reported as the most easily recognized pattern by Langfeld, Allport, and G. S. Gates (18). Feleky's results also placed *laughter* at the top of the scale in terms of recognition, though it is closely followed by *amazement*. Langfeld, too, found *amazement* the second most easily identified expression, whereas an experiment by Jenness reversed this order with *amazement* first and *laughter* second. *Bodily pain* is perhaps the third in order of identifiability, taking the many experiments as a whole. Secondary emotions, Ruckmick discovered, are more difficult to identify than the primary emotions. For example, *love*, *hate*, *joy*, and *sorrow* were more uniformly named than *repulsiveness*, *distrust*, and *defiance*. These secondary states are more attitudinal than emotional and are either less clearly differentiated biologically than the primary states or else less clearly conventionalized by social practice. It should be noted, however, that *fear* and *anger* are easily confused, perhaps because these emotions are sometimes found together in a mixed pattern.

Theories of Facial Expression

(a) *The Biological Theory.* The biology of facial expression has been clearly and convincingly formulated by Charles Darwin. The two cardinal principles in his theory are *the survival of serviceable associated habits* and *the direct action of the nervous system*.^{*} According to the first principle the habits associated with biologically adaptive reactions become innately tied to these responses. They persist from generation to generation even though their adaptive usefulness has been lost. For example, Darwin maintained that the retraction of the upper lip and the exposure of the canine tooth in sneering and defiance goes back to a time in the history of the race when men used their teeth in attacking one another. Again, in contempt the nose is turned up or wrinkled so as to close the nasal passages. A contemptuous expression thus serves to exclude an offensive odor, and Darwin regarded this as its origin. Similarly, the dilation of the nostrils in terror survives from a period when men fled from danger and their great exertions led to hurried breathing.

The second principle of the direct action of the nervous system is illustrated in trembling, blushing, respiratory changes, and facial contortions. In agony almost all muscles of the body are brought into action. The intense excitation overflows into many pathways. The teeth may be clenched or ground together with the lips retracted, though sometimes the lips may be tightly compressed. In extreme horror the eyes stare wildly. Breathing is hurried. In fact, the diffuse overflow in great excitement makes it difficult to find distinctive patterns for intense emotions. Extreme experiences of fear, rage, or joy may be accompanied by the same widely distributed muscular patterns. And these patterns may be much the same as those seen

^{*} Another principle in Darwin's theory was that of antithesis. "Certain states of the mind lead to certain habitual actions, which are of service, as under our first principle. Now when a directly opposite frame of mind is induced, there is a strong and involuntary tendency to the performance of movements of a directly opposite nature, though these are of no use; and such movements are in some cases highly expressive" (9, p. 28).

in cases of great muscular exertion. For example, H. S. Langfeld found that subjects could not differentiate between facial expressions of athletes in strenuous competition and expressions depicting emotional states.

A more involved application of the overflow of nervous energy is found in laughter. Darwin accepted Spencer's explanation that, when the individual was already in a state of excitement, an unexpected event would lead to a discharge of energy in a new direction. This sudden release found its outlet in the facial muscles in the form of laughter. F. H. Allport has worked out the details of this theory as follows. Humor involves a sudden transition from one type of attitude to another. "The tickled baby passes from a reaction of withdrawal and alarm to one of mirth and laughter as the playfulness of the attack is felt." The energy of the first defensive reactions is released when these attitudes collapse. Incongruity, which involves a quick and complete change of motor setting, is thus the most favorable condition for laughter. The point in a good joke generally involves a shift from the expected to the unexpected. The Freudian theory of wit as the release of unconscious suppressed impulses fits into this picture. These inhibitions are held in check by socialized attitudes (the censor). The sudden thrust of the humorous story eludes the censor partly because it is unexpected and partly because it appears in a socially acceptable guise. It is still a case of Darwin's principle of excess nerve energy being released into the most available motor channels.

The weakness of the biological theory in its emphasis upon the survival of serviceable associated habits is apparent. It implies the inheritance of acquired characters, an untenable doctrine according to modern science. Moreover, it assumes a constancy of facial expression for all but the extreme emotions. Surprise, disgust, pleasure, anger should be uniformly manifested in all cultures. Darwin fully realized this implication and made the most of comparative material to establish the uniformity of expressive patterns for the human race. In his time, however, anthropological studies were in their infancy

and carefully controlled psychological investigations of emotional expression were lacking. Evidence from these two sources has thrown doubt upon the notion of constant biological patterns of expressive behavior and has led to the cultural theory of facial expression.

(b) *The Cultural Theory of Facial Expression.* The antithesis of the biological theory reached its climax only yesterday in the doctrine of cultural determinism. The culture determinists see little biological meaning in facial expression. We express scorn by raising the eyebrows, they hold, because we have learned that that is the way to communicate scorn in our society. In another culture scorn may be expressed in an entirely different manner. Facial expressions are comparable to verbal language. All peoples have a word which signifies affirmation, but the particular word employed in a specific society is an historical accident perpetuated through custom. We use the word *yes*, but any other monosyllable would function as well, if standardized by convention. In a similar fashion facial expressions are stylized in different ways in different societies. To read expression, therefore, one needs to know the culture of the group rather than the biology of the facial muscles.

The theory of cultural determinism is a natural reaction to the oversimplification in biological interpretations of man's social behavior. The positive evidence in its support in respect to facial expression is not overwhelming. Careful studies of the involvement of muscular groups in expressive patterns in various societies is lacking. The argument is often by analogy to forms of behavior which are known to vary. The theory does receive fair confirmation from studies in our own culture of the variability of facial expression and the nature of the agreement of people in recognizing expressions.

It will be recalled that the studies of judgments of facial expression involve two problems: that of the *correct* recognition of the expression and that of the agreement of people concerning an expression. Investigations centering about the first problem indicate that expressive patterns are difficult to dif-

ferentiate and to identify even for trained observers. Yet if the biological theory were sound in its entirety we should expect definite expressive movements of body and facial muscles to be correlated with specific emotional states.

Landis' experiment on this very point, however, yielded negative results. Not content with the usual posed pictures of emotional expression, Landis photographed subjects in situations productive of emotional strain and upset. For example, some of the situations were: mental multiplications with electric shocks, reading sex case histories, the explosion of a firecracker underneath the subject's chair, the placing of the hand in a pail of water containing live frogs, cutting off the head of a live rat with a dull knife, and listening to the experimenter read the description (previously written by the subject himself) of the meanest or most embarrassing thing ever done by the subject. Subjects indicated the emotions experienced in their ordeals. The photographs taken were then presented for identification of the emotional expression to a group of 42 students. The students did little better than chance in naming the emotion which the subject claimed he experienced. Thus, in the firecracker situation, the photograph of a subject who reported surprise was called joy by 54 per cent of the students. In the mental multiplication with electrical stimulation the photograph of a subject reporting *fear* was also called *joy* by 59 per cent of the students. In this same situation the photograph of a subject reporting *pain* was called *sorrow* by 83 per cent of the judges.

As a result of his investigations Landis contends that the posed expressions employed in most experiments on the judgment of facial expression are not genuine emotional states but socially acquired language reactions. When real emotional situations are employed, the muscles of the face reveal no consistent patterns of feeling. The data from his experiments do not conclusively establish this hypothesis, since emotions produced in the laboratory are after all somewhat artificial. The fact that students described so many of the photographs as expressing joy may possibly be due to the desire of the subjects

to appear as good sports. Nevertheless Landis' results show great variability in expressive emotional patterns.*

(c) *The Psychological Theory of Facial Expression.* The antithesis between the biological and cultural theories has been resolved by the formulation of a psychological explanation of facial expression. The name of F. H. Allport is rightly associated with synthesizing the hitherto opposed doctrines concerning the emotional expressiveness of the face. Allport repudiates the survival of serviceable associated habits as a matter of racial inheritance but also rejects the sociological idea that expressions are purely accidents of social history and have no psychological utility in themselves. Obviously there is always some reason why one expressive pattern has come to acquire its social meaning while another pattern conveys a different meaning. And this reason is more likely to be related to something intrinsic to the pattern itself than to some irrelevant cause in cultural history. For example, the relaxation of the muscles about the mouth in smiling is a better psychological expression of approval and satisfaction than the contraction and compression of the lips, or the grinding of the teeth.

In other words, the principle of serviceable associated habits is altogether valid, if applied to the lifetime of the individual rather than to the race and if modified to mean learned rather than inherited connections. The facial muscles do serve biological and psychological functions in the individual's own life story. Nostrils are dilated in hurried breathing; the lip muscles do relax in the child after nursing; the mouth does

* Another experiment, contraverting the biological theory, indicates that the agreement in the judgment of facial expression is not based upon the actual emotion experienced. M. Sherman found that nurses, medical students, and graduate students in psychology varied greatly in naming the reactions of infants when hungry, when dropped suddenly, when pricked with a needle, and when the head was restrained by being held down (32). When the same subjects were shown the stimuli causing the reactions of the infants, however, they showed considerable agreement in labelling the emotions. Knowledge of the total situation is thus an important condition in the recognition of expressive patterns. The experiment is far from crucial, however, because the infants were below twelve days of age. Few authorities believe that distinctive patterns of emotion appear so shortly after birth.

purse up in the expulsion of distasteful substances. The psychological functions of the facial muscles may become abridged as the child grows older. The child learns to remove quietly an obnoxious substance from its mouth instead of spitting it out, but the pursing of the lips remains.

In the case of the frown the contraction of the brow is first related to fits of crying and screaming in infancy, elicited by thwarting or irritating stimuli. Later in life in the same type of stimulating situation the screaming and crying are inhibited but the brow contractions persist as an abbreviated expression of the unpleasant experience. "But this statement," writes F. H. Allport, "implies no reaction whose expressive significance is *inherited* as a vestige of an *ancestrally* useful habit. The original response was serviceable for the life of the individual himself, and within his life passed into an expressive act. That the baby's ancestors protected their eyes in screaming by a frown is of no particular interest to us; it is sufficient to know that the baby himself does" (1, p. 214).

The psychological and biological functions of the face come to take on expressive meanings through conditioning and learning. But since facial reaction already has a meaning in the experience of the individual it is not tied with equal facility to any social situation. And this is where the culture determinists have been in error. Facial reactions are readily conditioned to persons, objects, and situations which are similar or analogous to the original stimulus pattern which evoked them. This is the *mimetic* principle of Wilhelm Wundt which William James and F. H. Allport subsequently elaborated. For example, the expression of disgust, originally related to distasteful substances, comes to be exhibited toward people we dislike. Some common element or relationship in the two situations is responsible for the new use of the old expression. In many cases, Allport suggests, the common element may be our own bodily attitude which contributes to the total sensory pattern. Whatever the basis, the mimetic theory holds well in practice. "There is a whole vocabulary of descriptive adjectives," William James reminds us, "common to impressions belonging to differ-

ent sensible spheres—experiences of all classes are *sweet*, impressions of all classes *rich* or *solid*, sensations of all classes *sharp*. Wundt and Piderit accordingly explain many of our most expressive reactions upon moral causes as symbolic gustatory movements. As soon as any experience arises which has an affinity with the feeling of sweet, or bitter, or sour, the same movements are executed which would result from the taste in point" (17, p. 481).

The psychological theory thus assumes that facial reactions have a biological meaning which becomes extended and modified by social learning. Hence patterns of facial expression are not rigid and universal in their appearance. They show considerable variation in form and in meaning, since they are a function of experience as well as of anatomy. But they are not an underived cultural product. The effect of a particular culture may be to select out certain patterns and inhibit others. The stoical demeanor of certain Indian groups is well known.

The psychological theory is consistent with the bulk of the experimental evidence. Most studies show a fair degree of agreement concerning the meaning of facial expression but not by any means complete agreement. These findings can be interpreted to support a culture theory but they need qualification for this purpose. As they stand, the experimental results fit well into a psychological interpretation which holds to a core of biological constancy overlaid with the variations of social conditioning. The conclusions of Landis, it is true, emphasize only variation and show no distinctive patterns whatsoever. That they are extreme, however, is shown by Frois-Wittmann's careful study in which an analysis of the muscular involvements in agreed-upon expressions was made (14). Frois-Wittmann found overlapping of muscle groups in many expressions, but he also found typical muscle patterns characterizing certain expressions. "For example, the raised and frowning brow is common to Fear, Pain and Sadness; but Fear is differentiated by the raised upper eyelid, which is absent in Pain and Sadness; Pain, by its special mouth-combination; and Sadness, by the absence of any other involvement except the de-

pressed mouth corners; both eyelids are contracted in Laughter and Crying, but Crying is differentiated by the frown. Similar combinations, simple or of increasing complexity, similarly differentiate all well-agreed-upon expression. . ." (14, pp. 132-133).

Facial Expression and Social Interaction

Ordinarily people are not moved by deep emotions. They stimulate one another facially by attitudinal expressions. The intimacy of face-to-face contacts derives in part from the language of the facial muscles. Conversation in a small group is carried on against a background of interstimulation through facial expression. Often the trend of the discussion is directed by this interchange. Individuals learn to adjust their remarks according to the feelings of their fellows as indicated by expressive movements of the face. The public speaker is particularly sensitive to the expressions among his audience. He detects hostility, indifference, and approval very quickly and is dependent upon these cues. They influence his speech greatly, and it is an unusual orator who can do his best before an uninterested and indifferent audience. Many lecturers have the habit of concentrating upon two or three appreciative faces in the audience and addressing their remarks solely in their direction.

The role of the eyes in social stimulation is not revealed by studies of static photographs of expression. The directionality of behavior is frequently indicated by the eyes, as has already been suggested. This furnishes a significant cue in athletic competition. Hence football players are trained not to give away a play by looking in the direction in which it is to go. The eyes also show whether or not the individual feels himself in control of a situation. This has important consequences in ascendant-submissive relationships. The shy individual will cast down his eyes and fail to meet the gaze of the more confident person. Salesmen are sometimes taught to fixate the bridge of the nose of the prospective victim and thus outstare him. H. T. Moore and A. R. Gilliland confirmed

the relation of eye movements to ascendance-submission experimentally (29). They selected the 13 most aggressive and the 13 least aggressive men in a class of 89 students on the basis of ratings of associates. Each subject performed a series of mental additions with instructions to return the fixed gaze of the experimenter who sat facing him. In the non-aggressive group 72 eye movements were recorded as against 6 in the aggressive group. "Not one of the aggressive group averted his gaze more than twice during the five series of additions, whereas ten of the thirteen least aggressive subjects shifted their eyes four times or more" (29, p. 101).

Physiognomy

Appearance apart from expression is a significant social stimulus pattern. The static anatomy of the face is, of course, far less important than the dynamic play of the facial muscles. Even when we think we are responding to a person's appearance, we are often reacting to his expressive movements. Nonetheless, we like or dislike people, and we attribute characteristics to them on the basis of the size, shape, and patterning of facial features. Photographs are still used as a criterion for selecting people for jobs. It is popularly thought that a high forehead indicates high intelligence, a receding chin a weak will, and narrowly spaced eyes greedy and grasping characteristics. The criminologist Lombroso actually founded a school of criminology which holds that criminals can be distinguished from normal people by facial stigmata. The most obvious importance of facial features appears in love and mating, though the significance of the face for sex interest is largely a matter of cultural determination. There was a period in our own history, to judge from the writings of the romanticists, when sheer beauty of feature was far more important than it is today. In turn the reaction of people to the appearance of the individual affects his personality. The physically ill-favored child may learn to make the most of his aptitudes or may develop defensive reactions as a result of the real or imagined attitudes of others toward his ugliness.

Experimental work, however, conclusively refutes the notion that character can be read through such external signs as the size and shape of the head and of the facial features. F. E. McCabe compared the judgments of character based on photographs with judgments of character based on knowledge of the person (26). Forty college women were ranked in respect to the following traits: neatness, conceit, sociability, humor, likability, refinement, beauty, snobbishness, and vulgarity. Twenty of their number did the rankings. Another group of judges, who did not know the original subjects, then ranked the photographs of the 40 women in respect to the same traits. There was no relationship between the two rank orders save on the traits of *beauty* and *snobbishness*. Since beauty is largely a function of facial features and not a trait of character, the correlation of 0.61 was to be expected. The coefficient of correlation for snobbishness was low (0.32), and this slight relationship was probably due to expression rather than appearance.

Another more direct test of character reading was made by G. W. Cleeton and F. B. Knight (8). Twenty-eight students were rated by members of their own fraternities according to their possession of these eight traits: sound judgment, intellectual capacity, frankness, will power, ability to make friends, leadership, originality, and impulsiveness. Measurements were taken of the physical characteristics commonly described by phrenologists as indicative of these traits. Finally a group of 70 judges, consisting of business men, school superintendents, and students of personnel management, passed judgment on the 28 students, who were seated on a platform. The ratings of close associates were then correlated with the physical measures, the physical measures with the judgments of the character readers (the 70 judges), and the ratings of close associates with the judgments of the character readers. The great majority of the resulting coefficients were around zero, showing no relationship. In a few instances coefficients of 0.31 and 0.32 were obtained, but their probable errors were so high that they appeared to be the result of chance. The investigators themselves concluded that readers of character and

the physical measurements did not reveal personality traits as judged by close associates. An interesting fact, however, was that the 70 judges did show fair agreement among themselves, even though they did not agree with other measures of character.

The widespread belief that intelligence can be read from the face has been the subject of a number of studies. These investigations completely shatter this belief and show that even supposedly competent judges of men do little better than chance in estimating intelligence from photographs. H. Gurnee has shown the stereotyped nature of such estimation of intelligence (15). He secured photographs of eight twelve-year-old boys whose intelligence quotients on the Stanford-Binet test ranged between 62 and 130. One hundred college students placed these photographs in rank order according to apparent intelligence. "Then the prints were sectioned so as to provide views of three different facial parts, the eyes, the forehead, and the mouth and chin; and these parts were given out three different times to another large group of students for ranking." None of these four series of judgments came close to the real ranking of the eight boys according to their intelligence-test scores. The significant finding of the experiment, however, was that, as in the Cleeton-Knight investigation, the judges often agreed among themselves even though wrongly. In general, a loose mouth and drooping eyelid led to an unfavorable estimate of intelligence. A high forehead and an aesthetic proportioning of the features tended to give favorable judgments of intelligence. In other words, people frequently use the same cues in judging intelligence from the face, in spite of the facts that these cues mislead them.

The fact that physiognomic features do not reveal traits of personality does not destroy their importance as social stimuli. People's responses to one another are still influenced by appearance. The social psychologist cannot ignore beliefs in facial interpretation merely because these beliefs are fictitious. Fictions which people believe in are sometimes more important socially than facts about which they know nothing. Further

studies along the lines of Gurnee's investigation would show the significant stereotypes in our culture which govern the perception of personality from physiognomy.

The reasons for the common error in reading character from facial features are not hard to find. We seek obvious external cues on which to hang our preconceptions. In all stereotypes economy of effort is a prominent factor. It is much easier to take a simple characteristic, readily perceived like the receding chin, as an indication of personality than to watch the individual carefully and weigh his conduct. Moreover, we dislike ignorance which leaves us at sea concerning a situation. If we can fit a person into our mental organization we feel we have the situation under control. In Gestalt terms we tend to organize or structure an unstructured field. Analogical thinking accounts for some of the particular traits associated with particular anatomical characteristics—for example, the superstition that red hair is evidence of a fiery temperament. The halo effect is also in evidence in character interpretation. The good-looking girl or boy is judged favorably on intelligence and character ratings. But often the meaning read into the face goes back to expressive movements. The protruding jaw, supposedly indicative of a strong will, probably derives from the thrusting out of the jaw in determination. In all fairness it should be added that expressive movements leave their marks which are sometimes reliable signs of personality. The lines left about the mouth from constant smiling illustrate this principle. It is also true that experienced judges of men can tell something about an individual from his face, if they have an opportunity to judge him in action. Here, however, expressive movements are the cues, not the features as such.

2. GESTURE

Before the child can stimulate his parents to minister to his needs by language, he uses gestures. He turns his head and body away in rejection, he stretches his hand toward desired objects, and he tugs at the clothes of an adult. Some measure of gesturing persists into adult life and retains a high stimulus-

value in controlling and influencing the behavior of others. This is true even in American culture in which gesticulation is rigidly restricted as compared to other societies. The social norms of Continental Europe in contrast encourage a ready use of gesture. The emotions and ideas of the European easily flow into an expressive movement of the hands or body. He conveys more meaning by a shrug of the shoulders than by a bushel of words. In spite of cultural differences in the emphasis upon gesticulation, the fact remains that all peoples find gesture a natural and useful method of expressive behavior.

Gestural Patterns Not Innate Racial Characteristics

The ease, frequency, and manner of gesturing of national groups other than our own has led to the assumption that gestural patterns are inborn racial characteristics. Experimental investigation has disproved this notion, however (11). In a crucial study the following groups were carefully observed: (1) Italians living in "Little Italy," New York City; (2) Jews living on the east side in New York City; and (3) assimilated Italians and Jews, both living in similar Americanized environments. The gestural behavior of these groups was observed directly in natural situations, it was sketched by an artist, and motion pictures were taken of it. The results show that there are characteristic patterns of gesturing for the Italians as compared with the Jews, *but these patterns are not innate*. The assimilated Italian and Jewish groups showed no such characteristic ways of gesturing. The particular way in which the hands and body are used to express emotion or convey meaning is a socially acquired habit.

Types of Gestures

F. H. Allport has classified gestures into three kinds: *emotional*, *demonstrative*, and *graphic*. An *emotional* gesture is a natural bodily movement in pleasant or unpleasant states of excitement. It is not made for purposes of communication but

expresses or comprises the emotion experienced. *A demonstrative* gesture consists in pointing. It calls attention to objects or persons and sometimes signifies the source or goal of an activity. Hence it is greatly limited in its purpose of communication. *Graphic* gestures mimic the objects or situations they represent. For example, in sign language, walking is indicated by a slow movement of the fingers, running by a rapid movement.

To this threefold classification may be added at least three more types of gestures: the *symbolic*, the *habitual*, and the *autistic*. Language gestures not only point or portray; they also symbolize. Apart from the artificial development of a sign language based upon the written alphabet, many of the gestures in the vernacular of the deaf-mutes are *symbolic*. Doubt is expressed by moving the fists up and down in alternation. This gesture does contain a graphic element in that it portrays the rival pull of opposed forces. Nevertheless it is sufficiently formalized to be unrecognizable through its graphic features alone. Among normal people many gestures have also become conventionalized for language purposes—instance our use of the thumbs-down signal, which the Romans employed before us. In many cultures movements of the hand symbolize religious meanings in sacred rituals. Among the Egyptians the uplifted arms and hands designated life or the vital principle. Art has stylized gestures into a language of emotional expression. In India the dancing girls learn thousands of formalized gestures, no less than twenty meanings being represented by merely extending the fingers.

Habitual gestures are not used for communication nor do they necessarily express emotion. They are the movements which characterize a personality and which become fixed in the course of the individual's development. Examples are: the folding of the arms, the bobbing of the head, the placing of the tips of the fingers of one hand against the tips of the other, the placing of the hands upon the hips, running the hand through the hair—to mention only a few. These habitual gestures may have little stimulating value save when the person who exhibits

them is well known. In such instances they may be telltale signs of the maker's intentions. One man may pull his ear when in doubt; in another person this gesture indicates an adverse decision; in still another it may have no characteristic expressive significance. Many professional and occupational habits have a gestural component. The diplomat carries over his bowing into personal situations, and the politician his hand-clapping and back slapping. The doctor, the lawyer, the machinist reveal their callings through the characteristic gestures of their trade.

Habitual gestures are concomitants of behavior which have been more or less accidentally conditioned to situations. They have little meaning in the individual's own life, though they can be used to interpret his intentions and to indicate his cultural background. *Autistic* gestures are also characteristic responses of an individual, but they do have a definite relation to his personality. Just as autistic thinking is self-directed thinking, so autistic gestures are the individual's reactions to his own conflicts. Moreover, they are not externally directed toward the solution of a conflict. Many so-called nervous habits are included in this category. Biting the fingernails, stretching the arms as a result of embarrassment, and pinching the lips with the fingers are in many cases autistic gestures.

To account for autistic gestures M. H. Krout has formulated the following theory based upon association tests and case studies (22). Gestural behavior originates in conflict. The blocking is not complete. The individual responds partially in the form of a gesture. The gesture may be part of the original pattern of response or it may be a substitute motion. The former situation is illustrated by a student who reported a desire to get up and leave the table immediately after eating. He suppressed the desire, remained seated, but found himself shuffling his feet under the table. The conflict found partial expression in this manner. A single instance of this sort will not produce a characteristic gesture, but constant restraint in a given type of situation may lead to persistent restless gesturing in similar situations. In the second type of reaction to conflict

there is complete inhibition of the original pattern, but not quiescence. Overflow occurs into some other motor channel which the individual does not recognize as related to the forbidden action but which may unconsciously symbolize the blocked desire. The autistic gestures of an individual are not called out directly by an external situation. A situation may reinstate the original conflict and in this manner evoke the autistic gesture.

Autistic gestures are emotional in origin but they differ from the emotional type of gesture previously referred to. By emotional gestures were meant those direct expressive posturings in emotional states not necessarily characteristic of the individual. They have, moreover, more direct reference to the external situation as is evidenced in cringing and withdrawal in fear and clenching of the fist in anger. Autistic gestures are more personal and more indirect. For this reason autistic movements are less clear in their social-stimulating effect than other gestures. Often we fail to respond to autistic gestures. The most common reaction to them is one of annoyance. H. Cason in an extensive cataloguing of people's irrational annoyances found a high incidence of nervous habits and related items which look very much like autistic gestures (7). This high nuisance-score of autistic gestures suggests that they are often not accepted at their face value, for in themselves they are not always irritating. We see more to them than is revealed on the surface, though we may not penetrate to their motivating conflict.

The Recognition of Manual Gestures

Experimental work has concentrated upon facial expression, and non-facial gesturing has been neglected. A promising start has been made, however, by the investigation of Carmichael, Roberts, and Wessell into the recognition of manual expressions as portrayed in still and motion pictures (5). Thirty-five gestures, posed by an experienced actor, were photographed and made into lantern slides. The actor practiced each expression before a mirror until he considered he had a

satisfactory portrayal. In the second part of the experiment the procedure was repeated but this time motion pictures of the manual gestures were taken. The still pictures were shown to 348 college students (229 men and 119 women) who were asked to name the expressions. Both men and women agreed among themselves the most in respect to the pictures in which the actor believed he expressed *worship* and *entreaty*. About three-fourths of both groups called the former expression *worship*. Fifty-four per cent of the men called the latter expression *pleading* and 56 per cent of the women *begging*. These two conventionalized gestures produced much higher agreement than manual expressions which had more of an emotional component. About a third of the women concurred in labeling the posed expression of *surprise* as *surprise* and the posed expression of *threatening* as *anger*. The least well-recognized pictures included both attitudinal and emotional expressions.

A different group of students were asked to judge the motion pictures. The results were in substantial agreement with the naming of the still pictures with slightly greater commonality of judgment on the better-recognized expressions. Again *worship* and *entreaty* were recognized by over half of the group. In both parts of the experiment the subjects tended to call the posed expression of *anger, fear*. The pictures called *fear* have the following common components: "The arms are raised with one or both palms toward the observer, and either a recession or a jerky approach or alternation of both approach and recession follows." The expressions judged as anger showed in all cases a general movement toward the observer. Gestures which were named *surprise* involved one or both palms being opened toward the observer with the arms raised halfway between a horizontal and vertical position.

3. VOCAL EXPRESSION

Man stimulates his fellows vocally in three ways. In the first category may be placed emotional cries and non-representational sounds. These sounds are generally expressive of an emotional state, or to be more exact they are the vocal part of a

total bodily reaction elicited in exciting, strenuous, and other situations. A second type of vocal stimulus pattern consists of the character of an individual's voice and its changes in quality and intensity under different conditions. In the third class belongs articulate speech. In this category conventionalization and symbolization of sounds are carried to the highest degree. Words are employed as pure symbols in the sense that they stand for something which they themselves are not.

Emotional Cries and Non-Representational Sounds

Non-representational sounds refer to the noises made in excitement, effort, eating, and other bodily activities. They include the cry of the hungry infant, the laugh in pleasure or hysteria, the shriek in agony, the gurgle in delight, the *ahs* and *ohs* in surprise, and the grunts in strenuous activity. Originally these sounds are not used for purposes of communication. Nor are they caused by the soul's desire to express outwardly an internally felt emotion. Rather they are by-products of respiratory and other visceral activity which happens to be part of a pattern response to a total situation (12). That it is an audible part of the pattern is fortuitous, but nevertheless highly significant socially. For example, the crying of the infant is part of a random diffuse pattern of responses occasioned by some bodily want. Since, however, this component of the pattern consistently brings the parents to his assistance, the child learns to control people through crying. Non-representational sounds thus can take on a conventionalized meaning and serve the two-fold purpose of their biological function and of communication. Nevertheless these cries and growls are hindered by their connection with their original pattern from becoming a pure language. It takes the skill of a trained actor to simulate the range of exclamations and emotional sounds at will.

Among animals non-representational sounds comprise the only vocal language. In spite of an ear structure and a vocal apparatus similar to man the great apes lack articulate speech.

"It may be taken as positively proved," writes W. Köhler concerning the chimpanzees, "that their gamut of *phonetics* is entirely 'subjective' and can only express emotions, never designate or describe objects" (21, p. 305).^{*} The lack of representation and symbolization in emotional cries means that they often stimulate the animal by reinstating in him a similar emotional experience. For example, Kohler reports that the utterance of a cry of rage by one ape produced in her fellows the same expression of fury and led to a state of frenzied excitement in the whole group. Not all vocal intercommunication is at as simple a level, however. An ape will successfully beg food of one of his fellows by lamenting and gesturing. The solicited ape gives of its share when it is in good humor and if it is a friend of the beggar. The response to the begging entreaties is obviously more than the reinstatement of the emotional state suggested by the soliciting creature. There is some recognition of the need of the comrade; otherwise the ape would merely join in his unfortunate friend's lamentations. Apparently the animal has learned to avoid the unpleasantness of a full sympathetic reinstatement of the emotion by giving some of his food.

Emotional cries among animals and among humans function more for purposes of social control than for the exchange of ideas. The fierce growl of the dog is used to intimidate, just as the piteous wail of the ape was employed to control the behavior of his friend. H. W. Nissen on the basis of his observations of chimpanzees in their native habitat states that their vocalizations are too complex and varied to be finely classified (30). Roughly the following categories are possible in his opinion. (a) The panting cry, which varies greatly in pitch and intensity, indicates general excitement or any particular emotional state. (b) The fear-pain cry, usually high-pitched,

^{*}R. M. Yerkes and A. W. Yerkes have questioned this conclusion, however (cf. Chap. 21 of a *Handbook of Social Psychology*). The question is partly one of definition. It is impossible to draw an exact line of demarcation between an affective expression, which through conditioning is used in specific non-emotional situations, and descriptive language.

is expressive of fear or discomfort and in captive animals of anger. (c) The barking cry resembles the barking of dogs and denotes anger and exasperation. (d) The whimpering or whining cry, high-pitched but not loud, signifies disappointment or frustration. (e) The food-muttering call, like a low abbreviated bark, apparently expresses satisfaction.

The signaling function, which emotional sounds acquire among animals through conditioning, aids in their group relationships and social organization. C. R. Carpenter in his field study of *howling monkeys* found the following types of vocalization related to specific group responses. (a) A voluminous barking roar in the males and a terrier-like bark in the females diverts the animals in the group from feeding or playing and produces uniform defensive or aggressive action. (b) A deep metallic cluck starts the clan moving from one tree to another. The sound is made by a leading male and is repeated at irregular intervals. Together with the movements of the leader this vocalization serves to initiate, direct, and control the rate of progression of the group. (c) A series of deep gurgling noises, made only by the males, prepares the other males for coordinated defensive action against a common enemy. (d) A wail ending with a groan, emitted by the mother, occurs when one of her young falls from a tree. "The wailing groans of the mother function in two ways: to produce stimulation to which the infant may orient and move, and to focus the activity of the clan, especially the males on the recovery of an infant. The cries of the infant are cries which localize it for the animals which might retrieve it" (6, p. 111). (e) A chirping squeal, made by young animals at play, apparently facilitates and coordinates their activity.

In man, emotional cries are limited and modified by cultural influence. In contemporary culture the emphasis is upon the inhibition of signs of emotional distress in all but the appropriate situations. And the appropriate situations are defined socially. Restraint is the accepted ideal, and the period of childhood is one in which the individual learns to repress his cries and modify his boisterous laughter and exclamations.

In some primitive societies an even greater stoicism is required. Generally speaking, cultural habits do not so much completely repress emotional expression as they limit its appearance to the proper ritualistic occasion and modify its manner of release. An exception to this formal expression occurs in intimate family and friendship groupings, in which there is a letdown from the code of public conduct.

The Pitch, Intensity, and Character of the Voice

Closely related to emotional cries is the stimulation through changes in the pitch and intensity of the voice. Words uttered in a loud, high tone may have an entirely different meaning when uttered in a moderate pitch. This fact has been very well illustrated in a movie short in which the same lines were spoken by the actors on two occasions. In the one situation the actors are soft-spoken and the interchange is amiable; in the second situation the precise phrases are delivered in high, rough tones and the scene represents a violent altercation. The character of the voice in verbalization evidently takes its meaning from the expressive cries in emotion. Sheer loudness is related to overstimulation. High pitches resemble the piercing shrieks and yells in states of excitement. Very low tones are like the grunts and groans in great effort, and agony. Possibly part of the expressiveness of music also goes back to the meaning of emotional cries.

Apart from the emotional state expressed and from the ideational content carried, the voice of every person is a distinctive social stimulus pattern in its intertwined characteristics of pitch, intensity, timbre, volume, rhythm, and vocal mannerisms. Voice is important primarily in temporary social relationships. We soon grow adapted to the voices of our permanent associates and disregard any unusual vocal qualities they may exhibit. But we often react violently to the high-pitched voice or the rasping tones of a stranger. Public speakers, salesmen, and other persons who come into frequent contact with many people are handicapped if they have harsh,

weak, or high-pitched voices. That we read personality interpretation into the voice is shown by our subjective images of radio performers. Often our subjective addition is rudely shattered upon beholding the radio speaker or singer in person. The question is thus raised concerning our ability to judge personality through voice.

In seeking an answer to this problem G. W. Allport and H. Cantril conducted a series of experiments in which both students and the public radio audiences judged personality characteristics on the basis of voices heard over the radio (2). In each experiment three speakers read the same lines to the judges, who tried to match the voices with physical and expressive features, personality traits and interests, and summary sketches of the personalities of the speakers. In all, 18 speakers and 587 judges took part. The degree of agreement among the judges in their assignment of traits to voices was fairly high, and in many instances there was more correct matching of trait with voice than would be expected by chance. The audiences made their best records in identifying the speakers from thumbnail sketches which summarized all their personality traits. In five of the six experiments in which these summary sketches were used, positive results were obtained. In four of the experiments the positive results were significant. "The more information given concerning the speaker, the more accurately is his voice identified" (2, p. 51). This does not mean, however, that every person in the judging audiences could correctly match the description of the speaker with his voice. Nor does it mean that a person who made one correct matching was necessarily correct in naming all the speakers. It does mean that the judges taken as a whole achieved better than chance results in their matching.

Language Responses as Social Stimuli

. The most characteristic feature of the great society is its verbal aspect. Modern man is subject to a constant barrage of words. His formal education is carried on through the written

and spoken word. His daily round of activities exposes him to the newspaper in the morning, verbal instructions on the job during the day, conversations with his friends at lunch, entertainment over the radio in the evening. The ultimate source of the control of human beings may go back to physical force and economic pressures, but these sanctions are mediated 90 per cent of the time through verbal promises, entreaties, and threats.*

Oral language responses owe their importance as social stimuli to at least three factors. In the first place, the human voice is capable of an enormous range of sounds to which the ear is sensitive. Man can stimulate his fellows verbally in an almost infinite variety of ways. According to a study by M. E. Smith the child of six years already has a vocabulary of 2,500 words (33). Estimates of educational psychologists place the vocabulary of the average high-school senior between 15,000 and 18,000 words. In the second place, vocal language can be carried on with a minimum of effort. Gestures are more cumbersome, impede the individual in the use of his hands for other tasks, and are useless in the dark. Finally, the range of oral responses and their ease and flexibility in everyday usage make possible systematic symbolization. Gestures are closely tied to their representational functions and hence do not readily become organized into elaborate systems.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE IN THE RACE

The popular notion is that language arose from the need and desire for communication. The error in this idea is that it puts the cart before the horse. It takes one characteristic of the finished product and places it back in social origins as the cause of language development. Having language, we can use it for communication. And it is more likely that our desire to

* In the words of F. H. Allport: "Making and responding to language stimuli, oral and written, has become deeply rooted in our most vital interests. We can scarcely conceive what human culture, or even human nature itself, would be without this function. The institutions upon which the social order rests are really systems of traditional and recorded language." (1, p. 197).

communicate grows out of our possession of language than that the wish to communicate led to the invention of language.

Interesting theories have been propounded to explain the origin of language. The *onomatopoeic theory* asserts that words are imitative of the sounds of the creatures and objects which they name. Men originally used the sounds heard in nature to designate the corresponding objects, just as the child's word for dog is "bowwow." Followers of this so-called *bowwow* theory point to the many words in our language like gurgle, splash, snake, roar, crackle, sputter, and soft as proof of their contentions. Undoubtedly all languages have a certain number of onomatopoeic words. All this proves, however, is that natural sounds are one source of names. It does not tell us anything about the mechanism of language acquisition save to assume an instinctive imitation. Men did copy the sounds heard in their environment, but *how* and *why*, this theory does not inform us. Moreover, a language limited to the imitation of natural sounds is not much in advance of gestural communication.

Another theory, the *interjectional* or *poohpooh* theory, has it that language originated from the expressive sounds uttered in emotion. The exclamations and emotional cries, already discussed, do become used in a language sense for adapting to people on the one side and controlling them by the use of these sounds on the other. Nevertheless they fail to provide a basis for adequate symbolization, and they do not cover the range of words in our vocabularies. They are primarily expressive and only secondarily communicative.

The Social-Behavioral Theory

As against these early literary accounts F. H. Allport has set forth a social-behavioral theory in which he employs the reflex-circle principle of Bok, its application to language acquisition as worked out by J. M. Baldwin and E. B. Holt, and other concepts of behavioral development. (1). According to this theory, language developed in the human race from

the individual's use of vocalizations to control his fellows and from his adaptations to the sounds made by other people. Articulate speech belongs in the same category with man's reactions to his environment in satisfying his needs as a biological organism. It differs from many of these responses in that articulate sounds derive their importance from their social effects. The vocalizations of primitive men almost always stimulated the immediate group whereas other responses often went unnoticed.

The Allportian explanation further has it that there is no problem concerning the social origin of articulate sounds. Many writers have speculated about the transition from emotional cries to articulate sounds in the development of language. Study of the human organism shows, however, that its vocal apparatus, sensitive ear, and complex nervous system combine to make man a talking creature, and this was true from the start. There was no point in phylogenetic development in which men suddenly hit upon articulation as an improvement over emotional exclamation. The first generation of the genus *Homo* in all probability made articulate sounds as well as affective cries. The development of articulation is hence an ontogenetic problem rather than a phylogenetic one. The employment of articulate sounds for language purposes, however, is a different question. Here we have a gradual process to which successive generations contributed to give us the effective system of verbal communication we enjoy today.

Again, the story of language development has been made unduly mysterious. Since men were always capable of articulate sounds and since they always lived to some extent in close association (the human young cannot survive if abandoned by adults), they soon developed common experience for some of the sounds in their repertoire of vocalizations. Just as emotional cries among animals convey meaning through conditioning to the situations in which they occur, so among early primitive groups the articulate sounds as well as the emotional cries served as signs for situations, experiences, and objects. It is true that a community of meaning was more naturally asso-

ciated with emotional sounds than with random articulations, since most men gave vent to approximately the same type of cry in the same emotional situation. Nevertheless the random babblings of two or more people, living together, at times coincided in reference to the same situation and were used thereafter to designate that situation. Twins reared together may similarly develop a language of their own. And the coincidence of sounds uttered by two people at the same time is not accidental but goes back to the reflex-circle principle.

Articulate sounds become fixated in the growing infant on the basis of the reflex circle, as has already been described (see pp. 225-226). The child in its babbling stimulates its own ear, and the sound comes to be a conditioned stimulus for evoking the same or a similar sound. Thus the child through this self-stimulation acquires a great many ear-vocal reflexes capable of being called into action by specific sounds whether uttered by itself or others. In the early stages of racial development the babbling of the child led to a similar babbling of the mother, and vice versa. Any two people, for that matter, could stimulate one another in a process of mutual imitation. Given this necessity for the same sounds being uttered at the same time by two or more people, we have the basis for a common conditioning of words to the same situation and object.

The development of ear-vocal reflexes in any physically normal child, whether primitive or civilized, also explains the onomatopoeic nature of certain words. The child in its random articulation develops a wide range of vocalizations in which the sound is a conditioned stimulus for the spoken reaction. Hence any natural sound as well as the utterances of people will call out its echo, provided that the individual already has acquired that particular reflex-circle. For example, a primitive man who had previously stimulated his own ears by making gurgling sounds would repeat these vocalizations when he heard these sounds in nature. And since he generally saw the object or source of the natural sound at the same time that he responded to it vocally, he became further conditioned to use the spoken response at the sight of the object. Thus sounds

in nature came to be names for the sources which produced them. The same process can be observed in the child's naming of animals.

Another source of meaning is suggested by the interjectional theory and allied hypotheses. The characteristic responses associated with the production of certain sounds have aided in the early development of meaning. Some sounds required a gross muscular pattern; others, a delicate adjustment of the speech apparatus. From this fact certain phonetic elements may have derived their significance as symbols. Jespersen points out that the vowel *i*, especially in its narrow or thin form, frequently is used to indicate what is slight, insignificant, or weak (19). The vowels *a*, *o*, and *u*, on the other hand, enter into words meaning large, heavy, and massive. This may be due to the difference in the volume of sound, but it may also be related to the difference in muscular pattern involved in vocalization. S. Tsuru and H. S. Fries report that Americans who do not know Japanese can correctly guess the meaning of certain Japanese words (35). The words they used were mostly antonyms, and the subject was given the equivalent English opposition. For example, he was informed that the Japanese words represented the English antonyms *sharp* and *dull*, but he was not told which of the two Japanese words means *sharp* and which *dull*. Nevertheless in a list of 25 pairs of words (three of which are not antonyms) subjects were right in their choices 75 per cent of the time. Tsuru and Fries explain these results on the basis of a Gestalt hypothesis, according to which meaning is regarded as a property of an organized whole. A more analytical explanation would seek out similarities in common associations and in the type of muscular adjustment employed in the articulation of these words.

The Instrumental Function of Language

Given the human organism with its capacity for producing articulate sounds, given the mechanisms of the reflex circle and the conditioned response which explain the acquisition of lan-

guage responses, there is still a third factor responsible for language development—its motivational source. This factor has been neglected by many students of language. It refers to the instrumental function of language in social adaptation, cooperation, and control. The vocal play between mother and child with its mutual imitation would never have produced a language of any complexity, if it had not served many social purposes. The mother's harsh exclamation, as she forcibly restrained her child, soon came in itself to produce obedience. And the growing child learned to use the same sound on its contemporaries when it wanted compliance with its wishes. Nor was the early primitive group restricted to mother and children. To survive, human beings had to live in small bands. Vocal signs had many uses in establishing intragroup relationships as well as in forming a united front against a common enemy. Carpenter's study of howling monkeys indicates the way in which vocalizations aided in coordinating the movements of the group and in producing cooperative behavior in emergencies. Man with a cortex making possible a greater patterning of behavior, a higher specificity of response to external cues, and greater ease of conditioning soon learned to employ a wide range of vocalizations for cooperating and competing with his fellows. Accidental discoveries of the utility of verbal signs led to the deliberate exploitation of the possibilities of verbal communication.

The instrumental use of language in social living, as the reason for its development, has been emphasized by Grace De Laguna (10). Though her account of social evolution is highly speculative, her description of the adaptation of language to social function is sound and contributes nicely to the social-behavioral theory. Thus she shows that men in their organized activities needed more than simple defensive cries to orient and coordinate their behavior. Hunting with very primitive weapons was safer and more effective if carried on cooperatively. The *proclamation*, an early language form, announced only the presence of an object, condition, or situation. In cooperative activity it became "supplemented by subsidiary

signals, incipient commands, vocal and gesticulatory, given not only by the leader, but by other individuals to their neighbors." Speech in this manner becomes one of the most important tools of man in effecting group organization.

Original primitive language did not employ the highly specific words and the logically simplified forms of modern tongues. As D. V. McGranahan points out, two kinds of primitive units were possible (28). One was a unit which merely named an object or event without conveying any information about the object or event, much like our proper names. Specific meaning was read into this name by the context in which it occurred, or the gestures which accompanied it. The name for water uttered at a time when the group was on the march and in search of a stream might signify its discovery. The name for an animal together with a pointing gesture might indicate the place in which it had just been sighted. Another type of unit was the *holophrase*, or portmanteau word. It stood for a total situation rather than for specific objects and events. Every new situation needed a different term, since there was no analytic relation between the parts of the term and the specific components of the situation. The holophrase thus makes for an elaborate and cumbersome language. Undoubtedly both types of units were employed extensively in early times. Some primitive tribes still employ many holophrastic terms. Indeed one suspects from the constant coinage of new phrases in modern social science that we still think in terms of the unanalyzed entity, the holophrase.

The development of language was not from simple word units to complex sentence structure. The primitive units just mentioned were more like sentences than like our highly differentiated words. They were vague inclusive patterns which in time were broken down. Men did not start by inventing a system of key units out of which complex forms could be put together. Differentiation of parts of speech was a later development. Words became more refined and specific through long trial-and-error experience. True generalization demands specificity of meaning, and the generalized grammatical forms

were, therefore, absent in the very early systems of vocal communication. Most extant primitive groups yield little information about language development because they have highly developed languages. They are really not primitive in the sense in which we have been using the term to designate early man, since their culture reflects a long history of accomplishments in some respects superior to those of civilized men.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE IN THE CHILD

At least seven stages or processes may be distinguished in the child's language development. They are: (1) random articulation with the fixation of ear-vocal reflexes, (2) the selecting out of particular articulations through social stimulation, (3) the social conditioning of articulations to objects and situations or the acquisition of meaning, (4) the modification of the child's utterances to fit his whole pattern of vocalization, (5) the subsequent change back to socially approved pronunciation, (6) the recognition that everything has a name, and (7) sentence building. These stages are not all distinctive steps and some of them may go on at the same time.

1. Random Articulation with the Fixation of Ear-Vocal Reflexes

The child vocalizes from birth on. Its early diffuse patterns of random activity often include vocal components. Generally the first utterances are some modification of the vowel sounds of *a* and *u*, which require little active participation of the tongue and mouth muscles. Then consonants appear in combination with these vowel sounds, *m* being the consonant reported as the first to appear by the majority of observers. Among the earliest sounds are also a variety of "clicks," "grunts," and "gurgles." Between five and twelve months occurs a particularly significant phenomenon for speech development. The child babbles to itself, repeating the same syllables several times in succession. This period of babbling continues in some children into the second year of life with a greater and greater

variety of sounds being practiced. In other words, the vocal reflexes become conditioned to the sounds they produce.*

The child during the stage of random articulation develops enough ear-vocal reflexes to learn any language. It approximates the basic sounds of all tongues. C. H. Bean states that in listening to the child's vocalizations: "One cannot fail to hear all the vowels and consonants, diphthongs, aspirates, sub-vocals, nasals, German umlauts and tongue trills, French throaty trills and grunts, and even the Welsh *l*."† The fact that a child learns a particular language takes us for its explanation to the second step in development.

2. The Selecting out of Particular Articulations through Social Stimulation

The calling out of previously acquired ear-vocal reflexes has already been mentioned in connection with the racial development of language. And once language has developed in the race the sounds made by people associated with the child operate in a selective fashion, because they call out only part of the child's repertoire of vocalizations. The child who has

*The conditioning of a sound to its vocal reflex is a particular application of the reflex circle as has already been indicated. E. B. Holt was the first to work out this application and to show its significance in language development. In 1931 appeared in print the following statement, the gist of which Holt had given years before in his lectures: "It is well known that infants which are born deaf do not learn to speak, even though their vocal organs be absolutely normal (Preyer, 1889, pp. 42, 98). This is because a pre-requisite to the acquisition of speech is the establishment of reflex paths from the ears to the vocal organs, such that a sound received at the ears causes the vocal organs reflexly to reproduce that sound as closely as their anatomical structure permits. These indispensable reflexes are established inevitably if the infant's audition is normal. For, as is well known, its random murmuring, cooing, babbling, and other more strenuous vocalizations are, during certain of its early months, well-nigh incessant. It exercises *at random* its entire articulable gamut. Now each sound as it is produced stimulates the child's own auditory apparatus, if this is intact, and each such auditory excitation finds motor outlet in precisely that set of the vocal organs which has just made that very sound: and which now will make it again (a reflex-circle). Hence the infant's persistent reiteration of any sound which it has made" (*Animal Drive and the Learning Process*, Henry Holt, pp. 39-40).

† Quoted by I. Latif in his impressive citation of observers who agree that the random articulation of sounds by the infant furnishes raw material for the development of any language (25).

practiced many ear-vocal reflexes is already conditioned to respond to many sounds by duplicating them. But he hears only a limited number of articulate sounds. Hence the vocalizations elicited in a German-speaking group will be sounds which approximate German words, and similarly in any language group the language heard will reinforce only certain of the child's vocal reflexes.

The selective process, moreover, is hastened by the deliberate attention of the parents to the child's babblings. Many of these random utterances will be disregarded, but let the child approximate a word of its mother's tongue and she will echo it back to the child many times. Motivation enters in to strengthen the socially significant vocalizations of the child. When it does happen upon comprehensible words it is rewarded by attention, even though it did not use the word in a meaningful way.

The diction, the pronunciation, and the manner of vocalizing are similarly influenced by the early social environment of the child. Characteristic dialects associated with different parts of the country are perpetuated by the same selective process which determines the language the child speaks. Accent and pronunciation also mark off social classes in countries where universal public schools do not exist to standardize speech. Such differences in accent become convenient pegs on which to hang elaborate stereotyped fictions concerning different types of people.

3. The Acquisition of Meaning

The child's articulate sounds which are called out by the speech of its parents may at first have little meaning to the child. Its mother responds to certain of its babblings with similar vocalizations, and the child echoes back these sounds. The mother, however, employs words in particular contexts and in reference to specific objects. Hence the child in imitating its mother gives back the same sounds in these situations. Through conditioning, therefore, the visual stimulus of an object reinstates the verbal response to it. The child, in other

words, comes to name things in its environment. The child, moreover, learns the names and meanings of objects, qualities, and actions because it is constantly responding to its world and attempting to satisfy its needs. Through trial-and-error the socially correct sounds are used in connection with the child's activities, and thereafter become used when the same activity is in progress. The trial-and-error is considerably abbreviated and sometimes entirely eliminated by the mother's help. If as the child reaches for its doll the mother says *doll* and the child echoes back the word; upon the following day its activity in reaching for the doll will be accompanied by the word *doll*. Though the child uses only one word, that word stands for the complete sentence "I want the doll." Nor is this the only meaning conditioned to the word *doll*. *Doll* also stands for the many actions of the child in playing with it and for the general feeling state associated with this play activity. Hence the child needs more words to convey its exact meaning than the word *doll*. Before it acquires them the mother is often perplexed by the child's insistent naming of an object. Her first move is to fetch the object, but this fails to satisfy the child, for on this occasion it is employing the word in another sense. The word now signifies a different motor attitude from that of simple want.

The child understands the meaning of words before it can pronounce them, but the same process accounts for the understanding of meaning as for the active utterance of meaningful sounds. Words are auditory stimuli associated with objects, people, and events. By conditioning the word *milk* comes to stand for the whole feeding situation. Gradually this vague meaning is made more specific by hearing the word spoken in different contexts but always with reference to the same object. "The child's acquisition of meanings of verbs," I. Latif writes, "is not much more difficult, for actions and processes can be readily pointed out to a child and the corresponding verb simultaneously spoken" (25).

In the acquisition of meaning E. B. Holt has called attention to the subjective aspect and the objective reference, a distinc-

tion of great importance in social psychology. A verbal stimulus, and for that matter almost any stimulus pattern, calls out a pattern of responses which comprise the meaning of the stimulus. This pattern of responses consists of two parts: first, the movements of the eyes, hands, and body which follow, trace, or explore the contours and relations of objects; second, the attitudes assumed by the body toward the stimulus pattern. The first aspect is the objective reference of the individual's response; the second, the subjective aspect. "It is obvious that what logicians call the denotation and connotation of words are both realized in the objective reference of the response, while the 'feeling tone' or emotional value of the word lies in the subjective aspect of the response. All evaluation is, of course, within the subjective aspect. The pleasant and unpleasant experiences of the child are its subjective or attitudinal responses to various stimuli. The responses of the new-born baby seem to be predominantly attitudinal or subjective" (25, Latif p. 71).

For example, the subjective aspect of the word *mother* to the child may be its motor attitude of comfort and rest, since its mother takes care of its needs. The objective reference of the word would include the eye movements which explore the face and dress of the mother, the tugging of the infant's hands at her dress—in short, all the responses which objectively recreate the appearance of the mother and her actions. Words vary greatly in the amount of objective and subjective content they carry. Many words have relatively little objective reference. The important words in propagandizing people are those which carry heavy emotional freightage. People are moved to act without knowing the objective nature of the situation. Stereotypes are the most dangerous terms to successful social living because they arouse a predominantly subjective pattern under the guise of objectivity. People employ stereotypes as if they were largely capable of objective reference, when in reality their content is attitudinal. The first step in science is the search for terms which can be objectively referred to the world they describe.

4. The Modification of the Child's Utterances to Fit His Pattern of Vocalization

It is customary to slip over an interesting stage of language development. It is assumed that, once the child has correctly articulated a word in a meaningful manner, it is henceforth part of his correctly spoken vocabulary. Unfortunately for the pedagogue, learning is not so simple. Many children in the second year of life will pronounce and use words correctly in the first few repetitions. Then they proceed to distort the pronunciation of the word while still employing it correctly to designate objects. The distortion takes a characteristic form and fits into the child's whole pattern of vocalization at the time. Words containing phonetic elements difficult for the child are modified to make for easy vocalization. Economy of effort is not the only distorting factor, however. The child for a time goes on a vocal spree in which it practices two or three phonetic elements. Words previously uttered correctly are now distorted by the substitution of the practiced syllable. For example, a child may turn all its *da* sounds into *ga* sounds.

This phenomenon is not the same as the incomprehensible speech of the child due to inability to master all the difficult consonants. It refers to articulate sounds which the child is able to make as evidenced by its first correct pronunciation of them. It results from the influence of his manner of vocalizing during a given period. Similar phenomena are found in other forms of learning. The first few times we practice an act of skill we may do it correctly. Later we modify it to suit our personalities. For example, a person may start playing tennis by using the correct grip taught by an instructor. After a time, however, he finds himself slipping to a grip more in keeping with his habitual pattern of grasping objects.

5. The Subsequent Change to Socially Approved Pronunciation

The individual's modification of the correct action to suit his personality often endures. In speech, however, there is a constant social check on the personal distortion of words. Often

the mother can understand the child's mispronounced words and is lax in correcting them. Other people, particularly playmates, cannot, and the child finds itself thwarted. Moreover, its mispronunciations make for confusion even in the family situation. To be praised and to get what it wants the child must achieve articulations which can be readily understood.

Motivation is always a good part of the story of learning. Most children are highly motivated to speak and to speak correctly. Their own physical exertions get them little compared with the power of words. New words extend their reach and increase their control over their environment. The mere addition of the single word *please* to the vocabulary of the eighteen-month child gains it numerous favors. The relation between parents and children in respect to control is two-sided. The dominant control is by the parent, but children manage their parents to an astonishing degree, if we take into account their undeveloped intelligence and physical inadequacy. And a great deal of this control is through words. Hence it is small wonder that children rapidly acquire extensive vocabularies and return to correct pronunciation of words.

6. The Recognition That Everything Has a Name

An important step in the acquisition of meaning is the realization by the child that everything has a name. The objective explanation of this generalization is difficult, but the fact remains that in the second year of life many children make the significant discovery that everything has a name. From then on they plague their parents with the query, "What's that?" Often this reiterated question is used to gain attention, but there can be no doubt that in many cases the child uses it because he knows things do have a name. And often after his question is answered he will repeat the answer to the best of his ability.

The discovery of the naming function comes about in the following manner. The child's ability to echo back some of its parent's articulations leads to the constant naming of objects in the presence of the child. The child thus acquires some

words and uses them more or less appropriately. "One can say," writes K. Bühler, "that the child now has a general tendency, when attentively perceiving an object, to say a word, not just any word, but some definite word every time. On the basis of already existing reproductive associations it pronounces the word 'dada' when it sees the father and the corresponding associated words for other objects; it is only when an object is met with that has not as yet been associated with anything, that the child stops and calls for the help of the adults by means of unequivocal gestures. This shows that the situation calls up a 'problem' in the child's mind, a problem for which it has the general scheme of solution—enunciating a word—but not always the particular means—a definite word" (4, p. 57). Hence the child transfers from some cases in his experience the finding that objects have names to all objects and situations. He generalizes or carries over to new situations facts true in other situations. How suddenly this recognition comes to him, whether it is one flash of insight or a gradual process, it is difficult to say.

In the famous case of Helen Keller, who lost her sight and hearing at 19 months, the realization that everything has a name came with dramatic suddenness according to the account of her teacher, Anne Sullivan. When Helen Keller was in her seventh year Miss Sullivan tried to teach her language by spelling words into her hand. Progress at first was very slow and Helen confused some words. One such confusion was between *milk* and *mug*, its container. In an effort to overcome this difficulty Miss Sullivan had Helen hold her mug under the spout while she pumped water into it. Then she spelled the word *water* into Helen's hand immediately after some of the cold water had run over her hand. Suddenly, a change of behavior was apparent in Helen. Her face brightened up. She spelled the word *water* several times and excitedly began asking the names of all the objects she could think of. Within a few hours she had added thirty new words to her vocabulary. From that time on her language development was rapid.

The very young child apparently does not discover the

naming principle in as sudden a fashion as did Helen Keller. At any rate, observers find it difficult to place the exact moment of the discovery. There is not the startling change in the child's language behavior. In the case of Helen Keller the realization that everything could be named grew out of the problem of the confusion of a specific word *milk* with its whole context. By separating out one element from that situation, the container of the milk, and placing it in a new situation involving water, Miss Sullivan succeeded in making Helen break down her previously unanalyzed response. Moreover, Helen in this analysis applied her finding of the specific use of words to the naming of everything. Her sudden recognition of this principle may have been aided by many previous acts of discrimination and analysis in her six years' experience in this world.

The child's assiduous use of the discovery that everything can be named is motivated by other factors than the sheer delight in the discovery. Reference has already been made to the control of its environment which language gives to the child. In learning to name things there is another type of mastery which the child enjoys, namely, a subjective control. For example, the child not only learns the name of objects in order to ask for them; he also learns their names because that enables them to be assimilated into his mental patterns. To name means to control, because the first words learned are names of the objects which the child can manipulate and control. Events of a strange, terrifying character may even lose some of their unpleasant aspect when they can be named, especially when their names are related to familiar words. To be specific, the child who is frightened by a locomotive feels much better after he has learned to verbalize about the train. The child's feeling of control over things he can name is similar to the adult's use of verbalizing for his own satisfaction. The man who places a thermometer on the outside of his house reads the temperatures constantly and somehow feels that he has the weather under control.

7. The Building of Sentences

The child articulates syllables and words before it can fashion them together in sentences. Its single words have been interpreted as sentences as far as the child's intended meaning is concerned. Thus, when the child names an object, it is often equivalent to asking for it. These sentence-words are not true sentences from the point of view of language, however. A grammatical sentence involves the patterning of specific elements into logical relationship. Sentence-words, on the other hand, are holophrastic, and their meaning has to be inferred from tone of voice or the context of the situation in which they occur.

The combining of words is at first a mere echoing of the last phrase of a sentence spoken by an adult. The child will often repeat the last two or three words heard without using them meaningfully. The ability to sustain a pattern reaction involving several words is soon put into practical use. The first real sentence generally consists of a noun-verb combination such as "Baby fall," "All gone," "Daddy gone." The specific formations used, however, are greatly dependent upon tuition. Often before the noun-verb combination the child will add the word *please* to the name of what it wants, as the result of its mother's teaching. Here the verb is implied but not spoken. The noun-verb combination is soon extended to include the missing subject or object. The child's name, or the personal pronoun *I*, is frequently prefixed to the verb and object to comprise the simple sentence.

In a study of language development D. A. McCarthy selected twenty children at each of the seven age levels of 18, 24, 30, 36, 42, 48, and 54 months (27). She found that by 18 months children already employed simple sentences, but simple sentences constituted only a small proportion of the vocalizations at this age (6.7 per cent of total responses of boys and 4.2 per cent of the total responses of girls). The next significant stage is the addition of the phrase to the simple sentence. The sentence with phrase did not appear in the 18-month-old group,

but its occasional use was found among the 2-year-old girls. Not only were the girls ahead of the boys in early use of the phrase, but they also maintained a fairly consistent superiority in the frequency with which they responded in this manner. After the appearance of the simple sentence with phrase come the compound and complex sentences. A very few complex sentences were observed at 2 years, but not until $3\frac{1}{2}$ years was there an appreciable increase of this response. Similarly, compound sentences were not used to any extent before $3\frac{1}{2}$ years and did not comprise more than 4 per cent of the responses even in the $4\frac{1}{2}$ -year group. Since complex and compound sentences can be relatively short, McCarthy also noted the appearance of *elaborated* sentences, namely those which contained two phrases, two clauses, or a phrase and a clause. The elaborated sentence first appeared in the 2-year-old girls and did not appear among the boys until 3 years. Structurally the sentences of children are frequently incomplete. The omission of the verb or some part of the verbal combination is the most common failing at nearly all the ages studied. This is partly due to the later acquisition of verbs than of nouns in the child's vocabulary.

The importance of the social environment in language development was clearly demonstrated in McCarthy's study. Children from the upper socio-economic groups were superior to children from the lower occupational groups in sentence construction. They were earlier in their use of compound sentences, and they consistently talked in complex and elaborated sentences more often than children from the lower economic groups. Nor was this superiority due to a greater innate ability in the socially favored children. When mental age was held constant (that is, when children of the same I. Q. in the two groups were compared), the children from the poorer homes were still inferior in sentence construction. This difference can be attributed to two factors: (1) the greater individual attention paid to the child's development in the wealthier home, and (2) the use of less grammatically correct and complete language in the poorer home.

The Function of the Child's Sentences

Apart from the problem of the development of logical grammatical structure is the question of the functions fulfilled by the child's sentences. J. Piaget has emphasized the *egocentric* function of the child's speech (31). On the basis of extensive observations Piaget asserts that the early years are characterized by speech and thought which are not socialized but which are concerned with the self. The child carries on a monologue even in the presence of other children. Its speech functions to sustain a self-concerned mental activity and not to convey information to others. American observers do not confirm Piaget's report that the child's speech is highly egocentric. McCarthy analyzed the verbal responses of her seven age groups and found that egocentric utterances were a small proportion of the total responses at all age levels. Socially directed speech was much more frequent than egocentric speech. Comprehensible speech first appeared in emotional situations in which the child voiced its needs and wants. Imperative sentences decrease as the child grows older and communicative utterances conveying information about situations increase.

The discrepancy between the findings of Piaget and McCarthy are partly due to the technique of study. Piaget observed children playing together, whereas McCarthy recorded the conversation of a child with an adult. Children may take more account of an adult in conversing than of other children. Both social and egocentric functions can be observed in early speech. Before one or the other can be singled out as the more common it will be necessary to study the child's entire life. Sampling one type of situation gives a selective error, but the present evidence suggests that Piaget has overemphasized egocentricity in the child's language.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WRITTEN LANGUAGE

Written language obviously lags behind spoken language in social evolution. Writing scarcely exists among many primitive peoples, whereas even animals possess a rudimentary

spoken language in their signaling cries. In fact, the use of written symbols is a distinguishing characteristic between primitive and advanced cultures. The alphabet represents a long history of development and invention. C. H. Judd has described three stages in the evolution of language antecedent to the use of the alphabet (20). They are pictographic writing, the simplification of pictographs into symbols, and the bringing together of visual and auditory symbolism.

Pictographic Writing

The first written communications among men were pictographs. Primitive man drew pictures of the objects and situa-




FIG. 15. PICTURE WRITING FROM ROCK NEAR LAKE SUPERIOR.
(From E. B. Tylor, *Anthropology*; after Schoolcraft.)

tions about which he sought to convey information. These crude drawings, though not accurate in detail, were sufficiently like the visual forms they depicted to carry meaning. For example, the moon might be represented by a crescent, the sun by a ball. In Fig. 15 an expedition of 51 Indians across Lake Superior is portrayed. The figure on horseback represents the chief with his magical drumstick in his hand. The first canoe is led by the chief's ally, whose name is Kingfish. The land tortoise shows their reaching of land. The three suns under the sky in the lower right-hand corner indicates that the journey took three days.

Picture writing bears little relation to speech. It constitutes

a separate language in which the effort is made to communicate visual images directly. Its general limitation is its inability to go very far beyond the representation of spatial forms. The qualities of experience are expressed hardly at all. Moreover, picture writing as a method of communication is cumbersome and laborious.

The Simplification of Pictographs into Symbols

Picture writing developed in two different directions. On the one hand, as primitive men acquired more skill in representation, they refined their rough drawings and enriched them with specific detail. Pictures were produced which became valued in themselves. This artistic emphasis, though impor-




FIG. 16. ANCIENT AND MODERN CHINESE SYMBOLS.
(From C. Judd, 20, p. 163; after Endlicher.)

tant in the expression of emotions and values, did not contribute to the development of written language. On the other hand, pictographs pursued another course of development which made possible a greater facility in the communication of information and ideas. They became less and less pictures and more and more simplified line drawings. Some lines were omitted altogether; others were distorted in the interests of ease of writing. Curved lines, for example, were replaced by straight lines. In the beginning of this simplification the attempt was made to preserve some semblance of the form of the object. Gradually, however, the outline drawing was so reduced that the object it represented could no longer be recognized. This process is illustrated in Fig. 16, which presents ancient and modern Chinese symbols.

Simplified pictographs developed because they were easier to draw and because the use of written forms to convey information led to an emphasis upon meaning rather than upon exact reproduction. "The fact of greater and greater emphasis on meaning ultimately results in reducing the characters used in writing to what we call symbols or mere signs. . . . Symbols, freed from reference to objects of like form, came very soon to have two or three meanings, some very remote from the original signification. Thus, in Egypt the figure of the owl came to mean not only the bird itself but also, as with us, night, and still more indirectly, silence and wisdom" (20, pp. 163-164). Symbols are essentially short cuts, the use of abbreviated signs to stand for a larger totality. As the outline drawings in picture writing became simplified, they became more symbolic and more conventionalized.

The Bringing Together of Auditory and Visual Symbolism

Long before men had simplified their pictographs into pure symbols, they had developed elaborate spoken symbols. Thus as picture writing progressed it was brought into relation with the spoken language already in existence. The two systems came together because they both had the same objective reference. Since an object was denoted by both a visual sign and a spoken symbol, the visual sign through the process of conditioning or association became tied to the spoken symbol. At the picture-writing stage this association was hastened by the difficulty of representing actions and qualities through visual forms. Where primitive man could not draw a certain action, its verbal sound might suggest another meaning which he could portray. We do the same thing in our rebus puzzles in which the verb *can* is represented by the picture of a can. Old Egyptian writing shows many similar instances of rebus writing. One widely quoted illustration is the name of one of the Egyptian gods pronounced *hesiri*. The syllable *hes* in Egyptian meant seat, and the syllable *iri* eye. Instead of drawing a picture of the god himself, the Egyptian drew first a seat and then

an eye. In thinking of the god the Egyptian uttered his name aloud or subvocally, and the sounds suggested the visual objects for which they stood. In this manner the simple symbolism in picture writing became widely extended to include even abstract ideas.

In the example of the Egyptian seat-eye picture for one of their gods an advance over the first use of written signs for spoken words can be seen. Here the word is broken down into its component syllables and they are separately represented. A further advance toward alphabetic writing appeared when the written symbol used for a syllable of one word was employed




FIG. 17. ORIGIN OF THE LETTER M.
(After I. Taylor, 34, pp. 9-10.)

to stand for the same-sounding syllable in another word. Such a written symbol emerged into an alphabetical letter when it became simplified and lost its pictographic character. In Fig. 17 is illustrated the derivation of our letter *M* from the Egyptian hieroglyphic owl. In ancient Egyptian language the word for owl began with the sound which we designate by the letter *M*. The Egyptians came to use the owl-pictograph to stand for the sound *M* in general. The pictograph became more and more simplified until it lost all relation to its original graphic form.

The Egyptians themselves did not achieve a pure phonetic alphabet. They had the necessary alphabetic symbols but they persisted in cluttering up their writing with various graphic signs. They were afraid that, if they used the alphabetic sym-

bols alone, the meaning would not be clear. "But all the same," I. Taylor informs us, "in the tangled wilderness of the hieroglyphic writing the letters of the alphabet lay concealed. All that remained to be done was to take one simple step—boldly to discard all the non-alphabetic elements, at once to sweep away the superfluous lumber, rejecting all the ideograms, the homophones, the polyphones, the syllabics, and the symbolic signs to which the Egyptian scribes so fondly clung, and so to leave revealed, in its grand simplicity the nearly perfect alphabet of which, without knowing it, the Egyptians had been virtually in possession for almost countless ages" (34, p. 69).

The Phoenicians are generally credited with endowing western European culture with a phonetic alphabet. This Semitic group borrowed the Egyptian hieroglyphs, stripped them of their graphic and other non-alphabetic features, and produced a logically simplified form of writing. The tremendous advantages of the phonetic alphabet can be seen more clearly if it is compared to a less analytical type of writing like that of the Chinese. Until well into this century the Chinese for over four thousand years had employed a graphic system in which every word had its own written symbol. Written characters did not stand for basic sounds. Hence instead of learning a score or two of letters, the Chinese student had to learn thousands of separate characters. Literacy was reserved for the highly educated, since it took twenty years to learn to read and write. Undoubtedly the nature of the Chinese written language was an expression of Chinese conservatism, but in turn it also served to intensify the conservative nature of Chinese institutions.

SUMMARY OF PART II

In this section we have penetrated below the level of the layman's observation of his social world to the scientific psychology of the laboratory. The physiological mechanisms of human conduct have been described, and the psychology of human motivation has been explained. In addition to this basic social biology we have considered the social psychology of

interaction, social stimulus patterns, and the development of language. Equipped with an understanding of the mechanisms of behavior and the mainsprings of action, we shall return in Part III to the practical realm of social events. This time we shall view them as they appear to the clinician.

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PART III

*THE SOCIAL WORLD OF THE CLINICIAN:
PERSONALITY*

CHAPTER XII

THE NATURE OF PERSONALITY AND METHODS IN ITS STUDY

The social world presents such a complex scene that it cannot be grasped in its entirety from any one approach. The man on the street perceives a cross-section of social phenomena. He sees the uniformities and differences in human behavior, and he beholds the interaction of people in primary-group activity. He misses, however, the development of social processes, for he does not stay with one situation long enough to see its historical unfolding. He also lacks an intimate knowledge of the specific people who are playing roles of varying degrees of importance in the social drama, since he has not been able to follow the same individual through a long period of time. In this section we shall supply this second omission of the man on the street, namely, the knowledge of specific people, more technically known as the study of personality.

The Clinician as the Observer Who Sees the Problem of Personality

Until yesterday our knowledge of personality was largely derived from the field of abnormal psychology. While laboratory workers were exploring the processes of the generalized normal mind, psychiatrists were investigating the personality organization of maladjusted human beings. Pierre Janet and Morton Prince contributed their classical studies of dissociated personalities. Sigmund Freud described the stages of development through which the individual passed in his psychological maturation. While social psychologists observed the overt struggles of men adapting themselves to society, Freud concentrated upon the internal conflicts associated with this process

—in other words the effects of socialization upon personality. From Freud, too, has come a description of the structure of personality with reference to man's elemental impulses, his conscious strivings and the social prohibitions internalized within him. The role of inferiority conflict and of ego motives in men's lives has been popularized by Alfred Adler. In short, abnormal psychology has been rich in observations and concepts concerning personality.

It is no accident that the majority of the books on personality have come from the pen of the clinician or the psychiatrist. If the field of social psychology had been mapped out logically from the start by a world-controller, a fair number of research workers in academic psychology would have been assigned to the study of personality in the very beginning. But early works on social psychology, absorbed in the larger social scene and searching for constant features of human behavior, neglected individual differences and their antecedent causes. The clinician and the psychiatrist comprised the only professional group whose primary task it was to understand people as separate and distinct individuals. As we have organized our social world, most of us are assigned to roles in which we are mainly concerned with the common segments of the behavior of many people. The teacher or professor works not so much with the unique qualities of individuals as with their common characteristics as students. The lecture or class method of mass instruction prohibits an individual approach. The employer is interested in his employees as productive workers, not as distinctive human beings. The judge and jury are called upon to evaluate the individual not as a personality but as a non-conformer to legal rules. The business man and the advertiser see people as a buying public with common tastes and habits. The politician and public official view people as like-minded voting blocs.

The clinician and the psychiatrist, then, have been the outstanding observers to regard the individual as a whole, to see him as a distinct personality. These workers have not been preoccupied with a systematic study of society like the academic

social psychologist. Nor has their practical interest been in common sectors taken out of the lives of a large group of people. Their practical problem is to straighten out the lives of patients who come to them with personal problems of adjustment. In solving these problems, general formulas applicable to all mankind are useful, but it is also indispensable to know the specific developmental story of every patient. To understand his motivation it is necessary to know how he came to be what he is. It is true that many individuals have the same attitudes, traits, and habits, but the particular weighting or importance of a trait in one person may vary greatly from its weighting in another person. Therefore, the clinician must study each patient as an individual case and look for the deeplying dispositions and habits which stamp the man as a definite personality.

Four Definitions of Personality

So popular and ancient a term as personality is likely to be overloaded with many meanings, not all of them mutually compatible. Etymologically, the word personality derives from the Latin *persona*, which was used to designate the mask worn by the actor in a drama. Since the mask denoted the role which the actor was to play, an early meaning of personality emphasized the assumed behavior of an individual according to his part in the drama of life. This use of the term persists in some modern sociological writing. Thus Kreuger and Reckless in their *Social Psychology* devote their discussion of personality to the social roles which the individual takes in life according to his occupation, age, and membership in various groups. "Even the physician," they tell us, "cannot be himself; he must wear a mask and conduct himself according to his kind" (10, p. 333). In general, however, modern usage has refused to identify the word personality with standardized role behavior. Since we already have terms like custom, status, and institutionalized role to refer to the stereotyped cultural aspects of conduct, we may well reserve the word personality for a man's more intrinsic characteristics.

Another use of the word personality which must also be rejected equates it to the individual's effects upon his fellows. "It is the responses made by others to the individual as a stimulus that define his personality," writes M. A. May (11, p. 83). The objection to this definition of personality as a man's social-stimulus value has been well made by G. W. Allport (2). It confuses an individual's reputation with his true self. If logically carried out it would be synonymous with the superficial popular view that a man has a lot of personality if he is very effective socially, and practically no personality if he is a seclusive, mousy creature; or that he has a desirable personality if he is well liked. The psychologist cannot accept at face value the doctrine that personality is defined solely in terms of the reactions made by others to an individual. It must be remembered that these responses which we make to an individual are not wholly determined by his nature, but are also affected by our own make-up. The reactions made to a given person in one group may vary from the behavior he elicits in another group, because the members of both groups respond to him in terms of their own interests and habits. According to the conception of personality as an individual's social-stimulus value, his personality would be quite different in the two groups, whereas the change may not have been in the individual in question but in the nature of the two groups.

A third conception of personality is found in the omnibus definition. According to this interpretation personality covers all the reactions which the individual makes. Typical of this viewpoint is the definition of Valentine: "Personality is the sum-total of one's habit dispositions" (16). Similarly M. Prince maintained: "Personality is the sum-total of all the biological innate dispositions, impulses, tendencies, appetites and instincts of the individual, and the acquired dispositions and tendencies" (14, p. 532). In other words, personality is the complete term to sum up all the individual's potential responses. The difficulty with this definition is its very inclusiveness. It is very much like defining the world as the sum total of everything in it. A definition which covers all human behavior is not par-

ricularly helpful to the student interested in the problems of personality. Definitions are useful tools when they restrict terms to definite phenomena or concepts. Everything that people do is not necessarily significant for an understanding of their personalities.

We come, finally, to a widely accepted view of personality which avoids the overgeneral character of the omnibus conception and which also steers clear of the fallacy of regarding personality merely as the effect one has upon people. This notion, which will be used in this book, can be summarized as follows: *Personality is the concept under which we subsume the individual's characteristic ideational, emotional, and motor reactions and the characteristic organization of these responses.* Characteristic in this definition means that the conduct in question is more a function of the individual than of the immediate stimulating situation. Thus we would exclude from personality behavior which is imposed by the exigencies of the present situation.

For example, if the child is tardy to school because there was a fire along the way and he tarried too long in the crowd watching it, this tells us very little about his personality. If, however, he is tardy almost every morning because he seeks out distracting situations, then we can call his tardiness a personality trait. Similarly, the actions of people in conforming to police orders may be largely a function of the compulsive nature of the situation. If, however, conformity is characteristic of a man in many situations and in situations in which there is little external sanction for obedience, his conformity is an expression of his personality. Personality refers to the ideas and actions which become *interiorized* within the individual. It does not refer to roles which are lightly assumed for the moment but which do not characterize the person. This notion of personality is widely used in everyday life when people say "Isn't that extravagant gesture just like him? He would do that."

The definition of personality as the characteristic behavior of an individual is similar to, but not identical with, the idea of

personality as the distinctive or unique nature of a person. Many writers have pointed out that personality would not exist if people were regimented and standardized so completely as to wipe out individual differences. They hold that the actions and ideas of an individual which differentiate him from his fellows constitute his personality. In the main their contention is sound. Behavior which shows little individual difference is more often than not compelled by the demands of the situation. All men turn up their coat collars in the face of a blizzard, almost all men obey the whistle of the traffic officer. Moreover, when we consider the total personality, we encounter dissimilarity in a comparison of people. No matter how similar the hereditary background and the environmental context which determine human nature, no two people represent exactly the same mixture of innate and environmental forces.

It is more accurate, however, to use as the criterion of personality expressions *characteristic* of the individual than to rely upon *uniqueness*. Though every person may represent a distinctive combination of traits, these traits may not always be organized as a system within him affecting his every move. Few people are so well integrated that they possess a unified pattern of psychophysical dispositions directing all their actions. The uniqueness of an individual may be nothing more than the fact that his many selves sum up to a distinctive total when we consider them over a period of time. For example, John Smith at times is an ardent reactionary, at other times a clear-sighted realist, on still other occasions a confused romantic individualist. No other person we know may have this particular combination of selves. Nevertheless these selves may not be integrated in a system in John Smith which acts as an internal unitary force in influencing his many activities.

When we observe people, therefore, we need to include much more than uniqueness in our study of personality. People manifest deeply interiorized wishes and habits in ways which closely resemble the adjustments of their fellows. Individual differences, moreover, are as often quantitative as qualitative, that is, men vary in terms of more or less of a given trait as

much as they show qualitatively unique responses. The emphasis upon uniqueness grows out of a narrow examination of social phenomena. The investigator of broad perspective is less impressed by individuality than by similarity in studying personalities within a culture. The uniqueness of every one of our small circle of friends seems less significant if we compare Americans with Chinese, or with Greeks of the classic period, or with Australian bushmen (even if we are making a longitudinal study and not a cross-sectional analysis). In such a comparison of personalities, we notice similarities in Americans which are so commonplace as to be overlooked. From the point of view of this book, therefore, both uniqueness and similarity will be considered as the subject matter of personality. The determining criterion will be the question: Is the attitude or behavior characteristic of the individual? Is it consistent with his motives, his past actions, his values?

Limitations in the Clinician's Emphasis upon Personality

In our study of personality we must avoid the common fallacy known in social psychology as the *error of local determination*. This error consists of attributing causal efficacy to one element in a situation and ignoring the dynamic context in which the element is found (4). For example, the great-man theory of history has it that the unfolding of social events can be understood through a study of the biographies of outstanding leaders. The personality of Rousseau explains the romantic revolt, or the life of Hitler, the Nazi dictatorship. In looking at the social scene through the eyes of the clinician we must not be misled into interpreting the drama as the actions of one or two talented personalities. Human beings acquire their equipment for leadership in a social setting, and what is more important they function as effective leaders largely as the content of the total social situation dictates. Hitler's influence upon German history would remain a mystery if we knew only the personality of the man. The mystery is cleared up when we study the whole framework of German life following the

World War. As we saw in our consideration of institutional leadership (Chapter VII), Hitler came to the fore less because of his own abilities and more because his life, his hopes, his plans typified the experiences and aspirations of a people crushed by military defeat and oppressed by economic disaster.

Another variety of the error of local determination in the field of personality is the projection of blame and hatred upon a single individual. The undergraduate pillories the professor whom he feels is personally to blame for his flunking out of college. The college professor with a grievance hates the university president and forgets that the president is only one man in a large system. The President of the United States has always been a target for all kinds of abuse. It is his personal qualities, his failings and ambitions, which are responsible for the state of the nation, it is commonly held. The extent to which his actions are determined by the political and economic framework in which he operates is not examined. Some proposals to reform politics also partake of the error of local determination. If we encourage college men to enter public life, it is hoped, we will get better government. The assumption is that the main evil in politics is the wicked personality of the politician. Replace him with an honest college graduate and the problem is solved. Again we have the simplicist's view of political life, the refusal to see the complex interrelationships of our governmental system.

Besides this error of dwelling upon the personalities of a few people there is the limitation in the clinician's point of view of missing the importance of *role* behavior. If we consider the effect of a man's behavior upon his fellows it is often not necessary to know his personality. His action may be deeply interiorized within him, or it may not be at all characteristic of him. But its effect upon his fellows may be the same. At an auction the enthusiastic bidder who bids first and who keeps bidding up the price of an article may be planted there for that purpose by the auctioneer. Or he may be there because he loves auctions. Nevertheless, he plays the role of the enthusiastic bidder and affects the bidding of other people, regardless of

his motive. In many situations of life, role behavior of this sort is of first importance. Often it precipitates actions which would otherwise not occur or facilitates activity which is already under way. And we need know nothing about personality in studying role behavior as a social stimulus.

The Advantages of the Clinician's Approach

Though the field of social psychology is more comprehensive than the study of personality, the clinician's approach can make four important contributions to social science. In the first place, the study of personality has the practical advantage of enabling us to understand ourselves and our colleagues. In the hands of the psychiatrist this knowledge can be put to use in solving the problems of the maladjusted individual. In the hands of the employer, this knowledge helps in the selection of employees. In everyday life the understanding of personality is constantly applied to the motivation and manipulation of people.

In the second place, case studies of particular people are needed for more adequate scientific generalization concerning such psychological processes as learning, thinking, and motivation. The experimental findings of the laboratory can be checked and supplemented by developmental studies of children. An adequate theory of motivation, for example, cannot be based solely upon rigidly controlled animal experimentation. It demands as well some study of the individualization of motives as they take form in the life history of a person. Traditional laboratory studies of memory, to take another example, had led to the notion of forgetting as a progressive fading away of mental impressions. By following memory changes in the individual, however, J. J. Gibson and F. C. Bartlett have demonstrated that remembering is a dynamic process in which impressions undergo qualitative distortion as well as quantitative decay (7, 3). Memory images are altered as they are assimilated to the specific interests and mental pattern of a particular individual.

A third contribution from personality study is the *increased accuracy in individual prediction*. General formulas enable us to tell roughly what percentage of people in a given group will act in a specified manner, but they do not predict who these individuals are. This actuarial prediction earlier described is illustrated once more in the following example: In an entering group of freshmen who attain a high score in a standard intelligence test we know that the majority will attain scholastic honors in college. But we do not know from the intelligence-test score exactly who these future members of Phi Beta Kappa will be. A study of the individual as such will furnish this information. The boy with a high intelligence score whose past history shows industry, application, a sense of responsibility, and emotional balance is an almost certain candidate for honors. Individuals, of course, are not always consistent performers, but a study of their personalities shows in what respects they are consistent and in what respects inconsistent.

An illustration of the increased accuracy of prediction through a knowledge of personality can be seen in an audience situation which threatens to go over into crowd behavior. If we know only the momentary structure of the situation our prediction of its outcome may go wide of the mark. If, however, we also know the individuals who make up the audience, it is possible to make an accurate prognosis. To turn a group into a crowd it is generally necessary to have a few emotional, uninhibited individuals who initiate the violence through their cries and actions. Now, if we know the personalities of the people in the group we know how many persons of this sort there are in it. The teacher who knows her pupils can generally tell when she has a class which can be left to itself without starting a riot.

A fourth benefit accruing from personality study is closely related to the increased accuracy of individual prediction. *It is the increased knowledge concerning certain factors in social change*. The social scientist who studies uniformities in social behavior and who describes the social norms and cultural patterns of a group is often unable to foretell when these patterns

will break down and give way to new social standards. His inability at prediction is due to his ignorance of how well the cultural forms are interiorized within individuals. And here the study of personality is helpful. Often people follow standardized ways prescribed as right and proper in their culture through fear of penalties and through the general desire to conform socially. But these customs are not deeply rooted as habits of personality. Hence they may change overnight.

In Turkey the custom which required women to veil their faces in public had a long history of faithful observance. Yet it disappeared in remarkably brief time. The chances are that the present generation of Turkish women were quite willing to show their faces and veiled themselves because their lords and masters demanded it. Since the custom was not a function of the women themselves but of the social situation, it changed when the situation changed. Many customs and culture traits, however, are deeply interiorized in the people who carry them. Any prediction of social change, therefore, must take into account how deep in people's personalities various parts of the culture pattern are embedded.

METHODS IN THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY

1. The Genetic

The best method in the study of personality is the genetic method. The way to find out about a person is to watch him over a period of time. The earlier in his career we can study a man and the longer we follow his development the more adequate and the more valid is our knowledge of his personality. Because of the practical difficulties of a complete genetic record (few psychologists are Boswells) the study of personality by the developmental method falls short of its ideal. The genetic approach, as it is carried out in practice, breaks down into four methods which approximate in greater or lesser degree the goal of complete observation.

(a) *The Observation of a Single Trait.* A useful technique in the genetic approach is to study the development of a single

trait in a child. Psychologists will keep records of the imitative behavior of their offspring, noting the age of appearance of imitation, the things imitated, and the extensiveness of the imitation. Perhaps the most widely studied characteristic is the child's facility in the use of language materials. Piaget has conducted elaborate investigations of the development of the child's mental world through extended observation of its use of language. In nursery schools the emotional behavior of the youngster may be subjected to careful scrutiny. Very few of these studies are thorough enough in following the growing personality over a long period of time. Great temporal gaps occur, and they are filled in by making observations of more than one child. It remains for some scientific investigator to keep a fairly continuous record by means of movies and the dictaphone of some single aspect of the child's behavior over a period of months.

(b) *The Time-Sampling Technique.* Since continuous observation of the developing personality is extremely difficult, irregular temporal gaps tend to occur in the observation. Recognizing the sources of error in this irregularity, many experimenters have abandoned the attempt at continuing observation and have employed a procedure of time sampling. The observer will watch the child for a stated period, perhaps five minutes, every day for several months. Or the time sample may be repeated a number of times during one day. The constancy of the time samples permits statistical comparison, and the samples can be checked for reliability and stability in respect to the behavior reported.

The technique of time sampling is generally employed to study a single trait. The frequency of appearance of a given type of behavior can be noted for each time sample taken. Thus W. C. Olson observed the nervous habits of children by listing the presence or absence during a five-minute period of such items of behavior as thumb sucking, nail biting, and protruding the tongue (13). And M. B. Parten studied the development of leadership in children by recording the leadership and followership activities of preschool children during a one-min-

ute interval of the morning free play hour. Methodologically, the time-sampling procedure leaves much to be desired as an application of the genetic approach. It presents a picture of development through statistical comparisons rather than through actual observation. Nevertheless in the hands of skilful investigators it can be very useful.

(c) *Observation of the Child as a Whole.* The closest approximation of the ideal genetic method, however, lies not in the study of single traits but in the observation of the child as a whole. Not every action need be charted nor every expressive movement recorded, but fairly complete observations of the developing personality will show the significant aspects of behavior to be studied in the individual case. Research workers in children's institutions have excellent opportunities for such study, and we are beginning to get reports of first-hand observation of actual personality development. For example, O. H. Mowrer and W. C. Mowrer have watched the personality changes in a psychotic child of four years after his placement in a new institution. Their records do not cover every moment of the child's life, but they have many extensive and continuous observations of him. Their attention, moreover, was not upon single, isolated traits but on the total adjustive behavior of the child as he responded to a new program of treatment.

(d) *The Method of the Case Study.* Another attempt to get around the practical difficulties inherent in a thoroughly genetic approach is the case study, familiar in sociological and clinical work. The case study tries to reconstruct the life history of the individual through a synthesis of materials taken from a wide variety of sources.* The individual himself is generally interviewed at length; he may be given standard intelligence and personality tests; his medical history is taken into account;

* From the point of view of rigid logical definition *case study* need not involve reconstruction from secondary sources. It can be based on a direct study of behavior. In common practice, however, case studies have drawn more upon secondary materials such as social records and biographical accounts than upon actual observation. Hence the term *case study* will be used in this book to refer to the usual procedure of synthesizing materials from many sources to give the life story of the individual.

his school, employment, and court records are scrutinized; his social and economic background is investigated; and his family, friends, teacher, and employer may be consulted. Biographical materials such as letters and diaries are also drawn upon. From all these sources a picture of the individual's personality emerges. The case study as a methodological tool has been largely confined to social workers and clinicians who prepare these personality sketches for definite practical purposes. The end in view may be the guidance of judges and officials confronted with decisions concerning probation or commitment to various types of institutions, or it may be to aid in the therapeutic treatment of the maladjusted individual. The case study in practice tends to be less complete than the above general description of it. The case worker will naturally select out for study only those phases of the individual's life which seem to bear directly upon the practical decision which has to be made.

Sociologists, appreciating the advantages of the case study as a method, have turned it to more scientific purposes. Letters of immigrants to relatives in their native land furnish excellent biographical material for an understanding of processes of acculturation. Case studies of criminals are being utilized to secure information about the etiology of crime. Recently, students of personality have appropriated the method for a more complete psychological understanding of personality.

Since the method includes many different techniques and involves the use of many sources, it is difficult to evaluate as a general approach to the study of personality. In the strict sense it falls short of scientific standards because it depends in large part upon secondary sources. Science works primarily with original sources, with direct observation of phenomena. In the case method, personality is seen indirectly through social records and the eyes of others. Often these records are unreliable and the judgments of relatives and acquaintances biased because of their role as participants in the social scene. Moreover, the reconstruction of the life history on the basis of sources which are largely secondary requires an imaginative synthesis, entailing a fair amount of speculation. The case study, in

short, is methodologically weak. Nevertheless, in the hands of capable investigators it can yield rich returns. The factors to watch carefully in this method are: (1) the reliability of the sources, and (2) the interpretation of the case worker. The accuracy of the social records is the limiting factor in the *reliability* of a case study, and the penetrating insight of the investigator is the limiting factor in its *validity*.

In an attempt to improve the competence of the case study as a scientific instrument J. Dollard has formulated seven criteria for judging life histories (5). These criteria are: "(1) the subject must be viewed as a specimen in a cultural series, (2) the organic bases for action must be studied at the social rather than the biological level, (3) the peculiar role of the family group in transmitting the culture must be recognized, (4) the specific method of the elaboration of organic materials into social behavior must be shown, (5) the continuous related character of experience from childhood to adulthood must be stressed, (6) the 'social situation' must be carefully and continuously specified as a factor, (7) the life-history material itself must be organized and conceptualized."

These criteria make one contribution to the evaluation of case studies which is not new but which is worthy of repetition. They emphasize the need for social perspective in the study of personality and they reiterate this need. Thus they aid in determining the adequacy of a life history, but they help very little in establishing its reliability and validity. No matter how much social perspective a case study reveals, it is still vulnerable in its reliance upon secondary sources. Hence the main emphasis in this method should be the constant checking of the various biographical records upon which it is predicated. The possibilities of the case study have been attractively summarized by G. W. Allport: "It provides a framework within which the psychologist can place all his observations gathered by other methods; it is his final affirmation of the individuality and uniqueness of every personality. It is a completely synthetic method, the only one that is spacious enough to embrace all assembled facts. Unskilfully used, it becomes a meaningless

chronology, or a confusion of fact and fiction, of guess-work and misinterpretation. Properly used it is the most revealing method of all" (2, p. 390).

2. Teleonomic Description: The Observation of Integrated Behavior

The genetic approach is essentially concerned with the way in which personality has developed. If successful, it tells us how the individual came to be what he is. It is not, however, the only valuable method available for the study of personality. We can discover a great deal about human beings if we pay attention to their present behavior. We need not reconstruct the past to predict future conduct. People give away a great deal about themselves in their present adjustments. The method that commends itself here is what F. H. Allport calls *teleonomic description*, the observation of integrated behavior (1). In this procedure we concentrate upon the integrated pattern of personality as it is revealed in what the individual is trying to do. In short, we take account of the individual's purpose.

This does not mean that we are returning to the old superstitious notion of purpose according to which men are supposedly driven by psychic forces toward preordained goals. It means rather that we observe behavior at the *molar* level as well as at the *molecular* level, to use the terminology of E. C. Tolman (15). *Molar* behavior is the complex activity of a man which has reference not to a single stimulus but to a goal situation. *Molecular* behavior is a description of specific reflexes. *Molar* behavior is a new term for E. B. Holt's old contention that conduct can be described in relation to those objective aspects of the environment of which it is a constant function. In other words, we can discover an individual's purpose if we watch the constant direction of an activity in many varying contexts. For example, a child may be disobedient at home and well behaved in the schoolroom, but both types of action may have the same objective reference, the securing of attention.* At home his parents may be so busy that they attend to him

* This example is taken from F. H. Allport's *Institutional Behavior*.

only when he becomes a problem. At school, on the other hand, the skilful teacher may give more attention to the well-behaved children than to the unruly youngsters.

The importance of studying purposive behavior was clearly presented by E. B. Holt over twenty years ago. In 1915 in *The Freudian Wish* he warned against an exclusive preoccupation with the elements of behavior, a warning which the extreme behaviorists neglected. At that time he wrote: ". . . the often too materialistically-minded biologist is so fearful of meeting a certain bogey, the psychic, that he hastens to analyze every case of behavior into its component reflexes without venturing first to observe it as a whole" (9, p. 78). To make his point clear Holt developed the concept of the *recession of the stimulus*. "As the number of component reflexes involved in responses increases, the immediate stimulus itself recedes further and further from view as the significant factor." We can describe the immediate sensory stimuli which play upon the individual and some of the resulting reflexes, but in this observation we miss the direction of behavior and its relation to environing objects. Consider that relatively simple biological organism, the bee. "To study the behavior of the bee is of course to put the question, 'What is the bee doing?' This is a plain scientific question." The answer of the biologist, however, is concerned with the specific stimuli affecting the bee, the sense organs stimulated, and the reflexes elicited. "Whereas," writes Holt, "an unbiased observer can see plainly that the *bee* is laying by honey in its home!" No immediate sense stimulus need be employed in describing what the creature is doing. "The fact is that the specific object on which the bee's activities are focused and of which they are a function, its 'home,' is a very complex *situation*, neither hive, locality, coworkers, nor yet flowers and honey, but a situation of which all of these are the related components. In short we cannot do justice to the case of the bee, unless we admit that he is the citizen of a state, and that this phrase, instead of being a somewhat fanciful metaphor or analogy, is the literal description of what the bee demonstrably is and does" (9, p. 79).

The application of this non-mystical notion of purpose to the study of personality appears in the method of teleonomic description of F. H. Allport (1). In teleonomic description the observer watches behavior in reference to the ends toward which it is directed. These ends are not mysterious subjective forces, but the observable objects or relationships which satisfy the individual's actions. The goal is revealed in the act itself. In interpreting the purpose of an individual, the observer makes no further subjective addition than to say what he himself would be doing, if he went through a similar series of motions. To check on this element of subjective addition in teleonomic description, the agreement of a number of observers can be used for verification. The predictive value of teleonomic description can also be validated in actual tests by comparing specific predictions with future performance. Observer agreement, moreover, can be measured fairly precisely by means of telic scales, prepared for this purpose in advance by having people judge how well a series of acts accomplish a given purpose. In an application of teleonomic description to the matching of literary compositions N. Frederiksen has demonstrated that individuals can be identified through the purposes revealed in the content and style of their writing (6).

From teleonomic description, then, we can learn about the goals toward which people are striving. This important aspect of personality is neglected in laboratory research, though psychiatrists have long taken it into account. Teleonomics does omit the genetic story of the origin of these goal activities, and it omits, moreover, a quantitative description of capacities and traits. For that matter, however, no one method will tell us all there is to know about personality.

3. The Approach through Tests and Measurement

Both the genetic and the teleonomic methods give us personality in its pure form in presenting the individual case. And personality is the story of the individual case. But our understanding of the individual case would be limited indeed if we could not refer back and forth between cases. Nor could we

approach the problem of the maladjusted person if we had no means of comparing him with his fellows to determine the extent of his maladjustment. We might have no accurate notion of whether or not he was maladjusted. Hence the testing method with its cross comparisons of people in respect to capacities, interests, and traits has its place.

In the light of our definition of personality as the characteristic behavior of the individual, the question immediately suggests itself: Are not tests cross-sectional comparisons of many people? Do they not measure performance and verbal behavior without revealing its characteristic interiorization within the personality? In many instances this question must be answered in the affirmative. Many measures which pass as personality scales give little information about personality characteristics. They show how a large number of people behave in one situation, but they do not indicate whether the behavior is situationally or personally determined. This is not true, however, of all the so-called tests of personality. If the test covers many items of performance, interest, or attitude, it may be a reliable indicator of some aspect of personality. In practice, experimenters try to make their measuring scales worth while by including a number of items and a variety of items.

Types of Tests

Social psychologists are still searching for diagnostic measures of personality. Tests for the emotional and self-expressive functions of personality have not been as successful as the scales for measuring mental ability. A wide variety of tests have been evolved, however, which can yield useful information about the characteristics of people, if wisely applied. These tests are of five main types: (*a*) life-situation tests, (*b*) performance tests, (*c*) paper-and-pencil situations, (*d*) questionnaire inventories, and (*e*) projective tests.

(*a*) *Life-Situation Tests.* The ideal method is to measure the actual behavior representative of a given trait directly as it occurs in social situations. Control of the situation is necessary so that we can tell whether the situation remains the same for

all individuals studied. Yet control is likely to destroy the validity of the situation as a natural event. The problem has been solved by staging a situation in such a way that the subject is unaware of the staging. In one experiment, for example, the relative strength of various appeals was tested by asking students for contributions to a charitable cause. The campaign was staged as if it were a genuine drive for funds. The work of M. A. May and H. Hartshorne on testing character followed this principle. Situations were set up in which school children were given opportunities to cheat, to lie, to steal and to be self-sacrificing (8). In one test they were given insufficient time to solve exceedingly difficult puzzles, though a dishonest solution was possible by lifting pieces off the board. After the experiment they were asked if they had cheated. In another test they were given puzzle boxes containing coins which were used as counters. No apparent check was made on the return of the money, though in fact careful records were kept.

The obvious advantage of the life-situation method is that it samples the exact personality behavior which it seeks to measure. To the extent that the investigator controls and standardizes the situation, it becomes identical with the experiment of the laboratory. The disadvantage of this method is its impracticality. Many important problems of personality cannot be tested directly, because social situations outside of the school-room are difficult to control.

(b) *Performance Tests.* A second method calls for performance by the individual in a situation which he knows is a test situation. The performance test is a direct sampling of what the subject can do. In the intelligence test, for example, the student is given essentially the same sort of task which he meets in his school work. He is asked to do mathematical problems, to educe logical relationships, in short to manipulate verbal materials. The performance test of this sort is similar to the life-situation test save that it is a condensation and selection of the essential elements of a series of actions. The intelligence test thus sums up in two hours the scholastic performances of years.

Like the life-situation technique, the performance test, though excellent methodologically, is cumbersome and impractical for measuring many personality functions. People will not cooperate in all the performances which might be devised for them. Many aspects of personality, moreover, are qualities of behavior or matters of motivation and are not easily detected by performance tests.

(c) *Paper-and-Pencil Situations.* To overcome the practical difficulties of measurement through actual performance, tests have been constructed which duplicate life-situations verbally. The investigator in this technique is trying to get at the same behavioral type of trait which the life-situation method or the performance test samples directly. Specific situations from everyday life are described, and the subject selects from a number of answers the one which fits his customary behavior. The Allport Ascendancy-Submission test, for example, is composed of such items as the following:

1. At church, a lecture, or an entertainment, if you arrive after the program has commenced and find that there are people standing but also that there are front seats available which might be secured without "piggishness" or discourtesy but with considerable conspicuousness, do you take the seats?

habitually .
occasionally .
never .

2. When you see someone in a public place or crowd whom you think you have met or known, do you inquire of him whether you have met before?

sometimes
rarely
never

The paper-and-pencil situation as a testing method has the advantage of covering a wide range of behavior. It can be used, moreover, to discover the characteristic reactions of people which cannot be tested directly through performance. Its weakness lies in its lack of control over the responding subject. Individuals may fake their answers, or they may be sincere but

inaccurate in describing their actual behavior. These disadvantages of the paper-and-pencil situation are not so great as they appear at first glance. People can generally remember their behavior in specific, everyday situations. Moreover, they are not so inclined to misrepresent their specific actions as they are their general motives. Save in the moral sphere, details of conduct can be reliably elicited by particularized situations presented verbally.

(d) *Questionnaire Inventories.* A simpler approach to the problem of personality measurement is found in the questionnaire inventory. A list of questions is drawn up covering subjective feelings, attitudes, and items of behavior. The individual merely underlines "Yes" or "No" as he checks through the list. The first widely used device of this sort for personality diagnosis was the Woodworth Psychoneurotic Inventory, which was constructed during the World War to detect emotional instability among soldiers in the army. Woodworth selected his questions from the symptoms of maladjusted and neurotic individuals. The great majority of personality questionnaires which purport to measure self-sufficiency, introversion, or neurotic tendencies have drawn heavily upon Woodworth's Inventory. Sample questions from Woodworth's list follow:

1. Are you troubled with dreams about your work?
2. Do you usually sleep well?
3. Do you feel tired most of the time?
4. As a child did you like to play alone better than to play with other children?
5. Do you usually know just what you want to do?
6. Do you feel you must do a thing over several times before you can drop it?
7. Do people find fault with you more than you deserve?
8. Do your feelings keep changing from happy to sad and from sad to happy without any reason?
9. Does some particular useless thought keep coming into your mind to bother you?

Questionnaire inventories have been employed to test attitudes, interests, and values, as well as behavioral traits. Ob-

viously this method is open to the objection that, if people had sufficient insight into themselves to answer these questionnaires accurately, there would be little need for tests of personality. The inventory is decidedly limited in its usefulness, if it depends solely upon the honesty and accuracy of the self-revelation the individual makes. Various techniques have been employed, therefore, to make inventories reliable and valid. They will be discussed presently under the headings of validity and reliability.

(e) *Projective Tests*. Instead of being asked for self-evaluation as in the questionnaire inventory, the subject may be asked to interpret various ambiguous or incomplete stimulus-situations. The investigator analyzes the needs and attitudes of the subject on the basis of what the subject projects into the situation. This type of test is based upon the well-known principle that people see what they want to see and think what they want to think. The Rorschach Ink-Blot test illustrates the projective technique. Ink blots of various shapes and sizes are presented to the subject, who reports the forms and figures suggested by the blots. His reports are classified under four main headings: (1) Does he see primarily details or the figure as a whole? (2) Is his interpretation determined by form, by color, or by his own kinaesthetic sensations? (3) What is the content he sees, i.e., does he report landscapes, animals, or human beings? (4) Are his responses peculiar to himself or common to other subjects who have taken the test? On the basis of this type of classification the investigator makes certain generalizations about the individual's attitudes, emotional wishes, occupational tendencies, and even philosophy of life.

H. A. Murray has developed projective tests to the point where they are a short-cut psychoanalysis (12). His techniques include the arousal of association through picture completion, musical reverie, literary themes, story elaboration, word association, and character identification. In a thematic apperception test, for example, the subject in his interpretation of pictures reveals his identification with certain types of characters.

The term projective test might well be applied to any device which emphasizes the subject's response as the *indirect* revelation of deeper personality attributes. The use of rationalizations in attitude testing to detect behavior and wishes which the subjects would otherwise conceal is a technique of this description. If cribbing in examination is cleverly rationalized as the only resort from the unfair tactics of the professor, students will often admit their indiscretions.

Like questionnaire inventories, projective tests, if uncontrolled, would be too subjective for scientific and clinical purposes. They can be made into useful instruments, however, if they are *standardized*, *validated*, and made *reliable*. Otherwise the conclusions of the investigator may be his projected wishes rather than those of his subject. Standardization, reliability, and validation are principles which come from long experience with performance tests.

Standardization is the process of finding norms for a test. The test is given to large groups of people, and the relative frequency of all possible scores is noted. Then when it is applied to a particular individual his score can be stated as a percentile rank in relation to the population. Thus he may be among the highest 10 per cent in extraversion, if the test happens to be one of extraversion. Standardization gives numerical meaning to test scores. By standardizing a test we also find how well it differentiates people. If the range of scores is very small in relation to the assumed distribution of the trait, the test needs revision.

Standardization is closely related to *reliability*. By reliability is meant the consistency with which the test measures people. If the test is administered to a group of people today, it should differentiate them six months from now in much the same manner. The man who makes a high score should still make a high score, and the man who makes a low score should still make a low score. Reliability can be obtained by increasing the number of items in a test and by discarding poor items. One way of discovering the poor items is to analyze test scores and to find the items which both high scorers and low scorers

accepted. If a projective test is standardized and made reliable, it means that it is really testing some function of personality. Otherwise it may not be a personality test but a phantasy of the investigator's mind. A reliable, standardized test is one which different investigators can use and from which they can obtain the same results.

A further criterion is necessary with all tests save the life-situation technique. We not only need to know whether the test measures the same function consistently, but also we want to know what that function is. If people respond characteristically to the Rorschach Ink-Blot test, it does not indicate that these characteristic responses represent their philosophy of life. These consistent responses may represent the specific perceptual training of the subjects and nothing else. The problem of what the test really measures is the problem of *validity*. The validity of a test refers to the closeness of its correlation with some criterion admittedly representative of the personality function under consideration. Thus a test is *valid* to the extent that it really measures the variable it is supposed to measure. Intelligence tests, for example, are valid tests, not of general intelligence, but of general scholastic achievement.

The great difficulty in personality testing is to find criteria against which to validate the test. Objective criteria are to be preferred, but they are seldom available. In testing for introversion-extraversion, for example, what objective standard of comparison exists? The common criterion used, therefore, is the rating or judgment of associates. The average estimation, or rating of subjects, by their acquaintances is compared with the scores of the subjects on the test. By experimenting with the items of the test, it is possible to obtain a final test which will place people in the same relative position in the group as their average ratings place them. At its best, validation by pooled ratings of judges means that the test classifies the individual according to expert social opinion.

The Rating Scale

A less controlled method of measuring personality than the test is the *rating scale*. People are rated by friends and associates on a linear scale according to the degree of the trait they are thought to possess. The scales may contain descriptive adjectives connoting quantitative degrees of the trait. For example, the following scale can be used to rate a student's application in his school tasks:

Needs much prodding in doing ordinary assignments	Needs occa- sional prod- ding	Does ordinary assignments of his own accord	Completes suggested supplementary work	Seeks and sets for him- self additional tasks
--	-------------------------------------	--	---	--

The testing and rating methods are short cuts for finding out about the personality characteristics of many people. By one application of a standardized test situation, we can obtain information about a great many individuals. The testing method achieves its economy, however, by telling us less about personality as a whole than the genetic or teleonomic approaches. The test is generally devised for a single aspect of personality. In the nature of the case, statistical comparisons afforded by tests are more valid as they leave the level of integrated patterns, which may be unique, and approach common elementary attributes. It is necessary, nevertheless, to have exact quantitative comparisons of people in terms of their capacities in order to have a complete understanding of their life pattern. The child who is emotionally maladjusted in school may be a behavior problem because he is either of superior or inferior intelligence. To deal with his personality difficulties the first thing we want to know is how he compares intellectually and emotionally with his fellows. Exact measurement here is far superior to guesswork. Another value of the test method is that in practical life we are often concerned with single personality characteristics and not with the complete pattern of an individual's life.

To remedy the weakness of the test procedure in giving us parts of personalities, the psychograph has been employed to

bring together an individual's scores on a number of tests. The psychograph is merely a chart in which are plotted the measurements of the individual's many characteristics, obtained through tests or rating scales. Generally the absolute score on a test will be translated into a percentile rank which indicates an individual's relative position in comparison to the rest of




FIG. 18. PSYCHOGRAPH OF "E. Y." IN PERCENTILE UNITS.

(From L. Shaffer, *Psychology of Adjustment*, p. 455; through the courtesy of Houghton Mifflin Co.)

the population. Hence the inspection of a psychograph shows at once the characteristics and abilities which the individual has more of or less of than his fellows. It may show him to be highly intelligent, moderately introverted, not at all ascendant, unusually persistent, and rather seclusive.

The composite picture of personality which appears in the psychograph is a partial remedy for the inadequacy of measur-

ing techniques which quantify single traits. It presents the individual as a many-sided person with his various abilities and characteristics precisely formulated in comparison with other people. It suffers, however, in its somewhat artificial portrait of a man. A human being is not a bundle of separate and independent traits which are brought together within one compass simply because the same person has exhibited them. These separate traits which we abstract from people for purposes of measurement are dynamically interrelated in the individual. His personal qualities may be a blend of a number of more elementary characteristics, or they may reflect an antagonism of elements. His personality is not the summation of independent traits but the interaction of these attributes. In other words, a complete psychograph would supplement but would not be identical with the description of integrated behavior furnished by the method of teleonomics.

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CHAPTER XIII

PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS AND THE STRUCTURE OF PERSONALITY

Psychology employs many terms to describe and explain behavior and experience. Some of these terms such as conditioned response, attention, sensation, perception, and emotion apply to processes so universal and constant in the human species that they have been studied with little reference to their individual carriers. An experiment upon conditioning in the laboratory is regarded not as an experiment upon people, but as an experiment on the process of learning. One subject in the experiment is regarded as roughly equivalent to another subject. Other terms in psychology such as introversion, inferiority conflict, and ego-ideal are used with a somewhat different connotation. They not only have reference to a process, but they also remind us of the specific people who exhibit these processes.* In this chapter we shall investigate the dimensions of personality which the terms of this second group name. These concepts cover aspects of personality of varying degrees of inclusiveness, and all of them must be considered to cover the total structure of personality.

In Table VI is presented a classification of personality characteristics. The major categories represent descriptions of personality for different purposes and hence are not mutually exclusive as far as personality itself is concerned. The five major headings are: (1) Capacities, the physically determined abilities; (2) temperament, the emotional dimension; (3) traits,

* The difference between these two types of concepts is not in the process studied, but in the point of view taken by the investigator. Introversion, for example, is not a function independent of learning and emotion. It is the way in which learning and emotion are organized with reference to the adjustment of a particular individual to his world.

TABLE VI

CLASSIFICATION OF TERMS DESCRIPTIVE OF PERSONALITY

- I. Capacities—the physical dimension of personality.
 - A. Aptitude: skills and abilities determined early in life.
 - 1. Intelligence.
 - 2. Special abilities.
 - B. Motility: simple motor characteristics.
 - 1. Reaction time.
 - 2. Level of activity: hyperactive-hypoactive.
 - 3. Impulsion and inhibition.
- II. Temperament—the emotional dimension.
 - A. Specific emotional attributes.
 - 1. Emotional frequency and change.
 - 2. Emotional breadth.
 - 3. Emotional strength.
 - B. Temperamental types.
 - C. Emotional stability.
- III. Traits—the behavioral dimension. (Generalized tendencies toward action.)
 - A. Introversion-extraversion.
 - B. Ascendance-submission.
 - C. Persistence.
- IV. Attitudes—the subjective or verbal dimension.
 - A. Specific interests.
 - B. General value attitudes.
 - C. Radical and reactionary attitudes.
- V. The ego or self—the most-generalized statement of personality.
 - A. The ego as the central core of personality.
 - B. The level of aspiration.
 - C. Insight or self-objectification.

the behavioral dimension; (4) attitudes, the ideational dimension; and (5) self or ego, the central core of personality. These aspects of personality will be broken down into more specific characteristics and will be discussed in relation to experimental findings.

CAPACITIES

Limitations are obviously set to men's performances by their physical structures and the chemical functioning of their endocrine glands. The great majority of human beings are in-

capable of running a hundred yards in ten seconds no matter how carefully they may be trained in the art of sprinting. Similarly, the feeble-minded can never be taught the intricacies of symbolic logic. Capacity in relation to personality means the limiting physical characteristics of the individual, chiefly his nervous structures. Capacity, though determined early in life by the nervous system, is not the simple resultant of inheritance. The genes, the carriers of heredity, and physical environmental forces interact in the process of growth to make men what they are. Notwithstanding the imperviousness of capacities to training, they are not so rigidly set as to be unmodifiable. Changes in body chemistry can change capacity—instance the improvement in the feeble-minded cretin when fed thyroid extract. Capacities may be broken down into two subgroups: *aptitude*, or the skills of the individual, and *motility*, his simple motor characteristics.

Aptitude

Aptitude refers to the skills and abilities of the individual which are determined early in life. Aptitude may refer either to a person's general intelligence or to his special gifts, either of an intellectual or of a motor nature. What is ordinarily called artistic talent, native shrewdness, or mechanical skill would come under the rubric of aptitude. A person's achievements in life, or his emotional characteristics, are excluded from this category. Aptitude is not measured by socially recognized success, but by what the individual can do, if and when he wants to. Intelligence as the most important and generalized aptitude deserves special mention.

Intelligence. Intelligence is generally defined as the ability of the individual to adjust to new problems and conditions of life. The truth in this definition is obscured by the difficult concept of adjustment. Adjustment really involves both intellectual and emotional factors. Moreover, the problems in life to which we try to adjust generally arise out of our social environment. Now, the social environment consists largely in

our reactions to one another. Hence it is constantly changing, and our very act of adapting or failing to adjust alters the social environment. The genius who refuses to adjust to the ideas of his time may by this act start social changes which result in the adoption of his so-called maladjusted attitudes years after his death.*

If we omit the broad sociological notion of adjustment, intelligence can be defined as the learning and thinking abilities of the individual. The intelligent individual can learn more quickly and can solve more difficult problems than the unintelligent individual. The traditional intelligence tests do not measure all phases of intelligence. They are limited to testing the ability to manipulate the language materials of the school-room and hence are more properly called *scholastic aptitude tests*. Our present tests of scholastic aptitude derive from the work of Binet, who after much trial-and-error experimentation produced a successful scale in 1905. Binet's success was largely due to his discovery of an objective criterion against which his test could be checked. This criterion was the differences in ages of a group of children. Obviously, as children grow older they develop mentally. The problem, then, was to correlate the age differences with the differences in performance in scholastic tricks. The norm for a given age level was what the average child of that age could do.

Revisions of the Binet scale have been widely used in the United States. The average performances for the different age levels are the basis for calculating the intelligence quotient, or I. Q. The child is credited with a mental age of ten if he can equal the performance of the average ten-year-old. The I. Q. is the relation between his chronological age and his mental age. It is found by dividing the mental age by the chronological age and multiplying the quotient by 100, so that it is stated in whole numbers. If a child of ten has a mental age of twelve, his

* George Bernard Shaw has summed up the matter neatly in his statement: "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man."

I. Q. would be 120. Terman has suggested the following interpretation of intelligence quotients:

I. Q.	INTERPRETATION
Above 140	"Near" genius or genius
120-140	Very superior intelligence
110-120	Superior intelligence
90-110	Normal or average intelligence
80- 90	Dullness
70- 80	Borderline deficiency
50- 70	Moron
20- 50	Imbecile
0- 20	Idiot

The nature of the stunts in the scholastic aptitude tests is well known to most American college students. In the 1937 *Stanford Revision* the tests for the sixth and fourteenth years are as follows:

Sixth Year (6 tests, 2 months' credit each).

1. Vocabulary.
2. By imitation strings beads in certain order.
3. Tells missing parts of mutilated pictures.
4. Picks up requested number of blocks.
5. Selects unlike picture from several.
6. Traces a maze.

Fourteenth Year.

1. Vocabulary.
2. Discovers the rule followed in a series of paper foldings.
3. Points out absurdities in picture.
4. Ingenuity: solves problems.
5. Directional orientation.
6. Meaning of abstract words.

When the student grasps the significance of the construction and nature of the scholastic aptitude test, he will realize that it was designed to function as a means of differentiating children who have a common scholastic background. The tests have little meaning when they are used to compare children whose cultural backgrounds vary widely. Nor are the tests applicable for comparing adults on anything but schoolroom abilities. There is a patent absurdity in the widely accepted generaliza-

tion that the mentality of the average individual in the United States is that of a child of thirteen and a half years. This statement is based upon the fact that the army recruits in the World War, on the average, did no better on a test of scholastic aptitude than the thirteen-year-old child. Since most of the soldiers left school before they were fourteen, since they had been out of school for a number of years, and since their mental abilities had been addressed to other problems than those of the schoolroom, it is natural that they did no better on tests designed to differentiate school children.

Another widely accepted generalization based on test results is that mental growth stops somewhere between fourteen and sixteen years. This is really a statement of the limitation of the tests. Once people leave school, there is no longer a common background against which their abilities can be compared. Their subsequent mental development expresses itself in earning a living, in marriage, and in other social relations. To say that their mental development stops because they do not grow increasingly adept at the arithmetic and language problems of the grammar school is to forget that the four walls of the schoolroom do not include all there is of life.

The elaborate attempts to establish innate differences between races and between classes by scholastic aptitude tests overlook the essential nature of these tests. Before children of different national groups can be properly compared, it is necessary to equate their environmental backgrounds. Children who come from homes where they receive better training in the use of language materials are at an advantage in taking the tests.

An old popular belief concerning superior mental ability has been exploded by the studies of Terman and his associates (34). This belief had it that the brilliant child was compensating for physical and social inferiority. Though compensation does occur in some cases, in general, gifted children do not show this process. One thousand children with I. Q's above 130 were selected for study. These mentally gifted children showed an all-around superiority. Taken as a group they were ahead of the average child in physique and in health. They were

superior to normal children in emotional stability. They exhibited more play interests, more hobbies, more enthusiasms. They occupied positions of leadership more often than the normal child. They read more and they read better books than other children. In fact, the typical gifted child of seven years reads more books than any average child under fifteen. These gifted children were again studied after a period of seven years and the results confirmed the early findings. They still maintained their all-around superiority.

Tests of scholastic aptitudes show that the ability to deal with language materials is fairly well generalized. Scholastic aptitude is not a composite of independent, unrelated mental functions. Subjects who do well in one part of a test, say arithmetic problems, generally do well in other parts which may involve rearranging sentences or completing analogies. "The best evidence for a conspicuous and central intellectual factor," writes L. L. Thurstone, "is that if you make a list of stunts, as varied as you please, which all satisfy the common sense criterion that the subjects must be smart, clever, intelligent to do the stunts well, and that good performance does not depend primarily upon muscular strength or skill or upon other non-intellectual powers, then the interstunt correlations will all be positive. It is quite difficult to find a pair of stunts, both of which call for what would be called intelligence, as judged by common sense, which have a negative correlation" (35, p. 3).

Motility

Capacity and aptitude are general terms which apply to the individual's abilities in any field of endeavor. Motility is a more limited term which refers only to the motor characteristics of a person. Motility, also, describes functioning rather than structure. Under the heading of motility are included a person's reaction time, his motor coordination, and his speed of movement. Here, too, would come a consideration of his general level of activity. Some people are always on the go. These everlastingly active creatures we call *hyperkinetic*. Other

individuals in contrast are placid. They stay put, and it requires unusual stimulation to move them. They are called *hypokinetic*. Under motility it is also possible to consider impulsion and inhibition. In some individuals stimulation seems to flow over into motor activity very readily. They act first and think afterward. Other people are just as sensitive to stimulation but they are blocked or inhibited in expression. The inhibited type is not the same as the hypokinetic type. The latter is not easily aroused; the former is excitable, but the excitement is a matter of internal commotion rather than gross motor activity.

An ingenious attempt to measure characteristics of motility appeared in the Downey Will-Temperament test. Unfortunately too much was claimed for the test as a diagnostic instrument of emotional temperament, but it does contain specific devices which have not been fully exploited in the measurement of motility. For example, *speed of decision* is tested by presenting the subject with twenty-two pairs of opposite traits and by asking him to select a trait in each pair which applies to himself. *Speed of movement* is determined by instructing the subject to write the words "United States of America" at his ordinary speed. In a test of *motor impulsion* the subject writes his name under various conditions: first, in his usual manner; second, with his eyes closed; third, with his eyes open and while counting by threes; and fourth, with his eyes open while counting by twos. The theory here is that the impulsive person tends to write larger and more rapidly under conditions of distraction. In a test of *motor inhibition* the subject is instructed to write "United States of America" as slowly as possible. In all, the Will-Temperament scale has twelve subtests, but they have not proved useful because they have tried to cover too many aspects of motility and temperament. Hence, their intercorrelation and reliability have been low. Nevertheless, people can identify acquaintances on the basis of their scores on the Will-Temperament test with greater than chance success. In one experiment 12 judges were given the scores of 12 subjects and were asked to identify the scores. "The percentage of successes

for the total of 144 judgments (12 judgments by each of the 12 judges) was 22, where chance success would be less than 10 per cent" (9).

TEMPERAMENT

The general term for summing up the individual's characteristic emotional states is *temperament*. Sentiment describes emotional organization as it is related to specific stimuli. Temperament covers all phases of emotionality in the individual. F. H. Allport distinguishes three dimensions in emotional life (2). One dimension is *emotional frequency and change*. Does the individual maintain the same high emotional pitch for a long period of time? Or does he rapidly calm down to a neutral condition? Does he alternate between states of elation and depression? A second dimension is *emotional breadth*. How wide a range of stimulating objects and situations will set off emotional responses in a given personality? Some people have a low autonomic threshold and are thrown into a state of excitement by any intense stimulus or by any stimulus remotely resembling the conditions of a previous emotional experience. These individuals are greatly handicapped in life in comparison with the people who have their viscera well under control. *Emotional strength*, the third dimension, describes the depth of the affective experience. People differ in the profundity of their emotions. The man who is rarely moved by exasperating or dangerous situations may show deep internal upset when he is aroused. And there are individuals whose emotions are so intense and so frequent that "they live at the mercy of their diaphragms." *Characteristic mood* may also be considered as an aspect of temperament. A mild emotional state may be almost a permanent characteristic of an individual. The jolly person, the gloom monger, and the timid Mr. Milquetoast are well-known examples. Often the individual's mood is perpetuated by its social reflection. Only gloom and despair are expected of the man who has that kind of reputation, and he finds it difficult not to fulfill people's expectations.

A modern attempt to summarize the temperamental dimen-

sions of the individual as personality types has been plausibly presented by the psychiatrist Kretschmer (22). From his studies with the insane, Kretschmer contends that there are two basic types of emotional organization which can be found to some degree even among normal people. The *cyclothymic* temperament shows a high degree of emotional change and frequency. Cycloids fluctuate in emotional mood and are easily elated and easily depressed. Their emotional life is directed outward. In his pleasant states, the cycloid is cheerful, sociable, and friendly. He is the likable type, since even his unpleasant emotions are readily expressed and hence are understandable. The *schizophrenic* temperament, on the other hand, reveals few observable fluctuations in mood. The emotions of the schizoid, however, are more intense, though the casual observer misses this depth of feeling. The schizoid keeps his emotions to himself. His reserve may cloak his sensitivity. He is not understood and, therefore, is not popular.

The cyclothymic and schizophrenic temperaments represent statistical rather than actual personality types. Most people are varying mixtures of these temperamental factors. Kretschmer has attempted to identify temperament with physique. The tall, thin person with poorly developed muscles and with a narrow chest is the schizoid.* The heavier, shorter, rounded physique is associated with the cyclothymic temperament. Careful studies of this assumed relationship between body build and temperamental type indicate a gross oversimplification in Kretschmer's theory. In their experimental test of the theory, O. Klineberg, S. E. Asch, and H. Block obtained negative results when they compared actual physical measurements with personality measurements (21). Most people do not fit into rigid types according to physique any more than they do according to temperament. Furthermore, the statistical association between physical characteristics and emotional charac-

* Kretschmer has two additional types of physique which are associated with the schizophrenic temperament: the *athletic* and the *dysplastic*. The *athletic* follows the build described above but is more heavily muscled. The *dysplastic* includes abnormal types of physique.

teristics is too complicated by other relationships to bear out Kretschmer's hypothesis.

Emotional Stability

A great deal of the research upon the temperamental phases of personality has been from the practical point of view of measuring *emotional stability*. Normal people differ in their tendencies toward breakdown and mental disorder. Though everyone will lose his emotional balance under sufficiently trying conditions, some persons will go under at the first real crisis whereas others will maintain their sanity through a series of severe mental shocks. It is important to know about the relative instability of people in order to help the more unstable.

The Psycho-Neurotic Inventory, first developed by Woodworth, has been widely used as an index of emotional maladjustment (see page 408). It has been revised, standardized, and made internally consistent by L. L. Thurstone and T. G. Thurstone (36). In an empirical test of the validity of the Thurstone Inventory J. V. Hanna compared the scores made on the test with the clinical records of students who had come to the psychological clinic for assistance (15). On the basis of case-history material and clinical observation, 98 of the subjects were adjudged clearly maladjusted, and the remaining 81 not maladjusted but showing minor symptoms. The scores of these two groups on the Thurstone Inventory follow:

THURSTONE SCORE RANGE	98 MALADJUSTED CASES Per Cent	81 NON-MALADJUSTED Per Cent
0-29 (lowest quartile)	7	33
30-74 (middle quartiles)	54	55
75-180 (highest quartile)	39	12

The scores of maladjusted groups were also compared with their degree of maladjustment as determined by the rating of three judges. Each judge rated every case on a five-point scale. The comparison between their scores on the Inventory and the ratings of the judges follow (each case appears three

times in whatever category or categories it was assigned by the judges):

RATING	NUMBER OF CASES	AVERAGE THURSTONE SCORE
1 (Least maladjusted)	33	44.2
2	51	61.0
3	52	64.4
4	66	70.1
5 (Most maladjusted)	92	75.4

Hanna's data demonstrate the usefulness of the Psycho-Neurotic Inventory in indicating degrees of maladjustment. It must not be inferred, however, that because subjects who make high scores are maladjusted, low scores mean lack of maladjustment. If the individual is on the defensive and wants to make a low neurotic score, it is not difficult for him to do so. Thus the Inventory is helpful in finding students in need of clinical advice and aid, but it does not detect all cases of maladjustment. The test will work best when the people who are taking it are convinced that they have more to gain than to lose by being frank.

The emotional maladjustment which the Psycho-Neurotic Inventory measures is not identical with social maladjustment. Emotional instability may grow out of failure to adjust socially, but the struggle against the social world must be internalized before neurotic tendencies are in evidence. H. J. P. Schubert and M. E. Wagner studied the emotional instability of a group of transient boys as compared with a group of high-school boys of the same age (31). They employed an adapted form of the Woodworth Inventory and found that the *transients had lower neurotic scores than the high-school students*. The high-school students were more frequently troubled by feelings of physical ill-being and of depression and the transients by feelings of worry about their families.

The relation of neuroticism to family background appears in the correlations found between the personality characteristics of parents and children. M. N. Crook found that there was a marked tendency for daughters to make neurotic scores on the

Bernreuter Inventory comparable to the scores made by their mothers (8). The correlation for 73 mother-daughter pairs was 0.63. The relationship between mother and son in neuroticism was positive but not as high (a correlation of 0.32). The emotional instability of the father evidently has less influence upon the children than that of the mother, for the correlation coefficients between father and son on neurotic scores was 0.06 and between father and daughter 0.24. Intrafamily relationships between other personality characteristics were studied, and in general the father influenced his daughter more than his son, though the mother's personality was of more importance than that of the father upon children of either sex.

TRAITS

The great bulk of the experimental and testing work in the field of personality has been concerned with traits. A trait has been defined by F. H. Allport as a group of characteristic reactions which reveal a typical adjustment of the individual to his environment (2). Attitudes may be specific or general, but traits are always *generalized tendencies toward action*. A trait, moreover, has no clearly defined object of reference. Though arising in adjustments to specific problems it becomes so deeply internalized in the individual that it appears in both appropriate and inappropriate situations. Trait, therefore, is a concept peculiar to the field of personality. We cannot talk meaningfully about traits without reference to individuals.

A trait is so generalized and personal a characteristic that it may even be regarded as a quality of behavior. This quality we see in many actions of a man and therefore we abstract it from its particular contexts and call it a trait. Shyness, talkativeness, or introversion, for example, are not names for definite actions. They are terms for describing how a person behaves. The neural correlate for the individual's fundamental way of responding is not known. Some writers have postulated as the basis for the trait a neural organization which has both a directing and motivating force for conduct. G. W. Allport

contends that the trait is functionally autonomous, i.e., that it furnishes its own source of power (5). According to this view we need look no further for accounting for an individual's actions than his basic traits. This is similar to the doctrine of the force of habit (see pages 256-262), and it involves the same error. From the scientific point of view the trait is not a free agent in an otherwise determined world. It is true that the specific genetic origin of the trait is no longer its source of motivation, but the inference is not correct that it is, therefore, autonomous. It is either cross-conditioned to many constant background stimuli, or it is conditioned to the thousands of temporary stimuli which activate the individual in his daily activities. On the interpretative level of understanding a person, however, traits are all-important and their motivating conditions of minor significance. Nevertheless we should not assert the complete independence of traits from the dynamics of the adjustment process merely because we are interested primarily in traits. Many traits of personality might be described, but we shall discuss here the following three which have been the subject of quantitative study: (a) introversion-extraversion, (b) ascendance-submission, and (c) perseverance.

(a) Introversion-Extraversion

Kretschmer's division of people into cycloids and schizoids derives from Jung's description of introversion-extraversion. Jung characterized people as extraverts or introverts according to whether their fundamental interest was directed outward toward the objective world or inward upon themselves (20). The introverted personality meets life's problems by turning from active participation in the objective world to an inner world of thought and phantasy. The extraverted personality turns from introspective consideration of his problems to overt action. This classification is thus definitely related to the popular discrimination between the practical man of action and the idealistic visionary. Extraversion implies further that the individual is thick-skinned and relatively insensitive to the

opinion of others, spontaneous in emotional expression, impersonal in argument, not deeply affected by his failures, and not given to self-analysis and self-criticism. Introversion, on the other hand, connotes sensitiveness to criticism, inhibition of emotional expression, personalization in discussion, magnification of failures, and a great deal of self-analysis and self-criticism.

A review of the studies in this field (J. P. Guilford and K. Braly) shows that three main conceptions of introversion-extraversion have been emphasized by various writers (13). One conception stresses the direction of interest of the individual, that is, whether the individual is self-centered or interested in the world around him. The second view refers to the ease of social adjustment. The extravert adjusts to social situations more readily than the introvert. The third notion is concerned with the emotionality of the individual. The introvert expresses his emotions less freely than the extravert, and this inhibition or blocking makes the introvert more sensitive emotionally to a wide range of stimuli. These three concepts are not mutually exclusive. Rather they supplement one another to make up the final generalization known as introversion-extraversion by describing its intellectual, social, and emotional aspects. Statistical evidence presented by J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford confirms this descriptive analysis (14). These investigators studied the responses made to the items in various tests of introversion-extraversion and found that the responses fell into a number of fairly distinctive groupings. The two more important of these groupings corresponded to the social and emotional aspects of introversion-extraversion described above.

Introversion and extraversion are not to be regarded as distinctive types of personality into which all human beings can be classed. Introversion and extraversion are qualities of behavior which people show in varying degrees. Furthermore, almost all persons possess both introvertive and extravertive characteristics. The majority are *ambiverts*, who show a preponderance of neither introvertive nor extravertive mechanisms.

Evidence for this view appears in Table VII, in which the results of applying the Heidbreder test to 200 college students are plotted (16). The distribution curve is normal, with the majority of the students falling in the middle categories. Moreover, the curve shows no clear breaks which would justify the

TABLE VII

DISTRIBUTION OF EXTRAVERSION-INTROVERSION SCORES AMONG A GROUP OF TWO HUNDRED COLLEGE STUDENTS

Class Intervals			Self Ratings		Associates' Ratings	
			No.	Per cent	No.	Per cent
+20	.	+24	1	0.50		
+15	.	+19	4	2.00	3	0.75
+10	.	+14	8	4.00	6	1.50
+5	.	+9	12	6.00	19	4.75
0	.	+4	19	9.50	43	10.75
-1	.	-5	27	13.50	43	10.75
-6	.	-10	40	20.00	68	17.00
-11	.	-15	28	14.00	57	14.25
-16	.	-20	34	17.00	72	18.00
-21	.	-25	16	8.00	50	12.50
-26	.	-30	7	3.50	28	7.00
-31	.	-35	3	1.50	6	1.50
-36	.	-40	1	0.50	4	1.00
-41	.	-45			1	0.25
Total			200	100.00	400	100.00

A high positive score indicates introversion, a high negative score extraversion. From E. Heidbreder (16).

interpretation of introversion or extraversion as types. The Heidbreder test is a questionnaire inventory which has been standardized and validated to some degree. The twelve most diagnostic items in the scale follow (a positive answer indicates introversion, a negative answer extraversion):

1. Limits his acquaintances to a select few.
2. Feels hurt readily: apparently sensitive about remarks or actions which have reference to himself.
3. Is suspicious of the motives of others.
4. Worries over possible misfortunes.
5. Indulges in self-pity when things go wrong.

6. Gets rattled easily; loses his head in excitement or moments of stress.
7. Keeps in the background on social occasions; avoids leadership at social affairs and entertainments.
8. Is critical of others.
9. Prefers to work alone rather than with people; prefers to work at tasks that do not bring him into contact with people.
10. Has ups and downs in mood without apparent cause.
11. Is meticulous; is extremely neat about his dress and painstaking about his personal property.
12. Blushes frequently; is self-conscious.

Psychological Mechanisms in Introversion-Extraversion. The degree to which an individual is introverted or extraverted is a matter of his specific developmental history. E. B. Holt has explained introversion-extraversion genetically on the basis of his description of the development of behavior in the individual. In this process, it will be recalled, two basic reactions can be observed: *adient* responses and *avoidant* responses. Whereas adient responses give the organism more of the stimulus and are outgoing, inquiring, and grasping in nature, avoidant responses take the organism away from the stimulus.

These two basic types of reaction are the clue to extraversion-introversion. The introverted character is the sensitive organism that has developed many avoiding reactions in comparison to the extravert. Extreme introverts shrink or withdraw from stimulation to which the normal person has only approaching or adient responses. The extreme extravert (Holt calls this type the aggressive character) has many outgoing or adient responses. He meets obstacles by a direct frontal attack. When confronted by problems that cannot be demolished by sheer aggression, he is incapable of solving them. On the other hand, the introvert falls back upon imaginal processes when he meets problems. Implicit responses or ideas take the place of overt activity. Hence the introvert may become the thoughtful, imaginative individual. Frequently, however, he does not compare his ideas sufficiently with the realities they symbolize to make him an objective thinker. Thus poetic and artistic activity have a great appeal for the introvert. And if his in-

troversion is very extreme, he may lose complete contact with reality and think only in terms of the phantasy of the mentally disordered patient.

Whether a stimulus is sufficiently intense to produce an avoidance response depends upon the physiological make-up and experience of the organism. A given form of stimulation which is overstrong for a child of nine months may be mild for a child of three years. Introverted habits of withdrawal and avoidance can develop in the child, through contact with a harsh and rigorous environment with which it is unable to cope. From the blows and scorn of older and stronger children the child may withdraw within himself and construct a dream world of imaginative play. Nutritional and glandular factors which contribute to the structural development of the organism also help to determine the degree of sensitivity of the child to various types of stimulation.

This developmental view of introversion-extraversion helps us to understand the different forms which introversion assumes in different individuals. If the intense stimulation which produces avoidance in the child is predominantly social, that is to say punishment by people, the child's subsequent shrinking from stimulation may be largely a withdrawal from social situations. As an adult he may find difficulty in adjusting socially, but he is not necessarily introverted in respect to the non-social environment. Inventors and scientists often represent this type of introversion. Since the non-social and the social environments are so closely related, however, the more usual occurrence is an avoidance of all reality whether social or non-social.

The results of tests of introversion-extraversion confirm the description of this trait as an avoidant or adient orientation toward one's environment. A number of investigators have found that physical handicaps are associated with introversion more frequently than with extraversion. Thus H. H. Welles reports that the partially deaf are more significantly introverted than their hearing friends (41); and T. C. Hewlett and O. P. Lester found that poor medical history and present physi-

cal handicaps are related to introversion (17). The physically weak or crippled child is limited in the exploration and manipulation of his environment. Thwarted more often than his physically normal brother, the handicapped child tends toward the construction of an inner world of the imagination.

A related finding is the picture of the early development of introverts and extraverts in the study of Wang (40). The personal histories of students making high introverted scores and high extraverted scores on tests were compared. The following facts were found to be true of the childhood of many introverts but of very few extraverts:

- Having no, or just one or two playmates.
- Indulging in social amusements only when urged.
- Participating in games only when asked, or practically never.
- Having only a few intimate friends among own sex.
- Having practically no friends among opposite sex.
- Going to shows alone for recreation.

The greater sensitivity of introverted children to criticism appears in the interesting experiment of G. Forlano and H. C. Axelrod (12). These experimenters divided the pupils of four fifth-grade classes in a New York City school into extraverts and introverts on the basis of their scores on the Pintner inventory of extraversion. The classes were given a cancellation test, and each pupil was called to the teacher's desk to receive a mark. In one class all the introverts were told their work was poor and the extraverts were told their work was good. In the second class the introverts were praised and the extraverts censured. In the third class some introverts were praised and some were criticized and some extraverts were praised and some were criticized. The fourth class constituted the control group. After the first test, the students were given a second cancellation problem. Again they were praised or censured. Then a third cancellation test was administered.

The introverts showed a greater increment in performance than did the extraverts after both groups had been blamed the first time. The repeated applications of censure, however, produced greater activity among the extraverts than the introverts.

The greater sensitivity of the introvert made him more responsive to criticism, but under continued criticism he became discouraged. On the other hand, a single application of praise affected the extraverts more than the introverts. But under repeated praise the introverts surpassed the extraverts.

If introversion makes for withdrawal from the real world, we should expect to find that introverts seek activities which bring them into the least contact with the harsh realities of existence. Studies of interest and vocational preferences show just this tendency. One investigation indicates a greater introverted trend among literature majors in college and a greater extraverted trend among science majors. Another study reports that introverted students are more interested in journalism, literary pursuits, and medicine; while extraverted students are more interested in engineering, law, and architecture (Oliver, 25). Occupational groups, when tested, also show slight differences in introversion-extraversion scores. Thus executives, foremen, policemen, and salesgirls were in general on the extraverted side of the scale, whereas clerical workers, accountants, research engineers, and teachers were on the introverted side (Laird, 23; Pechstein, 28; and Trabue, 37).

Ascendancy-Submission

The popular division of mankind into leaders and followers has a factual basis, but it is in need of further psychological analysis. Leadership can be either *institutional* or *personal*. *Institutional* leadership refers to the control of people by a leader through his official position of authority or his superior social status. Almost everyone has conditioned responses of obedience and deference to the external signs and symbols of office. The judge's robe compels respect even though we know nothing of the man whom it cloaks.

Personal leadership, on the other hand, means the domination and control of people in face-to-face situations through the greater aggressiveness, ability, or physical superiority of the leader. Such personal leadership has been called *ascendancy* by F. H. Allport, who gives this description of it: "If two per-

sons of equal status come into a face-to-face relation, and if the behavior of each is a response solely to the immediate behavior of the other, there generally results a conflict, genuine though often unconscious. . . . One is likely to become the master; his impulse dominates. The other yields and adjusts his behavior to the control of the first. The former personality we may call *ascendant*, the latter *submissive*" (2, p. 119).*

Ascendance-submission is another way of describing much the same behavior covered by the notion of introversion-extraversion. But while the purpose of introversion-extraversion is to characterize individuals by their manner of meeting their problems, ascendance-submission emphasizes the way in which individuals deal with their fellows. Psychologically, extraversion is a *general adient* orientation toward the environment. Ascendance is that specific form of adience which is directed toward the domination of people. The relationship between ascendance and extraversion is indicated by the correlation of 0.39 which I. E. Bender found between scores made on the Allport ascendance scale and scores made on the Heidbreder introversion inventory (6). This correlation, though not high, is as great as the correlation generally found between two introversion tests.

The Pecking Order. Ascendance-submission is so fundamental and elementary a behavior relationship that it has been observed among many animals. The relationship in a group of animals produces a hierarchy of rank called the *pecking*

*The following specific description of ascendance-submission is furnished in *Experimental Social Psychology* in the review of Eisenberg's study of dominance feeling: "Individuals in the top 10 per cent in dominance feeling tended to come late for their appointments, enter the room without knocking, sit with their feet apart, maintain an even tone of voice, work rapidly at a variety of tasks, offer criticisms of the experiment, accept and smoke cigarettes, look steadily at the experimenter; those at the low end of the distribution came early for the appointment, knocked before entering, made sure they were in the right place, hesitated, stammered or blushed in speaking to the experimenter, worked slowly and cautiously at the tasks, refrained from criticism, refrained from looking the experimenter in the eye, became confused when given a difficult task under distraction and tried to slip out at the end without comment or question on the procedure" (p. 809).

order. Thus Schjelderup-Ebbe has observed a well-defined rank order among various species of birds. One bird will regularly peck another which submits to this domination. The latter bird in turn will dominate a third animal, and the third animal will be ascendant over a fourth. This pecking order can be readily observed among a pack of dogs. After a series of fights one dog will establish his leadership and will have first chance at food thrown to the pack. The other dogs will have a definite ranking in the order in which they follow the leader. Let a new dog be introduced into the pack and the fighting will be resumed until the newcomer establishes his place in the hierarchy.

Schjelderup-Ebbe has many interesting observations of despotism among birds. A bird which is low in the pecking order is often a more severe despot over his few subordinates than a bird higher in the pecking order. "It seems as if the bird which is a despot over only a few shows its annoyance at the pecks to which it itself is exposed by especially furious pecking, while the birds which range high in the pecking order, and so are seldom pecked, are more reasonable" (30).

Sometimes a revolt occurs on the part of the subordinate against the despot. It is seldom successful since the despot fights with more than usual energy to keep his precedence and the subordinate's confidence is undermined by memory of his previous defeat and period of submission.

Another experimental animal study of ascendancy-submission is that of A. H. Maslow (24). A limited food supply was presented to each of fifteen pairs of previously unacquainted monkeys. The percentage of the food obtained by each animal over a period of thirty such presentations was taken as a measure of dominance. Other forms of social behavior were found to go together with this measure of food behavior. Regardless of gender, the dominant animal played the masculine role in sex activity, initiated fighting and play, and was more active. The submissive animal played the feminine role in sex activity and responded to the aggressive behavior of the ascendant animal by passivity, cringing, or flight.

Ascendance-submission appears among humans at a very early age. M. B. Parten studied the play activities of nursery school children and found ascendant and submissive traits appearing consistently in the same individuals (27). Her study also shows the methods employed by these youthful personal leaders. Some children control their playmates by diplomacy, i.e., by artful and indirect suggestions. Others boss their companions by "bullying" or by physical force. As the personnel of the groupings of children changes, shifts occur in the ascendant-submissive relationships. A child submissive in one group may be the leader in another. Often a child learns the technique of leadership through being the follower of a forceful leader.

Although ascendance is a relationship between persons, its development is aided by the skill and competence of the child in manipulating objects. This principle has been demonstrated by L. M. Jack in an experimental modification of social behavior, and Jack's results have been confirmed by M. L. Page. In Jack's study preschool children were paired in an experimental situation in which the two children were allowed to play for five minutes at a sand box containing three sets of toys (19). Their behavior, as they attempted to secure the play materials, was carefully observed and recorded, and ascendance scores were computed. Then the five children with the lowest ascendance scores were trained individually in the use of the three types of play materials. After the training they were paired with ascendant children. Four out of the five subjects improved in their ability to look after themselves as a result of their increasing familiarity with the play materials, whereas a control group, who had not been trained, showed virtually no increase in ascendance. In an extension of this type of experiment M. L. Page has obtained similar results (26). Children trained in handling toys and manipulating objects improved their average score from 16.7 to 28.8, whereas non-trained subjects suffered a loss in mean score.

A number of writers, including H. H. Anderson and P. Pigors, have argued for differentiating between dominance and

leadership on the ground that leadership integrates the needs and wishes of the group and dominance is control of the master-slave sort. This distinction is sound, but the term ascendance can be retained to cover control whether it is achieved by bullying or by integration. Thus far, however, the experiments cited have not emphasized leadership through integration. Adelberg's study of a group of twenty children ranging from three years to six and a half years illustrates integrative leadership (1). In this group one boy of four years and ten months stood out as the recognized leader. More of his plans were accepted than those of any other child. Other boys came to the fore from time to time but they never lasted. The secret of the real leader's success was that his suggestions summed up the needs of the group so well, it seemed as if they were really made by the group. An important phase of ascendance over a group, therefore, is *conformity with the main tendencies of the group*.

Factors Related to Ascendance. An analysis of the factors in face-to-face or personal leadership was made by W. H. Cowley on the basis of a comparison of three groups of leaders with three groups of followers (7). Criminal leaders, student leaders, and non-commissioned army officers were given the same tests as criminal followers, student followers, and privates in the United States army. The following characteristics were common to all three groups of leaders: self-confidence, speed of decision, and finality of judgment. In other words, ascendant personalities tend to believe in themselves, to make up their minds quickly, and to hold to their decisions. The significance of this study is that it shows that personal leadership does not depend entirely upon the nature of the group in which it appears. Leaders selected from different social groupings possessed traits in common.

The Situational Basis of Face-to-Face Leadership

The studies cited above indicate that ascendance and submission are characteristic and consistent traits of the personality. This does not warrant the assumption that the situation has

no effect upon face-to-face leadership. Ascendance and submission are built up as responses to human beings as stimuli. Since human beings are such variable stimuli, an ascendant or submissive orientation toward them will be relatively rather than absolutely consistent. Specific aspects of the situation will frequently upset our prediction of an individual's actions, if the prediction is based solely upon his generalized habits. An ordinarily submissive individual may become highly aggressive if some deep interest or some streak of personal vanity is touched. The situational basis of ascendance is well illustrated in Winkler-Hermaden's study of the evolution of leadership (42). Between the ages of 12 and 14 years the popular leader was found to be the *despot*, the individual of domineering qualities. Between 14 and 16 years, leadership shifted to the *pedagogue*, the person capable of understanding problems. From 16 to 18 years another shift occurs, this time to the *apostle*, the person who appeals to the ideals of late adolescence.

Persistence

The quality of carrying a task through to its completion is sufficiently generalized in many individuals to warrant its inclusion as a personality trait. In the words of G. W. Allport: "One of the commonest characterizations of people is in terms of their characteristic level of perseverance. This person, we say, is tenacious, resolute, pertinacious, dogged, or steadfast with 'grit' or marked strength of will; another, we say, is inconstant, irresolute, fluctuating, capricious, an opportunist, easily deflected from his chosen course" (5, p. 416). Predictions made from the scholastic aptitude scores sometimes are upset by dull students who work hard and bright students who do not apply themselves. Next to talent itself, persistence is the most important personal factor in practical success.

Persistence is a more general term than *perseveration*, which has been used in experimental psychology. Perseveration refers to the tendency of a single activity to repeat itself or to complete itself. It was ushered into psychology by G. E. Müller who noticed how nonsense syllables which he had pre-

viously learned intruded themselves in a new series he was attempting to learn. Müller related this perseverative tendency to the more dynamic function of persistence. Persistence, however, involves continuous application of efforts in complex performance toward a definite goal.

A simple test of persistence was devised by Fernald, who measured the length of time the subject could stand on tiptoes with heels an eighth of an inch or more from the floor. Apparatus was constructed to make the measurement precise. Fernald found this test highly differentiating between reformatory prisoners and normal subjects. The median time of the normal group was more than double that of the reformatory group. Similar tests of physical endurance, carried out by Bronner on delinquent girls and college women, have yielded comparable results. Only three out of twenty-six delinquent girls exceeded or attained the median score of the college group. These findings do not conclusively establish lack of persistence as a correlate of delinquency. Reformatory inmates may not cooperate with the experimenter for the same reason that they do not conform to legal rules. The crucial test would be to measure their persistence in breaking rules.

In a series of tests T. H. Howells found that persistence was only slightly correlated with intelligence, but its correlation with grades in college courses was 0.44 (18). Howells' technique consisted in testing the ability of his subjects to withstand pain. In one situation a wooden peg was placed against the palm of the hand and the pressure constantly increased. In another situation the hand was exposed to an electric toaster. In still another situation an edged instrument was pressed against the thumb. After a series of such tests the subjects were given an opportunity to increase their scores by undergoing further electric shock. The reliability of this battery of tests was high. Howells also gave his subjects a chance to raise or lower their scores by gambling on the toss of a coin. The more persistent individuals were less inclined to gamble than the less persistent individuals. In other words, the person who would endure pain to attain a high score would not take

a chance on the toss of a coin. The less intelligent among the subjects were the individuals who were willing to gamble. Another interesting finding was the positive correlation between radicalism and persistence.

ATTITUDES

The definitions of the term attitude are more numerous than those of the word personality, itself. This is due to the lack of scientific knowledge about the subjective states to which attitude refers. Though we all seem to know what is meant by an attitude of mind, as, for example, a derisive attitude, or a snobbish attitude, we experience difficulty in arriving at a precise definition. The old notion of attitude as a *mental state of preparation for action* was discarded by the behaviorists because of the non-objective character of a mental state. They substituted the meaning that attitude is a *motor set of the body*. Their favorite example is that of the crouching runner all set to spring when the starting gun barks. Yet this obvious case of motor readiness seems far removed from such social attitudes as radicalism and conservatism. Many attitudes show no clearly observable muscular tensions by which they can be differentiated from one another. Moreover, the idea of attitude implies more than a set to respond to a specific stimulus. It implies an orientation toward the world—an orientation which can be adapted to more than one situation. The concept of attitude is a way of taking into account the directive and dynamic phases of the human mind. The mind is not an automatic reflection of its environment, but an active agent which goes out to meet the world and to transform it. An eclectic definition of attitude summing up these various factors has been offered by G. W. Allport. "An attitude," he writes, "is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related" (4, p. 810).

Though attitudes are determining tendencies they are not synonymous with motives. In considering motivation, refer-

ence must always be made to the objective sources of the drive as well as the direction of the activity. In describing attitudes the main concern is with the expressed opinion or action, not with the bodily tension from which it derives its stimulating energy. The child complaining of a playmate who does not like him is describing his playmate's attitude. The driving cause for this dislike would reveal a motive. Attitudes, though the product of experience, must also be differentiated from habits. Habits imply a routine pattern of action. Attitude is less rigid and can be expressed in varying ways.

In everyday life we deduce attitudes from what people say. We do not know what goes on in their heads, but since they talk willingly about their mental processes we use their verbal reactions as an indication of attitude. The bulk of attitude research in fact consists in sampling people's verbal responses to social symbols. For practical purposes, attitude can be conceived of as an evaluative orientation toward the social world which is expressed verbally.* Attitude research thus follows the modern tendency in experimentation in substituting *verbal* activity for the old term *mental* activity. The two words are not the same in logical meaning, of course, but they may be very similar operationally, since we get at one another's ideas through words.

Attitude is not a distinctive concept for personal as against non-personal phenomena. Many attitudes which people display are not deeply rooted orientations. They do not flow from the individual's own make-up, but are absorbed bodily from social teaching. Hence they may not take hold in the individual's personality and may be readily discarded under pressure. In general, attitude research has concentrated upon the attitudes common to a group of people and has ignored the

*Personality attitudes are often as important in everyday social contacts as personality traits. We may like an individual's behavioral characteristics but we cannot make him an intimate friend because of his smug attitude toward social problems. Or we may dislike the aggressive, assertive side of a man's personality, and yet find his company congenial because he has the same aesthetic values as we have.

problem of personal and public attitudes. Since no better term than attitude is available, however, it will be used in the description of personality and prefixed by the adjective personal. Of the many personal attitudes which are to be found we shall discuss only interests, Spranger's value attitudes, and radical and reactionary ideas.

Interests

The broad category of interests has been narrowed in research studies to the practical problem of occupational preference. Maladjustment frequently arises from forcing an individual into a vocation in which he is not interested. Interest in various types of work is, therefore, a function of personality as much as it is a function of the intrinsic attractiveness of the task itself. Quantitative support of this thesis appears in studies which demonstrate the permanence of people's likes and dislikes. E. E. Franklin questioned the same students in junior high school over a period of three years and found that three children out of four expressed the same type of vocational preference at the end of the three years as they did originally (11). The highly specific likes and dislikes of young people have little predictive value for future occupational liking, but the broad types of preference which children express are more stable. Before the high-school period occupational interests show less permanence, and after high school they show greater stability. E. K. Strong reports that tests of interests have successfully differentiated engineers, lawyers, salesmen, ministers, physicians, and school teachers at 25, 35, 45, and 55 years of age (33). According to the same study, the things people like most at 25 years of age are liked better and better with increasing age, and the things liked least at 25 years are liked less and less.

The technique for measuring interests consists of checking a long list of items according to one's liking, indifference, or dislike for each item. The list covers occupational characteristics, types of amusement, peculiarities of people, school sub-

jects, and miscellaneous activities and objects. Sample items from Strong's *Vocational Interest Blank* follow:

Draw a circle around one of the symbols after each item below:

Being a floorwalker	L (like) ?	D (dislike)
Being a farmer	L ?	D
Playing golf	L ?	D
Attending symphony concerts	L ?	D
Reading <i>New Republic</i>	L ?	D
Cowboy movies	L ?	D
Studying geography	L ?	D
Studying algebra	L ?	D
Repairing a clock	L ?	D
Acting as cheer leader	L ?	D
Looking at shop windows	L ?	D
People with gold teeth	L ?	D
Religious people	L ?	D

The meaning of these items for occupational interests has been empirically determined by submitting the list to people already established in different professions. The subject's vocational preference is thus checked against the pattern of interests common to successful individuals in that particular vocation.

Spranger's Value Attitudes

An interesting attempt to portray men on the basis of highly generalized attitudes or values has been made by E. Spranger (32). In his work emphasizing the neglected cultural aspects of personality Spranger describes six basic types of interests. They are (1) the theoretical, (2) the economic, (3) the aesthetic, (4) the social, (5) the political, and (6) the religious.

The *theoretical* or intellectual interest is the preoccupation with observation, reason, and the discovery of truth. The desire is "to solve a problem, explain a question, or formulate a theory" (32, p. 111). Plato exemplified this attitude when he banished poetry from his ideal philosophic state. And the mathematician revealed the theoretical attitude in his question upon hearing a Beethoven symphony "Beautiful, but what does it prove?"

The *economic* attitude is the emphasis upon utility as against all other values. Knowledge is evaluated in terms of its direct application to life's problems. People are judged on the basis of their earning capacity. The proverb "Honesty is the best policy" is an example of the practical man's attitude toward ethics. The miser represents the economic interest run wild.

The *aesthetic* attitude places its value upon the life of the imagination. The interest here is upon form, beauty, harmony, and proportion. The aesthetic aim is one of self-realization and self-fulfillment. "Anyone who ascribes a use to an aesthetic object be it technical or moral: a value, either for education or enjoyment, destroys its pure being" (32, p. 154).

The *social* attitude in its highest development is the love of fellow men. We find the social attitude in the gregarious tendency to foregather with others not for any purpose beyond the pleasure of association. The extreme social individual lives vicariously in the experiences of others. The communistic communities of the Utopians represent the social ideal. Whereas the economic attitude stresses self-preservation, and the aesthetic, self-realization, the social interest emphasizes self-sacrifice.

In the *political* attitude power or control of others is the goal. The manipulation of his fellow men is the chief interest of the politician. The political value-attitude is not confined to the politician, but can be found in all leaders who desire ascendancy over others for the sake of power. The successful leader must be a realistic student of human nature, for he "must take people as they really are, while the pedagogue is inclined to see them as they might be" (32, p. 192).

To fathom the final secret, to understand the ultimate meaning of life characterizes the *religious* attitude. Such understanding goes beyond knowledge and rests upon belief and faith. Science deals with the finite and measurable; religion, with the infinite. Thus the religious realization of the meaning of the world comes not through reason but through mysticism.

These six sets of values refer not to types of men but to

general attitudes which may be found in varying degrees in different people. The relative importance of these values in the personality structure of the individual can be measured by a test devised by G. W. Allport and P. E. Vernon, entitled the *Study of Values*—(38). In Part I of the test the subject is asked to check one of two alternative answers to statements designed to force a choice of interests. Question I from Part I of the test follows:

The main object of scientific research should be the discovery of pure truth rather than its practical applications.

(a) Yes (b) No

In Part II, one of the four alternative answers is to be chosen to indicate the subject's attitude toward the situation described. For example, Question 14 reads:

If you should marry, do you prefer a wife who

- (a) can achieve social prestige, commanding admiration from others;
- (b) likes to stay at home and keep house;
- (c) is fundamentally spiritual in her attitude toward life;
- (d) is gifted along artistic lines.

The whole test contains 120 possible answers, 20 for each of the six values.

The *Study of Values* is not very diagnostic for the individual personality, but it can be used for obtaining generalizations about groups. Its validity has been shown by the fact that it differentiates students according to occupational interests. For example, engineering students show higher economic and theoretical values than language majors; language majors are very high in aesthetic interests; students in science and medicine are relatively low in religious values and high in theoretical values. Another proof of the validity of the Allport-Vernon scale comes from a comparison of scores on the test with an experimental test of interest. Twenty-two newspaper items were selected from a large number of clippings by four judges as the clearest examples of Spranger's six life-values. A group of naïve subjects glanced over these items and later were given

a memory or recognition test. At a subsequent date the subjects were given the *Study of Values*. The results showed a fairly high correlation (0.71) between the group scores on the test and the recognition of types of news items.

The *Study of Values* confirms the traditional notion of sex differences in our culture. Women make higher scores than men on aesthetic, social, and religious values, and lower scores on theoretical, economic, and political interests. In one study, the attitudes of 187 students toward the church, toward prohibition, toward war, and toward the Negro were compared with their value scores (R. Pintner, 29). The theoretically or scientifically minded students were relatively favorable toward the Negro, were opposed to war, prohibition, and the church. The economically or practically minded students were unfavorable toward the Negro and prohibition and favorable toward war. Table VIII summarizes these findings.

TABLE VIII
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VALUES AND OTHER ATTITUDES
From R. Pintner, 29, 356

Value	Attitudes Measured			
	Church (low score favorable)	Prohibition (high score) favorable)	War (low score favorable)	Negro (high score favorable)
Theoretical	0.41	-0.27	0.28	0.35
Economic02	-.14	-.43	-.28
Aesthetic28	.06	.33	.23
Social	-.01	.28	.16	.08
Political28	-.36	-.36	-.31
Religious	-.78	.36	-.10	-.19

Radical and Reactionary Attitudes

Radical and reactionary attitudes are deviations from the accepted beliefs of the time. A radical idea implies a change in the direction of the new; a reactionary idea emphasizes a return to an older day. Radical and reactionary ideas are not always internalized as a function of the personality. Unless we know the consistency with which an individual adheres to

radical or reactionary opinions, we cannot be sure that we are dealing with a personal attitude. Although radicalism and conservatism can be applied to almost any field of human activity these terms have had their greatest use in describing political, economic, and religious attitudes.

F. H. Allport and D. A. Hartman have compared typical conformists with non-conformists on social, political, and economic issues (3). The most significant finding of this study was that those who hold atypical opinions whether radical or reactionary are generally more emotionally convinced of the correctness of their views than those who support less extreme doctrines. The usual interpretation of the greater emotional intensity of the atypical individual assumes that radical and reactionary views are outgrowths of emotional thwartings. It is also possible, however, that the greater emotionality of the non-conformist is related to his thinking the issue through for himself. Conclusions which a man arrives at himself are more meaningful and more intense than stereotypes he mouths without understanding.

Although personalities vary in their degree of atypicality from one issue to another, it is not difficult to find individuals who maintain a consistently radical or reactionary attitude in different situations. An adherent to Marxian economics can be readily identified from his views concerning art, literature, and education. G. B. Vetter studied the reactions of students to questions on birth control, miscegenation, the powers of labor organizations, socialization of medicine, academic freedom, divorce, the protective tariff, our Latin-American policy, and social limitation on mating (39). He found that extreme radicalism on one issue generally was accompanied by extreme radicalism on other issues. Quantitative study has also confirmed the popular impression that people who accept a radical economic philosophy are generally radical in their religious views.

It is often asserted that radicalism and conservatism are functions of age. The youth who starts with a radical outlook on life becomes conservative as he grows older. In support of this

belief is cited the fact that the dozen chief leaders of the French revolution averaged 38 years of age in comparison to the average age of 59 years of French leaders in quieter times; also the fact that Marx was 29 and Engels 27 when they wrote the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*.

Undoubtedly years and experience serve to temper the impulsiveness of youth, but this factor has been greatly overemphasized in relation to radical and reactionary ideas. Personality attitudes and integration are built up fairly early in life and in general change very little with passing years. Marx and Engels were still as radical in their sixties as in their twenties. It is nevertheless true that in the French revolution as in all revolutions youth played a large role. This is because objective conditions in the world change, but adults are too inflexible to change with them. A younger generation whose personalities are in the process of formation during the altered world conditions will develop different ideas from those of their parents. Hence they may become the medium through which social change operates.

THE EGO OR SELF

The most general term for describing the individual, with the exception of the word personality, is ego or self. Self suggests the essential mystery of human individuality. Subjectively regarded, it may easily take us beyond the province of science to the problem of the soul. To avoid the incommunicability inherent in the introspective, metaphysical notion of the self, its meaning in this book will be restricted to the following description: The unity of his physical structure and his experiences in a social environment organize the reaction tendencies of the individual around a symbol which differentiates him from other people and from the physical environment. This symbol is usually some form of the personal pronoun *I*, or a proper name. Experiences freighted with emotional loading are most closely associated with the personal symbol. The self or ego refers both to the symbol and to its intimately connected and affectively toned responses.

Obviously, then, the idea of self is bound up with the direction of reference of the various phases of an individual's life. What one man objectifies in his experience, another man treats as part of himself. Nonetheless, it is not necessary to invoke as the sole criterion of self the individual's introspective report of his conscious feeling about the matter. Unconscious as well as conscious impulses and experiences are tied to the ego. We can tell a great deal about a man's true self if we observe carefully how he behaves both verbally and non-verbally. He will respond to internal and external stimulation in one way if it affects his ego, and in another way if his ego is not affected. Though individual differences make generalization difficult, ego responses can be detected most readily through their emotional components. In practice this involves either an under-reaction or an overreaction to a given situation. The individual protests too much or too little; his violent display of wrath or his callous indifference seem inappropriate to the stimulating conditions.

The ego, or self, is the central core of personality. The emotional patterns linked to the personal concept lie at the heart of the individual's psychological life. They are generally the least amenable to change of all one's habits and dispositions. They are directive in their influence upon the individual's ideas and actions. Apparent inconsistency in personal conduct becomes consistency when interpreted in the light of the ego. Why the self or ego is vitally involved in the individual's motivation will be discussed in the following chapter on the development of personality.

Experimental studies have been accumulating on the effect on performance of ego involvement. Especial attention has been given to the aspiration level which the individual sets for himself. J. D. Frank reports that the relation between level of aspiration and the level of past performance is a relatively permanent characteristic of the personality (10). Some individuals consistently set their aspiration level higher than their level of performance. Others are realistic and relate their aspirations closely to their performance. Still others cautiously

keep their aspirations below their achievements. Apparently the direction of aspiration is determined by the individual's ego organization. These results would be more convincing if there had been some check on the difference between publicly announced expectations and genuine aspiration. People will sometimes say they expect to achieve very little whereas in their heart of hearts they hope for great success. Aspiration level is perhaps revealed as much by discovering the individual's identification with successful people as by his own statement of what he expects to do.

Insight or Self-Objectification

A puzzling aspect of the self is the degree to which the individual objectifies it. People have insight into their natures when they can regard themselves objectively. Obviously complete insight is impossible, since that which regards the self is part of the self, and subject cannot be at once object and subject. Most of our problems in psychology arise because people as subjects do not know themselves very well as objects. Nevertheless the faith in introspection remains, and it is assumed that we can find out about a person by simply asking him about himself.

A pioneer field in personality investigation consists in an analysis of the kinds of insight and their determining conditions. Freud and other workers have shown that people have less insight into their socially disapproved motives than into other motives, but other than this little is known. Freud's point is that the child rationalizes to present a respectable front to his parents and in this process finally deceives himself as his parents' values become part of his own ego.

The problem of insight is complicated by many factors. Generally we fail to distinguish between emotional and intellectual phases. A man may understand some of his motives and some of his inadequacies without being emotionally reconciled to his self-discovery. He may try to objectify his personal failings, but may not succeed in doing so emotionally. On the other hand, a person may be emotionally objective, but intel-

lectually not at all aware of his motivation. The most subtle rationalizations probably come from the former type of person. Again, we fail to distinguish between insight into internal motives and insight into personal capacity. The introvert often has good insight into his motivation and his mechanisms, whereas the extravert has very poor insight of this kind. In respect to personal capacity, however, the introvert has little knowledge and the extravert may surpass him here. Knowledge of ability is generally derived socially. We tell how capable we are by the way we affect others. And the extravert with his attention turned toward the external world gauges his social effects more accurately than the introvert.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY

The development of personality is the story of how all of us came to be what we are. It is the tale of how the culture of the group becomes incorporated into the biological organism to make of it a socialized individual.

BIOLOGICAL FACTORS AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT

In this story it is logical to begin with the biological factors which determine development. Psychologists are more interested in learning and experience, but they cannot neglect the biological equipment of the individual. At one time it was thought that personality was largely a matter of biological inheritance. The blue-blooded aristocrat was supposed to owe his polished tastes and manners to his lineage. The thief similarly was supposed to come by his anti-social habits through chromosomes which made for thieving. The modern view, however, is that a man's life is not the progressive unfolding of his biological constitution. Present scientific thought regards the biology of the individual as setting the limits within which he will develop. The specific outcome, the adult personality, is affected for the most part *indirectly* by biological factors and *directly* by social and psychological factors.

Biological Factors Not Solely a Matter of Inheritance

Biological factors refer to physical structure and to the characteristic functioning of physical structure. *Biological* is by no means synonymous with *inherited*. Because man's neural, glandular, and muscular equipment in certain respects is not influenced by teaching and because it remains relatively stable,

it is often erroneously regarded as a manifestation of inheritance. In an earlier discussion of maturation (see pp. 238-239) the error in this conception was exposed. Structures which become set early in the organism's life history are the product of both innate and environmental forces. Nutritive, chemical, and temperature conditions on the environmental side interact with inherited determiners to produce nerves and muscles of a given quality. Hence it is a mistake to attribute the strength and quickness of the vigorous child to his good fortune in drawing the right pattern of genes, though the genes do make their contribution.

Anthropological measurements of American-born children of southeastern European peoples furnish evidence on this point (4). East European Hebrews were below the American norms in height and skeletal structure. Their children reared in a more favorable environment, however, deviated from the measurements of their parents in the direction of the American norms. Even the cephalic index undergoes change.* Likewise fairly constant physiological factors which at first glance seem to be the result of simple innate determination are found on closer examination to be environmentally determined as well. A study of the onset of puberty, which is earlier in the southern races as compared to northern races, illustrates this fact. A group of Italian girls were found to mature more rapidly than a group of Danish girls. Girls from these two racial groups, growing up in the United States, however, showed much less difference in respect to the onset of puberty, owing to the later maturing of the Italian group (9). Puberal development is thus related to climatic conditions as well as to innate factors.

In treating as biological those early aspects of the organism

* "In most of the European types," writes Boas, "that have been investigated, the head form, which has always been considered one of the most stable and permanent characteristics of human races, undergoes far-reaching changes coincident with the transfer of the people from European to American soil. For instance, the east European Hebrew, who has a very round head, becomes more long-headed; the south Italian, who in Italy has an exceedingly long head, becomes more short-headed; so that in this country both approach a uniform type, as far as the roundness of the head is concerned." (4, p. 5).

which are relatively stable and relatively unaffected by learning, it is not assumed that we are dealing with man's original nature. Under biological factors come the descriptions of man's physical make-up, including his neural structure, his internal appetites, his glandular equipment, his physique, and his capacities. Here too should be placed such facts about physiological functioning as speed of reaction and ease of conditioning. In earlier chapters the physiological basis of conduct, its mechanisms and motivation, were described as common characteristics of the race. At this point we are concerned with the fact that these biological constants are not true constants, since they are not distributed in equal proportions in all individuals. For example, one man may possess a nervous system physiologically superior to another because of more cortical convolutions. In this chapter we shall attempt to remedy an omission in our earlier treatment of the biological basis of conduct. The glandular equipment of man was purposely left for this discussion because it is probably the most important biological determiner of personality.

The Endocrine Glands and Their Relation to Personality

The extravagant claims of the modern glandular characterologist are reminiscent of the ancient theories of the humors, or fluids, of the body to which were ascribed temperamental differences. One such doctrine, associated with the names of the famous Greek physicians Hippocrates and Galen, has been fairly influential in the history of western culture. It asserted that there are four bodily fluids: blood, phlegm, black bile, and yellow bile. A man's temperament was determined by the predominant fluid of his body. Thus if it were blood, he was of a sanguine temperament; if phlegm, he was phlegmatic; if black bile, melancholic; and if yellow bile, choleric. Although the primitive physiology of this theory seems absurd today, the humoral doctrine contains one important truth, namely, that the chemistry of the body affects the behavior of man. The error lies in assuming a simple correlation between

a chemical condition of the body and a complex emotional experience. And this error is still made by those who write the history of the individual as the story of his endocrine glands.

The effect of glandular secretion upon personality is generally mediated through habits and attitudes which the individual already has acquired. Briefly, the picture is this. The endocrine glands, or glands of internal secretion, release chemical substances, or hormones, into the blood. These hormones sensitize or desensitize nervous and muscular tissue so that responses are facilitated or retarded. Moreover, their main




FIG. 19. LOCATION OF THE ENDOCRINE ORGANS.

(After R. G. Hoskins, *The Tides of Life*, p. 19; W. W. Norton & Co)

function concerns the growth and metabolism of the body. In turn, growth and metabolic changes affect the behavior of the individual. Thus the glands are important for personality in initiating a chain of processes which ultimately modify an individual's emotional disposition. Other factors enter into the working of these processes so that the end result is the product of many variables standing in mutual dependence and not the simple function of the activity of the glands. Specific illustrations of this truth will appear in relation to the description of the various glands.

The Thyroid Gland—The thyroid gland lies at the base of the neck (see Fig. 19) and produces thyroxin, a hormone rich

in iodine. The functioning of the thyroid gland is directly related to the metabolism of the body, i.e., the destructive and constructive chemical changes in body tissues. Thyroxin acts as a catalyzer and facilitates the breaking down of waste products, so that they can be readily eliminated from the body. Underactivity of the thyroid gland means that partially decomposed proteins are retained in the tissues and that further protein cell destruction is diminished. The result is that oxidation is lessened, and blood pressure falls. The effect upon behavior of this slowing up of metabolic processes is a general sluggishness and lethargy. The individual is easily fatigued and often suffers from states of depression.

Hyperthyroidism (the overactivity of the thyroid gland) is associated with increased metabolism. There is a general overstimulation of body tissues. "The results in the life processes," writes Hoskins, "are comparable with those of opening the draughts of a furnace" (13). An increase in nervous tension is reported, and the individual is excitable, restless, irritable, and worried.

In these general pictures of thyroid deficiency and thyroid excess, the description starts with the direct physiological effects and ends with an account of the mental state and behavior. Hence it has been assumed that personality characteristics of irritability, depression, and nervous activity are the direct resultants of the functioning of the thyroid gland. This oversimplification, which occurs in the great majority of the treatises on the subject, fails to discriminate between the immediate and constant effects of glandular functioning and the secondary and variable results. The changes of behavior, in other words, follow the general physiological state produced by the hormone and are complicated by all the habits and experience of the individual. Hoskins admits this in his significant statement, "The effect of thyroid deficiency on the personality may vary widely from case to case. The subjects are rather commonly depressed in mood, *a consequence perhaps of their realization of their handicaps*" (italics by the present writers). The realization of handicaps is thus a psychological

factor complicating the whole picture. The training and habits of individuals will then determine whether or not the knowledge of physical handicaps results in mental depression. The variable effect upon behavior of the malfunctioning of the thyroid is shown in the case of thyroid deficiency. Ordinarily lethargy is reported, but some subjects with a lowered metabolic rate are irritable and overresponsive to environmental annoyances.

For purposes of illustration, extreme cases of glandular malfunctioning have been described. It is probable that normal individuals vary slightly in either direction from the norm of glandular balance. If so, normal temperamental dispositions may have as one of their original causes a glandular basis.

The Adrenal Glands—These two organs are found lying close to the kidney. Each adrenal has two parts, an outer bark or *cortex*, and an internal *medulla*. The cortex and medulla have distinct endocrine functions. The cortex produces a hormone called *cortin*, and the medulla a hormone called *adrenin*. The destruction of the adrenal cortex results in a fatal illness called Addison's disease. The physiological symptoms are low basal metabolism, low resistance to infections, and weak heart action. The behavior picture includes lethargy, insomnia, irritability, fatigue, and irrationality. Overactivity of the adrenal cortex results in an accentuation of masculine characteristics in either the male or the female. In women the breasts atrophy, the voice deepens, and a beard appears.

The adrenal medulla functions to prolong the effects of the sympathetic nervous system. These effects, described in detail in Chapter IX, prepare the body for unusual exertions by inhibiting the normal vegetative processes and by making available the body's sources of energy. The results of the activation of the sympathetic nervous system and the release of the hormone adrenin into the blood stream are found in most violent emotional states.

Adrenin thus explains the intensity of many emotional states. It does not explain completely, however, why individuals differ temperamentally in the frequency of intense emotional experi-

ences. Adrenin unlike thyroxin and some other hormones is not always present in the blood stream. It has been found only at times of emotional excitement, unusual exertion, or disease. The emotional temperament which breaks out into frequent violent exhibitions of rage, or the temperament which is readily aroused to deep fears, is also the result of early conditioning.

The Parathyroids. Closely adjacent to the thyroid gland lie four tiny structures, the *parathyroids*. Their functioning is related to the calcium balance of the body. An excess of the parathyroid hormone results in an increased supply of calcium salts in the blood stream; a deficiency of the parathyroid hormone is followed by a decrease of calcium. Endocrinologists believe that a lowered calcium supply in the blood stream sensitizes the nerves and muscles so that the individual is overexcitable. At any rate, removal of the parathyroids produces muscular tremors, spasms, and cramps.

The parathyroid hormone in general seems to have an opposed effect to thyroxin. Whereas thyroxin speeds up bodily processes, the parathyroid product quiets or slows down the individual. The high-strung temperament with a low threshold for intense emotional responses may conceivably be the result of a hypoparathyroid condition (underactivity of the gland).

The Pituitary Body. The pituitary gland fits into a pocket in the base of the skull in the center of the head. The gland is composed of three parts: an anterior lobe, a posterior lobe, and a pars intermedia. In its functioning the pituitary body is a highly complex mechanism. Eight different active substances have been isolated from the anterior lobe alone. In general, the anterior lobe affects the growth of connective tissue and the activity of the sex glands. The posterior lobe stimulates metabolic processes and increases the activity of the smooth muscles of the body, e.g., the muscles of the stomach, intestines, and blood vessels.

Underactivity of the pituitary in childhood is associated with a generally deficient bony structure, weakened skeletal muscles, low blood pressure, and underdeveloped sex organs. The child

lacks aggressiveness, gives up easily, cries readily, and is regarded as cowardly. Behavior problems in school are sometimes hypopituitary cases. Overactivity of the anterior pituitary in childhood is associated with gigantism, thick skin, and precocious sex development. Unless the hyperpituitary condition has gone too far, the child is pugnacious and aggressive.

If the overactivity of the anterior pituitary first appears in adult life, the result is *acromegaly*. Acromegaly includes a protruding forehead, prognathous lower jaws, wide molars, large hands, and large feet. The picture is that of the deformed court jester and, according to Timme, not without cause. This endocrinologist reports that with a hyperpituitary condition is frequently found an increased keenness of mental functions (19).

The Sex Glands. In addition to their function in reproduction the sex glands are important in establishing the secondary sexual characteristics of the individual. The sex glands, or *gonads*, are duct glands which in the female produce the ova and in the male the spermatozoa. The neighboring tissue to these glands, however, has an endocrine function. In the male the interstitial cells of Leydig embedded about the testicles determine the development of masculine physical traits; in the female the Graafian follicle produces a hormone which controls the development of feminine physical traits. Such differentiating sex characteristics include height and weight, the distribution of hair over the body, and the development of the mammary glands.

Experimenters have transplanted ovaries from female rats and guinea pigs to castrated male rats and guinea pigs. The result was that the animals took on the characteristics of the female. Similarly, the transplantation of male interstitial tissue to female animals whose ovaries had been removed produced male characteristics. It is claimed in these experiments that not only physical traits, but also behavior traits, were affected by the transplanted glandular tissue.

The evidence for the glandular determination of emotional and personality sex differences is suggestive rather than con-

clusive. No significant differences between men and women have been found in tests of intelligence. Observation and tests of non-intellectual traits, however, show that women are more emotional and personalized in their reactions than men. The greater emotionality of women is probably more a result of environmental training than of glandular functioning. On the other hand, the sex hormones may be a contributing factor. Thus, homosexuality may well be related to endocrine disturbance. Glandular malfunctioning may produce a feminine type of man who can make a normal heterosexual adjustment, but who will fail to make such an adjustment more often than the normal man.

The Pineal and Thymus Glands. The *pineal* gland is located within the brain. It was here that Descartes placed the soul, since it was the only single or unpaired structure of the brain known to Descartes. The *thymus* gland is situated in the lower part of the neck not far from the thyroid. There is evidence that both the thymus and the pineal glands inhibit the development of sex. Hyperactivity of these glands frequently results in the lack of sexually differentiating characteristics in the individual, whereas underactivity of these glands often is associated with precocious sex growth. The thymus gland also plays a part in the general development of the body. The hypofunctioning of the pineal gland is found with a deficient muscular system and with mental precocity.

Interdependence of the Glands

All writers on the subject of endocrinology are agreed that the ductless glands do not function independently of one another. The hyperfunctioning of one gland frequently results in a compensatory functioning of another. Thus, an overactive thymus gland will be counteracted by an overactive thyroid or pituitary. Hyperthyroidism results in an increased activity in all the other glands. Now the adrenal and sex glands have an opposed effect to the thyroid. Hence an automatic balance may be struck if the thyroid condition is not extreme. The complexity of the interrelationships of the endo-

crines is shown by the fact that the development of the sex gland is retarded or facilitated by the pituitary, the pineal, the thymus, the adrenal cortex, and the thyroid. It is wise, therefore, not to identify completely this complicated system of chemical checks and balances with behavior changes, since such changes are also related to factors of training, habit, and situational set.

Physical Characteristics as Personality Determinants

(a) *Morphological Characteristics.* The most obvious aspects of an individual are his morphological characteristics, his physique, his height, weight, bodily proportions, and physical beauty. Perhaps for this reason they have been seized upon and given undue emphasis as indicators of personality. At any rate, people persist in evaluating personality according to physical appearance. The leader of men in the popular mind must be physically well proportioned and must be of more than average height, despite the fact that neither Napoleon, Hitler, nor Mussolini fits this picture.

Morphological characteristics, however, play some part in the development of personality. Their effect is mediated through the individual's conception of what he is like physically in comparison to his fellows. Long before parents can compare their children with other children on the basis of mental and social achievement, they can and do study height and weight norms and pronounce judgment accordingly. As the child grows older he hears himself compared to other children on the basis of physique and he finds it easy to make similar judgments of his fellows. The upshot is that the youngster who does not vary greatly from the group average builds up a notion of himself as a normal person physically. The undersized child may acquire a feeling of inferiority, and sometimes the story of the individual's life may be a compensation for physical deficiency. Especially is this true if the variation is not a quantitative one from norms of size and weight but an actual deformity. Fewer physically handicapped children develop into normal personalities than physically well-favored

children. In an investigation of this problem B. B. Rosenbaum tested the neurotic tendencies of a group of crippled girls by means of the Thurstone Personality Schedule (17). Their average score for the group was 69 as compared to an average score of 40 made by normal girls of the same age. The physically handicapped girls made scores on the average which placed them in the category of the emotionally maladjusted according to the standardization of the Thurstone schedule.

(b) *Physical Health and Strength.* Closely allied to physique is the factor of physical health and bodily vigor. Vitality is partly related to absence of psychological conflict and partly to the biological constitution of the individual. Sheer size and weight are less important in influencing personality development than strength and agility. It is not so much the undersized child who is pushed around by larger children as it is the physically weak youngster. Hence everything that has been said about inferiority in physical appearance applies as well to inferiority in physical prowess. Differences in strength are obviously more important in primitive cultures where the process of adjustment lies closer to the natural world of animals. In our society little emphasis is placed upon physical prowess in adult life. Nonetheless the successful individual finds his path easier if he is equipped with a rugged constitution. Health and vigor are also important in the formative years where contacts between children are in good part on a physical level. The sickly child, humored and pampered at home, finds his adjustment doubly difficult outside the home. Consequently he may consistently run away from problems and never learn to face reality.

(c) *Capacities.* Apart from gross physical structure and sheer bodily vigor is the personality determinant of the neuromuscular system. Individuals differ in respect to their nervous and muscular tissues. The nervous system is probably the most important factor in the determination of intelligence. The degree of retention, the speed of forming associations, and the number of responses the individual can sustain at one time are related to some attribute of nervous tissue. The evidence sug-

gests that more than sheer quantity of nervous matter is involved, since the correlation between brain weight and intelligence, though positive, is not high.

Sensitivity to stimulation may also be a capacity of the sense organs and nerves. Infants vary greatly in their reactions to strong stimuli, and this variation in the first year of life is not due to differences in experience. Some children are thick-skinned and are relatively unaffected by bumps and bruises. Others are timid and sensitive from the start. The physiological basis for these differences is not known. One possibility is the threshold of the autonomic nervous system. It may conceivably be higher in some individuals than others, even before emotional trauma has done its work. Another possibility is the number and distribution of pain sense organs. It is not out of the question that infants may differ in the actual number of pain sense organs in the skin and in the tissues of the body. A more likely possibility relates to the glands rather than to the sense organs or nerves. The glandular condition of one child, his bodily chemistry, may sensitize his nerves so that he is more affected by intense stimulation than another child.

Another capacity of nerves and muscles refers to the physical determinants of *motility*. Motor coordination and reaction time are affected by learning, but they are also influenced by the individual's physiological equipment. Every football coach looks for "natural" players among the men reporting for practice. The grace of the athlete can be acquired by long training, but there is no gainsaying the individual differences in physical aptitude among young children which are not due to practice.

THE BEGINNINGS OF PERSONALITY

To the casual observer the infant in the first few weeks of life seems little more than a squirming mass of protoplasm. Scientific observation describes early infancy more carefully as a period of mass, diffuse responses. The infant kicks vigorously, throws his arms about, clenches and unclenches his hands, and squirms, twists, and rolls. Mass activity of this sort

occurs with the greatest frequency at times of organic tension, i.e., during hunger, intestinal disturbance, and before defecation and micturition. Characteristic personality reactions develop out of these gross types of behavior. Nonetheless, no sharp line can be drawn at the point where personality supposedly begins. Although mass activity is the rule, the newly born baby shows some responses which characterize it as an individual. Certainly nurses and mothers can discern individuality in infants shortly after birth. Some babies are more restless and cry more than others. Babies vary in degree of motor helplessness, they differ in their feeding reactions, and their sleeping habits are not identical.

Many of these early differences may be determined by the immediate situation, but that some of them are true personality differences has been demonstrated by M. Shirley's study of the first two years of life (18). Twenty-two babies were examined within twenty-four hours of birth. They were observed daily during the first week, and every other day during the second week of hospitalization. They were visited in their homes every week during the first year and every two weeks during the second year. Observation of spontaneous behavior and records of test responses were employed to obtain scores on dimensions of general development, vocalization development, motor development, and social traits. Naturally the resulting picture is one of growth and change. But comparison of the individual records for the two-year period reveals that some children retained the same position they occupied in the group from *two weeks* to *two years*. For example, one, Virginia Ruth by name, ranked highest of all the children in irritability in the first week of life. She remained the most irritable at six months, at one year, at eighteen months, and at two years. Another youngster, Judy, consistently outranked all other children in vocalization. Two of the children, Virginia Ruth, and Max, were very consistent in almost all traits from babyhood on. Maurice and Don, on the other hand, were consistently inconsistent. Their percentage scores varied from age to age "with little rhyme or reason."

Since investigators differ in their conceptions of personality, they do not all agree upon the period of its first appearance. For the definition of personality advanced in this book, M. Shirley's results prove that characteristic reactions are observable in the first two weeks of life. There is general agreement, however, in placing the beginnings of personality before the the age of six months. G. W. Allport states that a careful diary of a child kept by two psychologically minded parents showed the first clear indications of personality in the fourth month (2). At four months these characteristics appeared in the diary: "Healthy, good-natured, smiles readily, amused, coy (while nursing he withdraws, smiles at mother, aggressively returns to breast with a kind of divided attention that can only be described as coy)." At the time of this entry the parents, interested in the problem of the consistency of traits, also entered a prediction about the boy for future checking. They wrote then as a prophecy: "ready laughter, well-adjusted, i.e., 'normal' and 'extroverted,' capable of considerable temper, active, sensitive to rhythm, adaptable, wiry and muscular, tall, mischievous, with linguistic superiority." Teachers who knew nothing about this prognosis were later asked to describe the boy's outstanding characteristics. At eight years the predictions about ready laughter, sensitivity to rhythm, and linguistic superiority were borne out by the teacher's report of an unusual sense of humor, interest in music and marked artistic ability, and high performance in school work. A shift in emphasis in development is seen with respect to mischievousness which the teacher does not think is characteristic. Instead she comments on his originality. The early prediction about extraversion seems widest of the mark. A sensitivity and reserve has developed according to later observations.

Evidence from the Yale Clinic of Child Development suggests that G. W. Allport's estimate of personality manifestations not appearing before the fourth month is too conservative. A. Gesell and L. B. Ames report that persisting traits of behavioral individuality are observable in the first sixteen weeks of life (10). Cinema records of three children were reviewed for

the purpose of appraising various traits, and the following characteristics were correctly judged: energy output, motor demeanor, self-dependence, emotional expressiveness, readiness of smiling. The test of correct appraisal was the ability to predict later behavior from early records.

Gesell and Ames also investigated the constancy of personality differences which appear in the first year of life. Extensive cinema records of five children, taken at monthly intervals during the first year, were studied by Mrs. Ames, who had never seen the infants. On the basis of the films she placed the children in rank order in respect to fifteen characteristics of personality. These judgments were set aside and later the investigator made a direct study of the children when they were five years of age. The children were tested and observed in a number of social situations and Mrs. Ames made a new appraisal of their ranking on the original fifteen behavior traits. These fifteen traits are described as follows: •

1. Energy output (general amount and intensity of activity).
2. Motor demeanor (postural bearing, general muscular control and poise, motor coordination and facility of motor adjustment).
3. Self-dependence (general self-reliance and self-sufficiency without appeal to the assistance of others).
4. Social responsiveness (positive reactivity to persons and to the attitudes of adults and of other children).
5. Family attachment (closeness of affection, degree of identification with the family group).
6. Communicativeness (expressive reference to others by means of gesture and vocalization).
7. Adaptivity (general capacity to adjust to new situations).
8. Exploitation of environment (utilization and elaboration of environment and circumstances in order to gain new experiences).
9. "Humor" sense (sensitiveness and playful reactions to surprise, novelty, and incongruity in social situations).
10. Emotional maladjustment (balance and stability of emotional response in provocative situations).
11. Emotional expressiveness (liveliness and subtlety of expressive behavior in emotional situations).
12. Reaction to success (expression of satisfaction in successful endeavor).

13. Reaction to restriction (expressiveness of behavior in reaction to failure, discomfort, disappointment, frustration).

14. Readiness of smiling (facility and frequency of smiling).

15. Readiness of crying (promptness and facility of frowning and tears).

In Fig. 20 are summarized the comparisons between the series of rank orders based on the cinema records for the first




FIG. 20. THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE APPRAISAL OF TRAITS IN INFANCY AND AT FIVE YEARS.

The fifteen traits listed in the left column are rated for five children in the adjoining columns. (From Gesell and Ames, 10, p. 219.)

year and the series of rank orders based upon direct study of the children at five years. The correspondence of rank orders is astonishingly high. Out of the 75 judgments (each of 5 children were ranked on 15 traits) there was perfect coincidence 48 times. There was a displacement of one rank order in 21 judgments, a displacement of two rank orders in 5 judgments, and a displacement of 3 rank orders only once. In the majority of her judgments Mrs. Ames gave the child at five years the same ranking he had at one year. Where the ranking varied it seldom did so by more than one place. The two least stable traits were *communicativeness* and *reaction to success*. The results of this study show a much greater constancy in personality differences in the formative years than our knowledge of growth and adjustive learning would lead us to expect. One factor which may have been partly responsible for the apparent close similarity in the children over a five-year period was the memory of the observer. Even though the observer set aside her ratings of the cinema performances of the children before appraising them in real life, her memory of the early judgments may have unconsciously affected her later judgments.*

In general it may be concluded that characteristic traits of personality appear in the first months of life. Personality is not rigidly fixed in the infant, but the infant does have personality. Later experiences may radically alter this personality, but definite determining tendencies are present in the early months. The constancy of a personality characteristic varies greatly with the dimension of personality. Characteristics of mobility and temperament are more constant than traits of social expressiveness.†

THE DYNAMICS OF PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

The squirming mass of arms and legs which is the human infant at birth seems a fit object for the biologist to study rather

*The exact interval between these judgments is not stated by the investigators.

†See R. E. Arrington, *Interrelations in the Behavior of Young Children*. *Child Development Monographs*, 1932, No. 8.




FIG. 21. A MOTOR TRAIT OF INDIVIDUALITY.

This child showed pronounced left-handedness: (A) in manipulation (age 36 weeks); (B) in spoon feeding (age 80 weeks); (C) in block building (age 260 weeks or 5 years); (D) in drawing (also age 5 years). She draws a left-handed type of man pictured in (E). (From Gesell and Ames, 10, p. 220.)

than the social psychologist. It is active when aroused by its physiological appetites and quiescent when these wants are satisfied. It has some specific means for seeking satisfaction, but in general its behavior is random, diffuse, and unrelated to the stimulating world. It has no control over its eliminative functions and has been aptly described as an open sewer. Gradually, however, it takes form as a socialized human being and ceases to be only a biological organism. The child responds less and less to simple biological needs and more and more to the objects and people in its environment which minister to its needs. Creature comforts still activate the child, but he learns specific and general ways of behaving toward the people around him which will secure for him the satisfactions of his wants. In this adjustive process, he acquires habits which become tied to various social stimuli. The human infant, moreover, is not only endowed with simple mechanisms for relieving organic tensions, but is also equipped with a highly complex machinery for planning about needs before they arise and for providing for their satisfaction in difficult circumstances. This nervous machinery is a lavish gift from nature: it is far in excess of what an organism requires for taking care of animal wants. But since it is there, it comes into play first at the call of organic tensions and then at the behest of symbolic goals only remotely related to physiological appetites. Figuratively speaking, man's intricate nervous apparatus, functioning in the service of self-preservation, manages to set up many fictitious wants in this process. Men strive, therefore, for goals which are genetically connected with appetitive drives, but which bear no logical relation to these drives.

Personality Development a Dialectical Process

As the infant becomes a child it acquires personality as its nervous equipment canalizes in more or less permanent form the attitudes and traits which adjust it, first, as a biological organism, and second, as a human being in a group of other human beings.

This developmental story can best be written in terms of *dialectics*. The word dialectics refers to that method of description and explanation which sees things in a state of flux, which emphasizes true growth as the result of the interplay of opposed forces. The dialectic method comes from Hegel, who pointed out that we start with *thesis*, i.e., with a system of factors in a definite set of relationships. Inherent in these relationships, however, are implicit contradictions. With the development of the system these implicit contradictions become explicit in the open struggle of the antagonists—a stage called *antithesis*. In this struggle the opposing forces mutually affect one another and in so doing become modified and eventually fused in a new *synthesis*.

Personality formation is essentially a dialectic process. The Hegelian formula can be applied to these three aspects of personality development: (1) the unification of personality, (2) the acquisition of social habits and attitudes, and (3) the growth of the self. In the first place, the unification of personality comes about through the operation of the opposed processes of *differentiation* and *integration*. Infant behavior in the beginning is unitary activity of an unorganized sort. It is unitary in the sense that the infant has few distinctive modes of adjustment. Through differentiation, specific items in this unorganized behavior become partialled out. Conduct ceases to be diffuse, mass response. It becomes specialized, and specific actions become tied to specific stimuli. But an opposed process enters the picture. Integration, or the unification of specific responses, takes place. Generalization occurs because a specific reaction is taken from its original context and applied to a new situation which contains the same relational pattern as appeared in the old context. Differentiation and integration in this manner bring about a new synthesis of unitary conduct, but this time of *organized* conduct. The first mass response is unitary in that the infant acts as if he were made of one piece. The final synthesis is unitary again but at a higher level, namely, that of an organized personality attuned to the demands of its environment.

In the second place, the characteristics of dialectics are manifested in personality formation in the operation of the opposed principles of trial-and-error learning and suggestion. Through suggestion the child acquires ready-made values and ideas. He is handed his attitudes toward life by his parents, by books, by the various agencies of social control. Uncritical acquisition of the stereotypes and rituals in the culture makes the child susceptible to manipulation through almost any authoritative source. Suggestion by itself as a medium of training makes for the crowd man, who in sheeplike fashion follows the loud-voiced leader. In opposition to suggestion, however, is trial-and-error learning. Through his trials, errors, and successes the child learns for himself what works and what does not work. By this method alone the child would develop into a hypercritical individualist. Such an independent person stands apart from social groups and has difficulty in making a satisfactory adjustment to the mores and institutional ways of his society. But in actual practice both suggestion and trial-and-error learning interpenetrate to produce personalities who are neither social sheep nor simple isolationists. The ready-made attitudes handed on to the child take on meaning as they are confirmed or contradicted by his own experience in solving his own problems. As an adult he retains a residual of experiences which are a product of suggestion and critical learning. The dialectic process, it must be admitted, falls short of its ideal consummation for many personalities. Cases of arrested development are all too frequent, in which no genuine integration is achieved between the individual's own goals and his cultural values. Differential rates of progress, moreover, often appear in respect to the various areas of an individual's life. Intellectual maturity may be much in advance of emotional maturity.

A third way of finding the dialectics in personality growth is through the study of the development of the self or ego. The ego of the very young child is intensely selfish. The child is self-centered, piggish, and predatory. He is interested in the immediate satisfaction of his physical wants. In short he is

governed by what Freud has called the *pleasure principle*. But the world contains other human beings who step in and discipline the child. They indoctrinate him with habits and values of an unselfish sort so that it will be possible for him to live with them without disturbing them unduly. To get what he wants the growing child must alter his immediate self-seeking, abandon the pleasure principle, and adjust to the realities of his social environment. The demands of the objective world, which must be met if one is to have satisfactions of all kinds in the long run, present what Freud has called the *reality principle*. The pleasure principle and the reality principle are thus opposed factors affecting development. Like other oppositions the very fact of struggle helps to produce resolution. The child learns to restrain his eagerness for immediate enjoyment for the attainment of fuller rewards in the future. The ego extends in time to include future goals. Honesty as the best policy becomes internalized as an attribute of the self. The ego extends in space to include the child's friends and family. A narrow self-interest becomes a broad social self-interest. The influencing and being influenced of the pleasure and reality principles culminates in a socialized ego in which short-sighted aggrandizement has become enlightened self-interest.

The broad outlines of personality development thus follow the pattern of dialectics. The three aspects of personality (the unification or organization of behavior, the social adjustment of the individual, and the growth of the self) may now be considered in greater detail.

THE UNIFICATION OR INTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY

A popular notion of personality has it that men are highly integrated creatures. A unified pattern is manifest in everything they do or say. This integrated personality, moreover, exists in miniature in the child. It awaits only physical growth to appear in its completeness, though many indications of it appear long before maturity. An opposed conception of personality development, once current in elementary textbooks,

regarded the infant as a bundle of specific reflexes. Through learning these reflexes became combined into larger unities called habits. Life was thought of as a process of building complex structures from independent, innate elements. Life proceeded from a heterogeneity of simple, unrelated items to the homogeneity of an integrated pattern.

The evidence from child psychology supports neither extreme interpretation. Unitary activity is found in the infant and even in the embryo. It is not integrated behavior, however, but diffuse mass response. It is not the adult personality in miniature but gross activity called out by organic tensions. The initial phase of development is a narrowing down of mass action to the few components essential to the problem at hand. This refinement of responses from diffuse behavior is called *differentiation* or *individuation*.

Differentiation or Individuation

Though a number of specific reflexes can be found at birth, they are apparently preceded by embryonic diffuse reactions. The direction of development is from generalized movements of the body to particular movements of specific muscles. Differentiation applies both to developing behavior, which is largely a function of *maturation*, or growth, and developing behavior which is largely a function of *learning*. *An example of individuation in maturation* is furnished by studies of embryonic development. At first, movements of the limbs and extremities are part of the gross pattern of trunk movement. As the nervous system grows, the extremities acquire greater independence of movement. In other words, arm and hand are first moved in connection with the movements of the body, and finally the hand and fingers are moved independently of the arm.

An example of individuation through learning appears in M. Curti's study of the grasping and reaching responses of the infant. Mrs. Curti observed the behavior of a baby, four months of age, when a rattle was shaken above and in front of it. At first the infant waved its arms, kicked its legs, made eager

grunting sounds, and in general seemed to react all over. Gradually the excess movements decreased and the rattle was steadily fixated while the arms were brought toward it. The specific responses were differentiated out so that "the infant who at the beginning of the experiment was a squirming, wriggling excited little animal when the rattle was presented, had in a week's practice learned to grasp the rattle promptly with a minimum of general bodily movement" (8, p. 169).

Interpretations of Differentiation

The use of differentiation to refer to both maturation and learning has resulted in conflicting interpretations of the process. Those addicted to a Gestalt type of theory turn to studies of maturation and assert that *patterned* reactions of the organism exist from the start. Early mass activity is regarded as *integrated* activity out of which minor patterns become individuated. Experimental evidence of differentiation is hailed, therefore, as a body blow to the behavioristic theory which makes integration the end result of a learning process starting with random behavior. Behavioristically inclined writers, on the other hand, interpret individuation as the first stage of the learning process. Early mass activity, they hold, is uncoordinated, diffuse behavior produced by stimulation which has not as yet become tied to definite response arcs. The crux of the issue is the question of the organized and integrated nature of the first mass action. Is the early behavior of the organism a unified pattern, or is it chaotic diffuse action?

Here the evidence from observation of infant learning is unfavorable to the Gestalt view and the evidence from studies of maturation is ambiguous. The infant's gross pattern of action can be called a pattern only by making a doubtful type of value-judgment. The mass activity called out by organic tensions is uncoordinated and unrelated to any goal. The hungry infant squirms, rolls from side to side, cries, kicks, and thrashes about with his arms. Excitation from organic tension has overflowed into almost all available pathways. And since nerve impulses spread at every synaptic junction the result is a diffuse,

mass activity. It is not an organized structured type of behavior. It is very much like the behavior of the adult when confronted with a new problem toward the solution of which he is highly motivated. He shows an excess of useless responses which are eliminated as learning proceeds.

The studies upon which the Gestalt exponents generally rest their case are observations of embryonic movement which involve maturation. The work of G. E. Coghill on *Amblystoma* embryos is the classic source most frequently cited to support an organismic hypothesis. Coghill's own conclusions strongly support the Gestalt contention, as the following quotation indicates: "Behavior develops from the beginning through the progressive expansion of a perfectly integrated total pattern and the individuation within it of partial patterns which acquire various degrees of discreteness" (6, p. 38). This conceptualization of his results may prove very misleading to the student if it is considered apart from the experimental data. What Coghill found was that the *Amblystoma* could swim before it had any true appendages, that when the forelimbs and hindlimbs first appeared they moved only in relation to total trunk movement; then the forelimbs gained independence and acquired a certain autonomy of function. Now this early integrated pattern of movement of the limbs in coordination with the trunk may merely mean that the limb-buds lacked the necessary nervous tissue to move independently of the trunk. There is no organismic entelechy or pattern imposing itself upon the developing limbs, but merely the mechanics of movement based upon physical structure. Coghill's study shows the interrelationship of parts in the maturation of a relatively simple organism and the dependence of function upon the structure. It does not prove that integrated patterns such as we find in adult personalities exist from the start.

Studies of mammalian fetuses, moreover, do not indicate perfectly integrated patterns of activity. Coronios concluded from his elaborate study of cat embryos: "The development of behavior progresses from a diffuse, massive, variable, relatively unorganized state to a condition where many of the reactions

are more regular in their appearance, less variable, better coordinated, and relatively individualized" (7). Here, too, is evidence of individuation, not, however, as the differentiation of a minor pattern from a well structured whole, but as the refinement of responses from a diffuse, unintegrated state. The most extensive observations of the human fetus are those of M. Minkowski, who studied 17 human embryos delivered prematurely at ages of six weeks to five months (15). His findings are that diffuse massive response precedes specific reactions to stimuli, and that the early movements of the human fetus are *asymmetrical, arrhythmical* and *uncoordinated*.

The upshot of the controversy concerning individuation is that the old notion of the human infant as a bundle of independent specialized reactions awaiting coordination into higher patterns is somewhat off center. Specific responses develop out of mass action and must await their proper maturational level before they can be partialled out of total activity by a process of learning. Similarly, the exaggerated picture of the infant as a structure of highly integrated patterns which can be broken down into finer units must be discarded. Early mass activity is not a true patterning but a diffuse overflow of energy into the most available channels. The channels related to successful adjustment become selected out through experience.

Differentiation and Personality Development

The specific application of differentiation to personality, in the light of the above considerations, cannot follow Coghill's thesis of the unfolding of partial patterns within a total unitary pattern. A thoroughly unified personality does not precede development. It is the resultant of developmental processes, and in many individuals it is never completely achieved. Individuation in personality development emphasizes the fact that the child is a complex of undifferentiated, confused behavior tendencies. The finely discriminating adjustments of the adult are lacking. The subtle nuances of emotional expression in the adult contrast strikingly with the uncontrolled, undirected dis-

play of emotional energy in the child. When the child wants something he gives away his desire by movements of his whole body. G. W. Allport writes:

Motor tensions in the child are far more totalized and imperative than in a self-controlled (well differentiated) adult. A child of three, for example, who is "set" to respond in some particular way cannot delay his response even until the starting signal is given. And every parent knows the exasperating insistence of a child who must wait twenty minutes to be read to, or who expects to leave for the circus in an hour. There is little capacity for delay. There is likewise little capacity for graded response. When the child acts he uses more of his body than does the adult. When he is pleased he jumps up and down; when he is angry he is "mad all over." . . . Especially when he reads, writes, talks, or practices on the piano, he wriggles or fusses. Precise co-ordination and patient skill are beyond him [2, pp. 133-134].

How Personality Integration Comes About

If the first stage of development is the breaking down of mass activity into specific responses, how then does the individual acquire a consistent pattern of behavior? Three main methods of behavior organization explain the unified personality. The first way is through an interconditioning of responses which occur together spatially, because of the constancy of the relationships between objects in the objective world, or which follow one another in temporal sequence on a similar objective basis (see pages 230-231). The child puts together a number of specific reactions in learning to ride a bicycle. Similarly, his elders help him to develop a pattern of politeness by emphasizing that the request "Please" precedes "Thank you" and these verbal responses should be accompanied by a smile.

Interconditioning of this sort, though it produces patterned behavior, does not in itself explain generalized types of response. Granted that patterns are constructed through learning, these patterns are still specific to a given situation. They become generalized and employed in many situations through the process called *reasoning* or *insight*. In reasoning, a common feature is perceived in widely differing settings. Such

generalization has been observed in infrahuman animals. In Köhler's experiments on anthropoid apes food was placed beyond the animal's reach and the animal learned to obtain the food by means of a stick. After long experience in experiments with the use of sticks, the ape was deprived of sticks and still tempted by food. In the enclosure which imprisoned the ape was a small tree. After surveying the situation the ape went over to the tree, broke off a branch and used it to obtain food. Psychologists do not agree concerning the precise explanation of the process of reasoning. The objective explanation is that the ape was conditioned to the visual stimulus of the stick as a necessary tool in obtaining food beyond his reach. Although the experimenter varied the situation, the ape was able to pick out the object which had helped him before, even though it now appeared as a branch of a tree. He was able to break down his response to the tree as a tree and see in one of its branches a functional tool. To see identity in difference is the basis of generalization. Personality becomes integrated as the child learns to see common elements and common relationships in various settings. A general trait of honesty develops through finding the specific relationship common to many situations which call for ethical conduct. The honest personality has generalized out of lying, stealing, cheating, and other forms of misappropriation the common factor of social unfairness. Similarly, a philosophy of life may be built up, which unifies the individual's attitudes toward all the problems in his universe.

Still a third way exists by means of which the individual comes to show a consistent front in varying situations. A response or a pattern of responses may become conditioned to many fairly continuous sources of stimulation. This is E. B. Holt's principle of *cross-conditioning* (see pp. 261 and 262). In discussing motivation in Chapter IX, attention was called to many relatively constant stimuli such as the pressure of clothes upon the skin, light waves affecting the retina of the eye, and characteristic background sounds and noises impinging upon the ear. Internally, as long as the heart beats and the lungs

breathe, sensory nerve impulses pour into the central nervous system. Now in childhood these constant or fairly constant stimuli become conditioned to the child's most frequent activities. Hence they become the sources which feed these early-established habits all through life. Thus they account for the characteristic and consistent behavior of the individual no matter what his *milieu* is.*

The principle of cross-conditioning accounts not only for the characteristic posture of the individual but for his more complex habits as well. The child, for example, who is encouraged to declaim and act on every occasion may easily acquire permanent exhibitionistic traits. Then in situations which do not call for acting the child will continue to pose and strut.

Cross-conditioning is thus the basis for those characteristic habits, skills, emotions, and thoughts which give a creature a personality of its own. Without cross-conditioning adult behavior would show little initiative and direction save for the appetitive drives such as hunger and sex. The controlling and directing nature of cross-conditioning in the organization of the individual's responses can be observed only developmentally. Let us consider the child who is left alone to manip-

* In Holt's own words: "While stooping over his books the boy's total afferent pattern comprises many impulses besides those which are stimulated by the desk and books to which he is immediately responding. There are the characteristic sights, sounds, and odours of the school-room, and also various more or less continuous afferent nerve impulses from the boy's own internal organs. All of these concomitant afferent impulses, according to Pavlov's law of the conditioned reflex, are to some extent acquiring *collateral motor outlet* into the lad's posture of sitting and leaning forward over his books. As this continues day by day, and if it is not counteracted by distinct change of posture and diversity of motor activity, the stooping posture besides being well canalized will come to be so *steadily innervated* by such extraneous and ubiquitous afferent impulses as to be beyond correction. And this is dynamogenic or cross-conditioning. Of these concomitant stimulations, the sights and odours of the school-room will be active only when the boy is there, but all the afferent impulses from organic sources he carries about within him. And when any posture or motor habit has been so persistently maintained as to become, more deeply than any other postures or habits, cross-conditioned to afferent impulses from the internal organs (as, say heartbeat and breathing rhythm) it has become in very truth 'second nature'" (*Animal Drive and the Learning Process*, Henry Holt, pp. 223-4).

ulate crayons and pencils for long periods of time and so becomes conditioned to play at drawing. When he is sent to school, the subjects which will appeal to him will be those in which he has an opportunity to draw. Later he will show an interest in books which pertain directly and even indirectly to his hobby. His dominant approach to life will be in terms of graphic representations of objects, people, and situations. He may become keenly observant of many things in the visual world which most people fail to notice. As he grows and develops he meets many situations and many problems calling for all types of response and adjustment. But the response he makes will be the one which is most closely related to his early cross-conditioning. And around this prepotent interest many activities become organized.

The unification of the adult personality is thus derived through *interconditioning*, *reasoning* or insight, and *cross-conditioning*. Integration achieved through reasoning, however, differs considerably from integration produced by cross-conditioning. Reasoning implies an adjustment of the individual's experiences to the relevant facts in the situation before him. Cross-conditioning brings about a consistency of behavior on the basis of factors irrelevant to the immediate situation. Each of these two processes gives rise to partial integration. True integration depends upon their mutual operation.

The partial integration resulting from cross-conditioning is illustrated in the narrowminded specialist or in the fanatical reformer. Such a personality may seem highly integrated since his life is organized about a single type of interest. But in a world full of cabbages and kings, fascists and communists, war and revolution this organization excludes too much. An integrated individual must be able not only to behave consistently with his interests but also to adjust to the realities about him. The cross-conditioned person, since his consistency is based on irrelevant stimuli, is often unable to look at the developing social scene and see what is really there. Outside of the narrow field in which his integration properly applies, he is disastrously ineffective. Removed from this field he may break down com-

pletely or live in a dream world of his own with his means of physical livelihood supplied by friends and relatives. Too single-minded an integration in life turns into its opposite and becomes disintegration.

Similarly, reasoning by itself does not produce true integration. The man who applies insight only to the immediate situation varies too much from day to day. He needs permanent interests to unify his life and give it meaning. Otherwise his chameleon-like nature can make him a charlatan. He is all things to all men including himself. Complete integration involves the interaction of reasoning and cross-conditioning. The truly unified individual is the man with cross-conditioned purposes of his own who can adjust these interests to the variable world in which he lives.

Organization and Integration Must Not Be Identified with Non-Specificity

Though the integrated patterns of adult life are not reflections of the mass unitary behavior of early childhood, it is nevertheless true that some diffuse actions do persist. Differentiation is not always carried to its logical conclusion in development. The partialling out of all useless response from the initial mass activity is a long procedure and is not necessarily attained in every case. For example, in an act of motor skill such as playing tennis, few people achieve the minimum of effort which makes for "form" or grace of performance. Many players keep some of the early elements of mass action, unsuited to the problem. They gallop madly over the court, contort their faces at every shot, and also bring into play, in their shot-making, other muscles which do not add to the effectiveness of their strokes. Similarly, in personality development many children make permanent in themselves parts of early mass response unessential for adequate adaptation. An extreme example is the child who learns to show outward deference toward authority but retains in addition his early emotional reaction in abridged form. He may grow up to be the

person who hates authority though grudgingly bending before it. Or his early experiences may have included a fear component which still appears when he is confronted with symbols of power.

This lack of specificity on the response end of the arc is similar to the non-specificity in stimulus discrimination often erroneously called generalization. Children may call any small fuzzy animal a cat, because they fail to differentiate out the specific form-quality of cat. They see merely identity, not identity in difference. Such failure to discriminate is analogous to, if not the same as, the *irradiation* in the first stages of the conditioned response. Pavlov's dogs at first gave a conditioned salivary reaction not only to the ringing of the bell but to any sound stimulus and to other stimuli as well. With more training the irradiation became less, until finally the field of effective stimuli was narrowed to sounds similar to the ringing of a bell.

Experiments have shown that it is very difficult to establish specificity of reaction for trace conditioned reflexes. Trace reflexes are conditioned reflexes in which an interval of time elapses between the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned stimulus. Thus if a bell were rung ten minutes before food was presented to a dog, the resulting conditioned reflex would be called a trace reflex. In this case, however, the irradiation of the conditioning to many stimuli shows very little narrowing. A great deal of our verbal conditioning is of this nature.

We use verbal labels apart from specific experiences which would limit their meaning. The terms *Bolshevik*, *Fascist*, *Turk*, and *loafer* become stereotypes because originally they were not used consistently in immediate temporal connection with a particular type of person.

The lack of discrimination in stereotypes and the persistence of a certain amount of mass action make for a non-specific adjustment which is sometimes termed generality of behavior. Such generality is not to be confused, however, with the organized, integrated patterns of the mature personality. Non-specificity is not synonymous with true generalization.

Evidence Concerning the Extent of Integration

We have described the ways in which personality becomes organized into a unitary system. The implication in this description has been that development proceeds toward integration. The factual evidence concerning the extent of integration bears out this assumption. Even the specificists and generalists, who differ violently on the meaning of integration, admit that individuals show a high degree of consistency in their behavior, but not complete consistency.

G. W. Allport and P. Vernon have studied the consistency of various expressive movements such as handwriting, walking, drawing, and speed of performance (3). They found no general factor of motility which could be assumed to enter into all expressive movements, but they did find that certain functions were very closely related. For example, the average correlations for tasks performed with different muscle groups were just as high as those performed with identical muscles. Also the speed of reading, of counting, or handwriting, and black-board writing gave a very high average intercorrelation.

In the field of attitudes H. Cantril has shown that general determining tendencies and attitudes do exist and that they exert a directive influence upon more specific reactions (5). In one of Cantril's experiments subjects were presented with a large number of problems to which they could respond either with a practical, a theoretical, an aesthetic, a religious, a social, or a political evaluation. In spite of the fact that the specific content of the situations and problems varied, subjects maintained a constant attitude. For example, the individual who showed a practical outlook on life in one situation, on the whole showed a practical outlook in other situations. In another experiment Cantril measured the reaction times to specific words reflecting the same six value-attitudes. Subjects with strong aesthetic values respond more quickly to such stimulus words as music, landscape, and poem than to such words as money, science, and church.

The extensive experimental investigation of character traits

in children by May and Hartshorne has been interpreted as proof of the specificity hypothesis. Here again it is necessary to separate questions of interpretation from questions of fact. The results of the May-Hartshorne study are not in essential disagreement with the studies already cited. They do show much more specificity than the other investigations but they also reveal important consistencies in honest and dishonest behavior. The real conclusion to be drawn is that neither adults nor children show complete generalization of behavior or complete lack of relation between items of their behavior, and adults show more integration than children.

May and Hartshorne studied three types of deceptive behavior: cheating, stealing, and lying (11). For detecting cheating they used such techniques as the following: The *duplicating technique* consisted of making exact copies of pupil's test papers, of returning these test papers to the pupils, and of allowing them to score their own answers. The *improbable achievement technique* consisted in allowing pupils to report scores on tests given under conditions which made achievement above a certain level impossible without deception. For detecting stealing, the pupils were allowed to work puzzles with coins. Unknown to the pupils a careful check was made upon the exact amount of money returned with the puzzle. For detecting lying the principle of the "improbable achievement technique" was invoked in a questionnaire for the most part concerned with conduct.

Children showed considerable consistency in the various tests involving the same type of deception, for example cheating in the schoolroom. The correlations between the various types of cheating, however, were very low. The gross correlation coefficients masked a high consistency in a small minority of the 2,400 pupils tested. Three per cent cheated at every opportunity and 7 per cent cheated not at all. Moreover, in a further test, which contained varying amounts of resistance to be overcome in order to cheat, it was found that children who cheated at a level involving great effort also cheated at levels

involving less effort. The levels were arranged by making it more and more difficult to change answers to tests.

From experimental findings, therefore, personality should not be regarded as a composite of many unrelated, wholly specific characteristics. Neither should personality be regarded as a completely consistent, harmonious unit. Individuals are highly complex; they have many water-tight compartments in their thinking and acting. An individual can be classified as possessing not one but a number of generalized functions. General types of behavior exist, but no one general factor accounts for all the conduct of an individual.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EGO

The ego has already been described as the symbol standing for the unity of the individual against the rest of the world, and the core of emotional responses tied to this symbol. The symbol is verbalized in the form of the personal pronoun, I. The development of the self has been briefly stated as the struggle between the reality and pleasure principles. Many stages in the development can be studied, of which the following five have been selected for brief analysis.

1. The Growth of the Vague Notion of the Me and the Not-Me

The infant is a physical unity with an integrating nervous system. Hence it is inevitable that sooner or later the child will develop a generalized symbol to represent this physical unity as a figure against the background of a non-personal world. In the beginning, however, the baby gives no sign that it has a notion of self and not-self. It plays with its toes as if they were objects not attached to its body. It will scratch and maul itself. The boundaries between its own body and the environment are not clearly defined. Moved by the pleasure principle, the child soon realizes the thwarting of this principle when it injures its own body. The pleasure principle thus negates itself and makes the child aware of obstacles in

the path of its satisfactions. The basis for the first recognition of self is the nature of the sensory impulses aroused by random activity. When the child strikes itself, it receives afferent impulses both from the part struck and from the offending member. When it strikes an object, it receives impulses only from the striking hand and arm. Moreover, there is always a kin-aesthetic backflow from its own movements due to stimulation of proprioceptive end organs, whereas there is no such afferent backlash from its observation of movements of objects. Early experiences thus produce the first vague notion which the child has of itself as differentiated from its world.

2. The Symbolization of the Notion of Self through Name and Personal Pronoun with a Resulting Generalization of Wants in Terms of the Ego Symbol

The vague notion of self becomes crystallized through the ready-made symbol furnished by the social group in the form of a name and the personal pronoun. Before the child uses his own name, he learns that his father and mother have handles in the form of names. That he himself has a name is a later discovery, which grows out of the constant reference his parents make to his name in describing his wants and actions. The common report is that children in referring to themselves use their names before they use the personal pronoun. This is not as invariable a developmental sequence as has been supposed, however. Some children refer to themselves as "I" before they use their names. At any rate self-reference of one sort or another begins shortly after the use of speech and occurs in many children in the second year of life. Between two and two and a half years, the child's speech shows a definite recognition of selfhood. He talks a great deal about himself describing what "I, John Jones" did, and "I want" is one of the most common clauses in his vocabulary. Moreover, he corrects the adult who calls him by the wrong name.

Experience itself differentiates the self from the not-self, but to have the process named in advance and named at every

step of the game hastens ego development. The verbal symbols for self enable the child to generalize his needs and experiences, and social influences set the example for him. The individual "becomes an object to himself," G. Mead believes, "only by taking the attitude of other individuals toward himself" (14, p. 138). All his wants and actions are stated as generalized attributes of himself by his elders. He is regarded by those closest to him as a person and not as a bundle of physiological needs. It is not only the specific act which is praised or censured but the child himself. "You were a bad boy, John, to pour ink into your father's hat," scolds the mother. Specific wants are not only verbalized by the parents, they are also verbalized as the wants of the child. Thirst is not merely referred to the mouth and throat nor hunger to the stomach. It is John who is hungry or Bill who is thirsty.

The child speedily assimilates his desires to the same concept of self or ego. Reference to the ego either by others or by the individual himself thus has a powerful motivating force. It involves the most basic experience of a person. The problem has been well summarized by G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb:

The thing known as the self is a selection and organization of experiences involving visceral tensions, muscular strains, the sound of one's name, one's mirror image, and so on; and the thing which knows this pattern is simply the organism as a whole. If this is correct, it is easy to see that the self, being a primary source of many satisfactions, *must inevitably become a value*. . . . Adient responses toward parts of our own body and toward our own voices and mirror images develop parallel with the awareness that the self is the thing which will have to be enhanced, assisted and rewarded if we, as organisms, are to live abundantly and satisfyingly (16, pp. 209-210).

3. The Use of the Self-Symbol for Comparison of Self with Others

The personal pronoun, as we have just seen, affords the child a symbol for generalizing his experiences and desires. It also aids in the growth of the ego by facilitating a comparison

between selves. This comparison is precipitated by the clash of personalities and by social teaching. The child comes into conflict with other children. He wants the same toy at the same time as does his companion. At first the defeated child may easily be diverted from his specific disappointment. Soon, however, his disappointment becomes involved with his self-concept. It is not only his desire for the toy which is balked but all the desires associated with the symbol of self. Nor is it long before the child feels himself defeated by another self. Sometimes he may not want a plaything until he sees another child going after it. He has enough imagination to put himself in the other youngster's shoes and to see the desirability of the toy. Now if he fails to get the toy, it is the self which has failed and it is the self which is defeated by another self. Another has what he wants.

The comparison which the child makes between himself and other selves is dampened or encouraged by his particular culture. In our society the growing youngster constantly hears his actions, accomplishments, and physical attributes evaluated with reference to other children. He is better, brighter, more daring than the children next door. He must do his best to stand well in his group and not be backward in any respect. Even the non-individualistic values are taught in competitive fashion. The well-behaved, socialized boy or girl is held up as a model for all the children in the neighborhood to copy. Charity toward others is taught in the elementary school in raising money for the unfortunate through a system of quotas for each grade. The grades vie with one another in trying to be the first to reach the quota, and every child is subject to social approval or disapproval according to his contribution.

The competitive motive to outdo one's fellows is thus rooted in the ego concept. The motivating force in self-reference is directed toward enhancement of the ego at the expense of other egos. This direction of ego motivation further intensifies ego feeling and ego drive because it becomes a circular process. The more effort one expends to outstrip a rival, the more one's rival will exert himself, therefore the greater the

energy needed to beat him. It is like the armament race between nations. Furthermore, a competitive ego motive is fed from many sources. Almost any person engaged in any activity is a potential rival. If one's neighbor acquires a new car, plants more flowers in his garden, or collects antiques, his behavior may be a stimulus for one to keep up with Mr. Jones. The fierce egoism and the unbridled aggression in a competitive society are the results of a self-concept which is expressed in terms of comparison with other selves.

4. The Extension of the Self

As undifferentiated experiences of the child become broken down into a notion of the me and not-me, an opposed process is in the making. The development of the self does not stop at the boundaries of the child's own body or of his immediate wants. Gradually it comes to include other things. The child's toys and possessions become part of himself. His cherished possessions may be taken to bed at night, and interference with them is treated as if it were interference with the child himself. The self also is extended to include the people about the child. The child becomes attached to his mother and may in time treat her to some extent as part of his own personality. The extension of the ego negates itself. The purely selfish tendency to treat objects external to yourself as yours becomes unselfish when it applies to other people. The child who identifies himself with a parent and acts to please the parent because by so doing he is pleasing himself has advanced a stage over the narrowly selfish egoist. The old debate about the selfishness of all actions is an academic issue. Practically, selfishness means lack of regard for others. Hence there is a world of difference between the man who acts only for himself and the man who acts as if all mankind were part of his ego.

The extension of the self to include others generally stops short of the immediate family. Men regard their wives and children as part of themselves. Sometimes the self-identifica-

tion embraces the immediate interest group, on occasions it may take in the community, and in times of emergency the nation. The social extension of the self has the socializing effect of turning the individual's energies away from his own biological satisfactions to the needs of others.

5. The Restriction of the Self

At the same time that the self is expanding in one dimension it is contracting in another. The growing personality learns to objectify some of its experiences and desires. Not everything a man does or says is linked with his ego. He divorces many of the experiences which earlier concerned him deeply. If other things were equal, we should expect that attributes and accomplishments of the individual which bear no relation to his own efforts would drop away from his ego most frequently and most completely. Since he has had little to say about his physical characteristics and since nothing that he has done has given him some of the positions he holds, conceivably he might not value these as part of himself. The contrary is too often the case. The things which are valued in his social group become the things which are included in his ego. Though he has not chosen his ancestors, he may still be inordinately proud of his lineage. Genealogical tables of doubtful accuracy can be sold at a profit as long as people value inherited status.

The self becomes restricted as personality matures according to two patterns. First, it narrows to exclude almost everything but the values socially prescribed for its age group. As a rule, adults no longer include their physical abilities as central parts of their selves. The middle-aged man does not care if someone can run faster or lift a heavier weight than he. Commercial success becomes the important goal, and a man cares little about his physique, his ability to enjoy art, his intellectual appreciation of the world so long as he is regarded as a financial pillar of his community. Second, the self narrows according to the emotional maturity and the intelligent insight of a person. The intelligent individual who has escaped emotional

trauma goes through life shedding the superficial values of the multitude, taking part in the conventional pursuits of his group but never becoming deeply involved in them emotionally. He forms a contrast to the emotionally immature person who feels every small disappointment as a personal defeat and every social slight as a deflation of his ego. This problem of the nature of the adult ego is highly important for an understanding of personality. It is so bound up with inferiority conflict and ego misplacement that some consideration must be given to these topics before we leave the subject of the self.

Inferiority Conflict

Personalities fail of complete integration for two reasons, the first negative, the second positive. In the first place the organizing effects of experience may not go quite far enough. Interference with cross-conditioning may check the development of a dominant interest which would help to unify the individual's life. Or too great specialization may not be accompanied by the profound intelligence necessary to relate the world to the individual's speciality. In either case, however, the personality, though not completely put together, is not at war with itself. Internal war is the second reason for lack of integration. In this instance the individual does not fall short of genuine integration. Internal conflict is perhaps the most important single key for unlocking the mysteries of personality. Inconsistencies in behavior, overreaction, defense mechanisms, rationalization, flight from reality, and compensation are often the product of internalized motives which are in conflict. Sometimes the conflict is between the sex drive and internalized prohibitions called the conscience. Perhaps the most significant of the interiorized struggles in American culture are ego conflicts, generally subsumed under the term *inferiority conflict*.

In bare outline, inferiority conflict may be stated as the opposition between the individual's self-estimate and his level of aspiration. The level of aspiration includes generalized desires of what the individual wants to be and to do. His self-estimate

is not his actual level of performance but his idea of that level. Inferiority conflict is thus a struggle within the ego itself. It is true internal conflict only if the fear of failure is fairly constant. Almost everyone at one time or another confronts a problem which temporarily shakes his self-confidence. The person characterized by inferiority conflict, however, acts as if the fear of failure came from some constant source within him and not from the momentary nature of the stimulus situation.

Genesis of Inferiority Conflict

Alfred Adler has traced the origin of the inferiority conflict to organic defects and to the dependence of the child upon his parents. The organic defects which Adler emphasizes include other handicaps besides obvious structural deformities. They include subtle types of physical weakness and extend to the child's helplessness before an adult. If we go back to childhood, according to Adler, "we always come upon the outstanding fact that, throughout the whole period of development, the child possesses a feeling of inferiority in its relations both to parents and the world at large" (1, p. 13). The question arises why these feelings of inferiority are carried over into maturity when the individual is physically capable of taking care of himself. The answer to this question involves a more specific analysis of the genesis of inferiority conflict through a consideration of the many factors which contribute to it. Four important factors are (1) the general cultural emphasis upon a high aspiration level which can be really attained by only a few, (2) the specific parental errors of overindulging or underprivileging the child, (3) the sense of guilt due to sex taboos, (4) and the circular reinforcement of the conflicting forces.

The first factor of the general cultural emphasis upon a high aspiration level is found in those societies which glorify individual initiative and individual ability. In America the child is brought up in the tradition of "from canal-boy to President." He is fed on success stories at home and in school. The best things of life are open to the individual, if he has only the

ambition to succeed. And the family do their best to inculcate ambition in the growing youngster. Very few American children want to follow in the footsteps of their fathers. If the father is a wage worker, the son wants to become a business man. If the father is a small business man, the son wants to become a professional man; if a professional man, the son wants to become a captain of industry. Parents project their ambitions into their children and are eager to have them scale the heights the parents never achieved, whether the heights are a college education, a \$5,000 yearly income, or a position in the public eye. In a recent study in which people were asked how large an income they needed to be happy, most people set the figure at one-third more than their present income. This was true whether their present income was \$1,000 a year or \$10,000. The overstimulation of ambition serves the purpose of motivating men to develop industries at the breakneck rate of capitalistic development.

The high level of aspiration becomes internalized as the individual's ego-goal by the social emphasis upon individual initiative and individual responsibility. Paralleling the social approbation upon success is the condemnation of failure as the inadequacy of the individual. Failure in any endeavor is a personal reflection upon the individual. No matter how complex the social process in which the individual is involved, his position in it is his own. Even when the army of unemployed rises over 10,000,000 the unfortunate plight of the man out of a job is taken as evidence of his laziness or personal incapacity. The result of the glorification of rugged individualism is a high incidence of inferiority conflict. Children are praised highly for their successes and censured for their failures. In an effort to secure praise and escape blame they rationalize their shortcomings. It is characteristic of Americans to distrust admission of weakness as false modesty or mock humility.

In addition to the general factor of the high aspiration level of a whole culture is the particular factor of parental training. Parental training is inclined to take one of two extremes. Either the child is pampered and coddled in preschool years

and then left to adjust to a world for which he is totally unprepared, or he is treated so harshly from the start that he develops avoidant responses instead of independence. The former course is the more common. The infant is overindulged, and the child from two to four years is made the center of the household. His ego is inflated, all the while everything is done for him. He is given little chance to develop his independence. The arrival of a new baby suddenly changes his role. Now he ceases to be the baby and is treated as if he were a small adult. The transition is too great. The child fails in what is expected of him. If now he meets ridicule and punishment he may well develop a constant fear of failure. Some children, on the other hand, are neglected as much as possible from the start. It is surprising how well such youngsters turn out in the main. Nevertheless this procedure can easily produce an inferiority conflict in the sensitive child. He lacks a feeling of security. He cannot cope with the world, and he cannot depend upon anyone to intervene for him. His feeling of being unwanted in the family may later turn into a feeling of being rejected by the world.

A third factor making for inferiority attitudes is the *sense of guilt* associated with sex interest or sex practices. The sinfulness of sex is ingrained at an early age. Rigid parental disapproval makes the subject one of taboo. Curiosity or experimentation concerning sex is often accompanied by a feeling of unworthiness. The child feels that he has done something which is intrinsically evil. He is afraid that, if other people knew about his guilt, the world of social approval upon which he depends would collapse. He is also less worthy in his own eyes. Hence a conviction of sin means an insecurity of the ego, a fear that the aspiration level will not be attained. The sense of guilt need not necessarily be related to sex. The child who has violated anything which is for him a taboo has his self-confidence undermined.

A fourth factor to be considered in the acquisition of inferiority conflict is the *circular reinforcement of the conflicting forces*. One way of resolving the conflict is to lower the aspira-

tion level of the ego. This is difficult to accomplish because of the social premium placed upon success. If an individual could renounce the goals valued in his culture, he might save himself much mental anguish. But it was precisely because he set great store by the opinions of his fellows that his original conflict arose. The tendency, then, is not to lower the aspiration level but to raise it. As the individual feels his inadequacy, he aspires to higher goals to compensate for his inferiority. In Adler's words: "Thus the child arrives at the positing of a goal, an imagined goal of superiority, whereby his poverty is transformed into wealth, his subordination into determination, his ignorance into omniscience, and his incapacity into artistic creation. The longer and more definitely the child feels his insecurity, the more he suffers either from physical or marked mental weakness, the more he is aware of life's neglect, the higher will this goal be placed and the more faithfully will it be adhered to" (1, p. 14). The more lofty his ambition, the more difficult it is to make his aspiration square with reality. In extreme cases the inferiority conflict produces a striving for perfection and infallibility which makes it impossible for the individual to accept any criticism or disapproval. This unattainable goal is a fiction which aggravates rather than alleviates the conflict. The logical conclusion of this reaction to inferiority can be seen in the paranoiac who stoutly maintains that she is the Queen of England as she scrubs the floors of the asylum.

We have still not considered at any length the role of real inferiority, of physical weakness, of mental incapacity, and the social handicaps of poverty. Real inferiority is, however, only a contributory factor, and it is effective only in mutual operation with the factors already discussed. Physical and mental handicaps become psychological handicaps through socially stimulated competition and through the inculcation of the wrong level of aspiration. Naturally the child of poor physical or mental endowment starts with the dice loaded against him. So, too, does the child who comes from a home where poverty and want permeate the family atmosphere with the chill of insecurity. Studies of inferiority feeling, however, show that it

can breed in other conditions than those of factual inferiority. Table IX summarizes a study by G. W. Allport of the number of college students reporting feelings of inferiority. The table shows that there is no close correlation between felt inferiority and actual inferiority. Over half of the students report that at one time or another they have experienced persistent feelings of intellectual inferiority. Statistically this large number cannot be below the average in intelligence. College students, moreover, are a selected group in respect to intelligence, to health, to economic background.

TABLE IX

INFERIORITY FEELINGS REPORTED BY COLLEGE STUDENTS
After G. W. Allport (2) (Courtesy of Henry Holt and Co.)

Type of inferiority feelings	Men 175		Women 100	
	Percentage reporting persistent inferiority feelings			
	Formerly	Now	Formerly	Now
Physical	60	48	56	55
Social	60	58	65	65
Intellectual	58	29	25	64
Moral	37	17	25	18
None at all	8	10	2	9

The lack of a close relationship between feelings of inferiority and actual inferiority is evidenced in the interesting cases of those who try realistically to dispel their inadequacy through objective achievement. Frequently, their inferiority conflicts are not cleared up by success, no matter how convincing the success is to the rest of the world. Apparently a person of this description shifts his level of aspiration after every successful realization of his immediate goal. The objective he had set his heart upon turns to ashes when he attains it. It can't be worth while or he never would have grasped it, his inferiority whispers to him. So now he sets up a new goal. His life is an unhappy progression up the ladder of success.

SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT OF PERSONALITIES RESULTING FROM THE INTERACTION OF SUGGESTION AND TRIAL-AND-ERROR LEARNING

The adjustment of the personality to its social world includes the unification of responses which give consistency to behavior, and the extension of the ego to embrace other members of the group, on the one hand, and the restriction of the ego to exclude unimportant bits of experience, on the other hand. In addition, personality adjustment can be considered in relation to the *complexity* of the social environment. The world which confronts the growing personality is at times relatively simple and at other times highly complicated. Out of the changing complexity of environmental relations develop three different types of adjustment. The first type of adjustment, the *synergic*, originates in relatively simple stimulus situations. From complex situations may appear another adjustive process, namely, a *discriminating course of conduct* in which the individual takes account of the many elements of the problem. Complex situations may also give rise to a third type of adjustment, *dissociated behavior*, in which the individual reacts to only part of the problem.

Synergic Adjustment

Synergic adjustment is an adjustment either completely avoidant or completely adient toward a simple situation. The flow of nerve impulses to many muscle groups activates those muscles which either take the individual away from an object or propel him toward it. A man flees a burning house, his eyes smarting from smoke, his throat irritated by it, and his skin scorched. All these sources of intense stimulation are forces making for the same behavior, immediate and precipitate flight from the fire. Similarly, a person rushes to grasp the hand of a close friend in cordial greeting. His whole pattern of action is adient.

Simple patterns of adience and avoidance are called out, therefore, when the objective situation is itself simple. The problem does not suggest conflicting solutions, and the ad-

justment is direct and straightforward. This simple adjustment becomes a characteristic response to objects and relationships when objects and relationships are *constant* in nature. Fire always burns, no matter how many times a child puts his hand into it. Hence fire early becomes a stimulus which evokes avoidance. The learning here is Pavlovian conditioning. Other simple problems are constant for a given culture because all the social agencies which train the child, such as parents, teachers, and books, present a united front in their teachings. And another factor must be added, namely, that this united front is not contradicted by biological or natural conditions. The folkways, discussed in Chapter II, are by and large synergic adjustments of this description. Social precept and example in our society prescribes the wearing of shoes. The child sees no exception to this practice and also finds that shoes protect his feet against hard pavement, sharp stones, and cold air.

Discriminating Adjustment to Complex Situations

A second and more complex pattern of behavior is the orientation to many aspects of the environment at one and the same time. The individual is simultaneously adient toward a number of objects and avoidant to others. This behavior is the solution of a complex problem through trial-and-error learning. We learn to take account of all the important elements and relations in a situation. Our final pattern of conduct represents a balanced or discriminating adjustment in which a solution has been found to the conflicting tendencies at first aroused by the problem.

An excellent example of this second pattern is found in E. B. Holt's description of the child who learns to sustain reflexes to many objects in his environment. The child plays with his toy, a miniature wheelbarrow, which he trundles over the rugs. He is first adient toward the red lines in the carpet and follows them carefully. On one excursion this takes him into a querulous aunt whose rocker is placed over one of the red lines. On another excursion the child comes too close to

the radiator for his own comfort. Finally he is called to dinner. He comes trundling his toy, and *the path he takes shows an adjustment to many elements in the situation*. He is still adient toward the red lines in the carpet and at the same time adient toward the general direction of the dining room, and yet avoidant of both the radiator and his aunt's chair.

Dissociated Orientations or Partial Adjustments

In contrast to this second pattern of behavior stands a third type which does not represent a fusion of the many forces playing upon the organism. The individual neglects some part of the situation and reacts overtly only to certain relations in the problem. The ignoring of part of the problem may be due either to repression or to suggestion. In repression there is a conflict between behavioral tendencies called out by the various aspects of the problem. One set of responses wins out with the resulting suppression of opposed tendencies. In suggestion there is also inhibition of many of the individual's potential reactions. In suggestion, however, the inhibition does not come from the temporary victory in *internal* conflict of one set of wishes. The inhibition results more from the *external* situation, which narrows the individual's behavior by blocking out incipient reactions almost as soon as they form. Both repression and suggestion lead to partial adjustment and not discriminating conduct. Their operation may be illustrated by the behavior of two men who join in the enthusiastic applause of an audience to a political speech. The first man is a rival of the speaker and unconsciously hates him. Proper social form, however, demands courtesy toward an opponent, and so the man represses his antagonism and applauds. The second man applauds the speech because the prestige of the orator and the universal approval of the group have inhibited his critical thought processes. The ideas in the speech are really opposed to some of his interests, hence in his applause he is making only a partial adjustment to the problem.

Though both men show a lack of balance in their approval of the speech, there is nevertheless a difference in their behavior.

The man who suppressed his dislike may shortly afterward seek to undermine his rival by spreading slander about him. This splitting up of a situation for present and future reaction means an alternation of opposed behavioral tendencies in the individual. In extreme form it gives us split personality. Repression, of course, does not necessarily mean that the suppressed wishes will appear in overt form as in the above example. These hidden desires may be so well repressed that they may never take complete possession of the individual. Their outlet may be only indirect in slips of speech, in projection, in overcorrection, or in symbolic actions. On the other hand, the man who uncritically accepted the suggestions of the speaker will show neither a violent reversal nor the indirect mechanisms as described above. His behavior will show an inconsistency of a less emotional sort. He will have no real solution to his problem, but it will not cause any *immediate* internal stress or strain. Eventually, however, if he attempts to meet all problems through the acceptance of social suggestion, he is likely to be led into such gross inconsistency that he, too, may show evidence of internal conflict.

The partial adjustment produced by suggestion is often not productive of internal conflict, because the ideas acquired through suggestion may not be deeply interiorized within the individual. It is sometimes assumed that the child takes over bodily all the values of his social group and that these attitudes automatically become part of his personality. Though children do absorb adult prejudices readily, it takes time and experience to internalize the culture pattern. In a study of the development of attitudes toward the Negro, E. L. Horowitz presents evidence of the types of prejudice at various age levels (12). The technique in this experiment included the administration of *three* attitude tests to boys in grade school from the kindergarten to the eighth grade. In the *rank tests* the subject was shown photographs of four white boys and eight Negro boys. The Negro photographs represented various degrees of skin color. The subjects were asked to select the one picture they liked best, the next best, and so on. In the *show me* test they

were asked to show the experimenter the photographs of the boys they wanted as companions in various imaginary situations. In the *social-situation test*, photographs were taken of four white boys in such activities as listening to a radio, eating, and playing marbles. These same situations were photographed again with Negroes substituted for one or more of the white boys. These pictures were presented to the children and they were asked if they wanted to join in and do what the boys were doing along with them.

The results of this experiment are revealing in relation to the problem of the internalization of group attitudes. The *rank's test* and the *show me test* indicated prejudice against the Negro in the kindergarten, a large increase of prejudice in the first grade, but no reliable increase thereafter. The more realistic *social-situation test*, however, showed little prejudice in the kindergarten, a slight increase in the first grade and no increase thereafter until the fifth grade. In other words, though children of five years absorb the stereotypes of their cultural group, these attitudes are at first public responses to symbols. They become interiorized within the individual so that they appear in personal life situations only after the child gives them meaning through his own experience.

The real issue in personality development is the acquisition of discriminating or balanced adjustment in an environment in which suggestion is the common means of social teaching. The individualist takes the extreme position of abjuring all suggestion. Integrated personalities, he contends, are the negation of stereotyped beliefs. The practical administrator, on the contrary, sees suggestion as the only way of holding men together in social groups. If every man is to think out every problem for himself, then concerted social action will rarely occur. These opposed views break down in practice because suggestion and trial-and-error learning interpenetrate in personality development.

Suggestion often has its place in directing the trial-and-error learning necessary to produce balanced adjustment. Suggestion in itself would never lead to discriminating conduct, but it

can hasten the solution of complex problems. Many of the suggestions in the home and in the schoolroom are of this nature. The specific action to be taken is not indicated, but the correct direction of problem attack is implanted. The child thus learns that, when mechanical devices break down, one turns to the mechanism itself and not to extraneous factors; and similarly in meeting any problem the answer lies in the problem itself. Moreover, in finding his way out of a difficulty the suggestions which the child is forced to test may contain the germs of the solution.

Although suggestion can make its contribution in the acquisition of discriminating adjustments, it is undoubtedly true that in our culture its extensive use leads to many partial adjustments of doubtful value. Complex situations are artificially simplified on every hand by the use of suggestion. Challenging possibilities which should be explored, significant factors which should be taken into account, are swept aside by the prestige of numbers and authority. Response is narrowly directed toward an adjustment which ignores a good part of the objective situation. Objective facts can be ignored, but they are not annihilated by being neglected. They remain to plague men tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. In a relatively static society the problem is not as great as in our changing social world. Our internalization of culture patterns through suggestion brings about mass maladjustment. We implant personality attitudes which have no permanent adjustive value. As our world changes, these attitudes as blanket non-discriminatory orientations produce conflict.

THE RATE OF PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE

We have been discussing the general aspects of the development of personality with little reference to the specific rate of growth or the specific conditions which make for personality change. The observer who watches the child from day to day will insist that personality development is a gradual process. It is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Similarly, most

people doubt the validity of religious conversion, or of any transformation of an individual, in which his personality supposedly undergoes a sudden change. On the whole this emphasis upon gradual adjustment is sound. Nevertheless, if we view the life of the person as a whole, we can see critical situations which effect marked alterations in personality. Human beings are adaptable, and they make new and rapid adjustments when they have to.

The child develops slowly until he is confronted by situations which demand new adjustments. Then his development is accelerated. If life flows along smoothly, adults change so slowly that the change is imperceptible. If, however, they are hit and hit hard, they show startling transformation. G. W. Allport has called attention to the *sudden reorientation* of a personality through *traumatic experience* (2).

Traumatic Experience

Traumatic experience is the application of the old law of intensity or vividness in learning to personality change. We do not need experiments on motivation to know that learning proceeds much more rapidly under incentives of reward and punishment than when incentives are lacking. Personality development as a special case of learning shows the same phenomena. Abrupt shocks will bring about a new energizing of the individual, and he will rapidly acquire new attitudes and activities. The nature of these shocks is some thwarting of needs or of habits built upon needs. The familiar world upon which the individual depended seems now to have collapsed. New adjustment is compulsory if he is to continue as a self-respecting person. Traumatic experience may be too extreme a term for these occasions in which the individual is abruptly shocked into a new way of life. There may be no permanent ill effects of the psychological upset. We are using the term trauma to refer merely to the psychological disturbance and not to permanent psychic injury.

Critical Situations in Development

Traumatic experience is not a simple function of the objective world. A situation which is dreadfully humiliating to one child may leave another child profoundly unconcerned. Nonetheless in American culture certain critical points can be selected which generally compel the individual to make new adjustments. The following seven situations do not exhaust the list but they are among the most typical (16). (1) The arrival of a new baby in the family is almost always an upsetting experience to its next oldest brother or sister. The child who had been the center of the stage becomes part of the background against which a new figure appears. Where once he was admired and adored at every turn he now finds himself neglected and very much in the way. His blind jealousy serves little purpose, and he must adjust to a different world.

(2) His entering school at the age of five or six is another critical point in his career. He is thrown into an unfamiliar world of strange children and strange adults. There is no one to mediate between him and the bigger children who dominate the playground. He must learn to stand on his own feet and fight his own battles. In the schoolroom he is one of a large group who must conform to standard rules. The transition from preschool life to the school world is a sudden wrench for many children which leads to significant personality changes.

(3) A different demand is soon placed upon the school child by his own group. Whether or not the boy enters a gang, he does become a member of a group of youngsters of his own age who have their own standards. In this group he must prove his independence of the authority of the home and the schoolroom.

(4) Puberty with its physical and psychological changes reorients the social direction of personality growth. Interest in the opposite sex and the reawakening of old feelings of sex guilt and a consequent estrangement from parents appear in early adolescence. The boy often shifts from his early imaginary goals to more realistic objectives. Before puberty he played

"cops and robbers" and dreamed of being a cowboy when he grew up. After puberty he becomes interested in accomplishments which will make him desirable to the opposite sex such as dressing neatly, driving a car, and dancing. His vocational ambition takes a more practical turn from his old childish romancing, and he now wants to be an engineer or a captain of industry.

(5) In high school a new emphasis upon the adolescent's social role appears. More independence is granted in school work, and more sacrifice in the interests of the group is expected. School spirit demands an idealistic surrender of one's individuality. In the main the youngsters respond wholeheartedly. The college football coach lies awake nights, thinking of schemes to motivate his team with some of the flaming spirit which high-school boys put into their games.

(6) The economic realities, which for the poorer boy or girl have already demonstrated their significance, confront the majority of adolescents after high school is over. To get a job and earn a living is a highly critical experience in the life of the individual. A new evaluation of ideas and beliefs takes place. Old ideals crash to the ground, practices formerly sneered at are now adopted, and the individual's philosophy of life may undergo marked changes. For most people, responsibility has a chastening effect, but for some it breeds pride.

(7) Closely following the assumption of the economic responsibilities of adulthood comes marriage with its accentuation of these responsibilities. Marriage entails, too, the adjustment of clashing personalities. Harmonious marital life comes not from the mating of affinities but from the shocks of mutual living which compel personalities to change.

These situations confronting the developing personality illustrate, to use the language of Murphy and Newcomb, "the varieties of demands imposed upon the growing young person by a society which progressively asks him to be the center of attention, to get out of the way, to accept absolute authority, to show his independence of authority, to sacrifice himself for the larger group, to be self-sustaining and independent, to love passion-

ately and to achieve financial success" (16, p. 327). In adjusting to meet the varied demands exacted at different age levels the individual is not always activated by traumatic experience. He may come to a critical situation torn by internal conflict. In its new type of demand he may resolve his old problems and find himself as an effective personality.

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CHAPTER XV

THE RELATION OF CULTURE TO PERSONALITY

The determination of personality by culture is a truism of such long standing that social scientists refer to the behavior of the individual as if it were only a miniature reflection of the great society. The significant truth in cultural determination is thus obscured by conceiving of society as an organic whole, imposing its wishes upon its members. This conception makes culture an underived social entity, regards social forms as static and immutable, and replaces all explanation of social events by pure tautology.

The Fallacy of Tautology in Cultural Determinism

Many writers have given fascinating accounts of the contrasts in the personality of man in one period of history or within one culture as compared with man in another period or in another culture. Unfortunately, however, they go no further, and merely point to the differences in cultures as if this in itself constituted an explanation. Oswald Spengler in the *Decline of the West* has given us many pictures of these personality differences between Greek man and modern Western man, between Egyptian man and Arabian man. These contrasts, after being brilliantly portrayed, are then ascribed to differences between the Greek soul and the soul of modern Western man, between the Arabian soul and the Egyptian soul. The Greek man, for example, had a fundamentally different orientation toward time and space from that of modern Western man. He had no conception of historical development but lived completely in the present. His life was not regulated by the calendar, and the preoccupation with time in modern culture was unknown to him. "Amongst the Western peoples,"

writes Spengler, "it was the Germans who discovered the mechanical *clock*, the dread symbol of the flow of time, and the chimes of countless clock towers that echo day and night over West Europe are perhaps the most wonderful expression of which a historical world-feeling is capable. In the timeless countrysides and cities of the Classical world, we find nothing of the sort" (10, pp. 14-15). Classical man also regarded the world of space as limited to his own narrow environment. Modern man with his feeling of the universe stretching out into infinite space is no brother of the classical Greek. To the latter, Olympus represented extreme distance, and the Gods were no further away.

The explanation of the ahistorical, timeless, and restricted spatial mind of the classical man as compared with modern Western man presents a very real problem. Spengler dismisses the whole question by attributing the difference to the cultures of the two periods. Culture for him is an organic entity which mysteriously molds the mind of the individual. Spengler calls the classical culture the Apollinian soul and Western culture the Faustian soul. With these additional names he can explain classical man as the product of classical culture and classical culture as the product of the Apollinian soul.

A homely example will illustrate the fallacy of attributing personality differences to the soul of an age or a culture. The speed of motorists accustomed to the open roads of the American middle west may vary from the speed of motorists accustomed to the congested, metropolitan districts of New York or Chicago. If someone were to suggest that these differences in the habits of motorists of the two areas were due to basic soul differences between the city and rural personalities we would be unimpressed. That, however, is just what a number of social historians like Spengler have done upon finding differences between people of one culture and another culture. They have failed to analyze the factors responsible for these variations and have forgotten that personality is not an explanation but a classification of certain types of facts about people. To label a fact as due to soul or personality or culture

without further analysis is simply to substitute one name for another name.

Reasons for the Tautological Fallacy

Much of the failure to give a naturalistic explanation of the cultural determination of personality differences arises out of a mistaken notion of psychology. We tend to forget that behavior develops from an interaction between the organism and its environment when we observe complex acts which apparently bear no relation to the environment. Such acts, however, originally arose out of a very specific adjustment to environmental forces. Because the stimulus which sustains them is obscured does not mean that these acts have no explanation. We have already observed how the posture of the boy stooped over his school desk can become so cross-conditioned as to be part of his nature for the rest of his life. Another factor which makes it difficult to see that behavior has an environmental basis is the complexity of the stimulating situation. A response may be the resultant of so many environmental forces that we fail to see its relation to these forces.

When more than two sets of forces affect behavior, as so often occurs at the more complex level of human activity, we fail to notice the part played by the integration of reflexes in the final result. We accept this final result as Spengler does and name it rather than explain it. For example, we attribute the high speed of a motorist to the fact that he always was a fast driver. We fail to see the many component forces which originally made him a fast driver such as his possession of cars with good brakes, his thorough acquaintance with traffic and roads, his habit as a child of starting a little late for an engagement, his financial ability to pay a fine for speeding.

The Fallacy of a Static Conception of Culture: the Doctrine of Survivals

Another aspect of finalistic thinking concerning cultural determination is to regard the customs, habits, beliefs, and material equipment of a people as permanently fixed and rigid by

a superorganic agency called culture. These material objects and human habits are always in the process of change and are the result of a long trial-and-error history of human frustrations and satisfactions. The patterns of behavior we learn from our parents are never photostatic copies of their habits. Every generation can only take on the old pattern through a learning process in which customs and traditions become modified to suit the needs and wishes of the members of the new generation. Some items of the old patterns drop out, others are altered, and new items are added. Because the name given to a group of activities remains the same, we are deceived into believing that the pattern of human action has not changed. For example, the names of the major American political parties have remained the same for generations, but the social realities represented by the names have undergone considerable change.

The dynamic nature of culture is forgotten by those anthropologists who accept the doctrine of survivals. This doctrine refers to the persistence of customs in a culture after their motivating conditions have supposedly vanished. Practices and customs which resemble the activities of an older period are explained as the maintenance through sheer inertia and social inheritance of earlier adjustments of the race. Strangely enough, these anthropologists are eager to give psychological reasons for the origin of the custom, but once their curiosity is satisfied on this score, they see no problem in finding psychological reasons for its survival. We have already had occasion to meet the doctrine of survivals in considering the persistence of rituals (see pages 74-75).

For example, the use of animal symbols to represent groups (the Republican elephant, the Yale bulldog, the American eagle) is traced back to the totemism of primitive civilization. In totemism a group of primitive men worship an animal from which they believe they are descended. Now no custom ever survives unless it has a psychological basis in the individual. To the extent that the custom shows no change through many generations, to that extent it is based upon a fundamental and constant psychological and physiological factor. Most customs do

change, however, in some way, although the names do not change. Thus totemism in primitive peoples is linked to their religion, their social organization, their group regulations concerning marriage, their hunting customs, in short to their characteristic ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. In our society we have found other symbols upon which to base our social organization. The totem animal remains as a convenient supplementary symbol in group ideology, as an expression of our belief in magic and luck, and in addition has taken on the new psychological utility of an outlet for humor.

STUDIES OF PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES IN RELATION TO CULTURE

When we get down to bedrock and study the different types of personalities found in different societies it becomes unnecessary to postulate a force called culture which supposedly molds personality. If we can describe the specific factors at work, this gives us the best possible explanation of the problem of personality and culture. For example, M. Mead has brought together a series of anthropological studies which really tell us something about how and why people in different parts of the world differ from one another (7). We shall examine four of the societies described in this compilation to illustrate how personality is the product of adaptation to both the natural and social-environments.

The Mountain Arapesh of New Guinea

The Mountain Arapesh are a semi-nomadic people who eke out a bare existence through agriculture, trading, and hunting. Though conspicuously undernourished according to our standards and confronted most of the time with dire physical want, they always have enough to avoid actual starvation. The mountainous terrain makes them safe from invasion by other peoples, and the scarcity of game and lack of abundant vegetable food destroy the motivation for any neighboring group to attack them. Since they are not menaced by danger from without and since they do not face actual starvation, the Ara-

pesh lack the crises from which social organization often arises. The tortuous nature of their country with its narrow paths and its slippery rocks also hinders standardized group activity. Non-economic social institutions, moreover, generally wait upon some measure of economic wealth.

The Arapesh are hence a people who suffer from meager institutionalization. Their relationships are largely on a personal basis. Specialization of function and stereotyping of social roles are at a minimum. Cooperative enterprises are personal in nature and hence not permanent. "The whole society is a vast network of personal relationships, of temporary companionships and alliances, and there is nowhere an effective closed group which demands internal cooperation from its members and maintains its position by hostility to outsiders." Communal sharing of food occurs not through common productive efforts nor through common ownership of property, but through gifts to friends and the giving of feasts to which many people are invited.

The Arapesh personality reflects the material and social conditions of life out of which it has grown. The lack of institutionalized competition and the absence of organized pressure upon the individual to outstrip his fellows makes for a weak development of the ego. There are no great rewards for leadership, and there is no hierarchy of leaders. In fact, no single scale exists for the measurement of success. Aggressive individualism is, therefore, the exception and not the rule. The warmth and affection for immediate friends and relatives is extended toward the whole community, but the individual takes little responsibility upon his own shoulders for the group as a whole. He feels obligated only to return personal favors. With little institutionalization of social roles the admired personality is the all-around man. The specialist is tolerated, but not revered. By and large the personalities of the Arapesh people can be characterized by such adjectives as mild, peaceful, unambitious, friendly, cooperative, genuine, unstandardized, and lacking in foresight.

The Eskimo of Greenland

The Eskimo face such rigorous conditions of life that their number is small in relation to the territory they occupy. Survival in the Arctic regions is difficult, and any individual who cannot make his economic contribution because of old age or other infirmity is killed or commits suicide. Every man makes his own weapons and tools and does his own hunting. His wife not only takes care of the home, but also performs the complicated and difficult job of converting animal skins into clothing and various types of equipment. The Eskimo couple is a self-sufficient economic unit. The Eskimo technology is highly individualistic. With the exception of seal hunting through the ice, hunting methods require a single hunter. A man takes his own kayak for open-sea hunting and must be able to right his kayak without aid from others, if he capsizes. Though a number of families will live together in one house during the winter season, the individualistic way of life still prevails. Each family has its own part of the house and its own equipment.

The technological individualism of the Eskimo grows out of the particular conditions of existence to which they must adjust. Given a very primitive cultural heritage, it is easier to meet the Arctic environment by simple individual adjustment than by group activity. Take, for example, the fact that each woman living in a winter house will cook her own food in her own pot over her own lamp. Communal cooking is impractical because it would take too long to heat the food for the group over a blubber lamp. Then, too, it would be difficult to transport a pot large enough for the whole group from winter to summer quarters.

The individualism rampant among the Eskimo should not be confused with the intense competitiveness in our own society. The Eskimo looks out for himself as does the American, but he is not highly motivated to outdo his fellows in every field of endeavor. He wants to do things his own way more than to outshine his fellows. Competition for property is not

great since most forms of property are perishable and since the mobile life of the people makes large surpluses a problem. Genuine rivalry is confined largely to securing wives. Women are a great economic asset, and the domestic tasks are so difficult that one wife can hardly do all the work of cooking, child care, and making clothes from animal skins. The Eskimo can have as many wives as he can support and as he can steal or forcefully take from other men.

In this individualistic society a person has largely himself to depend upon in the struggle to survive. A marked development of the ego is the result. Self-reliance, aggressiveness, and initiative are the cardinal personality traits. Boys take their place in adult society not through age but through accomplishment. As soon as a boy is able to hunt for himself and fight for himself he is accepted as a man. The motive for the youngster is thus one of self-dependence. The games which the children play are realistic and constitute a preparation for later tasks. Indeed, throughout their lives the Eskimo must remain closely in contact with reality. To indulge in mechanisms of self-deceit and flights from reality is to perish. The strong personalities bred under the primitive conditions of the Arctic are poor material for taboos, ritual, and regimentation. The taboos which exist are often violated, and the few rituals frequently go unobserved.

The Zuñi Indians of New Mexico

The Zuñi Indians represent a higher cultural level than the Arapesh or the Eskimo, though the peak of the pueblo civilization was already past at the time of the Spanish conquest. The Zuñi derive their livelihood from agriculture and sheep herding. Economically prosperous, they have had the leisure to develop their social institutions to a high degree. In turn their institutional development has increased their prosperity. Though individual differences in wealth exist, surplus capital is devoted to the good of the community. Sheep herding is carried on cooperatively, individually owned herds being pooled together. In cultivating the fields all the men in one house

hold cooperate. Their produce becomes common property of all the women in the household. House-building is a collective enterprise in which the members of the same ceremonial group cooperate. Competition receives no formal sanction in any economic activity.

An intricate social organization characterizes Zuni society. A man belongs to a large number of groups many of which are determined by accident of birth and not by achievement. Ritual counts heavily with the Zuni, and men go through life performing tasks allotted to them through status. They work together in the fields because they are members of the same clan, and they cooperate in sheepherding because of kinship ties. Other forms of cooperation have also been institutionalized. For example, friendships become binding through a ritual washing of the hair, and then the ceremonial friends are obligated to help one another in all large enterprises. Furthermore, the ceremonials of religious societies are collective. Individual magic is replaced by group ritual. The basic note of Zuni society is cooperative, and all its institutions are integrated about a collective pattern. The sanctions employed to maintain this pattern are shame and ridicule.

The ideal personality among the Zuni is the cooperative, socialized individual who plays his part in life strictly in conformity with the orderly processes of ritual. Ego development is suppressed. The self-willed man is looked down upon, and the person of affability and selflessness is highly admired. Actually many Zuni fall short of their ideal. Though personal violence and self-assertion are at a minimum, the suppressed ego sentiments appear verbally. The Zuni slander and defame one another. They rebel, too, at some of the ceremonial routine. They have not achieved a real integration between their formal institutional habits and their individual desires. One reason may be the use of shame as a sanction for conduct. Criticism and ridicule of one's fellows, when they do not conform, may carry over into fault-finding with people and the world generally.

The Maori of New Zealand

The Maori are a fairly populous group, including both coastal and inland tribes. They have a well-organized economic structure. Each tribe has one dominant productive occupation, and its food supply is supplemented by exchange with other tribes. Economic undertakings are carried on cooperatively by the various social groupings. The extended family group makes, owns, and operates small canoes. The village makes, owns, and operates the larger canoes. Large-scale undertakings are carried on by a number of villages in the same tribe. The Maori type of life is essentially a group life. One works with and for his group and enjoys the common fruits of common enterprise. Nevertheless the Maori are differentiated into social strata according to birth, ability, and accidents of war. The Maori chief has to be born of noble family, but this alone does not insure leadership. His position as chief is forfeited if he proves incompetent. The people contribute to the common storehouse, and the chief has the task of maintaining the prestige of his group by a liberal bestowal of goods upon guests. In addition he has to provide for his own followers. Equitable redistribution of wealth to his people of things given to him is a function of his office.

Though differences in rank exist among the Maori, these differences do not obscure the fundamental unity of group life. Production is a common enterprise with people of various ranks contributing according to skill and social role. Distribution of wealth is likewise a socialized process which is basically designed to meet the needs of the group. In times of want the chief's stores are apportioned on the basis of size of family. In general, distribution parallels production. If the enterprise is highly cooperative, the product is divided into equal shares. In instances of individually operated undertakings, each man keeps what he produces. Most of the Maori economy, however, is collective in organization.

The personalities of the Maori are a fusion of individualistic and socialized traits. The Maori boy or girl shows his indi-

vidualism by working more skillfully, more strenuously in co-operative enterprises. "Individual achievement and resourcefulness in special occupations were acclaimed by the whole group. Persons of all classes gained prestige by excelling in any endeavor." The ego is strongly developed but, unlike the intense ego development of the Eskimo, the self is extended to include the social group. The aggressiveness and acquisitiveness of the Maori are not suppressed as among the Zūfi but are directed against persons outside the tribe. Within the tribe generosity and cooperation prevail. This type of personality integration arises from two factors in the Maori's everyday life. In the first place he must cooperate with his fellows or see the communal enterprise fail. In the second place the communal enterprise is both collective in its productive phase and collective in the distribution of rewards. "The motivation for group cooperation is the knowledge that returns of its labor will belong to the individuals of the group. The economic structure of society is in this way responsible for creating cooperative attitudes in work."

Two General Ways in Which Cultural Factors May Affect Personality

These studies of different societies indicate that personality is shaped by natural forces, by the social environment generally, and by the specific personalities of individuals already on the scene. Cultural determination merely means that all individuals do not start from scratch in the marathon of life. The infant who starts life among Australian bushmen meets a different social world from that of the infant who first opens his eyes in New York City. Both bush children and American children will alter the accepted usages of their parents, but the consequences of the fact that their elders are there to teach them different habits cannot be minimized.

Cultural factors affect man in two ways. *In the first place they determine the specific content of the habits of individuals.* All human beings, for example, learn to fear and avoid certain

objects because of overstrong stimulation in childhood, but the Baganda children in Africa and the Kwakiutl children in northwest America will fear different things. Or, again, all known groups of humans communicate by means of a verbal language, but the particular verbal symbols differ widely from country to country. Out of the many babbling sounds of the infant, a certain few will be selected and elaborated through the language he hears spoken about him.

A second and more important influence of cultural factors upon personality is the effect of the specific content carried by the mechanisms of behavior upon those very mechanisms. A child learns to express himself in Chinese, Russian, or English, but the very nature of the language he learns in turn limits and affects his manner of expression. It will be recalled that the Chinese language for centuries used a pictographic rather than a phonetic alphabet. The thousands of characters made written expression for the Chinese cumbersome and difficult. Or compare the effect upon thought of a poetic language with its metaphors, sense images, and emotional phrases with the exact mathematical language of science. The poet is generally not a clear thinker and analyzer; the scientist is generally not a sympathetic interpreter of human emotions. Again, all men engage in activities which give them a living, but the manner of seeking that living affects the nature of personality. The hunting nomadic tribes are made hardy and warlike by their mode of existence. In contrast the agricultural peoples come to love peace and stability. The industrial worker in modern society tends a machine which requires one specialized act repeated over and over again. His body and mind are both affected by the mechanical monotony of his daily tasks. In brief, in different ages man lives in different kinds of dwellings, speaks different languages, meets different kinds of problems, and carries on making a living in different ways. Inasmuch as his living is always altering his environment, he pays the penalty of being forced to adjust to his own creations when he is finished.

THREE RELATIONS BETWEEN PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS AND CULTURE

It is possible to generalize the relationship between personality and culture both from the point of view of single personality characteristics and from that of personality integration. Personality characteristics are culturally influenced in three ways.

I. The Limitation of the Number of Fields of Personality Expression

First of all, the number and variety of personality characteristics which are found in a group differ from culture to culture. It is generally the aim of dictatorships to institutionalize people on as many items of behavior as possible. Dictators strive for a highly unified and homogeneous people. The citizen becomes identified with the soldier, and the ideal is a nation of likeminded goose-stepping units. The citizen-soldier exhibits personality differences only when off duty, and, to the extent that he is never off duty, the student of personality finds his field of study vanishing. The avowed ideal of democracies, on the other hand, is the free expression of as many personality characteristics as possible without mutual self-destruction.

Rulers and administrators often seek to make perfect mechanisms out of their followers, because leaders are judged by the efficiency of the institutions they construct. The fewer items on which people can express personality differences, the less difficult is the task of the leaders. The official bureaucratic mind sees Utopia as a state in which there is a form for every human activity and a regulation for every human desire.

At first glance it might seem as if chattel slavery was the attempt at complete institutionalization in its simplest form. The slave is owned outright like a commodity, and his every move is subject to the whim of his owner. The very power of life and death which the owner holds over his slaves, however, makes it unnecessary to institutionalize the slave classes in

every respect. Since they can be made to do any kind of work and can be punished if they rebel, there is nothing to be gained by regimenting them further. Hence, within the limitations of their economic opportunities, slaves often enjoy a measure of personality expression. Under feudalism, too, complete institutionalization does not take place, because the lord really owns his serfs through owning the land to which they belong. He has sufficient power to run his estate without regimenting every phase of the lives of his vassals.

A modern fascist dictatorship really represents an extension of regimentation to more fields of conduct and belief than either feudalism or slavery. Since the absolute forms of control of the older social systems are no more, one means of safeguarding power is thoroughgoing institutionalization of all human behavior. A fascist dictatorship seeks a totalitarian state under which economic, religious, political, artistic, recreational, and all other activities are coordinated and consolidated. The purpose here is really more than the regimentation of all phases of life. It is to bring all institutions under political authority. Thus the fascist dictatorship seeks to suppress not only personality expression but also any attempt but its own at institutionalization.

The fascist goal of complete regimentation is unconsciously approached by those capitalists who desire an ideal working class made up of men who work hard, ask for little, spend that little upon necessities rather than drink, starve through depressions without complaining, and raise their children to follow in their footsteps.* In fact many large concerns have adopted paternalistic schemes for regimenting the recreation, health, education, and thinking of their employees. In times of depression even charity is administered from this institutional point of view. Relief is given not to the needs of personality but to the needs of men as cogs in an industrial machine. An

* An imaginative treatment of certain aspects of this problem is to be found in *R. U. R.* by K. Capek, a popular play of the twenties. It pictures a model working class in the form of mechanical Robots, a Robot being an automatic, semi-thinking creature without a personality.

individual may sometimes need to attend a theatre for his soul more than to fill his stomach for his physical well-being, but as someone has well expressed it, "Organized charity, scrimped and iced, in the name of a cautious statistical Christ."

It is incorrect, however, to take the radical view of modern industrial society which sees the increasing regimentation of the age as the conscious plot of conspiring capitalists. F. H. Allport has presented a more complete analysis in his description of the domination of economic institutions over almost every phase of our lives, whether we are business men or wage earners. Allport uses the analogy of the stream of human life with its broad variety of desires and interests flowing through a funnel with a narrow spout (2). The narrow spout is represented by our business habits which place their restricting standardization upon all our activities.

Man's aesthetic impulses are made incidental to the commercial side of life. The intimate creative aspect of art is destroyed through a commercialization which calls for passive acceptance of the aesthetic products of machines. The scientific curiosity of the youth has its wings clipped and is restricted to the perfecting of technology rather than to experimentation and an understanding of the laws of the natural world. Scientific ingenuity bows to our economic institutions and produces synthetic perfumes. Our capacities for sociability, also, play a subservient role to economic demands. Service and cooperation are exploited by business concerns in the interests of the profit motive. Even in the field of personal habits and tastes we find the funneling tendency of the commercial mind. Homes, which once showed the individuality of their owners, now show the standardized skills of the professional interior decorators. Allport summarizes his position: ". . . life today has become organized about economic and industrial motives. We are allowing our interests in art, in science, in philosophy, in morals, in religion, and in social intercourse to be canalized through the aim of business promotion. It is primarily men of commercial outlook whom we have permitted to come into positions of the highest power and to wield through govern-

ment as well as through trade an unrivalled authority over our lives" (2, p. 257).*

2. Limitation of the Range of Variation of Personality Characteristics

A second aspect of the important relation of culture to personality is the *range* of variation of a characteristic of personality within various societies, i.e., the extent to which people differ from one another in respect to a particular trait or attitude. In any society, limits to the range of personality variation are already established in the habits of the people. The base line on which we measure personality characteristics is generally defined culturally, and we find this base line narrowing or broadening from culture to culture. If we measured aesthetic value attitudes among Americans and Italians, for example, we might find that the Italians clustered closely about the upper part of the scale, whereas Americans were spread widely over the whole scale. In other words, the Italians might be a more homogeneous group than the Americans in respect to art.

It is quite possible that in time Americans will come to agree as closely about the place of art in life as the Italians. Within a given culture, then, the same narrowing or broadening of the base line of personality measurement may occur with the passage of time as occurs in comparing different cultures.

3. Lack of Certain Personality Characteristics in a Culture

Finally, the culture of a people may omit completely certain personality characteristics. And this lack of a personality attitude or trait in a particular society may not be due to the institutionalization of that characteristic. The conditions of life in one culture simply do not call for the adjustments made

*The above quotation taken out of context may be misconstrued as an attack directed solely against our present social forms. F. H. Allport's position, however, is that of the individualist who is opposed to institutional funneling as such, whether it be economic, religious, or political.

necessary by another environment. According to Spengler, classical man did not conceive of the world about him from a developmental, historical, or evolutionary viewpoint. Spengler says: "Consider the Classical Culture. In the world consciousness of the Hellenes all experience, not merely personal, but the common past was immediately transmuted into a timeless, immobile, mythically-fashioned background for the particular momentary present; thus the history of Alexander the Great began even before his death to be merged by Classical sentiment in the Dionysus legend, and to Caesar there seemed at least nothing preposterous in claiming descent from Venus. . . . The fine pieces of Classical history-writing are invariably those which set forth matters within the political present of the writer . . . Thucydides would have broken down in handling even the Persian Wars, let alone the general history of Greece" (10, pp. 8-10).

It is possible that in Soviet Russia the religious attitude toward life may completely disappear. The older generation of revolutionists were anti-religious, but the newer generations of Russians may be non-religious. The faith in a Supreme Being and the mystical experience with the supernatural may be incomprehensible to a generation reared in mechanistic thought and Marxian analysis.

Even if some personality characteristics are altogether lacking in a number of cultures, it is highly probable that many personality traits and attitudes will be found in all human societies. Comparative anthropology and social psychology may some day be able to tell us what personality characteristics arise in all societies due to the essential effect of social interaction on the biological organism of man and what characteristics are the result of a particular form of social organization.

FOUR PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO PERSONALITY INTEGRATION AND CULTURE

The effects of the cultural environment on *personality integration* can be profitably studied with reference to the complexity of social organization. Although the tendency to over-

simplify primitive culture is to be condemned, it is nevertheless true that a society without written records has a much smaller bulk of traditional material and represents a simpler social organization than a culture with a written tradition. This is necessarily so, since a culture without written records is limited by the unaided memories and habits of a relatively small group of people (8).

Four problems which arise in considering the relation of personality integration to the complexity of culture are (1) the interposition of many institutionalized forms between the individual and the satisfactions of his biological and psychological needs, (2) the effects upon cross-conditioning of increasing cultural complexity, (3) the heterogeneity or homogeneity of a culture, i.e., the harmony or conflict between the many institutions within one civilization, and (4) the uneven rate of change of various cultural factors within one society. The essential dilemma of personality integration in complex cultures is that the very society which makes men narrow specialists also presents them with ever broader fields to which to adjust.

1. The Indirection of Life in a Complex Culture

The first problem has been described by F. H. Allport as the question of remoteness or immediacy in the satisfaction of an individual's purpose (2). The divorcing of the means of attaining personality expression from the goal of such expression makes a genuine integration of personality difficult. In Allport's words: "If life is to consist wholly of acts the fulfillment of whose purpose lies sometime in the future, we have a condition of continually thwarted anticipation" (1, p. 243).

Contrast, for example, our civilization where the individual satisfies his basic wants indirectly through activities meaningless in themselves with the social organization in the Trobriand Islands where the individual's work is tied up fairly directly to his biological needs. In this Melanesian society, the mores and customs are organized about an exchange of services and goods between two village communities (see pages 19-20). A

coastal village supplies an inland community with fish and in return receives vegetables. Each coastal villager has his permanent partner in the inland community with whom the exchange is made. This partner is generally either a relative or a sworn friend. The relationship between the two men is thus both economic and friendly, but in addition it is also ceremonial since the exchange calls for an elaborate ritual. Finally, it has a legal aspect which means that a gift must be repaid by a generous and immediate return gift. Hence the Trobriander has an opportunity for a harmonious life organized about his work, his customs, and his social contacts.

In our culture, social organization has grown so complex that many of our daily activities have only an indirect and remote relation to the satisfactions in which we are interested. In modern industrial economy the specialization and division of labor limit the working lives of most people to a small fraction of the total industrial process. Moreover, they are given no opportunity to see the relation of their work to the whole productive system. They spend their days automatically tending machines and rarely see any meaning in their work. On the other hand, the Trobriander in his fishing and in his ceremonial exchange of fish for vegetables can easily become interested in activities directly related to his purposes.

The extent of the indirection of American life has been brought out in a study at Syracuse University by F. H. Allport (1). A class of students recorded briefly on slips of paper the things they saw people about them doing or heard them saying in such varied places or situations as a fraternity living room, a bus station, the lobby of an apartment house, a theatre, and a grocery store. In classifying the observations made, it was found that 52 per cent of the incidents were concerned with behavior preparatory for future satisfactions and 48 per cent had to do with immediate satisfactions.

A striking example of the postponing and divorcing of biological needs from the activities of the individual's life is seen in our educational system. Education has come to be a preparation for life rather than learning through living. The tremen-

dous growth of extracurricular activities in secondary schools and colleges is due in part to the desire of students to live in the present rather than the future. The concentration in education upon turning out efficient cogs for our social machine is reflected in the time-serving nature of our colleges where so many hours of mathematics and so many units of language added up together give a college diploma. The college degree, a mere external symbol, has become the aim of thousands of students rather than the acquisition of an education. The degree in turn is only a step toward a future goal—a position, or a certain social prestige.

Even in schools devoted to vocational rather than verbal education where the emphasis is supposedly practical, standardized skills are taught not as ends in themselves but as a means to distant goals (2). The boy who wants to be an aviation mechanic is given little opportunity to develop his personality about his vocational interest. His scientific curiosity about the related laws of physics, his interest in flying as the great adventure, his aesthetic pleasure in the perfection of an intricate machine are all neglected for the one purpose of teaching him to be an efficient mechanic, so that he may obtain a job and get ahead in the world. In effect he is taught to have no other interest in his life work than its utility in earning a living.

2. The Interference with Cross-Conditioning by Institutions and in Densely Populated Areas

The second problem of personality integration in a complex cultural environment takes us back to Holt's principle of cross-conditioning. If the child is to develop deep interests of his own, he must be relatively undisturbed for hours at a time. Otherwise it is difficult for one type of activity to become predominantly associated with the many constant sources of stimulation from internal and external sources. In a society with many institutions the tendency is not to let the child alone, but to interfere at every turn. Organizations reach further and further into the early years of development. Nursery schools

take children at the tender age of two years. As soon as the child learns to read, the branch library supervises his interest in books. His play activities are regulated by the nearest playground and recreation center. His interest in nature is regimented by a Boy Scout organization which also looks after his morals.

Even if the child develops genuine interests of his own before the many institutions gobble him up, these interests are cut across by a school system which gives little heed to individual needs and capabilities. His schooling is not built around his early cross-conditioning but is imposed from above for a mythical creature, the average child. Thus he develops conflicts between his own interests and his school tasks and later in life may be vocationally maladjusted when his life work could have been his hobby instead of a chore. Often too, as E. B. Holt points out, the college graduate, whose cross-conditioned interests have been interfered with by a formal education, will go back to these interests upon graduation. But the years which have been given to an irrelevant training, and not to his original interests, have to be reckoned with. As an adult he returns to his early interests at about the age level he left them, and so has to confront life with the vocational equipment of a six- or seven-year-old child.

A complex culture generally means a greater density of population than a simple culture, for as the culture base grows the technological conquest of the problem of sustenance increases. Density of population can affect cross-conditioning and hence the integration of personality. Consider the child who grows up in an environment composed largely of people in comparison with the child who grows up in an environment in which natural objects as well as people are important. Natural objects are much less variable than human beings as stimuli. Fire always burns, but a human in one mood is jovial, in another ill-tempered. Children in responding to people learn to shift and change their behavior in accordance with the changes in those about them. Therefore, it is difficult for them to acquire cross-conditioning in their social behavior. And since people are

about them constantly they do not develop much behavior that is not social. Even in one culture this influence may be seen between the city-bred and the rural-bred individual. The sophisticated city dweller can assume many poses as compared to the naïve rural character. But the latter in his inability to play many different roles may represent a sounder integration of personality.

3. Cultural Homogeneity and Heterogeneity

Another way of considering the problem of personality integration in relation to culture is from the standpoint of the homogeneity of a culture. A complex culture with a great population, numerous institutions, and elaborate technology is generally less unified than a simple primitive culture, since there is so much more to unify. The heterogeneous culture abounds in conflicting choices and allegiances for the developing personality. The isolated primitive civilization has one religion and one set of gods. If the individual does not accept them there is no alternative faith. In America today many varieties of religion flourish from faiths which emphasize straight supernaturalism to that mixture of agnosticism, respectability, and reasonableness known as Unitarianism. Similarly, the single moral code of primitive society contrasts with the many standards of morality in our civilization. We have a public morality and a private morality, a single sex standard and a double sex standard, a Puritanical code and a Machiavelian practice.

Not only is the child confronted with the contradictory demands of many institutions, but its immediate family may reflect the heterogeneity of the culture in the diverse and opposed attitudes of its parents and other relatives. Margaret Mead has vividly described the problem thus:

So a girl's father may be a Presbyterian, an imperialist, a vegetarian, a teetotaler,—a believer in the open shop and a high tariff, who believes that woman's place is in the home, that young girls should . . . not smoke, nor go riding with young men in the evening. But her mother's father may be a Low Episcopalian,

a believer in high living, a strong advocate of States' Rights and the Monroe Doctrine, who reads Rabelais, likes to go to musical shows and horse races. Her aunt is an agnostic, an ardent advocate of woman's rights, an internationalist who rests all her hopes on Esperanto, is devoted to Bernard Shaw, and spends her spare time in campaigns of anti-vivisection. Her elder brother, whom she admires exceedingly, has just spent two years at Oxford. He is an Anglo-Catholic, an enthusiast concerning all things mediaeval, writes mystical poetry, reads Chesterton, and means to devote his life to seeking for the lost secret of mediaeval stained glass. Her mother's younger brother is an engineer, a strict materialist, who never recovered from reading Haeckel in his youth; he scorns art, believes that science will save the world, scoffs at everything that was said and thought before the nineteenth century, and ruins his health by experiments in the scientific elimination of sleep. Her mother is of a quietistic frame of mind, very much interested in Indian philosophy, a pacifist, a strict non-participator in life, who in spite of her daughter's devotion to her, will not make any move to enlist her enthusiasms. And this may be within the girl's own household. Add to it the groups represented, defended, advocated by her friends, her teachers, and the books she reads by accident, and the list of possible enthusiasms, of suggested allegiances, incompatible with one another, becomes appalling* [6, pp. 202-203].

The growing girl or boy in a culture where diverse and contradictory influences are encountered daily, faces a difficult problem in attaining an integrated group of habits and attitudes. Choice after choice between conflicting alternatives is demanded, and it is small wonder that most of us develop inconsistent beliefs and incompatible desires. College students upon returning home often maintain a dual set of practices, the one in keeping with the liberalizing influences of college and the

* In order to bring out the varied and conflicting influences playing upon the growing girl or boy, Mead has oversimplified her picture and has presented the members of the family as remarkably well-integrated personalities. Now if all the other members of the family have developed such unified attitudes, the girl, too, can achieve her own integrated outlook on life. As a matter of fact, however, all the attitudes described by Mead may be presented within the one family, but they are probably not present as consistent expressions of the various personalities. The pacifist mother may really condone war when it involves her country, and the mediaevally inclined brother may share some of his father's imperialistic notions.

other which avoids open conflict with the conservatism of their parents. Robert Frost has expressed the desire of the man bewildered by the conflicts of civilization for a more simple and primitive existence in his line, "Me for the hills, where I don't have to choose." The restlessness of American life may be partly due to the many conflicts engendered by our heterogeneous environment. We spend our lives either fighting someone or something (overt struggle) or trying to escape from ourselves (internal conflict).

There is one condition under which a heterogeneous culture does not produce conflict within the individual. If the heterogeneity represents differences among mutually exclusive groups in the same society, personalities have a favorable environment in which to attain a good measure of integration. Before the Civil War, American culture contained at least two diverse sets of beliefs, attitudes, and practices. One was the easy-going, cultivated, aristocratic life of the slave-owning plantation group; the other was the strenuous, money-grubbing, democratic values of the industrial North. Internal conflict was not engendered in the individual because he did not belong to both groups. The opposition between the two systems led to overt struggle; but only in those cases where men had identifications with both sides was there internal disharmony in the personality.

England and the United States are interesting examples of cultural heterogeneity in the various stages of modern industrial development. The industrial revolution came first in England, and in 1850 England was already the manufacturing center of the world. Today England represents the ripe fruit of capitalistic development, while the United States is far from the final stages of a capitalistic society. And the cultural heterogeneity of England is between groups, whereas the cultural heterogeneity of America is between individuals. In the development of modern industrial society the specialization and division of labor create groupings within a culture. For example, many such divisions can be recognized in America today—the farmers, the industrial workers, the white-collar classes, the

shopkeepers and small business men, the bankers and big industrialists. Now, as capitalism matures, these groupings become more distinctive and mutually exclusive. Class lines are drawn tighter, and a stratification of the divisions in society takes place. It becomes increasingly difficult to cross over from one class to another. Each group develops its own customs, prejudices, and beliefs. Working-class children are brought up as becomes members of the working class.

England today presents a picture of fairly rigid classes, whereas in the United States children are occasionally able to improve upon the economic status of their parents. Class lines in the United States, however, are much more fixed than the ideology of classes. The chances for able and ambitious men to rise by their own talents are growing less and less, but the tradition of the self-made man still persists. In other words, American working-class children have the same ideology as middle-class and upper-class children. The result is personality conflict, since they are trained to expect more from life than they will receive. In England the psychology of the lower classes is to be content in the position in which Providence has placed them.

4. The Uneven Rate of Change of Various Factors within a Culture

A fourth problem in the integration of personality in a complex culture is the difficulty of individual adjustment to a changing environment, the various parts of which change at different rates. A simple primitive society changes slowly; in a society with a huge cultural base, change takes place at a rapid rate. Change occurs most rapidly in the field of technological improvement. Mechanical invention and scientific discoveries far exceed the renovations of our ideas and attitudes. Individuals in a modern complex culture represent a curious mixture of old and new beliefs and practices. Americans believe implicitly in progress in industry, science, and medicine, but regard political concepts as fixed and absolute.

The rapidity of cultural change and the uneven nature of that change tend toward the disorganization of personality. Adaptable though human beings are, it is difficult for men to discard deeply ingrained attitudes which were once good solutions for their problems. Particularly is this difficult when it is a matter of discriminating between old attitudes which no longer represent a sound adjustment and old attitudes which are still not outmoded. Many an outstanding personality of our time thus shows a philosophy of life which represents an inconsistent orientation toward present-day problems.

For example, Clarence Darrow, growing up in an age when science was making its fight against religion and when capitalistic individualism was in its heyday, developed the clear-sighted realistic outlook of science and the individualistic outlook of an early industrial economy. Today the realism of science is still valid, but the individualism of the late nineteenth century has passed. So Darrow sees clearly into the mechanisms and motives of men. He understands their weaknesses and tries to help them, but since he can see no further than the individual his efforts are confined to rescuing an occasional underdog caught in the changing structure. Upton Sinclair, the writer, a younger man than Darrow,* arrived upon the American scene late enough to acquire a collectivist outlook upon life. In addition, however, particular circumstances of his childhood saddled him with two other attitudes, a Puritanical morality and the romanticism of Rousseau. He, therefore, sees the social implications of the problems of the individual, but he regards them from the viewpoint of an absolutistic code of morals and from the romantic conception of the perfection of human nature. Finding men weak and corruption rampant in our social order, he is thrown into a frenzy of expostulation. Were he a realist like Darrow his findings would produce no emotional upset, for then he would realize that a stream is no cleaner than the banks in which it flows.

*For an understanding of these two interesting personalities see *The Story of My Life* by Clarence Darrow and *American Outpost* by Upton Sinclair.

THE RELATION OF INSANITY AND ABNORMALITY TO CULTURE

Insanity is a legal construct; abnormality is a psychological concept. To call insanity a legal construct is another way of saying that it is defined in terms of a given culture. Societies vary in respect to the forms of behavior which are considered normal and proper. Therefore, what is regarded as insane in our civilization may be considered as highly desirable in another culture. For example, cataleptic seizures* are regarded as a sign of maladjustment in our culture, but among some of the Indian tribes of California cataleptics are accorded great prestige and many of the Indians go through cataleptic experiences (R. Benedict, 3). In one Melanesian group, studied by the anthropologist R. S. Fortune, the dominant traits are what we call paranoid (4). There is such constant fear of poisoning that no woman leaves her cooking pot untended. Distrust, suspicion, and fear are so prevalent that cooperative and collective enterprises are few. In this particular Melanesian culture the kindly, helpful individual is spoken of as crazy.

It is sometimes superficially commented that examples similar to those quoted above prove only the complete madness of all foreigners or the insane nature of other cultures. A little reflection will show, however, that members of another civilization might find many of our common practices lacking in sanity according to their standards. R. Benedict points out that our society allows gratifications of the ego in the form of unbridled and arrogant individualism which is considered an insane form of ego mania in other societies.

While insanity is defined culturally, abnormality is not as completely a matter of cultural determination. Abnormality may be defined as a sudden and definite break in an individual's personality due to a deep-seated internal conflict. Abnormality is of course related to the society in which it is found, and its content is described culturally. Nevertheless, its form

* Catalepsy is a condition of muscular rigidity. The individual assumes a meaningful attitude or posture and holds it for hours.

can be stated without reference to a particular culture. The expression of internal conflict will appear in very specific items of behavior which depend upon the types of conduct regimented in a particular society. This content of abnormality therefore varies according to the variations in the regimentations of different cultures. The form of conflict, however, in its disrupting effects upon balanced and discriminating personality expression will be true for all cultures.

Culture, Appetitive Drives, and Conflict

The physiological appetites for food, oxygen, water, and sex must be satisfied in all cultures even though the manner in which they are appeased varies. Evidence is accumulating to show that the restrictions placed upon sex in certain cultures increase the incidence of conflict and mental disorder in those societies. Since sex is an internally stimulated appetite, there are limits to the external repressions which can be placed upon it without wrecking the individual.

The social organization of the Trobriand Islanders in the South Seas permits a much freer expression of sex than Western culture. The Trobrianders do have incest taboos, marriage, and a matrilineal family, but they do not condemn sex or sensuality as such. The idea of infantile sexuality arouses no moral horror among them, and children develop without the repressive force of sex taboos for a much longer period than in our culture. The anthropologist Malinowski who lived among them reports, "In the Trobriands, though I knew scores of natives intimately and had a nodding acquaintance with many more, I could not name a single man or woman who was hysterical or even neurasthenic. Nervous tics, compulsory actions or obsessive ideas were not to be found" (5, p. 87).

Malinowski ascribes the mental health of the Trobrianders to their lack of repressive sex taboos in early childhood and to their loosely knit family life, for he found no such freedom from neuroses among the Amphet Islands, a people similar in race, custom, and language but different in social organiza-

tion and sexual morality. The Amphlett people regard premarital sexual relations with disapproval and have no institution to support sexual license. About these people Malinowski writes: "... my first and strongest impression was that this was a community of neurasthenics. . . . Apart from this general picture, I at once found a number of people affected with nervousness whom I could not use as informants, because they would either lie in some sort of fear, or else become excited and offended over any detailed questioning" (5, pp. 87, 88).

Another anthropological field study suggests similar conclusions. M. Mead in her study of Samoa reports a much smaller incidence of neuroses among Samoans than among Americans (6). Mead does not attribute the relative lack of nervous breakdown in Samoa solely to their freer sexual institutions, but she does regard this as an important factor. Promiscuity in sexual relations is widespread in Samoa, subject only to exogamic taboos. The highly individualized romantic love of Western culture occurs rarely if at all among the Samoans. Also, parental fixations do not develop in Samoa to interfere with later sexual adjustment, because many relatives play the role of father and mother to the growing child. One household will contain not only parents and children of one family but as many as fifteen relatives. "Children reared in households where there are a half dozen adult women to care for them and dry their tears, and a half dozen adult males, all of whom represent constituted authority, do not distinguish their parents as sharply as our children do" (6, p. 209). Samoan culture thus precludes the Oedipus and Electra complexes.

The appetitive drives other than sex are so compelling and so frequent in their recurrent demands that they are generally not thought of as a source of conflict. A starved people will revolt, but such a rebellion is an overt conflict, not an internal one. Hunger is only indirectly a source of internal conflict. A man suffers nervous breakdown not through lack of food but through fear of lack of food for himself and his family, a fear based upon the economic insecurity of his role in society. The governmental assurance here and abroad that "nobody starves"

is an attempt to counteract the personal insecurity of an economic system which involves a permanent army of the unemployed.

The Greater Incidence of Nervous Disorders in Complex Cultures

It has been pointed out that the integration of personality becomes more difficult as cultural complexity increases, because of the indirection of modern life, the interference with cross-conditioning, the heterogeneity of advanced cultures, and the differential rates of cultural change within modern society. We should expect, therefore, an increasing number of personalities riddled by internal strife, the victims of the complex demands of modern civilization. And statistics do indicate an increasing frequency of neurotic symptoms and insanity in our civilization. Perhaps these figures are inaccurate because much more attention is now given to the detection and treatment of nervous disease than ever before. Not all the reported increase, however, is to be so explained. M. S. Sherman and I. C. Sherman have studied neurotic and psychotic symptoms in relation to the cultural backgrounds of mountaineers (9). These investigators chose communities of varying degrees of isolation and complexity of social organization. As the social organization became more complicated, more social problems appeared, with a corresponding increase of neurotic symptoms of the people studied.

Nonetheless it should be remembered that, even though a complex culture makes for more problems of personality organization than a simple culture, a greater incidence of nervous breakdown is not an *inevitable* consequence. As the problems described above are coming to be clearly recognized, ways are being found for their solution. And if the difficulties are greater in a complex culture, the rewards to be gained in a life organized above the primitive level of vegetative satisfactions are also greater. Moreover, it should be remembered that we cannot generalize concerning complex cultures on the basis of the American scene alone. F. E. Williams has reported that the

Soviet Union has effectively handled its problems of mental disorder (11). The unification of institutions in a collectivistic state also reduces the conflicting demands made upon the individual.

Culture and Genius

The relation of insanity to genius has long puzzled writers because individuals like the "mad" poet Shelley, whom one generation considers mildly insane, a later generation regards as a genius. One theory has it that abnormality and genius are closely related, because the more finely geared and intricate a mechanism, the greater the chances for breakdown. The fact of the matter is that the term *genius* stands for no definite ideas or behavior of an individual. The term represents an evaluation by people of an individual who has radically departed from normal beliefs or conduct in a direction which they approve. This is why there is little agreement upon geniuses until after their death. Culture is never static but is constantly undergoing change. In the course of fifty or one hundred years the standard forms of conduct will show definite shifts. The genius is the man who has deviated from the accepted norms of belief or conduct in his day, only to have society catch up to his position a century later. Such phrases as "ahead of his time" and "born too soon" are a recognition of this fact.

Many people disregard the fact of culture change and view as more or less insane individuals who show marked deviations from common ideas and customs. And those who are aware of change cannot predict its direction. Small wonder then that genius and insanity have been used to label the same individual. Romantic rebels against neoclassicism like Rousseau and Shelley were insane to their contemporaries but geniuses to a later generation, because romanticism finally supplanted the neoclassic tradition.

It is probably true that "geniuses" are not confined to hospitals for the insane even if they are popularly thought to be "mad." They universalize their conflict with the existing social world so that, when they become a menace to the dominant

groups in society, they are exiled, killed, or imprisoned. Some geniuses are definitely abnormal in the sense of having deep internal conflicts; others are not abnormal in that their conflicts are overt. All of them are definitely supernormal deviations from the personality capacity norms, but many supernormal intelligences are never regarded as geniuses.

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PART IV

*THE WORLD OF THE SOCIAL ENGINEER: SOCIAL
CONTEXT AND SOCIAL CHANGE*

CHAPTER XVI

SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Aspects of Social Behavior

In Part I we described the behavior of everyday life and attempted to set up some psychological categories which gave order to the profusion of social incidents around us. Our interest was in the psychology of the average man in such situations, or in deviations from the average. It was, in a sense, a statistical approach which we called actuarial. Such a type of description avoids, on the one hand, the specific problems of a single individual and, on the other, is inclined to gloss over the nature of the environmental context in which the behavior is manifest. It deals with people in the mass. In such an account we find many of the problems of sociology, economic institutions, and political science, which are of interest to the social psychologist.

In Part II and in Part III we considered a single individual from a developmental point of view: first, as an organism standing in a certain line of biological evolution, and second, as a developing personality in a social order. In our preoccupation with adience and avoidance, with general and specific attitudes, with segmental behavior and personality factors, we understressed the nature of the social situation and the physical world in which the behavior occurs. As psychologists, however, we insist upon the soundness of the preliminary approach. To limit a field of study does not destroy its validity. It only presents a problem of synthesis with the whole picture which is sometimes difficult. None of the social phenomena which we have studied can change the gist of the argument we have presented. Explicit human behavior and attitudes can be studied from the comparative point of view, i.e., uniformity

and atypicality. But attitudes, whether unique patterns which characterize only a single individual or culture patterns which are found throughout an entire society, are mechanisms within the individual which cannot fail to affect other mechanisms of the organism. And the interaction of such mechanisms is the story of the development of a human organism. Thus we have also studied behavior from the standpoint of the energy release of an organism and have been interested in stimulation, orientation, language, suggestion, attitudes, traits, and personality itself.

Whereas Part I was a static cross-section of social life and its psychological interpretation, Part II was the life history of the person and inevitably dialectical and historical. So far we have not delved very deeply into group life. There is, however, an evident transition point. E. B. Holt has pointed out, it will be recalled, the unwillingness of the biologically minded psychologist to leave the task of resolving behavior into component reflexes and to turn his attention to observing the objective reference of behavior. Such a viewpoint immediately shifts our attention from the organism as an entity to the organism in its environment.

But the biological psychologists are not alone in this error. The social scientists have accepted culture patterns (common behaviors of people) without seeking the environmental context which created the problems to which the institutions were a solution. The institutional pattern is always a psychological problem, and the social scientist has attempted to avoid psychology by postulating non-existent entities such as the super-organic, or by giving ideas and attitudes a causal character (Spengler).

There is good reason for examining the objective reference of behavior in detail. The adience which exists as a physiological process based upon the circular reflex also takes the individual into direct contact with certain features of his world. The avoidance which results from overcrowding of nervous energy in the nervous system takes the organism away from objects or objects in certain relationships. There is no content

to attitudes except as implicit behavior to a real world. And if culture patterns, folkways, mores, and institutional ways are attitudes, they too must have an external reference. One is either going away from or toward real things. One is being ascendant, but only to people and not to sticks and stones. Even a general *Lebensformen* such as an artistic attitude can be understood only in terms of a style of manipulation of a real environment. Behavior is always a function of real objects and their relationships.

Now this social context to human behavior can be ignored by the practical man, because only in extreme instances can he afford to plot his life on a long-run scale. But the social engineer finds the understanding of society and culture, as evolving relationships, to be his major problem. The man on the street avoids crime because he sees other, simpler ways of meeting his needs, and he feels the injustice of crime or fears the punishment. The social engineer, however, who is interested in cutting down the cost of crime, must eliminate the causes, and these causes are generally rooted in the cultural set-up. So he must see the relationship of crime to other factors in the culture. In the same fashion the abnormal psychologist may analyze the criminal in an attempt to understand his behavior and so reform him as an individual. His emphasis is on personal adjustment, not on the causes, nor means of eliminating the causes. The social engineer, on the other hand, is interested in prescribing institutional changes which may eliminate the causes. His solution cannot be ahead of his time; hence he must know the history of his country. His program cannot be superimposed upon a culture, but must be developed in harmony with other programs seeking the solution to other problems. He must, therefore, also seek the development of the culture as a unity.

The Nature of Society

The environment of which behavior is a function is most often social. That is, our behavior is geared to the behavior of other people. Civilized man cannot be understood except as a

citizen of a state, and this statement, to paraphrase Holt, "instead of being a somewhat fanciful metaphor or analogy is the literal description of" what *a man* demonstrably is and does. A field of people serving as an environment for another individual is called a social situation. F. H. Allport has suggested that such situations be called *multi-individual* to emphasize the fact that they consist of people and their common and reciprocal behavior to one another (1). Allport has insisted upon this term because of a tendency in social science which he believes dangerous—the *tendency to personify social relationships*. There are those who have used the group as an entity external to the individual, which makes demands upon the loyalty of the individual apart from his own welfare. This entity is sometimes the nation, sometimes a university or church, sometimes a political party, or sometimes the family itself. Certain writers and certain modern politicians are urging a concept of the state which argues that just as the cells are organized in a certain fashion, and without possibility of revolt, so individuals are cells of a great society which has all the characteristics of the individual: mind, purpose, welfare, needs, desire, and even soul. Herbert Spencer, the great middle-class sociologist, and many others who have followed in his footsteps, have nurtured this metaphorical type of thinking. F. H. Allport has devoted much of his energy to exposing this notion, which he calls the *group fallacy*. We have already discussed its institutional form and its significance in rationalizing conflict (see pages 179-183). Allport has shown that the use of a group as an entity, when not used as mere simplification, is generally fostered by those who wish to control the behavior of others. It is a device to secure common action through distribution of emotional or psychic benefits, while the economic benefits are reserved for a few. Such personifications contribute to the hold of reactionary groups upon a society. If society is an organism, obviously some people are muscle, and other people brains. In the human organism the parts do not change place. The moral is obvious, but unfounded in psychological fact.

Though we clearly recognize social events to be phenomena

of people and their relationships, another problem arises to confuse us. This problem is the difference between society and culture. The difference is not to be discovered at the level of the superorganic, but at the level of different relationships possible between people and their environment.

Society refers to the common objective relationships (non-attitudinal) between man and man and between men and their material world. It is often confused with culture, the attitudinal relationship between men. Thus John MacMurray has correctly said:

More generally, society is not a complex of institutions (culture). This is only a phenomenon of society. In other words the system of institutions depends upon the (objective) relations between people. The (objective) *relations of people do not depend upon the system of institutions*. When we as economists talk of the relations of capital and labour, we are apt to forget that capital and labour are not things (personification). . . . Capital means the people who live by selling their power to work. Therefore, the relation between capital and labour really means the relation between the people who won't starve if they don't work and the people who will starve if they don't work. Until you have got down to the relation between people you haven't traced the reality of the things you are talking about. If, therefore, we are to understand the meaning of any proposed political reform or economic reform, we have to ask what changes it will make in the relations between persons and groups of persons in society. Or to take another side of it, if we want to understand the present crises we have to understand it not in terms of trade returns or movements of prices but in terms of starvation and ill health, and other quite personal changes. Industrial and financial statistics may be an index of these things, that is the most they can be [4, p. 48].

The Nature of Culture

Culture is to society what personality is to the organism. Culture sums up the particular institutional content of a society. Culture is what happens to individuals within the context of a particular society, and Professor MacMurray is right in saying that these happenings are personal changes. The trade returns or movement of prices can be an actuarial descrip-

tion of behavior such as we have given in Part I. In fact, the entire content of Part I, to the degree to which it overlooks the stimulus situation, deals with culture, i.e., institutions, folkways, mores, etc.

Society and culture are not concerned then, with the super-organic, but with two different relationships between people: objective and attitudinal. Both are problems of psychology because they are problems of the behavior of people. Sometimes they center upon people as environment, sometimes upon people as organisms adjusting in a social environment. Ordinarily the problem of society, the objective relationships between people and other people and between people and their physical world, is handled by the sociologist and economist. Nevertheless there are psychological problems here that must be clearly understood.

An example may make the difference between objective relationships and attitudinal relationships clear. Two men stand in different places; one on a cliff, another on a path beneath the cliff. This objective fact may have nothing to do with attitudes. Yet objectively the first man, owing to his position and to gravity, stands in a place where he has the objective (not the attitudinal) capacity to injure the second. He may not know that the other individual is below him, yet the objective possibility remains. As psychologists we may be interested in explaining why the men are out walking and why one is below the cliff and the other above. We may also be interested, however, in how one individual becomes conscious of the existence of the other and his capacity to injure him. In this case we are dealing with attitudinal problems. Granted they must have an objective reference. But the mere existence of the objective situation does not always determine the necessary development of attitudes in it. On the other hand, all attitudes developed do reflect an objective situation: hence no attitudes without an objective situation, but many objective situations without attitudes.

Nor would the facts be essentially different if, instead of a man on a cliff and a man below, we had a man with a loaded

rifle and an unarmed man. Perhaps the man with the gun does not know how to use it. Perhaps the other man is his friend. The latter are attitudinal relationships. Nonetheless, the objective fact, that a gun will discharge a bullet at a certain speed, remains. The attitudinal developments in regard to these objective facts are culture. Culture is not to be confused with society.

The Relationship between Society and Culture

From this standpoint, society is primary and culture is secondary. Just as personality is something that can happen in an organism, so culture is something that can happen in a certain type of objective situation. Before attitudes, which constitute culture, arise, there must be situations or objective relationships to furnish the problem to which the attitude is a solution. From an historical point of view, society is always primary. This is sometimes called the economic interpretation of history.*

* Sorokin, in *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, has missed this point: He confuses the primary nature of the objective relationships (which are economic) with the problem of deciding which of the various elements of a culture (attitudinal) are the most important in a situation. The following quotation shows his confusion on the point: "It is easy to see that an expression like the 'mode of production determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life' presupposes an anthropomorphic and one-sided conception of causal relation. . . . In the methodology of contemporary natural science the conception of functional relation . . . is being substituted for that of one-sided causal relation" (p. 527). This indicates what generally happens when a man untrained in natural science starts talking about such subjects. What Sorokin is saying is that the nature of a system has nothing to do with its development. He is arguing for a consideration of mutual dependence in a system without knowing anything about the system. All Marx was doing was defining the nature of the system with which he was dealing and arguing that the nature of the system determined any developments within it, but as far as treating any changes Marx and Engels were arguing for mutual dependence as early as 1885. See *Herr Eugen Durhing's Revolution in Science*, F. Engels. The fallacy of Sorokin's logic would be exposed simply by looking at the problem of the organism. We have said that the nature of the physical organism determines any developments within it. (Sorokin would call this one-sided causation.) But in studying any development within the physical organism we would certainly argue for a dialectical point of view which saw the organism as a developing system in which the factors interacted.

On the other hand, the heritage of a previous society and culture, such as feudalism, must have its effect upon modern capitalism and American culture. Thus in modern times one of the causes of the objective relationships between people and the means of production is related to certain cultural attitudes which remain from feudal times. In football the acceptance of certain rules makes the objective relationships of individuals on the field possible. The acceptance is attitudinal and cultural, however. In the beginning of a society certain attitudes from a previous culture determine in part the objective relationships which constitute society. Once that society becomes fixed, the variable part is called culture. Culture consists of the changing attitudes within the fixed objective relationships.

Society and Culture as Fields

This emphasis upon relationships prevents us from being placed in the tradition of those who deny that a social situation is something more than the sum of all the individuals present. We emphasize the quality of the whole situation. Our statement may meet with applause among many unscientific people who believe in an over soul, but their approval will be only momentary. There is only one genuine answer to the superorganist, and it destroys the validity of the situation as a tool for propagandists. That answer is this: a social situation includes not only the individuals, but their relationships to each other. The objective relationships constitute society. The attitudinal relationships create culture.

A modern school of psychology, the field theorists, represented by K. Lewin and J. F. Brown, have made much of the wholistic characteristics of both physical and social situations which confront the individual as a stimulus problem (2, 3). They have developed the notion of the psychological field. The organization of the stimulus pattern covers the relationships between objects which are psychologically apprehended. This is a useful notion, but there are many objective relationships between objects which are not psychologically apprehended. This viewpoint fails to distinguish between the luna-

tic who invents relationships in his own mind and the sane man whose attitudes are a product of real problems in a real world.

On the other hand, the problem of how the organization of the objective world becomes apprehended and appears as organization of the psychological field is very important. If the relationships between objects be considered *the organization of the field of reality*, and the organization as felt by the individual be regarded *the organization of the psychological field*, we have a method of maintaining the wholistic character of social relationships without recourse to the superorganic.

Three Methods of Studying Behavior in a Social Field

A close examination demonstrates the utility of the field conception over the mystical superorganic entities of the social scientists. To study a social situation we must operate upon it to change it, or find conditions under which changes are arising from some other source. Only through change is understanding secured. When one wishes to change a social situation one is confronted with the individual and his motivation. This procedure is determined by its usefulness rather than by an assumption about the nature of reality. It in no way denies the existence of the properties of the whole situation which cannot be understood by describing a *single* part. It rather asserts that the study of *all* the properties and relationships of the individual will expose the wholistic characteristics of the situation to which his behavior is a response. Those who wish to maintain the uniqueness of the situation *per se* are left in a position where, after naming their concatenation of facts, they have nothing left to do. Those who wish to build a scientific fund of information regarding these social situations must deal with the behavior of individuals.

The minute one looks at the relationships of behavior to the external situation certain problems arise. (1) Behavior may be referred to its goal or objective. This is generally called *motivation*. A man's behavior may seem unrelated until we see that he is going to the city. When his *goal* is demonstrated,

the meaningfulness of his actions becomes clear. (2) Behavior may be referred to the immediate stimulus situation between the individual and his goal. This is called his *adjustment to barriers*. Although the man is going to town, he finds that he cannot go as the birds fly, but must follow the roads. If there were a more direct road he would take it. There being none, he must adjust to the fields, that are fenced off, by driving around them. (3) Behavior may be referred to its effect upon other people as it constitutes a stimulus situation for them. This is called *role*. The individual by his actions in driving his car to town may serve as a guide to some individual behind him, who does not know the road but assumes that the driver of the car before him does. Now in all instances we are talking about the same item of behavior. Motivation, reference to barriers, and role are simply different relations of this behavior to the stimulus situation.

There has been much confusion in social science because of a failure to understand these three problems. Thus the social scientists talk about the profit motive. Obviously very few are motivated by profits. Any study of human beings shows that they seek food, shelter, prestige, etc. Between these goals and desirous men lie certain barriers in the form of the institutional behavior of others. In order to attain these goals one must have money or profits. There is really no profit motive, only profit behavior to barriers in the form of the capitalistic economy. Of course it is psychologically true that an adjustment to a barrier may become so cross-conditioned that it may become a motive in itself. This may happen in our culture, but it is doubtful that it happens often. (Cowles' experiment on food tokens in motivating chimpanzees argues against the theory of derived drives. See pages 257-259.)

In the same fashion motivation and behavior, to barriers have been confused with role. Thus, one writer states that he finds no antagonism between capital and labor, in fact, only antagonism between Catholic and Protestant, foreigner and native. Classes, however, are defined by role, not by attitudes possessed by members. It is true that under certain conditions

people become class conscious of their role, but that is not the way social classes are defined. A class is defined by the effect of the behavior of the members upon the social situation, in which others live. Members may be entirely unconscious of the significance of their behavior.

The distinctions we have been making are useful in clearing up much of the misinformation that is circulated in regard to these problems. Only at the level of the psychologist can the problems be clearly stated and the illogic exposed.

The Basic Features of Modern Capitalistic Society

English and American society, when viewed from an abstract level, are from one standpoint identical. They are both capitalistic societies. This means that certain objective relationships between people and other people, and between people and the instruments of production, are the same. No one would argue that the culture of America and the culture of England are the same. The time interval is certainly a factor to be considered here. English capitalism was on its way before the settlement of America. Likewise the supply of raw materials, the pressure of population, the degree of industrialization, climate, and previous cultural heritage are vital factors to be considered. All these variables have their cultural consequences. It is useful, however, to start at a level of generalization that describes both England and America and to add differences later to complete each unique picture.

The Objective Role of Capital in Modern Society

Many sociologists confuse the picture of society by making it a matter of common ends pursued by men. Any real knowledge of the blind trial-and-error methods of modern society should certainly demonstrate the artificiality of such a viewpoint. One psychologist after another has demonstrated the very different motives back of uniform behavior. The real point in our conception of society should be concerned with the objective relationships between people and things and the

role they play as a consequence of this situation. The most important role in modern society has been the role of the capitalist.

It is not our purpose to inquire into historical origins. If one desires to discover the situations that made possible the present objective relationships between men and the instruments of production, a survey of English history is necessary. It suffices for us to point out that at the end of the Middle Ages men were in an objective relationship to their material environment and to other men which permitted almost any individual to sell the consequences of his labor. Sometimes this labor was sold in butter and cheese, sometimes in wool or cloth; but still the individual was free to spend hours of his time at work on a product which, finished, might be sold in a manner paying for his efforts.

Many factors contributed to the overthrow of this objective relationship between men. Now with the factory and industrial situation the objective situation is changed. Most men have only their labor capacity to sell and not the consequences of their labor. This is because as far as most men are concerned the tools necessary for work, as well as the raw materials, are inaccessible. The reason for the inaccessibility of tools and raw materials is both objective and attitudinal. The tools are in factories behind wire fences, and the laborer is on the other side of the fence. But the fences are not objectively high enough, nor sufficient as barriers, to stand a raid by the majority of a population. They can withstand a minority but not a majority. This objective situation continues because the majority believe in property rights and have believed in them for some time. Whether the majority are deluded about their interests in the situation, and are merely ignorant, or whether, knowing all the facts, they choose to continue this arrangement, is another matter.

We would find in the common psychology which pervades a culture all the mechanisms of institutional opinion such as the feeling of universality, pluralistic ignorance, and the attitude of conformity described in earlier chapters. As long as

this objective situation remains constant, we have a framework of society. Other developments are cultural developments within this context. The overthrow of this objective social order is revolution. The changes within the context which still do not alter the context constitute the history of the development of a culture or its evolution.

Surplus Value

The key to the evolution of capitalistic culture within such an objective framework is found in a process which the economist calls surplus value. The objective relationship between capitalist and laborer permits the hiring of workers on a basis which has nothing to do with the number of labor hours spent in work upon a product. The price paid for labor has become a matter of competition between workers, and the greater the supply of labor the less has to be paid to hire their services. As a consequence those who own the instruments of production never return to the participants in production the full product of their labor. A percentage is retained as profits. Now, as psychologists, we are only secondarily concerned with the justice of this procedure. The economic books are full of rationalizations about this point, such as Senior's theory of waiting. We are chiefly interested in pointing out the kind of situation which makes this procedure psychologically possible. The objective relationship of the owners to the instruments of production makes the process possible, but only if they can persuade by education or propaganda a majority, or at least a very large minority, of the propriety of these actions. This process of effective propaganda is in itself dependent upon an objective situation. To disseminate such doctrines successfully it is necessary to have a frontier to drain off strong-minded dissenters, or sufficient unexploited economic fields to allow some laborers to climb from the ranks of labor into capital, or enough frustrating situations in a society to provide a fund of inferiority feelings which can be sublimated in nationalism, or some similar condition.

The very nature of the process of surplus value, however, and the limited extent of the globe, its peoples, and its natural resources tend continually to erode the fundamental attitudes which make this societal arrangement successful. Wealth tends to accumulate in the hands of the few. Unable to consume all the wealth gained, the few must reinvest it in more instruments of production. New territory and new lands must be continually sought for markets for manufactured articles and for raw materials, and the pace grows ever swifter. At the same time, the continual accumulation of wealth in one class cuts into the purchasing power of the 'other. When the frontier is gone, the world markets distributed, there is nothing left to do but to support a great many of the labor population on doles.

At every stage in this process the problem created has an effect upon the psychology of the people which supplements the objective relationships. Concomitant with every stage in the process we find a development of culture which reflects capitalistic evolution. In the early days we find the development of institutions such as education to provide the entrepreneurs able to direct the development. We find the development of a laissez-faire theory to rationalize and justify that stage. As surplus capital demands expansion we find colonization movements, and the effect of the frontier upon an economy like our own. We find in England the development of free trade and liberalism. A new economic theory accompanies every shift in problems. We see the destruction of the rural community structure inherited from the Middle Ages, and the development of great cities and great centralized units of production. As the process is accentuated, we find imperialistic wars between nations. We find nations arriving on the scene late. Consequently they are forced to stop industrial development at a premature stage, forced to techniques like Fascism to impose a lowered standard of living upon a whole nation if a revolution in the form of society is to be prevented.

The Psychology of Cultural Development

Culture as a consequence is dynamic, not static. Yet social scientists have acted as if public opinion were a static form of social relationship which operated in the same fashion at all stages in the development of a culture. Leadership is looked upon as a static problem to be investigated as if it had a universal quality which overlooked all differences in the contextual situation in which it works. Government is treated the same way. This utterly misconceived point of view is obviously in itself a product of the stage of our culture when social change was not apparent as a major characteristic of our life. We must investigate each of these problems as it exists in a different period of cultural development.

American history can be profitably divided into three periods: (1) the period of village and rural communities, (2) the period of publics, and (3) the period of conscious social classes. In making this division we are not denying that the whole process of social change is a continuous development. Our divisions are selected because they seem to provide the different contexts of a changing American culture which have affected the problems of social psychology.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE EPOCH OF THE RURAL COMMUNITY

Early Capitalism and the Rural Community

No society is divorced from the culture which gave it birth. Modern capitalistic social relationships took root in a village and community social organization inherited from feudal times. And this heritage interacted with the attitudes arising out of new societal relationships.

Kimball Young gives us a fleeting picture of this cultural heritage and its effect as a determining situation upon the behavior of its members. He says:

The village and town life which characterized our American life down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century was very largely the outgrowth of the culture typified in the towns of New England and the northern colonial area. We find in these communities a primary group organization not unlike that of village life in Europe during the previous two thousand years. Before modern means of communication, while these villages were relatively isolated, nevertheless their life and culture were fairly homogeneous. Except for Teutonic and Scandinavian immigration into the rural areas west of the Great Lakes, the immigrant tide affected more particularly our large cities. Social control in the villages rested in mores common to the Protestant-American type, principally with Puritan backgrounds.

The development of public opinion in any crisis depended upon gossip and conversation over the back fence, in the village store and postoffice, in the church and neighborhood gathering, and in the village assembly. The elders of the group, that is, the older and more prominent men of these communities, no doubt crystallized and gave direction to the common currents of opinion running through the village. On the whole, life was not very complex and the range of activity was not very wide. The major crises involved infractions of the moral code and the common political interests of taxation, roads, education and public institu-

tions. If some crisis arose, such as the burning of a neighbor's barn, the development of a bad mudhole in the county highway, or the overcrowding of a school building, the inhabitants did not have much difficulty in discovering the fundamental facts. On the basis of these facts, through conversation and personal associative thinking, a consensus of opinions about the situation could easily form. From this consensus of opinion a common course of action might be promptly determined. If the village school teacher did not live up to the folkways of the town, she was sure to feel ridicule and censure of a mild sort. This gossip usually was sufficient to bring her into conformity with village standards. The gossips might exert sufficient pressure on violators of the moral codes to drive them out of the village. Thus, if the teacher's conduct were too divergent, she might, and usually did, lose her position, being replaced by someone more satisfactory. Sometimes a whole community might mobilize to control the actions of a recalcitrant member. If the tax rates were to be raised, the citizens had opinions and exchanged them with others in terms of their wishes for civic improvements and a realization of added financial burden. However, life in the town or village was conservative and public opinion was decidedly narrow. Even today rural communities oppose consolidation of school districts, refuse to increase taxation for local improvements, and exhibit a great indifference to the larger political issues.

While American villages felt themselves to be a part of the larger political state and nation, their information about politics depended upon the weekly newspaper and on occasional campaign speeches. In times of agricultural crises considerable public opinion arose. This is illustrated in the rise of the Populist movement and the Grange. Yet, for the most part, political public opinion concerned itself with the details of village life.

Public opinion of special interest groups was confined very largely to matters of religion. A village might have a half dozen rival Protestant sects, each with its own membership and each developing certain opinions on affairs of common concern. In spite of differences in dogma and faith, these sects all held fast to certain fundamental moral codes, so that the mores affecting such things as sex conduct, Sunday observance, dancing, card-playing, horse-racing, and gambling, and the general scheme of honesty and fair dealing were only superficially in dispute. The result was that little public opinion was generated on these attitudes. Since they were fully accepted in the mores and folkways, they were not subjects for talk and discussion.

In general, American towns and villages were essentially alike as regards mores and folkways. Questions to be decided by group opinion were settled in direct, face-to-face manner. In the large issues of state and nation the older Puritan-American political-religious standpoint persisted. Because of this body of fundamentals the country at large was fairly homogeneous in spite of the relative isolation of the communities [9, pp. 571-573].

This picture gives us the feeling and atmosphere of early rural capitalism. Young, however, does not attempt to distinguish between those items which are a hangover from a feudal economy and those developments which are a result of the establishment of a capitalist economy. The community mechanism of public opinion described, and its control over the behavior of the teacher, reflect both new and old elements. Free education and the schoolteacher are a development arising out of the new social relationships of a capitalistic economy and were unknown in feudal times. The method for control of recalcitrants who broke the moral code of the community is, as Young says, of ancient origin. Nor is there very much reason for making this artificial separation if we see clearly that early rural capitalism was a blending of both conditions, the cultural heritage of the past and new attitudes arising out of new problems caused by the changed objective relationship to the instruments of production.

It is important, however, to state in general terms the change in problems effected by the development of capitalistic society even in these early days. The biggest cultural achievement as a consequence of changed societal relationships was the creation of what has been called the *market*, first on a small basis and later on an ever-increasing scale.*

One of the consequences of the new order of things was

* It is obvious here that such problems are inevitably dialectical, i.e., it is hard to see what is cause and what is effect. That is, the nature of objective societal arrangements permitted a few people to go into trade and led to the establishment of a small market. The existence of this market developed cultural attitudes and psychological wants, which were frustrated by the prevailing feudal *arrangements and finally led to their alteration*. The whole process by which feudal objective social relationships were displaced is a long story.

what E. D. Martin has called *the overstimulation of ambition* (5). Men began to feel the possibilities of bettering their material and social welfare. Motivated by these wants, they directed their various capacities toward successful trade. Others looked for more efficient methods of production. Soon there was a whole class of individuals whose lives were given over to organizing production and carrying on trade. This was the new middle class. That few of these individuals were conscious of their role is obvious. Most of them were individuals attempting to solve their personal problems in the objective situation confronting them. But the new altered societal relationships offered a mode of life hitherto unknown. The market and the middle class are two achievements of the changed order of society. The cultural consequences of these two factors in the life of the community are, of course, the chief difference between the psychology of rural life in the Middle Ages and in modern American history.

Characteristics of the Rural Community

The community has been called a face-to-face situation. Any member may and probably often does exist as a direct stimulus to his fellows. This arrangement contrasts with other situations such as the *public*, where members are only additional contributory stimuli: a background affecting some central stimulus problem.

Inasmuch as every member is in potential contact with any other, the rural community situation allows for deviation in attitudes only in the presence of the immediate family or intimate friends. The rural community is one large *public* situation, and the family is a small *private* situation. Modern city life, on the other hand, permits an individual to belong to many mutually exclusive groups in which his behavior in one situation seldom, if ever, flows into another. He may as a consequence have as many attitudes on a subject as there are groups to which he belongs.

The community situation has also been described as a *we group*. The members of the group possess what Giddings

has termed *consciousness of kind*. Out of the common life of the rural community, the common problems of rural existence, common dress, common speech, common subjects of conversation, common posture, common walk comes an ability on the part of the single individual to identify himself with other members. This process is probably as old as the rural community itself. A new factor, however, emerges from the changed order of things as against the constant qualities of primary-group life. This is the problem of status in the rural community in relation to the psychology of identification. The nobility and clergy of the feudal age had been from the rural community but not of it. The new middle class, however, was composed of individuals who themselves rose from the ranks. As they gathered wealth they acquired what the sociologist has been pleased to call *status*. Now status is obviously not a quality of the individual, but a description of the attitudes of others toward him.

The status of this rising class was a consequence of the rural situation which made possible the identification of all group members with the successful merchant. Freud has shown us that it is possible for one individual vicariously to solve the conflicts of his life through identification with some other person who is successfully solving these conflicts in the real world. Identification, moreover, is much more effective when the individual possesses the qualities which brand him of a "kind" and stimulate the *consciousness of kind*. One may watch the struggle of two African savages with some thrill in the power of the stronger. Nevertheless it is difficult to see one's self in the victor's shoes, because the victor is too unlike one. The middle class, however, was both climbing to success and wearing the mantle of the community. There, but for the slightest deviation of fortune, went any member of the face-to-face group. The greater the success attained, the greater the self-flattery to be derived in identifying one's self with a wealthy member.

Looking at the individuals with *status* from their role as stimulus situations to their fellows, we find the problem of

prestige. Because of the attitudes of the group members, individuals with status become powerful controlling factors in community life. Less successful individuals tend to conform to the way of life of those with status and to imitate them. The ideas and beliefs of those of status are important in community circles. They possess influence.

The Feeling of Universality and the Attitude of Conformity

In feudal communities, particularly those which had a resident squire, the important influence was of course the squire and his family. With the rise of the middle class, especially in those communities which had no squire, and in America with no feudal classes, there was an increasing importance of the majority. Freed of feudal class distinction, communities took on the problem of self-government. The entrepreneur acquired prestige, but so also did the majority. An efficient method for determining the feelings or opinions of the majority was not needed. Gossip over the back fence and other face-to-face means of communication were reliable enough to give one a workable idea of prevailing sentiment.

It was, furthermore, important to conform to majority sentiment. More and more an individual's ability to rise into the middle class depended upon his relationships to his fellows, as an efficient laborer, an honest business man, or a successful entrepreneur. Thus a strong tendency toward conformity was established to the community will. In addition to this strong self-interest in conformity the same possibility of identification occurred on a more subtle level. The individual, by identifying himself not with a single individual, but with the whole "we" group, was able to claim for himself all the achievements of the collection as well as the success of any member of the collection. The emotion involved soon became loyalty to the notion of a community as an entity in itself.

Public Opinion in the Rural Community

Many writers have confused the nature of public opinion by assuming a single phenomenon which operates alike in the community, nation, or world. Public opinion in the community is a phenomenon which exhibits characteristics not duplicated elsewhere. M. Ginsberg, in fact, has defined public opinion as "the mass of ideas and judgments operative in a community which are more or less definitely formulated and have a certain stability and are the result of many minds acting in common" (2). Lowell also seemed to be talking of the community when he described public opinion, for he insisted that there must be a sufficient common interest in it to make the minority feel itself bound to the opinion of the majority (4). The face-to-face nature of the community situation provides such necessary qualities in the stimulus situation.

Rural life provides a fund of personal experiences which eventually become reflected in individual attitudes and sentiments. Nevertheless it would be folly to assume that public opinion springs by itself from such a source. There must be definite forces at work to make public opinion, for most experiences, as Lippmann says, are "to an immeasurable degree personal in each individual and unmanageably complex in the mass" (3). They might logically be called *personal opinions*. Public opinion must, as Ginsberg has said, be definitely formulated and have a certain stability. Personal opinion meets neither criterion. But there is a real relationship between *personal opinion* and *public opinion*. The first is the stuff out of which the second is made. Just as there are writers who act as if public opinion sprang full-grown without social interaction, so there are those who so stress leadership that they fail to recognize the unorganized sentiments of a community as a limiting condition for any future development.

The unorganized opinions and sentiments are a product of the generalization of the experiences of everyday life by the individual citizen. The price of wheat, the cost of living, employment and unemployment, sickness and good health, real

wages, housing, and a host of other factors contribute to the fund of events out of which one forms personal opinions concerning various courses of action.

The organization of these sentiments and highly personal unique feelings into public opinion is another story. Public opinion cannot be said to exist until there is an issue. The first step toward public opinion is then *the creation of an issue* of enough vitality to cause people to take a stand on it. Even this can hardly be said to be public opinion in the sense conceived by Lowell, wherein the majority compels the minority to a common stand. It might be called unorganized opinion in the sense that such a situation is one in which people are asked to take a stand upon an issue but uncoerced as to what that stand might be. The second step is *the organization of a common stand upon an issue*.

Some writers have been interested in speculating upon the type of distribution of opinion produced by either process.* The actual fact is that both of these processes go on simultaneously in the rural community so that unorganized opinion seldom exists. The problem of public opinion may be illuminated by putting it in terms of our three references to behavior: (a) motivation, (b) adjustment to barriers, (c) role. The motives back of personal opinion are highly individual. We have demonstrated the nature of goals in earlier chapters. Now in order to get people to take a stand upon an issue, common barriers or obstacles must be so placed between the individual and his personal goal that he finds various steps or attitudes upon an issue to be a means to his personal and ultimate goal. The creation of an issue is nothing more than a method of limiting the environment in such a fashion that an individual must

* S. A. Rice, in his *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, was interested in this question. It was his thesis that if any issue could be found to exist without the presence of distorting influences such as propaganda, economic coercion, etc., individuals would tend to distribute themselves normally upon it. But people seldom feel the need of distributing themselves upon an issue until some vested interest persuades them to do so, and this situation always leads to a tendency toward a biased opinion.

choose one of several alternatives as the path of his action. This is what happens when we have unorganized opinion.

To persuade individuals not only to take a stand upon an issue, but also a very particular stand, means an even further limitation of actions by barriers. Barriers are placed so that the individual is limited not only to a field, but to a specific section of the field. In everyday life we limit the behavior of motorists going to town by putting up fences which keep them on the road. We also keep them on the right side of the road by putting motorcycle policemen upon the road who become barriers to driving on the left side. When we limit opinion in both these ways we have public opinion.

We have already demonstrated two powerful stimulus patterns to conformity in the rural community: (*a*) the behavior and approval of prestiged individuals, (*b*) the approval of the majority. Either of these conditions can become barriers which force people to solve their individual problems by taking a stand upon an issue, and to adopt, moreover, the particular stand favored by the prestiged individuals or the majority. The question at hand in the community, then, is how to secure the approval of prestiged individuals or the majority. The two problems are related in that the approval of the prestiged individuals often influence the majority, and the recalcitrant minority feels both the pressure of prestige and of universality.

Undoubtedly we have conditions wherein public opinion is *coenotropic*. The implications of a situation may be so unequivocal that all men accept the first statement of a program as a necessary solution to barriers between them and their individual goals. Individuals caught in a flood will accept immediately the necessity of boiling water, and perhaps, also, a particular method of conserving water. Disease stands between them and the satisfaction of thirst. Furthermore, their notion of disease is purely a verbal one, so that at the moment the problem is one of social rather than physical origin. Hence the word has only to get around and individuals begin to tell others about boiling water, and such behavior becomes a situation compulsive upon the minority. This is not for any mys-

tical reason but because members of the majority, fearing contagion, would take individual action against any person who failed to go along with the group.

Most situations of life are not so clear-cut. People must be brought into a situation which in itself is not an imperative problem. This involves individuals who play a specific role in public-opinion formation. Pareto has called such individuals *the elite* (6). In his sociology the elite are blessed with what he terms the instinct of combinations. They have inventive minds which see manifold means of connecting what they want with the needs of others. The elite of a rural community generally represent individuals with a vested self-interest in a problem. They are seldom professional leaders, but members of the community whose vocation has nothing to do with a leadership role. Their own interests, however, stimulate their keenness in regard to the problem at hand.

The most usual technique in creating social barriers to make people adjust to an issue, and to adjust in a special way, is that of suggestion. We have already discussed the nature of this mechanism in relation to the psychology of the individual in Part II. The molders of public opinion try to *suggest some connection between their issue and a genuine coenotropic situation*. They say, for example, that they foster some issue because it will lower taxes. In rural capitalistic society everybody is against high taxes. There is little notion of differentials to be applied to high incomes. So if a measure can be related to high taxes everybody is against it, if for low taxes people are for it. Inasmuch as taxes are barriers which stand between a man and his goals, because taxes cut into income, this is an effective technique. We have already pointed out, however, that a suggestion is effective in the long run only if the related attitudes called forth seem related in the minds of the individual and if no competing attitudes contributing to a contrary point of view are stimulated. The mere wish of a vested interest to stimulate a connection between two attitudes does not guarantee acceptance of such a suggestion.

A second effective method is to *vitalize the issue to prestiged*

people. If a vested interest in the solution can be demonstrated to the individuals of status, their effect may contribute to swinging general public opinion behind a course of action.

The rural community, by its nature, provides a short-cut method for both these procedures. *A vocal minority may create an impression of universality, noise being mistaken for numbers. A persistent minority may create an impression of universality.* The repetition of an argument over and over during a period of months and years gives it the appearance of widespread origin and hence of universality. Inasmuch as all situations, except very intimate ones, are public situations, the arguments heard at the postoffice, lodge, and church quickly become public property. They acquire familiarity with age, and, as the individual becomes habituated to them, he looks upon them as characteristics of the community, and forgets the vested interest of the original proponent (7).

Public opinion in the rural community is, as a consequence of these mechanisms, a leaping development. Though the period of crystallization may be slow, once a genuine impression of universality is created, or an illusion of a majority, the minority must conform. At this stage there is a qualitative change. Personal and unorganized opinion under such conditions gives way quickly to public opinion. Such a type of public opinion is in itself a social situation wherein the individual must conform.

Folkways and Folklore, the Mores and the Rural Community

The rural community situation is, of course, the foundation for folkways and folklore. There are certain facts about rural folklore which resemble coenotropic public opinion. The folk tales seem to crystallize a set of common emotions and sentiments which are unequivocal in implication. Rural life is concerned for the most part with agriculture and with trade in agricultural products. In agricultural pursuits the common experience of all individuals is the uncertainty of the natural elements, and man's lack of control over them. The daily ex-

periences of the city man are just the opposite. He finds that, if his machine does not go, some part must be at fault; weather is controlled by appropriate shelters; his income is related to his output. The folklore of the rural community reflects the uncontrollable nature of the elements in the profuseness of superstition. The city man with his experiences would find the beliefs of the rural community, such as planting wheat by the light of a certain moon, silly and untenable. The important point about folklore is that it reflects the broad generalization of daily experience just as public opinion reflects the generalization of more specific experiences. These experiences are so common to everybody that the superstition has wide currency. Moreover, it takes no elite to bring them to a focus. Let a story be told, and because it reflects these common generalizations of life, it becomes accepted as true and passed on because it so nicely fits each individual's feelings.

Many of the folktales reflect actual generalization of fact rather than superstition. "Red sky at night sailors' delight, red sky in the morning sailors take warning," is a generalization which probably fits the facts in some degree. It is to be noted, however, that whether belief in finding water by the use of a willow wand, or actual generalization of facts about the weather, folklore has a real connection to the multitudes of little experiences which constitute life in a rural community. The fact that much folklore can be found in the Schoharie Hills of New York, common with the folklore of the English and Scotch peoples of three centuries ago, testifies to the unchanged elements in rural life. An interesting study would be to test the effect of the changed elements in the modern world, such as the market and the machine, upon the psychology of individuals and their reaction to this inherited lore.

The mores also reflect the community situation. In fact, many moderns, in reflecting upon the decline of the mores, often overlook the fact that they may actually be speaking of the decline of the rural community as a stimulus situation. Certainly this is true to the extent that the mores represented community coercion. For without the community situation

the mechanism for control of others becomes an institutional mechanism, and in such cases it would be more accurate to speak of institutional taboos instead of mores.

We have spoken of public opinion as representing a situation compulsive upon the minority and have demonstrated the nature of such a situation in terms of the common and reciprocal behavior of people. The mores also represent situations which are compulsive upon recalcitrants. Most individuals follow the mores willingly, and in this sense, like the folkways, the mores represent synergic adjustments in which the generalization of experience points to certain solutions in an unequivocal fashion. How then are the recalcitrants brought into line?

In the first place consider the face-to-face, members-present nature of the community situation. Any member is a potential stimulus to conformity on the part of another. We have pointed out in relationship to taboo that the intensity of conviction on the part of any individual so fires his emotions that he has a strong motivation irrespective of how other people feel. Undoubtedly such mores still exist in a city civilization, so that a violation of certain mores leads to a very vigorous response on the part of any passing citizen. But mores in a rural community contain both an element of taboo and conformity based upon a strong feeling of universality. Except for intimates any member is as effective a stimulus to conformity as any other. Citizens are in this respect equipotential. Hence any violation of the mores flows over into the community and merits community action.

The chief effect of the change of society from feudal to capitalistic relationships on the mores comes in relationship to property. Some of the mores of feudal culture on drunkenness, sex, and cruelty still prevail. With the development of capitalism and the middle class we have a whole new set of mores on property. Certainly one *mos* is toward property destruction. The chief recalcitrants in many rural communities in this respect are often the youth. The adult belief that it is wicked to destroy property is heard every Hallowe'en evening in every rural community. Undoubtedly the community situation had

a real effect, also, upon business ethics. The business man was a member of the community. He was known to all other members and belonged to many of their groups such as the church or lodge. Any reputation for dishonesty would be quickly disseminated in the community. As a consequence, in this age men bragged that their word was as good as their bond, and sharp practices were said not to be good business.

The Rural Crowd or Mob

Somewhere in between the enforcement of the mores and institutional practices is a borderline field of discipline of recalcitrant individuals which has a psychology of its own. In the mores mentioned, any individual of the community becomes an enforcement officer. In this middle type of situation a crowd takes it upon itself to punish the offender. Both types of behavior are immediate, spontaneous, and rather universally approved. The crowd, however, finds a leader and creates its own organization during its development. In this sense it represents an incipient institution. The crowd is in a sense spontaneous government.

The anticipation of such a contingency by institutions of law and order may solve the problem before a crowd forms. In England the speed of institutionalized justice has made crowds infrequent. In America the slowness of justice has had the opposite effect, and the tradition of the rural community has been one of lawlessness.

The history of crowd behavior in America is a mixture of feudal and capitalistic social relationships. Witch hunts and heresy trials represent instances of the first kind; lynching parties to punish horse stealing and cattle rustling, and vigilante searches for bank robbers represent the second.* The relationship of witch hunts and heresy trials to the fund of attitudes and emotions already discussed in regard to folklore is quite obvious. The supernatural was a significant factor in the

* The persecution of the Negro race is a peculiar problem mixed up with both economic and cultural differences peculiar to the United States. For an excellent discussion of this problem see Chap. 7 of E. Freeman, *Social Psychology*.

lives of rural folk from Roman days until modern times. The sentiments which were reflected in the folklore of goblins, pixies, and witches on occasion reached a boiling point when actual injury was supposedly perpetrated by a witch. An angry crowd went out to eliminate an evil element from the community.

The lynching of a horse thief or a cattle rustler indicates the development of private property to the taboo state in which property becomes sacred. We have few actual first-hand accounts of these affairs—hardly enough to demonstrate the nature of the psychological problems involved. Leaders appear in such groups in a rather spontaneous fashion. The qualities of such leaders are undoubtedly different from those of the leaders of the city crowds of modern times. It is doubtful that the capacity to identify one's self with the leader, because of his majestic mien, his wit, common language, or other attribute of a Mussolini, a Hitler or even a Jimmy Walker, an Al Smith or Jack Dempsey, is the mechanism involved. The main principle of leadership seemed to be psychological capacity to carry out in action the aims desired by the others, which they find themselves less able to perform. Thus in certain rural crowds in modern times it was observed that the leaders in an insurrection were a former justice of peace and a former state trooper. Both men were accustomed to dealing with the police, and in one riot their attitudes of familiarity made them less impressed by uniforms. In other cases sadistic tendencies on the part of some individuals make them willing leaders in punitive expeditions which result in hanging or whipping. Individuals with these characteristics, however, are seldom the prestiged individuals of the rural community. They are the men whose influence is small except in circumstances where their special talents become a tool to the solution of the problem presented to the group.

The individual motives involved in crowd behavior are of course many and varied. Just as the property system stands as a barrier to the achievement of individual ends, so the behavior of the cattle rustler or the horse thief becomes an extraordinary

hurdle inserted into the game which constitutes unfair play. The same frustrated emotions often arise in games like football. The rules and the other team are set as natural barriers to the goal. But slugging is an additional handicap, not expected, and one which the individual is not likely to accept. The individual accepts the other team and even defeat. The slugging of a teammate, however, becomes an emotional situation which may result in a fight. Now the leader plays a special role in the crowd. Irrespective of motivation, whether from sadism, special hate of the victim, familiarity with bloodshed, or other reason, he is the first to act. Under the influence of crowd suggestion and the feeling of universality this single action is taken as behavior which everybody approves. Undoubtedly the familiarity with firearms on the part of the rural settler, his ability to kill animals in the hunt, and experience in border wars with the Indian all left a heritage of violence and capacity to injure in a few individuals. This provided one basis of crowd leadership. In modern times a man's stealing of a horse might be considered humorous. But horse and cattle were once main factors in production.

Associations for Communal Enterprise

Less striking than spontaneous groupings to discipline violators of community ethics is the rallying of rural community members for some communal enterprise. It, too, resembles the crowd in that, unlike the simple violations of the mores, it requires organization, division of labor, and leaders to accomplish the end desired. It is generally an unemotional situation so that the elements of crowd psychology are absent. The factors of the situation must be unequivocal so that the movement develops spontaneously and finds leadership in the process.

Thus the word goes round that John Jones' barn has burned down and that neighbors are rallying to aid him in putting up another. In such a situation (as in crowd psychology) organization develops in process. The weak and the lame are excused because of recognized incapacity. Whether one person is put

to chopping down trees or fitting joists may be a consequence of either physical strength or special skill. Another person ends by doing the directing.*

Sociologists have been wont to stress commonness of purpose in explaining this sort of activity. Purpose cannot mean commonality of motive in such a case and can only mean common adjustment to barriers between individuals and their respective individual goals. Certainly such activity is predicated upon common acquaintance with the skill of individual members. This can be easily seen to be a function of the face-to-face nature of community life. † We must also explain the willingness of individuals to participate, let alone to accept a specialized function. Here the equipotential nature of any member as a stimulus to conformity is clearly indicated. The subjective mechanisms of identification and the feeling of universality, which are a product of the community situation, are also demonstrated. Such common associations can be understood in terms of the common orientation of individuals in a community to the barriers of the attitudes of their fellowmen rather than in terms of individual aspiration.

Moreover, the next barn-raising will see the same division of labor springing into action. The big fellow who could lift objects the rest could not budge will be called immediately when a similar problem is discovered. The small fellow who proved of little use will be delegated to carrying water. A residue of dependence, expectation, and specialization is left behind, so

* This spontaneous growth of organization is seen at present in an emergency like a train wreck. Here institutional leadership seldom works, and although the railroad president, the despatcher, or the superintendent of maintenance-of-way may start out giving orders, the necessity for quick work leads to their retirement unless they also have actual capacity. In one railroad known by the authors an Irish maintenance-gang leader always ended by giving the directions after the high officials had become confused and had been forced to retire from the problem.

† Moreover, without such a face-to-face situation this differentiation of function could not occur. A revolutionary situation always has such a division of labor. Trotsky has outlined, however, the source of such capacity. He argues that previous trial mobilizations like sit-down strikes allow individuals to get acquainted with the ability of one another. See Leon Trotsky, *The Nation*, 1936, "French Sit-Down Strikes."

that individuals are soon playing special roles, for their presence affects the stimulus situation as it exists for others. No one would think of doing a certain job as long as Henry Smith is present and unoccupied. It becomes his part in the play.

Government in the Rural Community

The point to notice about the folkways and mores is that they are always an approximation to true democracy. Requiring no specialization of authority, they allow little perversion. They may be anticipated, but not ignored; channelized, but not squelched; perverted, but not created. They represent a situation where opinion and action are closely related. The one easily flows into the other. The face-to-face nature of the community and the immediacy of the problem require no division of labor for solution. The crowd situation arises where a division of labor is required, but the organization is developed in process, and disappears immediately upon the solution of the problem. Less striking than spontaneous crowds are associations for communal enterprise. They too develop a division of labor in process, but unlike the crowd they leave behind a residue of attitudes toward one and the other, which predetermines all future situations.

The basis for the institution of government is undoubtedly created in situations which resemble that of associations for communal enterprise. Government seems to have two meanings. Sometimes it refers to the development of permanent common and reciprocal attitudes in a population, such as the residue we have described which hangs over from collective enterprise. Sometimes it seems to refer only to the leadership which performs a special function. The two are different aspects of the same type of situation.

Government Is Dependent upon Public Opinion

We have already demonstrated the fact that public opinion in the rural community rests upon: (*a*) a fund of personal experiences and resulting personal opinion; (*b*) individuals moti-

vated to organize this type of opinion in relationship to an issue; and (c) the possibility for organizing the members of the community in a united front, depending upon (1) attitudes of conformity toward prestige and numbers, and (2) illusions of universality arising out of the nature of the community situation. This is not enough to make a field in which government can function. The crowd or communal association might be as likely a solution. There must be a *situation in which public opinion does not flow immediately into action*. If there is an immediate solution to thwarted motives and attitudes, there is no chance for government. Instead, individual action or crowd behavior is likely to follow. Government can exist only if the situation is lacking in these elements or if the agents of government are trained to act fast enough to prevent these conditions from arising. Moreover it is obvious that, if past experience has demonstrated the fact that the government will anticipate this situation, the situation itself will be slower in coming to a boiling point. So the faster the government acts in most cases, the slower it can act in exceptional cases without causing crowd behavior.

A third factor essential for government is the *recurrence of the same problem*. If a fire appeared in a community only once in fifty years, the necessity of a permanent organization for fire fighting would not be very deeply impressed upon community members. If the poor are so few that a dependent family appears only once in a decade, the case is likely to be left to spontaneous associations or individual enterprise. Special division of labor occurs because the problem crops up often enough to make specialization desirable. Three aspects of recurring problems should be noted: (a) recurrence must be frequent and closely spaced in time so that the lessons of division of labor, leadership, and capacity leave a residue in attitudes of expectation and dependence; (b) recurrence makes it desirable to anticipate problems and, therefore, to have a permanent division of labor (one fire teaches the necessity of an available water supply, signals of alarm); (c) recurrence makes it desirable to have a clear notion concerning community mem-

bership. A spontaneous event may include any passing stranger. His activities may not be required but they will not be refused. If a specialized group is to have a function, however, there must be some way, such as taking turns or paying taxes, by which fairness and equality can be established.

Given such a set of dynamics, the logical result is the development of local self-government as an easy solution. Undoubtedly every situation, when compared with another, has its differences as well as its common qualities. The preceding discussion is given only to show the general set of dynamics which make the institution of local government possible.

The development of a specialized group, charged with carrying on government, does not free this group from the situation that exists in the community. *In some instances the dynamics of the situation exist as a mandate upon the members of the local government.* In such instances organized public opinion is completely developed upon an issue, and the government is charged only with administration of community will. Thus S. Webb points out that certain of the English Open Vestry meetings, where the parish oligarchy had developed into an orderly democracy, required it to be entered into the parish book "that every man's hand consenting is set thereto" (8). Given this duly authenticated assent of all concerned, or at any rate a major part thereto, there seemed to be no limit to the changes in laws or customs which the parish government felt free to effect. Where administrators act under a direct mandate from community members, the problem of government is simple. It is interesting to note that in such instances as the English Vestry and the American town meetings the delegation of power is often considered a burden rather than a privilege. In the English Vestry the offices were often rotated through the community eligibles in terms of house rows. In many American town meetings the offices went to those who needed them most, so that a man with many children to support might be given an office on that basis. Obviously the problems at hand did not require a very high degree of specialization or this system could not exist.

In other cases the dynamics of the situation existed not particularly as a positive mandate upon the administrator, but rather as a limiting context which defined unsuitable alternatives. In instances of this kind greater freedom of action is given the government, though there is clear recognition of certain acts as beyond the authority of the administration. Thus an administrator can make all sorts of fire regulations, but when he takes the apparatus to fight fires of other communities, he may be creating an expense not tolerated by the community. It is, therefore, useful in such situations to have written statements of purposes and limits of power. A constitution is a likely and natural development.

Governmental institutions in turn lead to a further psychological development. Just as individuals become habituated to vested interests in the community that are constantly present over a long period, in the same way a constitution and the notion of being a citizen, as a result of habituation, may become reified into entities themselves. Thus their original purpose as a solution of a social situation is forgotten. For example, one observer tells of coming into a small community and questioning the individuals regarding Sunday baseball. One native answered, "Everybody is for it, but public opinion is against it." The community, public opinion, or the constitution become personified as things in themselves to which the individual owes allegiance. These notions about groups, as we saw in Chapter VII, are called *ideology*. The mores or folkways have little connection with such notions. No more does crowd behavior or communal association. The presence of an ideology, a division of labor, rules and procedures of a constitution point to a new type of behavior called an institution. Local government is a simple institution, but nevertheless an institution. Individuals are now citizens with obligations. They forget that the obligations are principally to themselves and secondarily to their fellowmen, and give their allegiance to abstract notions of the community or group and to the symbols of these relationships.

Governmental institutions, so far described, are more a func-

tion of the enduring aspects of community life through the centuries (i.e., the face-to-face nature of social life) than of the developments due to the changed order of society resulting from the emergence of capitalistic economy. We have already noted in regard to the mores that, as the modern age has developed, they have become increasingly concerned with private property and business. The same would be true of local government. As a feudal economy gave way to a market economy, the importance of travel and trade increased by leaps and bounds. Travel required good roads, and one of the major functions of local government was long concerned with roads and methods of raising taxes for road-building purposes. Crowd methods for handling cattle rustling, bank robberies, and horse thefts gave way to an institutional court procedure. It is to be noticed, however, that the sheriff and the justice of the peace were of the community and were, therefore, dominated by the compulsions of the community. These compulsions existed not as mysterious entities, but as the attitudes of other community members, their expectations, and their beliefs. Likewise was it with the jury. The judge and the jury were more administrators of the community mandate than detached students of crime, or agents of the owners of private property. The agents of government were not responding only to a crime, but to a crime as the *figure*, or main stimulus, against the *background* of the contributory stimuli of the behavior of other community members. It was in a sense collective justice which was administered. Nevertheless it did include all the mechanisms of public-opinion development, the operation of the mores, crowd psychology, feelings of universality, status, and prestige, which have been described as operating within the community context.

The Relationship of the Community to the Nation

The nation is an institution which develops from many communities. It is attitudinal and not objective. Feudal times provided a poor basis for such an institution. Its growth was

predicated upon the changed objective relationships to the instruments of production, the development of the capitalistic economy.

The consciousness of kind which is reflected among community members, and the psychology of identification, are easily seen to be related to the objective situation of community life. Local government thus arises out of men's problems in relationship to the objective world. The institution of the nation, however, requires a different situation to initiate its development.

In order to have a nation there must be some vehicle for convincing people of common interests with other communities. In feudal times there was little reason for such union. One of the best reasons for union is a common enemy. Most capitalistic nations were founded in war: America in a war of revolution, Bismarck's Germany in a war with France, and Cavour's Italy in a fight for freedom and independence. America also had the hostile savage as a threat to safety and an incentive to union, at least for some purposes.

In our own early history rural communities, as a rule, however, were unable to take nationalism very seriously. Such an institution develops under economic pressure in accordance with the growth of large-scale enterprise. Rural communities joined in sending representatives to Congress and the legislatures, but their activities seemed little related to community life. Nor were rural people convinced of any depth to national problems. Any man was as good as any other as a representative, the only test of fitness being popularity. As a result Congress was long filled with small-town lawyers.

What there was of rural nationalism was founded upon the structure of the rural community as it has been described. C. A. Beard and M. R. Beard, the historians, give an account of the mobilization of the colonies for the Revolutionary War which illustrates most of the principles given:

1. Nationalism (and war against England) was preached by individuals high in status in the community and was, therefore, effective. In the ranks of the successful, in the climbing middle

class, were members of a new vocation, law. Beard says, "When society became more complex and legal questions more involved, the need of skilled attorneys was recognized and in every colony a class of professional practitioners came into existence, which grew rapidly in numbers and influence during the passing decades of the eighteenth century. The door once opened, lawyers managed to win a higher social position in America than their brethren had ever enjoyed in the mother country. . . . Merchants, planters, and farmers of the colonies could erect no insurmountable barriers against the disciples of Coke and Lyttleton" (1, p. 101). But war and national unity were also desired by the merchants. Beard points out that a few merchant families of influence in every community fostered nationalism.

2. Nationalism was preached by individuals of high vocality in community life. We have pointed out the necessity of being vocal in community affairs against the inarticulate background of most community members. The disciples of early nationalism found in the lawyer the most articulate member of the community.

3. Moreover, the stupidity of the British allowed the American nationalists the opportunity to vitalize the issues so that the masses had to take a stand upon it. The Stamp Affair was one such issue. Beard says: "If Grenville and Townshend, laboring under an oil lamp, had searched a lifetime for a plan better calculated to stir rebellion in America, they could not have found it. . . . Unlike most laws relative to trade and shipping, it affected every section and nearly every class in America. The tax on sugar and molasses hit the New England shipper and rum distiller; the impost on tobacco irked the Virginia planter; but the Stamp Act struck at every order in society, making grievances universal. For the first time the thirteen colonies were stung into action by one and the same levy on their purses. . . . The tax fell heavily upon two classes skilled in controversy, loquacious in expressing themselves, and accustomed to fish in troubled waters—lawyers and editors" (p. 209).

4. Finally the test of community loyalty was evoked to force people to the nationalistic position. The occasion was the passing of embargo legislation. Beard describes the measure thus: "This was an ultimatum to the wavering masses; a test of allegiance to the American cause. Men who had been silent in the midst of the popular clamor or indifferent to the outcome could no longer avoid making a choice . . .: they were either for or against the non-importation act; they either bought British goods or they did not; they were either with the radicals or against them. They had to choose whom they would serve, and choose quickly, for no time was allowed for parleys. With breath-taking swiftness local committees were formed to enforce the non-importation agreement and stern measures were employed against those who sold or consumed British goods. Recalcitrant citizens were treated to tar and feathers while the champions of non-importation were hailed as heroes" (p. 230).

5. Crowd psychology developed to enforce community will. Spontaneous crowds, certainly no different from the rural crowd as described, and certainly not unmotivated by the lawyers and merchants, took action against the common enemy and against non-conformers. Beard says: "They broke out in rioting in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston; they pillaged and razed the offices of stamp agents; they burned stamps in the streets; they assailed the houses of royal officers; in Boston the residence of the lieutenant governor was pried open, his chambers sacked, and his property pitched out into the streets. In fact, the agitation, contrary to the intent of the merchants and lawyers, got quite beyond the bounds of law and order" (p. 212).

6. A feeling against England *as a common enemy* grew. The requirements of the situation had taken the leaders of respective communities far beyond their original destination. Lexington, Concord, the siege of Boston, and the general British method of handling the crisis played into the hands of American nationalists. The common grievance was rapidly giving way to a feeling that England was a common enemy. The

hiring of Hessian mercenaries to fight England's battle made the enemy a foreigner.

Nationalism is in a sense foreign to the rural community, for it depends upon consciousness of kind of communities, not of members in a community. Only for a few years with striking problems and under unusual handicaps was nationalism strong. After the Revolutionary War the spirit of nationalism was weak. It took high-pressure methods even after unsatisfactory experience with the ineffectual Articles of Confederation to secure a national government of any strength. Even then, local interests and community problems remained more important than nationalism until the country became industrialized.

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE ERA OF PUBLICS

Middle Capitalism and the Decay of the Rural Community

Just as men's psychological needs vary from age to age, so the barriers which intervene between men and their goals, in the form of the societal reactions of people generally, wax and wane. The decay of a social context such as the rural community is not, however, a mysterious disappearance of some superorganic entity. It is a problem in the abandonment of certain habits and attitudes of people. We, as psychologists, know that habits are given up by the individual when they interfere with more prepotent needs. In tracing the decay of the community we must show the existence of new problems which called forth behavior incompatible with the old ways once characteristic of rural life.

As capitalism, as a form of society, develops, so production increasingly dominates all of life. Kimball Young describes this development in his *Social Psychology*. He says,

With the increase of population, with specialization in industry and the whole growth of modern business, the simple village social organization has broken down. Rapid transportation and communication, especially within the present century, have practically destroyed the provincialism of the village. This has made possible the astounding increase in city populations. While at the outset our cities were largely overgrown American villages controlled by primary group folkways and mores, the last half-century has witnessed great changes. The coming into our cities of large numbers of immigrants of divergent cultural backgrounds, especially people of southern and eastern Europe, has introduced new points of view and new ways of living. This has produced a heterogeneity of subracial type as well as a mixture of cultures. Even without these forces, urbanization would have produced distinct changes in our modes of living.

The increasing importance in our life of secondary groups, dependent as they are, on voluntary and only partially personal interests, is another phase of the situation. Man is no longer tied to the family and neighborhood by geographical location, nor is he limited in the scope of his occupational choice, his political or church affiliations, his marital adventures or his recreational activities. In short, mobility and increased division of labor and the attendant expansion of the capitalistic economic order have produced remarkable alterations in our attitudes and habits. While in its emphasis upon the utilitarian virtues of thrift, economy, good works, temperance, and the repression of natural tendencies, there is much in capitalism which harmonizes with the Protestant and Puritan social-religious order, certain conflicts have arisen out of the expansion of our economic life. Our mores are in a state of flux. Our codes are no longer standardized; that is to say, they are no longer generally accepted by all of us. Where once we took for granted many details in the codes, now we discuss them. A kind of experimentation in new forms of social behavior is going on all about us.

The stimulus and scope of public opinion have changed. First of all, there is an enormous extension of the range of excitation. Urban life produces a wide variety of situations unknown in village life; it is more mobile, more flexible, more complex. Our economic, social, and political relations have a wider reach. The range of our gossip is greater. Nevertheless we cannot in person cover the entire area of interest. We depend on indirect and secondary sources of information and interpretation, and our facts and inferences are changed by the minds of those who bring them to us. The newspaper has long been an important medium of communication. Recently the moving picture and the radio have become important. This means, then, that the sources of news are not the same in the city as in the village, and that the psychological effects are different. Public opinion is of a more inferential, imaginative character than it was in the primary group. Public opinion today is increasingly like crowd behavior and less like that of the more stabilized primary life of the neighborhood and village [7, pp. 573-574].

Our interest in the problem described by Professor Young is, of course, in the psychological events. We must leave to the economist and the sociologist the analysis of the cause of capitalistic evolution. Why men were motivated to develop

the land beyond the frontier, to build railroads, utilities, and other public services, to abandon small business for the corporation, the small-town grocery for the chain store, is also an interesting problem. But we must leave it to the historian who has time to deal with the single event. We must pass over such facts hurriedly.

The simplest explanatory principle of the economist for the dynamics of modern society is found in the concept of *surplus capital* which has already been described. The small-town business man accumulates capital which he does not have to pay back to his labor, and finding no place to invest it at home, he opens a store in another community. Finally we have the creation of chain stores. The furniture maker, faced with an exploited local community, and becoming noted abroad for his craftsmanship, starts sending furniture throughout the country. Eastern and European surplus capital is invested in developing the railroads of the west. As competition gets keener, small and inefficient units are turned into corporations by amalgamation. The whole process is a complex one of many interacting factors.

Throughout the whole process, critical periods appear. The economy seems to falter temporarily in what is called a depression. A depression is a situation which temporarily exposes the objective relationships of a society. The shutting down of business and capital enterprise is necessitated because of incapacity to make profits. The lack of ability to find work causes the working population to stop buying consumers' goods, which accentuates 'bad business conditions.' Hard times make everybody critical of government and social relationships. And the whole situation seems caused by a surplus of commodities over buyers.

The problem is solved at each stage by new cultural developments which take care of surplus value. In England the major resultant of early depressions was the reorientation of the economy in the direction of world trade. By importing food-stuffs, the real wage of labor was raised without in any way

interfering with profits. In order to accomplish this the English farmer was ruined by allowing competition with the Argentine and America where land was cheap and large-scale production possible. By exchanging manufactured articles for foodstuffs a huge market was found for the 'surplus commodities' of a manufacturing civilization. Surplus capital could be reinvested in manufacturing plants which supplied these foreign markets. At another stage surplus capital from England was used to build up the railroads and capital equipment of America. England became, in fact, the banker for the world. The development of a merchant marine to carry both the raw materials to England and the manufactured materials to the world was another solution to the problem of surplus capital. The center of population in England shifted to the midlands to carry on manufacturing and world trade. The development of colonies is another solution which secures both markets and raw materials.

In America, unemployment and lack of opportunity in the east led to early westward movements. Small town enterprises developed into corporations doing business throughout the nation. To protect the domestic market in the interest of good business and high wages a tariff policy was created. This protected all business enterprise which sold in a domestic market. The farmer, being an exporter, sells in a world market and buys back in a protected market. The disadvantage to the farmer was tolerated probably because machine agriculture and a fertile top soil allowed American farmers a differential advantage in production costs which made it possible for them to compete with world producers. In spite of this tax on them, for tariffs were a tax for the benefit of labor and industry, they survived. Inventions of science created new machines which produced more abundantly. In view of the shortage of labor in relation to the immense task of developing the country the increased efficiency caused no hardship, but actually raised both wages and profits. Immigration from Europe was called in to aid in exploiting the opened territories, to build railroads,

canals, and highways. Only in the twentieth century is this task completed, so that any new depression can be solved only by reorienting the economy toward foreign markets.

Because of the immensity of problems of this kind we can only sample the developments. Our interest as psychologists is to indicate how the developments which occurred from these processes became barriers to the solution of the problems of an individual in the age in which he lived. In the epoch of the rural community, those barriers were chiefly the attitudes of acquaintances and neighbors who had certain expectations of him. The primary nature of rural life made integrity, honesty, consistency in character, as well as skill, application, and initiative in enterprise, desirable and necessary qualities. The local institutions were an outgrowth of the community situation and its primary-group problems.

Young demonstrates the fact that new movements broke down community life. But the individuals who were primarily concerned with these developments could not afford to have the institution of private property break down, for their whole scheme of life was founded upon it. We must be able to demonstrate how some new mechanism was developed to enforce private property rights in place of *local government*, *public opinion*, or even *vigilante mob rule*; since these local mechanisms were predicated upon the rural community structure.

The Objective Relationships of Middle Capitalism

The age of the rural community was the age of small capitalists. The access to the instruments of production was general, even though equality of opportunity was never completely realized in practice. The objective situation, however, allowed some men, more capable of utilizing the potentialities of the situation, to rise in the social structure. By the period of middle capitalism the objective possibility of equal capacity to compete has practically disappeared. The access to the instruments of production is no longer general, but limited to only a few. There is, however, no widespread attitudinal or

psychological recognition of this fact. This lack of psychological recognition is predicated upon other aspects of the objective situation. The increased standard of living, which was a consequence of modern large-scale production, so captivated the population that not only was the increased monopoly of the instruments of production ignored, but the majority of citizens were unqualifiedly in favor of such a world as the one which they seemed to be enjoying.*

In the rural community the rising middle class had status and prestige because they ran a race relatively open to all at a faster and more efficient pace. They were more skilled, more effective, more enterprising, or more trustworthy, but they were still community members. No member, however, no matter how successful, ever climbed very much higher than his neighbor because the range of individual difference was a matter of personal skill and capacity. In the city economy of this latter period success is a different matter. The golden aim is *monopoly*, and if one achieves a semblance of it there is no limit to the heights to which he can climb. Millionaires rise from the ranks of working men in a single generation. But everybody else rises also, only less spectacularly. The mastery of production, which occurs in this age, is fostered by a social system founded on private property, wage labor, and a division

*The nature of this relationship of the objective situation to attitudinal problems can be illustrated more clearly. Suppose that there were an economy where the possession of a bow and arrow gave an individual a capacity to injure his fellows or to kill game. Inasmuch as flint and wood are plentiful any Indian has as much access to these instruments of war and hunting as anybody else. Suppose that some Indian, however, is much more skilled at weapon making. The others make a bargain with him. He is to spend all his time at weapon making. They bring him game in exchange for weapons. He acquires prestige in the community and good fortune. But, as in the rural stage of capitalism, his skill does not put others at his mercy, for any Indian who does not like the bargain can make his own weapons. Suppose that another Indian discovers a metal which is precious and limited in supply, but which makes an arrow ten times as efficient. There is no objection to his monopoly as long as there is plenty of game because the new weapon makes everybody just so much more prosperous. Everybody is joyful. Only the monopoly and a scarcity of game would create attitudinal discontent, for in such a situation the Indian arrow maker and his friends would be able to starve the others into subjection.

of labor. A bountiful supply of raw materials, on the one hand, and unexploited markets, on the other, exist to make efficient production a lucrative enterprise for all. The universal rising standard of living fosters an approval of the increased monopolization of the instruments of production.

A second obvious feature of the objective world in this epoch is the possibility of its control by man. Where the showers and sunshine necessary for a good crop in a rural community were beyond man's control, the most obvious fact about this new world is that it is a machine world and, therefore, under the control of man. If the furnace does not work, it can be fixed by a plumber; if the lights fail to operate, an electrician can change the fuse; the roof can be repaired by a carpenter; the car by a mechanic; water is controlled by a tap; electricity by a switch.

Just as the controllable nature of a machine world invites men to control it, so the knowledge of machinery allows men to make more complicated machinery. In the earlier age the existence of a little market had stimulated men to partake of trade. Knowledge of trade had resulted in an increased development of the market, until we had both a world-wide market and techniques of business like the modern international corporation. Just so, the ability to control machinery led to specialized engineering, and specialized engineering led to more efficient engines of production, until at its height modern capitalism produces both scientists of hitherto unknown ability and machines of unheard-of capacities. By the period of middle capitalism the nature of the objective world has been completely altered. The machines still operate according to the plans of men, but only experts are capable of understanding those plans. Moreover, an operator need not understand his machine, and the capacity to run a steel lathe guarantees no ability to run a blast furnace. A division of labor is resulting in a high degree of specialization.

The General Psychological Implications of the Objective Situation

The implications of the objective situation for the general populace are that they are unequivocal for all sections of the population both economically and geographically. In spite of the polyglot nature of American culture, its many geographical sections, its different history, there is a common psychology throughout the culture. And this psychology is a direct consequence of the objective factors just described. There are still enough unexploited markets, unexploited resources, and situations demanding capital expansion to make business and money-getting a very lucrative vocation.

Throughout America there is an over-accentuation of the stimulation of ambition, which was germinating in the period of the rural community. Americans are among the most aggressive people on the earth. Moreover, the general chance for success in this age demonstrates completely to the individual mind that lack of economic success must be due to individual incapacity rather than the rules of the society. In the face of the tradition of the self-made man, so general in the culture, no one can claim lack of opportunity. As a consequence there is an increase in frustration of the unsuccessful as has been pointed out in our earlier discussion of inferiority conflict. Where lack of success can be projected upon the culture or upon another nation, frustration is sublimated or drawn off. During the period of middle capitalism no failure can convince anybody else and least of all himself that the game is at fault. Hence each failure is forced to live with his inferiority or find some other expression of it.

There is also a decided narrowing of the field of consciousness in the direction of economic goals. Whereas the Middle Ages had offered all sorts and varieties of very limited successes, the new age offered only one sort of success—of a magnificent sort, if achieved. Success with money promised success with everything else for most things seem possible of purchase. We have already described F. H. Allport's characteriza-

tion of this psychological narrowing of the field of consciousness as the "economic funnel" (1) (see pp. 527-528). All activity in this age is directed toward money making.* The psychological consequences of such a narrow orientation should be pointed out. It is a case of putting all the eggs in one basket. The danger of a narrow aim is the chance of failure and its attendant emotional problems. The man of many aims is bound to realize some and, therefore, is able to keep his feeling of self-importance and integrity. Thus, not only did this age force the individual to accept the consequences of his failure in the economic sphere as due to his own incapacity, but, by narrowing the race to a single goal, it increased the chances of failure for more people. Overstimulation of ambition and increased frustration are concomitant developments in capitalistic culture. Put in terms of reference to goal and barrier previously described, we see that men's motives now as always are the seeking of such biological satisfactions as food, shelter, sex, and rest, and such psychological satisfactions as are commonly called aesthetic, scientific, political, religious, and recreational. The economic system exists as a barrier between the individual and these goals. Where the barrier had been accepted only grudgingly in the earlier era (as evidenced by riots and forceful acquisition of property) it is now accepted wholeheartedly by the majority. The solution to the barrier is wealth getting, and in this period the problem is capable of being solved by increasingly larger proportions of the people.

At the same time the increased ability to control the objective world gives a tremendous stimulus to science and engineering. The results of the activities of these two professions in increased production and efficiency so increase wealth

* Dewey has written of this age as the age of the lost individual. But any analysis of behavior in terms of goals and behavior to barriers indicates clearly that individuals were never surer of their orientation toward a specific goal, that of wealth, and of the biological and psychological wants that money could satisfy. What was lost were the rules of the game, for it was a mad scramble with all old rules going overboard.

that scientists are often subsidized as a profession irrespective of their particular specialized interest. Colleges and institutes are maintained in which great freedom of activity is granted to men in research vocations. The value of the discoveries of a few are sufficient to warrant freedom for the many in their choice of research. Members can command high salaries, but undoubtedly the psychic rewards of status and prestige, which come to scientists and engineers in this age, are as often sought as is mere monetary reward.

The nature of a machine-age economy also has a profound effect upon lesser men. The nature of the tasks created by capitalism demands specialization. This accentuates the creation of different functional or economic interests in different people. Farmers, plumbers, machinists, carpenters, white-collared groups, and industrialists become increasingly aware of a common interest with members of their same specialty. This functional interest reaches across community lines and knows no geography. The plumber in Salt Lake City has a common bond of interest with the plumber in Virginia. The school teacher in Massachusetts has a point of view that can be partly shared with the teacher in Texas. At the same time there is a common vested interest in a functional group in maintaining certain social conditions, raising their income, and cutting their cost of living.

We see then as a result of the changed order of things these new psychological processes at work: (1) frenzied overstimulation of ambition, (2) increased frustration, (3) narrowing of the field of consciousness to securing wealth, (4) the increased prestige of science and engineering, (5) common functional interests.

PUBLIC OPINION IN MODERN TIMES

Out of these new objective relationships and the psychological attitudes which are a consequence of them, come new cultural achievements. One of these achievements is *the public*,

and unless its nature is carefully understood, we shall miss the significance of the whole era.

The public is sometimes confused with public opinion. It is undoubtedly a form of public opinion, if one conceives of public opinion in a generalized enough fashion so that the differences which characterize public opinion in the rural community from public opinion in modern times are neglected. But public opinion in the rural community, as we have indicated, no longer is a significant phenomenon. It was predicated upon the existence of the primary group and the rural community situation. The common acquaintance, consciousness of kind, identification, compulsion of minorities, which we have described as basic to this type of public opinion, arose out of an objective situation now largely antedated. We are forced to discover new mechanisms to deal with individuals socially and spatially separated in order to account for public opinion in modern times.

The public is undoubtedly the device which most clearly demonstrates the changes which have taken place. Public opinion, as the united front of a unified community, was no more than a group of people manifesting the same opinion publicly. Whereas the members of the *community* are confronted with an identical external social situation so organized in its content that its significance is unequivocal to each individual in it, the external situation of the *public* is unstructured, unorganized, and seems to have little to do with any opinions manifest by its members. The members of a public may be spatially separated, and people who are spatially close may belong to opposed publics rather than the same one. Two men working in the same office in the same type of conditions may belong to different publics. A small-town doctor in Minnesota and an iron worker in Pennsylvania may belong to the same public. The key to the situation then cannot be found in community structure, common life, common acquaintance, or direct social interaction. The primary group, in other words, is gone.

Propaganda and the Public

An understanding of this new problem is best attained through a study of a mechanism of modern times called propaganda, which operates through indirect vehicles of communication as newspapers, books, radio, and the moving pictures. These vehicles are a product of the new machine civilization, just as the abandonment of barriers which constituted the rural community is a product of developing capitalism.

The community was a constant stimulus situation of some duration, which served as a barrier to anarchistic solutions of individual problems as they might occur. With the decay of the community context there is no such limitation by the external social environment. To depend upon the varying backgrounds of interiorized individual norms would seem to predicate chaos. *Propaganda is an organized attempt to manipulate masses to concerted action through a medium which is indirect, in an age where barriers have broken down.* There have been writers who have defined propaganda as the use of suggestion. Our definition includes this emphasis upon method. The technique is a consequence of the problem rather than its cause.

The spatial separation of individuals destroyed direct communication. Indirect communication makes it difficult to control or put barriers between the individual and his goals. It is increasingly difficult to dominate more than a few stimulus situations which the modern man encounters. Such single contacts must, therefore, be made to count heavily, or chaos is the result. There is no compelling situation like that of the community whose influence forces the minority to agree with the majority or the less important with the prestiged individuals.

Propaganda employs suggestion, because suggestion is a technique which allows one experience to outweigh dozens of other experiences in the mind of the individual as he makes a judgment in favor of some form of action. It is a device which induces *dissociation*, a technique which limits the field of consciousness so that only attitudes favorable to some preconceived

end are elicited. It accomplishes this end by a manipulation of a single stimulus situation. The principal result of this manipulation is to group together as the central factor, or *figure*, of a stimulus situation those elements which are synergic toward a desired course of action and encompass all competing elements of the stimulus situation into an unstructured *background*.

The Techniques of Propaganda

Most of the techniques of propaganda will be seen to be an abridgment of this general principle: The indirect nature of the propagandist appeal means that a stimulus situation which can be controlled must compete with thousands of other stimulus situations arising out of everyday life which cannot be controlled. Hence the propagandist must fight to get the *attention* of those whom he wishes to control. Because of the lack of any controlling situation like the community he must rely upon *shotgun* principles which L. Doob has discussed under the heading of the "sphere of unpredictability." He must resort to any methods which increase the chances, first, that an individual will react to his appeal, and secondly, that it will *suggest* the desired form of action. Methods which increase the chances are said by Doob to reduce "the sphere of unpredictability" * (2).

Methods of increasing the possibility that the individual will note the controlled stimulus situation presented through an indirect medium are: (1) *Repetition*. If at first the propagandist does not succeed, he "tries, tries again." The major premise of propaganda is that one must be everlastingly at it. Major sales organizations have discovered that if efforts lag desire for their product falls. Undoubtedly the same is true of every other public. As Bruce Barton says of the Methodist Church, "They ring the church bell every Sunday morning." (2) *Auxiliary appeals*. Widespread in the population are interests in: (a) sex, (b) conflict, (c) invention, (d) science, (e) engineering, (f)

* Most of these principles are from Doob's *Propaganda*. They are, however, presented in a very different theoretical context.

economic success. By including an item of this kind in a stimulus appeal the attention of individuals can be secured. Once attention is secured, the attempts to restructure the stimulus field to suggest certain forms of action can be carried on.

(3) *Simplification of stimulus situation.* Most of us are too busy to react to complicated problems out of line with our own immediate problems of adjustment. The chances of getting the public to attend to your appeal are better, if it can be simplified so that it can be apprehended in a glance. Thus the propagandist simplifies his appeal. He writes no long-winded argument. Science is symbolized in the white figure of a surgeon in uniform. War is a monster in a gas mask. A scientist holding a torch, leading in the direction of world peace, symbolized by a university on the mountain, suggests to right-thinking people that they must contribute their funds to support education. If this simplification is not done by cartoons it may be done by labels, e.g., "Democracy hates Fascist Oppression."

Methods of structuring the stimulus situation so that it leads to the desired goal include both *positive* and *negative* techniques. The negative aim is, of course, *the elimination of opposed ideas or attitudes*.

(1) *Censorship.* The most effective method of accomplishing this end is by censorship. Thorough censorship is not often possible in a democracy except in time of war. In censorship a direct attempt is made to prevent individuals from having experiences which would serve as a counterbalance to the action sought from them. The public utilities in America for a period attempted by indirect pressure to force the school textbooks to omit certain types of information. Censorship can be used most effectively to keep individuals from having recourse to information about events far away. Censorship has little capacity to separate the individual from his immediate world.

(2) *Distortion.* Another method of achievement of this end is distortion. Distortion depends, however, upon censorship as a supplementary technique. Deliberate falsehood as a positive program is predicated upon censorship which, as a negative program, prevents counter attractions in the form of the real truth from competing with it.

(3) *Coun-*

terpropaganda. The propagandist makes a competing suggestion ineffective by converting it into an appeal for his own cause. (a) *Stereotypes*. One method of doing this is with emotionally toned words which by their implication both destroy the competing suggestion and point to the positive aim as the desirable end. The other side is described as advanced by self-seeking interests, the implication being that one's own proposition is noble and detached, the opposition ignoble and self-interested. The opposition program is one of entangling alliances, the supposition being that the proposed program demands no cooperation, but gives freedom of action. (b) *By omission*. The principal opposition case is neglected. Several minor opposition suggestions are taken up and disposed of. The implication of not treating the major opposition suggestions is that they are unimportant. (c) *By a strong positive appeal*. If a positive appeal can be vitalized to a high degree it often happens that other counterappeals will be overlooked. As one lawyer has said, "When you have a strong case stick to the facts, when you have a weak case, damn the opposition." All these methods tend to make the counterappeal become the unstructured background to the central stimulus core.

This brings us to the positive aim, *the presentation of a central core to a stimulus situation, in which the elements are both synergic to a desired form of action, and dynamic enough to lead to action*. (1) By the appeal to dominant attitudes. It is, of course, much better to suggest attitudes which are dominant in the individual at the moment as leading to a desired action. The fact that a certain attitude is dominant in an individual's actions indicates the high value of that attitude to the individual. The propagandist selects, for his central core, dominant attitudes when possible. To be dominant is, of course, not enough. Attitudes must also point unequivocally to the end sought as their resolution. (2) By the appeal to central attitudes. Equal to dominant attitudes are those attitudes which are both central to a culture and to an individual. Just as overstimulation of ambition is widespread in our culture at this time, so it is also vital in the individual. These central attitudes

are generally so strongly rooted in the individual from infancy, and so necessary for getting along in the particular culture of the time, that they are more than ordinarily reinforced. Again, however, the principle of selection is not only the fact that they are central, but that they are synergic to the desired end.

(3) By slogans. The introduction of slogans gives a stimulus core, the elements of which may have different meanings to different people but nevertheless are synergic to the same course of action. Thus "Back to Normalcy" implies more sugar for the housewife, rest from the war for the veterans, no more liberty bonds to be bought by the business man, and good times for everybody. Hence, if a program is back to normalcy, everybody ought to be for it. All subterms included under the slogan are synergic toward espousing the predetermined program. In the same way "The Forgotten Man," "New Freedom," and "A Chicken in Every Pot" symbolize many different sorts of aspirations and a common conclusion.

(4) By introducing prestige. In every culture there are persons who have prestige at the moment. If their support can be rallied to a movement, it induces a greater tendency to follow a suggestion. We have already spoken of the prestige of the scientist, economist, and member of high society in modern America. Such prestige might be said to be both a central and dominant attitude in our culture. The introduction of prestige also has the effect of de-emphasizing the counter-suggestions as of little importance. If Thomas A. Edison has said this, and John Jones a plain citizen has said the opposite, no one pays any attention to John Jones. Prestige introduces both dominant and central attitudes into an appeal, and effectively muzzles the guns of the opposition. It is, therefore, a technique which stands by itself.

(5) By the principle of universality. Another effective addition to the central stimulus core is evidence of widespread acceptance of the proposition. There is magic in numbers. This bandwagon psychology has already been described in Chapter X, which dealt with the mechanisms of interaction. Its effect in this age is undoubtedly a function of the disruption of the barriers and practices of the community. There is little

left except numbers to give the blessing of approval. The fact that everybody was doing it in New York City would have had little effect in sanctioning some course of action which ran counter to the mores of a rural community. (6) By the principle of variation. The wise propagandist introduces more than one appeal. If he has utilized one set of dominant or central attitudes one time, he utilizes another set a second time. In this way he overcomes individual outlooks which might be unaffected by one or the other appeal. He gathers not only the sanction of the scientist, but also that of the society girl, and he appeals not only to self-advancement but also to being cultured. (7) By the principle of orientation. Finally, the propagandist insures against individual differences not only by introducing attitudes synergic to some desired end and by overcoming counter-attractions which would lead to some other end, but by explicitly stating the goal and the means of attaining it. He orients individuals toward his desired objective and points out the road to be taken.

The special problem of an antagonistic group should be mentioned in passing. In this case the actual orientation of individuals toward the desired end is concealed until other, more easily produced attitudes can be initiated. A circuitous approach is used which fails to meet sales resistance. Dogmatism is avoided. Common ground is discovered between central and dominant attitudes and attitudes which may later be related to the purpose at hand.

The Public

A group of individuals brought to a common mind through propaganda and without the aid of the mechanism of the primary group is called *a public*. Nor is propaganda the only factor to be considered in regard to publics. The nature of the propaganda process is limited by the availability of attitudes—central, dominant, or auxiliary—which can be used to accomplish the desired end. Moreover, there are great qualitative differences in attitudes. Some attitudes are highly generalized and can find outlet in all sorts of equivalent behavior; others

are highly specific and relate to a particular form of action in reference to some specific stimulus or stimulus situation. But the existence of a fund of attitudes would not lead to a public, unless there is someone who performs the role of propagandist. The limitations on the achievement of the propagandist, on the other hand, are not only his own capacities, but also the materials with which he must work. The latter make possible very different types of publics.

1. Identification Publics

One of the most crowd-minded types of publics might be called the identification public. This type of public is characterized by its idolatry of some *person* or *group*. The personal public of a great movie star like Valentino, a dapper politician such as Jimmy Walker, a great prizefighter like Dempsey, or a golfer like Bobby Jones represents the first type. This type is both a consequence of propaganda and of the existence of certain attitudes which can be used by the propagandist. The same people who idolize Jimmy Walker do not necessarily like Greta Garbo. The differential factor lies in their varying attitudes. People with attitudes of interest in sports can be formed into a public idolizing Dempsey; Valentino's public was chiefly women who idolized him as the great lover. The common factor in all such *identification* publics is the release of *frustrated attitudes* and *feelings of inferiority*, undoubtedly a function of the culture at this time. The idol generally epitomizes the frustrated aims and ambitions of the individual. As in the rural community, this identification is predicated upon consciousness of kind. But whereas this commonness of feeling grew directly out of rural life, the new bond of commonness is generally a propaganda device artificially produced. A Jimmy Walker is partly a product of smart city clothes, a Will Rogers of a consciously adopted gum-chewing habit and homely attitudes, an Al Smith of a brown derby and "Thoity-Thoid Street" English. Each of these items plays directly to dominant and central attitudes in a certain part of the population and contributes to the forming of a personal public.

Nor is the fan public which follows some group essentially different in psychology. The followers of Notre Dame, the Chicago Cubs, Tammany Hall, the Empire State, Uncle Sam, or the Masonic Lodge reflect the same mechanisms. Here the identification is with a group symbol, a college color, a common lodge pin, a flag, or some other device which stands for a group. The individual who belongs to a group of this sort identifies himself with them, glories in their victories, their superiorities, their individual heroes, and, in fact, acts as if their activities were a part of himself. A football fan may actually fight to defend the reputation of a college to which he has never gone, because it is his college by identification. The tremendous increase in this type of public during this age is undoubtedly connected with a culture which builds up aspirations toward success without being able to satisfy them.

The Build-up. Nor do these publics spring into prominence full blown. We have in this period a process called the "build-up," which is a propaganda process of building up favorable sentiment toward an individual or a group. Millionaires are careful of their public relations. Colleges are affected by the success of their football team. Moving-picture stars are made by finding some appeal which pleases a public.

The build-up is designed to increase the possibilities of identification on the one hand and to provide an outlet for frustrated emotions and ambitions on the other. Thus John D. Rockefeller, senior, faced with a bad public sentiment, tried to change it in his lifetime by giving out silver dimes to all comers. The strategy of this simple act was to transform the great millionaire into an individual just like common folks. In the act they can see themselves. The very smallness of the amount made it an experience within the ken of common people. In a like fashion the principle of simplification discussed in regard to propaganda is evoked to make some college football team a more obvious outlet for the emotions of the football audience. The team is characterized as 'wildcats' to suggest fighting quality, or the 'bulldogs' to imply persistence. A lodge becomes a 'brotherhood.' The 'Empire State' suggests far-flung

state lines. A candidate for President becomes the 'great engineer.' Auxiliary appeals are introduced to make the individual have a wider appeal. Every president is also a devotee of fishing, and pictures showing him landing trout from a shady pool are circulated throughout the country.

2. Interest Publics

A different type of public is the interest public. Here the vested interest of many individuals is turned into a common program. The Consumers Union represents a great number of people interested in consumer problems. The National Electric Light Association represents utility interests. The Grange, League of Women Voters, Civil Service Union, and various taxpayers' organizations are other examples. Moreover, a public may be organized for a single purpose such as collection of loans granted the Confederate States, or the building of a memorial to Will Rogers.

The role of propaganda in organizing such publics is likely to be underestimated. Whereas it is clear in the case of *identification* publics that we are dealing with attitudes which have little specific reference, like inferiority feelings, in the case of interest publics the nature of the vested interest seems to indicate the individual's stand without any need of leadership. A group of people, spatially separated, although of like mind, is hardly what we mean by a public. It is only when they have come to be effective together, in spite of their spatial separation, that they constitute a public. They are common subscribers for the journal which fosters their aim, or they are financial patrons of a group which expedites their program, but at least their commonness of opinion has a concrete role to play in the culture in which they live.

Publics and Institutions

What is the relationship of publics to institutions? In the rural community an individual who held a certain opinion characteristic of a group also put it into action as a member of a

rural institution. In this latter-day situation, however, members of a public are often the financial supporters and the loyal followers of an institution but not necessarily members of the institution. Thus an institution may be maintained at the national capital called a lobby. The lobby is an institution, a group of people organized with rules and a program, which is supported by a public, but the members of the public are not members of the institution. The members of the institution often make their living carrying on a particular activity which is supported by a public.

This separation but continuous dependence of an institution upon a public is a phenomenon not characteristic of the rural situation. Moreover, the relationship between the institution and its closely affiliated members and the public which supports it is one which directly fosters the development of propaganda. The institution in a sense must be continuously sold to its public to insure its continuous operation. Although the institution may arise to solve the needs of a public, there also develops a tendency upon the part of the leaders of the institution to foster those needs in the public which lead to the support of the institution as well as to seek to increase the number of individuals who belong to that particular public.

THE NATIONAL STATE

The most significant institution thus supported by a public is the national state. It is dependent upon the growth of indirect sources of communication and propaganda, but this is of course not the cause.

The national state is perhaps the most significant institution of modern times, both in the role that it plays in culture and in the strong psychological conditions of the masses in which it is rooted. More than any other institution it plays upon all the devices of the public.

1. The national state bases one of its appeals upon the technique of the *identification public*. It provides in its symbolism the outlet for frustrated emotions in the glorious activities of the institution, as well as in the personalities of *built-up lead-*

ers who represent the institution. Of all countries England has utilized this psychology to the fullest. The personal symbol of the English national state is the king. The entire propaganda facilities of the country are spent in building up the king. In America the personality of the President is also built up, but less successfully. His short term in office, the fact that he is a political partisan, and the less regal nature of his office make him less a national idol. But there are scores of other national heroes who belong to the state, most of them military men.

2. The national state also bases its appeal upon identification with group activity. The army and navy become the team, and the citizens are the alumni. The glorious exploits of America in war are seized upon by certain citizens with all the vigor with which a college alumnus defends the Wildcats. The psychology is not essentially different. The insult to the flag by a foreigner is as grievous as the stealing of the goal posts by the rival college. It is a personal insult. The achievements of the American Olympic teams are personal successes of an American. The flight of Lindbergh to Paris is an American achievement, not an individual achievement. By exploiting the psychology of the group the institution of the state insures itself of very wide public support.

3. It would be missing the essential fact if the national state were depicted in this role only. It is not only an institution which appeals to the strongest sort of identification publics, but it is also able to extend its appeal to interest publics. (a) The state defends our shores from foreign invaders. This is a useful function which no citizen is prepared to carry out. It assumes that there is something to defend and somebody to keep out. The experience with the Indian was a practical justification of the state even in the age of the rural community. But little other foreign threat existed. It is necessary first, then, to sell the belief in the necessity for national defense before the state can be sold as the answer to this prayer. All wars, then, in this period of history are defensive wars. No country ever goes to war except to anticipate an invader. The great paci-

first center of America has been the middle west, owing to the distance from the coast line and the difficulty of selling the threat of invasion. Often the ability to sell the necessity of an army for defense is predicated upon first stirring up national patriotism by an incident such as the *Panay* bombing in which the identification technique so arouses emotions against a particular enemy that invasion by that enemy can be suggested as not only possible but even probable. (b) The state is, secondly, an institution which will defend private property rights from invasion. With the decay of the rural situation, some new technique had to be invented to secure the inviolability of property rights. The state is an institution which is willing and able to perform this function. By the creation of a separate institution with police power and with a virtual monopoly upon organized physical force a device is discovered for perpetuating the societal relationships born in the rural community. These relationships had destroyed the rural community, and by that destruction had demolished the only available social techniques for securing private property rights. If there is no state, "thieves will rob us in the night," is the new slogan, "riot will run in the market place," and "anarchy will be enthroned in industry."

The last appeal of the state to the public seems to us especially important. It is obvious that frustrated individuals could find other outlets for their emotions (e.g., rooting for a baseball team, if not in adulating some great movie star). There is, however, no other mechanism for insuring the inviolability of private property in modern times except the state. It seems logical to assume, therefore, that the public which supports the state for the defense of its property is more interested in perpetuating this institution than groups which find in it the expression of frustrated ego. Moreover, it is logical to suppose that the former have discovered the psychological appeal of the state to the frustrated masses largely by trial and error rather than by Machiavelian design. Only where there has been social insight into the process can we suspect the propertied classes of disseminating propaganda to enhance the value of

the national state to the unpropertied masses. This seems to be true of the British Government. It is doubtful that it is a deliberate policy of American statesmen.

The Courts and the Legislatures

If the state has a special aim of protecting private property rights, it must also do nothing to discredit this aim in the eyes of the public. As a consequence, no citizen must be dispossessed of his property without *due process of law*. Any such illegal policy, if permitted with state connivance, would develop a psychology which would make the state increasingly unacceptable to a large proportion of the population. It would thus work against private property. If private property is to be inviolable for one man it must be for all.

Three inventions were necessary to make the increasing concentration of large capital possible. These devices were conceived by the legislatures, which define the rules of property, and the courts which interpret the laws passed by the legislatures. Moreover, in our country these laws must be interpreted in the light of a written constitution. The first device is the myth of *corporate personality*. The second is the principle of limited liability for corporations. The third is the principle of the franchise.

In the struggle of the west for the right to develop the railroads and other large capital units, the doctrine of the franchise played an important part. If in the struggle for land or water rights, or even oil lines, violence were allowed to settle the problem, a psychology would be developed which might jeopardize the control of property everywhere. The fight became not a physical fight for property but a political fight for franchise. Although the fight was for a legal title, nevertheless the techniques of securing the legal title were anything but legal battles. Legislatures were corrupted; graft ran rampant. Once the paper title could be secured, the power of the state could be depended upon to guarantee that right. The state went with a document, but it was very careless about how the document was obtained. This procedure gave the impres-

sion of *due process of law* to western expansion, and, although the corruption of legislatures may be at present an established fact of history, it was then a difficult fact to demonstrate. These franchises gave individuals and companies title to great tracts of land and rights to develop railroads or other capital goods, and the privilege to sell their services relatively free from immediate competition. In this way the natural resources of a country which actually belonged to nobody were passed on legally to specific individuals and groups of individuals. This was, no doubt, necessary, if the advantages of modern large-scale units were to be gained.

The limited liability of corporations was another achievement which confiscated property but at the same time advanced enterprise. Thus, in the partnership in the rural community, bankruptcy meant that a creditor had a full claim on whatever property any partner had left. This residue was in reality the creditor's property for credits advanced. Under the limited liability corporation, a group of individuals could not be held for their total debts but only a portion of them. The creditor was deprived of his property, but apparently legally. Such a psychology gave an immense impetus to big business. An individual was not risking his all in a venture, but only a portion which he could calculate in advance. All sorts of risks could be undertaken with the knowledge that the real sufferer would be somebody else, if failure ensued. This measure gave an immense stimulation to the imagination and cupidity of men, and launched forth schemes which a partnership would never have dared to try.

The acceptance of limited liability of corporations was undoubtedly fostered by the third myth, that of the personality of corporations. A corporation was not those men who were in it, or they would be liable for the full amount of debts they contracted. It was a personality in itself which had its own obligations. The corporate personality had still another advantage. The corporation, being an individual in itself, could not be deprived of its property without due process of law. Thus child labor laws were declared unconstitutional as de-

priving the corporate personality of its property without due process of law—a protection originally intended for the individual citizen.

The State as an Institution of Government

We see, in the situation described above, the state as an institution of control. In the rural community, government occurred under the mandate of community members. The citizen actually carried on the governmental process. In this second type of control, the individual can object to any demonstrated violation of rights which seems vital and understandable to his neighbors, or in other words try to change the public which supports the state. He does not do this as long as he can appeal to the courts charged with the protection of his rights under the Constitution. Administration is carried on by a group of individuals standing above and removed from the community. So also is the repression of recalcitrants. In war, the army is now a detached unit, but the community must rally behind it to provide it with economic necessities.

The state is not, however, an inflexible institution. It is designed to reflect changes in the public upon which it rests. By voting for its major officers, by electing a legislature which is independent of the executive, by appeals to the courts for protection of constitutional rights the institution is theoretically kept within bounds. The institution of the national state, therefore, cannot be understood without understanding something of the nature of politics in this age.

POLITICS IN THE ERA OF PUBLICS

Local Politics

A profound change has occurred in local politics. The breakdown of the community situation has changed the situation so that personal integrity, individual capacity, or leadership demonstrated in primary-group life is no longer an important item. The local politician cannot depend upon a build-up through the press, radio, or movietone news, although an oc-

casional district attorney receives such fame. Nor is he deeply related to his constituents by the nature of the situation as he was in the rural community. He is not their butcher, landlord, or holder of their mortgage.

But he "gets around." * Salter, in describing the local ward heeler in the city, or the politician in smaller towns, states that he *must be a man with a superabundance of physical energy* of the sort that can keep steadily renewing itself (6). The *Philadelphia Ledger* once published a statement about a successful politician to this effect: "The main lesson to be obtained from the passing of Charles Seger is that if you give twenty-four hours a day to politics you can succeed at it." Deprived of all the primary-group relationships to their political leader, people at least want to know the man for whom they are voting. Secondly, the politician *knows everybody*. This is distinctly a local propaganda method, for no one can know ten thousand people and really know more than their names and what their businesses are. Yet it is said that some politicians can tell the name of every individual in their wards. It is more effective, moreover, to know people by their first names. The use of the first name suggests an intimacy which is flattering, and the mass of voters having little other relationship to local politics find this important. The third rule of local politics is: *Do something for everybody*. A little spread widely is better than a lot concentrated. The Tammany politician's picnic up the river may seem a very indirect appeal to a constituency, but it is a gift to all who want to go. So also are free seeds from a congressman, or a clambake for the rural folk. The

* "Politics is a man's game; and women, childer and prohibitionists 'd do well to keep out uv it. Th' reason th' New York jood thinks marrd men oughtn't to be in politics is because he thinks pollytics is spoort. An' so it is. But it ain't amachoor spoort, Hinnissy. They don't give ye a pewter mug with y'er name on it f'r takin' a chanst on bein' kilt. 'Tis a professional spoort, like playin' base-ball f'r a livin' or wheelin' a thruck. Ye niver see an amachoor at annything that was as good as a profissional.—No sir, pollytics ain't drroppin in for tea and it ain't wurrukin' a scroll saw, or makin' a garden in the back yard. 'Tis gettun' up at six o'clock in th' mornin' an' rushin' off to wurruk, an' comin' home at night tired an' dusty. Double wages f'r overtime an' Sundahs." *Mr. Dooley's Philosophy*, p. 142, by P. F. Dunne, 1900).

fourth rule is: *Join everything*. The community is no longer. In its place are dozens of different institutions, lodges, Y. M. C. A.'s, churches, university groups, granges, etc. The local politician joins every one for which he is eligible. He is both a Mason and an Elk, a member of the Dairymen's League and the Isaac Walton Club. The more pins he has, the more evidence of group relationships to voters. He cannot stay long at any meeting, but he can drop in long enough to look like a regular. The fifth rule is: *Be non-institutional or human*. The courts and other government agencies treat people as citizens, the politician in the local unit treats them as personalities. Lippmann once wrote, "You can beat Tammany Hall permanently in one way, by making the government of a city as human, as kindly, as jolly as Tammany Hall." In an impersonal world created by modern city living and capitalistic economics, to find a personal relationship is important. The local politician provides it.

Boss Rule and the Abnegation of Public Opinion

Increasingly, as people find their personal relationships to a politician more important than political issues, we see the development of boss rule. The boss is essentially an individual who has seen that the disruption of the rural community has left no device for politically handling the personal problems of individuals which are not of state or national scope. He provides this service extralegally. In return for this service he is given the loyalty of his constituents. As one gentleman in Philadelphia put it, "My platform is short, sweet and easy to say, 'I am for William S. Vare.'" This loyalty means that he will support his program, both state and national.

Such a situation means the abnegation of opinion by citizens in certain fields. It is essentially opposed to the democratic ideal. As Salter has said, "The live-wire committeemen—the ones that always carry their division—hold their leadership because they have no opinions on public questions, or they have no freedom of opinion concerning civic problems. To think and to hold opinions, as posited by democratic theory,

would lead to friction and destroy the oligarchy. They have given a lifetime of labor to the building of their leadership; they have the artist's love of his work, the capitalist's interest in his investments. Risk all this for a free expression of opinion? Never. And their people would not think of asking that of them" (6, p. 54).

The Boss and the Machine

The desire for control of local politics is also more than a matter of liking to play a game as far as the boss is concerned. In this period of history with a certain development of the material economy, the local politician has many contracts to his friends. Many of these friends are a part of his 'machine.' The boss is, in fact, a broker operating for a fee. It is this fee or percentage which keeps the machine going. This is called spoils politics, and the era of publics is especially the age of spoils politics. The lesser members of the machine receive jobs in politics, in the water department, public works, or tax collector's office. In return for their spoils and patronage the members of the machine turn out the vote. For in this age the most characteristic thing about the voter is his apathy. Most state and national issues at this time are so remote from the immediate life of the voter that it is not a question of how he will vote, but whether he will vote. A good machine turns out a big vote.

There is also a relationship between the newly emerging state and the machine. Whereas the old police force and judges were members of the rural community and knew each citizen as one knows a family member, in this new era judges and police are increasingly deciding problems of justice of individuals whose relationship to them is exceedingly remote. But where the machine can elect a judge or appoint the police force, the member of the machine can be sure of special treatment. Personal justice is secured through the boss, who has his inside contacts with both the police force and the bench.

The Limits of Boss Rule and the Political Party

Boss rule is not without its limits. Boss tactics, the trading of personal favors for the right to decide how the city or community will stand on state and national issues, is dependent upon certain facts about these issues. They must be impersonal. The issues sold on the auction block to the boss are for the most part distant and their significance upon the fortunes of the individual voter indirect and hard to calculate. Let an issue become of personal importance to local individuals and a conflict will arise between personal allegiance to the machine and a newly rising public which favors some form of public action. The overthrow of the Vare machine in 1933, and the success of almost every city reform, illustrate this situation. Once the specific issue is settled, however, it is hard to keep a reform mayor in office. Once the problem is settled the citizen returns to his preference for personal favors over interest in government. Reform administrations seldom last more than one term.

But there are, of course, issues which are permanent as well as vital to the boss's constituents. He solves the problem by joining a national political party. As a practical operator in the field of politics the party is a convenient technique for solving the problem of these regular vital issues. In a northern industrial area, the tariff is such a problem. Here the boss is usually identified with the Republican party. In a southern agricultural area, he is identified with the party of free trade. As long as the national political party stayed "right" on these regular issues, the boss could depend on both the personal vote and the party vote.

By belonging to the right political party, the boss not only secures the assistance of many free workers who believe in party loyalty, but he receives the aid of the party propaganda agency at election time. If he belonged to the party which could not carry the state or nation, he was forced to increase the personal local benefits which his machine could confer on individual citizens. If he belonged to the right party, he could

economize on such benefits. The fattest political machines were run by those who were able to utilize the national and state party in addition to local spoils and patronage.

The Political Party

The state and national political parties are interesting to examine. They are devices by which local machines are amalgamated to support the *state slate* or the *national slate*. The process has two directions. For its support the local unit receives favors from the state or national unit. Control of the state or national unit, on the other hand, comes out of the ability to control the local units. The party is in itself something of an accommodation apparatus. The shifting of public opinion on some vital issues gives a new group the chance to attempt to gain control of the state or national machine. But a fight for power within the party must not be at the expense of turning the voters over to an opposing party. Only on rare occasions is a faction willing to go to these lengths. If the opposing party obtains the national patronage, the spoils will be lost, and the basis for doing business with local units made increasingly difficult. Thus most fights are primary fights, and by and large most states go through long periods belonging to a single political party.

The political party like the state appeals to *identification* and *interest publics*. The drama of state and national politics has all the elements of a football game, and partisans of a party follow the good fortunes of that organization and its men with great interest. A national political campaign is a spectacle involving all the elements of conflict and suspense which make drama. The convention is staged like a circus. The campaign in the papers and over the radio is conducted as if the oppositions were between purity and darkness. But, as every impartial observer has noted, there are seldom any real issues. Moreover, a political campaign is like any other propaganda movement to secure an identification public.

The main support of political parties is found in the political

publics which support a party as vigorously as if it were their family. These individuals become identified with the party and eagerly accept and disseminate its platform. Coupled with the machine which voted as ordered, this loyal adherence provides a regular and consistent support which is broken only by exceptional circumstances.

The party must also rely on interest groups. Its campaigns are financed by individuals who hope to gain from keeping the party in office. In modern times the cost of these campaigns has mounted. The period of electioneering involves a propaganda campaign of real size. Just as the boss is tied to commercial interests locally, the party is tied to bigger interests nationally. Of course these interests can be rewarded only if their demands are not too far out of line with the party program necessitated by local public opinion. The tariffs which are a reward to northern industrialists for their support are also an aid to northern labor which supports the same ticket, or an injury which is so indirect (as to the farmer) that the individual fails to see his self-interest in the policy at hand.

Politics in this period is, then, a matter of business. Politicians are brokers operating for fees. Their dealings with each other are largely bargaining by means of spoils, patronage, and actual material advantages. With outsiders and the general public their technique is a propaganda campaign, no different from the sales campaign of a big company.

How the Party Operates

The first function of a local political unit in the national party is to act as a barometer. The state committee must be able to evaluate the significance of events as interpreted locally. If there is a homogeneous electorate, this may be easy. If it is heterogeneous, the local politician must have aid in keeping his ears to the ground. Laski has commented upon the successful congressman's knowledge of issues and their priority in importance. This knowledge is not communicated by telepathy, although many politicians are rather unconscious of

their sources of information. The local politicians, the local party members, the floaters, and the independents are all indices of the meaning of the election in the community situation. If a party loses the independents, no tears are shed. If the floaters begin to go, the fences need looking after. If the alumni desert the party, it is seriously in error. But if the organization deserts, the party no longer exists. This is the order in which individuals desert the party, and by keeping in contact with particular units a good politician knows the strength of his party.

There has been much debate upon the ability of local operators to gauge public opinion. C. E. Robinson, in *Straw Votes*, has pointed out the inability of local politicians to correctly estimate the anti-prohibition sentiment (5). But this issue was one in which the mores and pluralistic ignorance played a large part. The individual was unwilling to reveal his private opinions publicly upon such an issue. Given issues in which the element of mores is not an important part, it is probable that local bosses are very accurate barometers of community mood. Wishful thinking undoubtedly influences all politicians. They see majorities bigger than those which they will get, but all in all the regular organization men are not afflicted by this tendency as are the political party alumni.

A political party is also the guardian of national spoils and patronage. No matter how well equipped a party is to render psychic satisfactions of all sorts, it is likely to fail if it cannot meet the single reality test which is always present—actual benefits for local members. Every political boss has realized this fact. Any party building a machine of long life immediately seeks complete charge of spoils. The voter is given to understand that party regularity is a means of securing such rewards. The voter who jumps party fences is soon disciplined. In the same fashion the local boss who fails to hew to the party line finds himself without such favors from the national or state organizations. A party out of power is at a great disadvantage at this point. It has little to offer. It can only hope to gain control of the government and secure these spoils for

its own advantage. But to get into power it must hope for mistakes in the strategy of the opposition, economic crises, or some very violent problem which so outrages the community that it will vote against the party which controls patronage and spoils.

The third function of the party in the local scene is concerned with public-opinion molding. The will to believe in the party must not be disturbed. There are continual thrusts which must be parried. The party must explain away locally those phases of their party's administration of the national scene which affect local loyalty. This process often consists of finding rationalizations which resolve the conflict developed between the desire to believe the party and the disturbing arguments of outsiders. The opposition party members, or some individual not connected with the party, accuse the party of tendencies toward dictatorship. This is completely incompatible with the average man's ideals regarding democracy, cherished within his group. The argument is upsetting and threatens to destroy his loyalty to his party. But the party henchmen are busy explaining that this apparent dictatorship, like the dictatorship in war, is only a temporary solution to an economic crisis and will disappear as soon as it is over. As this rationalization satisfies both needs, the belief in the party is undisturbed.

The members of both parties spend their time locally interpreting the events of the national scene in terms of the attitudes of their fellow citizens. They argue in such a way that the loyalty to the party is not disturbed if they belong to the party in power. Or they argue in such a way that the party position is hard or impossible to defend in terms of local attitudes if they belong to the opposition party.

The Source of Rationalizations on Political Issues

It is of course true that ingenious party members may make up rationalizations as they go along, but by and large, they pick up the effective answers from outside sources. This ac-

counts for the similarity of rationalizations in different localities. There have been times when a party attempted to take one stand in one part of the country and a different position in a second part. In an age of rapid communication this is dangerous practice. Every party has a state and national committee. A party line is evolved including issues and explanations. This line is not determined a priori. It is agreed upon only after a considerable sounding out of the sentiments expressed in many communities. Upon occasion a trial balloon is sent up to test reactions before a definite line is evolved. Some famous speaker makes some sort of a speech outside of the party program. If it seems effective, some of it is taken over for the party line. Other things are selected because their popularity has been demonstrated by preachers, teachers, and others who are in contact with the public.

This tends to make for national consistency, which has its advantages and disadvantages. It is bound not to please everybody and may lose certain communities. Any attempt to broaden the program to include everybody makes it easily exposed by the opposition. The platform must be designed to bring in a majority if possible. Disagreement can occur within the party regarding the most effective national issues. The result may be a struggle for control of the state or national committees. The side that can line up the most local politicians generally triumphs. But a national line has distinct advantages, particularly in these days of radio, newspaper, and movie news. Syndicated articles can be circulated throughout the entire nation. Small-town newspapers, grateful for boiler plate, take what the party wishes to circulate.

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS

Although a single state is generally pretty much under control of a single party machine, the diversity of states in the union means that the legislature is usually composed of individuals of both parties as well as independents.

Psychologists must seek the conditions of the social environment which make possible attitudes which can operate through representative institutions. Laski has been one political scientist to recognize this fact. He points out that the conditions which operated to make parliamentary government successful in England are fast disappearing. The social relationships giving rise to attitudes are developmental. We must understand not only the kind of attitudes upon which representative institutions are predicated, but also the type of conditions under which they occur.

First let us characterize representative institutions briefly. Laski has suggested that the Parliamentary system is a device which "offers the chance of transferring all disputes from the plane of violence to that of reason" (4). This is truly the role that members of a parliamentary assembly play, but Laski's description is in such generalized terms that we may easily overlook the real psychological nature of the political process here involved. We must study some of the specific operations back of this description. Obviously the conflicts to which Laski refers are not the conflicts of single individuals. The chief vested interest may be a single individual. Nonetheless he would be impotent indeed in governmental affairs who could not rally publics to his standard. The conflict to which Laski refers is obviously a conflict between organized parties. Now this is no ascent to superorganic concepts. It simply means that the public opinion process, as we have described it, results in a social situation in which individual members are compelled to support a particular program of action, and compelled by their own motivation and not by mysterious forces. Inasmuch as almost any individual of a particular party may be counted upon to support this opinion, conflicts are said to be between parties and not individuals. The conflict is then at the behavioral and not the motivational level. It describes the willingness of many individuals for all sorts of motives to do all sorts of things to accomplish certain ends. It may actually end in combat, but in representative institutions we have a technique to avoid this sort of behavior.

The Role of the Member of an Assembly

The member of a parliament or congress seems to play a role which may be divided into two parts: (1) He adjusts to other members of the assembly. (2) He adjusts to his constituency which contains one or more publics. Whatever adjustment he makes to the one may involve the necessity of readjusting to the other. If he adjusts too fully to the requests of other parliamentary members, he may do something that will alienate his own following. If he fails to adjust to other parliamentary members he may so alienate them that he cannot longer adequately secure the interests of members of his constituency. He must be able to live successfully in two groups at one and the same time. In his relationship with other members various arts are called into practice. He must be able to persuade, buy, coerce, or trade for the support of other members. This is essential to getting reelected by his own constituents. His ability as an orator, business man, social scientist, student of human nature, his personality, culture, or education, his money, friends, or relatives, may all enhance his ability to carry on with other members. In his relationship with his constituents he must understand the psychology of the public. He must be able to feel the pulse of the constituency. As Laski has said, he must know "the issues which need handling," must be able to "judge their priority in importance," and must have the power and courage to carry the "proposed solutions to a successful conclusion" (4). We add, he must also know issues which must be avoided, when to desert issues which he has previously supported, as well as many other arts. Most of these problems are directly related to the public opinion process and the psychology of groups.

The Role of the Assembly Member and His Motivation

A member of a successfully operating parliament or congress stands in much the same relationship to his constituents as that in which a lawyer is supposed to stand to his clients. The

specific legislation before the assembly is seldom an end to the representative but rather a means to an end. General success in getting through his legislation means enhanced reputation, reelection, and promotion. Through these effects upon other members of his social group he attains specific ends of many sorts. Even defeat upon a few issues is not disastrous if some way can be manufactured to justify his failure to his voters. There is an occasional member who is completely dominated by some specific issue, but parliaments could not operate with too many of this type. The average representative is not an expert or a man of brilliant reputation in some narrow field. Those who criticize parliaments on this ground fail to understand how they operate. All effective parliaments have delegated technical matters to experts and have been content to discuss general principles. A parliament is full of ordinary politicians who know the art of enrolling the support of their respective communities and the art of getting along with their fellow legislators.

The Institutional Practice of Debate and Majority Vote

The practices of a parliament are a direct result of the motivational factors just considered, and when that type of motivation disappears parliaments become ineffective. Debate in parliament has been a source of pride to Englishmen. Yet debate can exist only when men are able to inhibit tendencies toward physical violence. The law has long recognized the inability of a lawyer to plead his own cause effectively, because nearness of an issue to one's personal affairs causes the domination of emotional factors which both distort reason and easily flow into direct action. As long as representatives are dominated by other motives than direct interest in specific legislation, they have some of the objectivity of the lawyer. As long as the issues before an assembly do not jeopardize the property, income, family, or personal life of the representative, debate is an effective solution of conflicts between constituents. But let the issue become a direct thrust at the immediate self-interest

of the representative as well as his constituents, such as the attacks on slavery in the fifties or the attacks on property interests in modern times, and argument quickly gives way to violent emotion and tendencies toward direct action. The minority is increasingly unwilling to accept the majority vote as final.

Moreover, "The kind of issue which the nineteenth century discussed," says Laski, "existed upon a plane which could be understood without excessive intellectual effort and naturally lent itself to the great commonplaces of rhetorical analysis. Religious toleration, the extension of the suffrage, the desirability of a national system of education, the reorganization of local government, they are in their larger perspective the kind of thing the average man finds interesting and intelligible without the possession of special knowledge" (4). The success of a parliament of politicians of ordinary stature is dependent not only upon their motivation but also upon their abilities. The combination of political ability and scientific knowledge is unusual for many almost obvious reasons. The specialist must know more and more about less and less. The politician must be a very well-rounded man in order to keep the confidence of his constituents. Parliamentary government is successful as long as the tasks which must be handled are not those of the specialists, as long as special matters can be willingly delegated to the civil servant or the expert. Parliamentary government is predicated upon ordinary men with political abilities in an age where the economy is operating in spite of those running it.

The Committee System of Legislation

A second institutional practice of assemblies is the committee system of handling legislative problems. Undoubtedly this practice is very much related to the same conditions which give rise to debate and majority vote as a means of settling disputes. In almost all assemblies any matter settled in committees can be brought to the floor for majority decision if desired. The

implication is that most committee decisions will be acceptable to the majority.

An additional factor, however, enters in regard to this practice. Particular committees confine themselves to particular kinds of problems. Obviously, some communities are more interested in the tariff, agriculture, manufacturing, rivers and harbors, than others. It is to the self-interest of a member from a constituency which has individuals in it who are concerned with some particular type of problem to keep on a committee which handles this type of problem. There is also a general willingness among other members not so concerned with the specific problem not to bar the appointment of the interested member. For generations agricultural communities in America have been unconcerned about industrial tariffs because their interest in such measures was not seen. In the same fashion, the communities with rivers and harbors proceeded to dominate these committees. There is, then, a general spirit of live and let live in a parliamentary government, because issues seem specific to particular communities and sections and not matters of general welfare of all individuals. Such a condition is also evidence of an expanding economy.

The Political Party in an Assembly

The relationship of an individual to a committee also depends upon his relationship to a political party. There is a scramble for membership upon important committees. Rather than leave this matter to yearly controversy, in the American Congress the political party is utilized for orderly procedure in partialing the plums. A member of long standing in Congress gains a priority in claim when his party is in power.

Another function of a party is to make it possible for members with opposing interests of importance to settle their disputes through party channels. It is generally possible to fight battles through party lines. Upon occasion, the members of a single party find themselves in opposition as did the western Progressives and the Republicans in the early twentieth century.

In the long run, one of the dissenting groups leaves the party and joins the opposition party. This practice makes possible a two-party system with the minority party in opposition.

Several psychological factors are operative to make a two-party system workable as far as adjustment within the assembly is concerned. Where parties are divided upon racial, religious, class, or military lines, this type of operation is impossible. A segment finding itself no longer in agreement with the party cannot simply go over to the opposition. As a result a multi-party system is developed. It is in no way as efficient a governing device. The two-party system nicely indicates the majority and minority interest in an election. Even a two-party system divided upon class lines lacks this democratic quality. An opposition in a party has nowhere to go, for the other party represents even more divergent interests than their own. When classes become important in government, representative government is on the way out as an effective institution, except for very major interests. A two-party class government represents really a struggle for sovereignty on the part of each rather than an instrument of accommodation.

Non-Institutionalized Conduct in an Assembly

The problems of accommodation in an assembly are also solved by other highly personal means. An assembly by its very nature represents a face-to-face situation. F. H. Allport has pointed out the effectiveness of personality factors in bringing about adjustment on segmental or institutionalized issues. A man's personal qualities may more than compensate for his unpopular attitude on the tariff. Books like the *Washington Merry-Go-Round* are principally revelations of back-of-the-scenes accommodations carried on outside of the realm of institutional political practice. Certainly golf, card playing, duck hunting, and social activities cannot be divorced completely from legislative process. The story of the role of women in effecting political accommodation among statesmen is yet to be written.

Another practice of assemblies has been called in America

"log rolling." This is principally an art of trading one's vote on issues which seem of no importance to one's constituency for votes of others. At a later date when the issue, though important to the first individual, is now of no importance to the second, the second individual will reciprocate. In this way, the shrewdest vote trader becomes a potent force in a legislature. Log rolling is chiefly effective in regard to pork barrel legislation, where the government is financing particular developments such as buildings, harbors, and forts. The practice does not seem to have any rules or regulations but is a matter of personal qualities of the particular legislator who uses it.

A third practice is rather unusual. A few legislators have the ability to coerce their fellows by going over their heads to their constituents. A few towering figures in every assembly develop a national public. For one reason or another their personalities or their programs have qualities which have affected the psychology of cohesive groups so that the group or community process results in a favorable opinion. Many individuals in many communities find a personality like Theodore Roosevelt's a symbol of their own attitudes. In the public opinion process he very nearly becomes accepted as a part of the group itself. One member of Congress may thus be able to go over the representatives' heads to their constituents in a way that forces the representatives to adjust to some program, whether they like it or not.

Representative and Electorate

We have still to consider the problem of the relationship of the representative to his constituency. Theoretically, his representation is measured at election time. To the extent that he has failed to accomplish the minimum program which his constituents as individuals affected by propaganda demand, or has supported a program which is disapproved, he runs the danger of defeat. The art of representation is then essentially the art of getting and maintaining the vote. This all seems very democratic and just and apparently demonstrates a direct con-

trol over the parliamentary process by the electorate. But here we run into other conditions: (1) The citizens of a community are often ignorant of their real interests in legislation. (2) A few possess information, but the rest are unwilling to accept the facts. (3) Citizens may know their interests, but they accept defeat upon one issue if victory is won upon another, and they show very poor judgment as to the importance of the two issues. (4) They may accept defeat because they see no prospects of victory except through direct action and they are unwilling to undertake that measure. (5) They may prefer direct action. Undoubtedly these situations do not cover the actual gamut which exists, but they do indicate the relationship of representatives to electorate in some detail. We must see how the representative adjusts to his constituency.

Colonel House said in the 1932 campaign that "the secret of success in a presidential election is to forget that it is a presidential election. There is a technique for electing a village constable and there is a technique for electing a president. The formula in both cases is practically identical." This observation needs to be qualified. The representative cannot hope to talk to individuals separately. Even if he did, their acceptance of his pleas and even of his personality is also a matter of conversation with their neighbors, their family, and other members of their union or grange. The speech made or the address printed may be grist for the public opinion mill, but the emergent opinion is a function not only of the content of the speeches but also of the various publics.

In a rural community this problem is not complicated by the existence of groups crossing each other to any great degree. In the city a man may seem to belong to many groups. The keen politician must see beneath this confusing surface to the cohesive groups which really matter. The Elks or the S.P.C.A. may go on record as favoring some candidate officially, but the action of the group may not be able to deliver a single vote on election day. The members of the S.P.C.A. belong to other publics as well, and on election day they vote according to their more important group affiliations.

Local Psychology and National Issues

We have already described local politics; we need only to elaborate upon the local scene as it affects national politics. The national arena is a remote scene to most individuals. Certain aspects of national politics, however, have a local significance. The new postoffice, the dispensation of federal relief, taxes, and patronage are facts which are within the direct experience of the individuals of the community. The uncle who got a job with the administration, the new postoffice for the town, the cousin at West Point, all indicate a representative who is 'doing things for the district' or who has 'done a lot for the town or city.' He is delivering the goods. The separate individuals who profit directly from these enterprises may be few, but the good fortune of group members is accepted as good fortune for all. Part of this psychology is the belief that what is good for the locality is for the benefit of all.

We have already pointed out the fact that local politicians trade exclusively in personal politics. The city ward, the Tammany machine, as well as the small-town community is unified around direct returns which can be objectively verified. This type of politics cannot be ignored. One prominent Philadelphia boss once remarked that a congressman who spent his time worrying about foreign affairs when he could be securing postoffices, river and harbor appropriations for his community, or patronage for his supporters was doomed to defeat. The first part of national politics is just local politics repeated, but aided by the federal budget.

Other national issues are not easily checked against personal experience. The tariff policy, the gold standard, direct or indirect taxation are measures understood only by the expert. These measures are accepted or repudiated not because the community members oppose or favor them, but because of psychological reasons for believing particular individuals or disbelieving individuals on these especial issues. It was impossible for the rural sections of Protestant America to believe in the farm program of a Roman Catholic from the sidewalks of

New York, no matter what the soundness of his economics might be; nor could the northern Pennsylvania Dutch accept a candidate for governor whose wife went around doing public speaking when a woman's place was in the kitchen. Yet whole sections of the country would and did believe that a New England Yankee with a drawl of Vermont origin could sit as vice-president in a cabinet of direct plunderers of the Treasury and share no responsibility for the corruption.

The local process is a filter through which any political propaganda must pass to be successful. These attitudes and stereotypes, however, are not static. Economic depression, defeat in war, failure of crops, and other great social changes such as introduction of machinery, contact with foreigners, or social mobility do affect them. Group attitudes are not at the beck and call of individual men. The game is too large for that. They may be directed but not artificially produced. Nor can they be destroyed by edict.

The Selective Process of Politics

The nature of local politics limits the type of candidate who can expect to be successful. It requires an individual with a feeling for public sentiment, with qualities which appeal to his constituents, with an ability to play practical spoils politics, as well as other characteristics. Party support imposes additional requirements. The nomination is likely to go only to those who qualify in party regularity. Party service is generally demonstrated by long and extensive service; by minor work to begin with, and a widening field as a member progresses upward. Add these qualities together, and the specialist has very little chance of success in a parliamentary system. The political process selects out and promotes men whose qualities are chiefly political. In America the country lawyer has been the type who best succeeds within these requirements, and Congress has been full of men of this group. We have already pointed to the similarity in the role of the lawyer and the representative, both succeeding best in issues where there is no direct personal issue at stake. We have also demonstrated

the fact that the great success of the representative system occurred in a period during which the issues debated were general enough so that they could be handled by this type of man.

The Executive

We have not as yet said much of the role of the executive branch of government. In England this function is directly related to Parliament, but in America we have a separate branch. The fact that the President is elected by all the people undoubtedly aids in the process of making national government out of thousands of localities. The search for a presidential candidate is often a search for an individual of personal qualities which have a strong universal propaganda appeal throughout the nation. The rugged frontier type and the business man have been the two most appealing personality types in America to date. If a political party can add a strong presidential candidate to their platform and their local candidates, it is a great advantage indeed. Modern presidential elections, however, have been characterized by the use of the build-up. The presidential candidate attempts to create a stereotype of himself which will be liked by all the people. Fishing, fireside scenes, church scenes, planned characterizations in the news are all designed to build up an acceptable impression of the candidate.

The prestige of a president with the masses gives him the ability to go over the heads of representatives, if they fail to follow his program. This is certainly one added factor which works for national unity among a nation of groups of diverse interests. During election year the representative who must face reelection is generally found staying pretty close to the wishes of the chief executive.

Moreover, many presidents have been particularly concerned with building a party machine. With the immense patronage of federal origin, and with the federal budget, they possessed an instrument of intimidation which few local politicians could withstand. All in all, the presidential office has a strong tendency to aid the illusion of unity of a nation, perhaps even in a greater degree than the party itself.

A Broad Characterization of Parliamentary Institutions

In reviewing parliamentary institutions we are impressed by several facts: (1) There is a direct delivery of observable benefits to the community in spoils and patronage or in public welfare enterprises. (2) Most national issues are remote from a reality check of everyday life, but the individual likes to believe that they are in his interest because of such mechanisms as (*a*) the political party, (*b*) the executive or king, (*c*) the representative as an individual with whom he can identify himself. (3) Even though this wish to believe is destroyed by some act or consequence which outrages his feelings he can still change party and change the executive in a political democracy. (4) Of the many accomplishments of the national government, some are obviously in his interest. Such factors militate against many individuals advocating revolutionary action, particularly as long as the economic system is expanding.

State and Government

We have seen, in this picture of politics, a technique (largely one of bargaining within the limits of the few dominant issues which excite the population) by which accommodation is brought about between organized political groups. Thus government is carried on. By and large, the process seems to work out, not because most people are represented in government, but because they do not choose to interfere. As long as their personal lives go on smoothly they accept a given government. Upon rare occasions they desire to take a personal stand on certain issues, but for the most part the vote is delivered to a party by party machines and local bosses. Yet the fact that changes in government do reflect changes in individuals on crucial occasions seems to argue that this is representative government.

Yet we must not overlook the relationship between the state and government. It might be argued that, since the officers of government are at the same time the members of the institu-

tion of the state, the state is, therefore, representative. The President, for instance, is the commander-in-chief of the army and navy. Should not the peace policy of the state then reflect public opinion? The governor is commander of the state militia. Should not the policy of the state militia in regard to strikes represent the public opinion of the people of the state?

The State as a Separate Institution and Its Relationship to the Public

It may seem a paradox to say that the state can ignore public opinion, but that it never goes against public opinion. This is because the state has the possibility of manipulating the social situation so that it can counterbalance events giving rise to an undesirable public opinion. Public opinion affects government. But the state affects public opinion.

The British state, faced by pacifist public opinion, orders the fleet into the Mediterranean and creates a crisis with the Fascist powers. The French state, faced by demands for social legislation which is expensive, creates a 'crisis' of the franc which demonstrates to the public the necessity of economy.

The fact that the state has the right to create these crises grows out of the fact that the institution has habitual acceptance. No one questions the right of the governor to use militia to maintain law and order. All that needs to be done is to change a strike from a quarrel between capital and labor into a threat toward law and order and troops can be ordered into an industrial settlement. Public opinion, which may have been on the side of labor in a labor-capital conflict, is decidedly on the side of law in a law-and-order crisis. The state, by its actions, can reinterpret a situation.

Inasmuch as the state has been created chiefly as a device for protecting private property rights on the one hand and giving outlet to identification publics on the other, it is no wonder that the state in such situations proves to be an institution whose actions are in the direction of the self-interest of the propertied groups. But such incidents are rare in a period of expanding

good times. Inasmuch as the good fortunes of business mean the good fortunes of everybody, there are few situations in which such a discrepancy can occur.

The State in International Affairs

The clearest notion of the state in this era comes in international affairs. The average citizen is indifferent to most state and national issues. He is completely illiterate about international relationships. This allows the development of the use of the state for prestige purposes, in international diplomacy, in a fashion which is little understood by the man on the street.

In the era of the rural communities, rampant nationalism was a difficult thing to develop. Throughout the era of publics, however, we find several forces at work creating patriotism in the population. First, our country is contrasted with other countries. It is found to be especially superior in certain respects. The first comparison is *size*. We have the largest bridges, the tallest skyscrapers, the largest dams, and the biggest universities in the world. Texas is as big as many single foreign countries. Secondly, we are a people of *action*. America is dynamic. Cities are built, wrecked, and rebuilt in a generation. The horse and buggy gives way to the automobile, and the automobile to the airplane. Our heroes are men of action. Thirdly, we are a country which stands for *cleanliness*. We worship sanitation. Our expeditions to Central America are to free the natives from yellow fever, malaria, and hookworm. Fourthly, we are *experimental*. We have no hidebound traditions. We are breakers of precedent. We will try anything once. Fifthly, we are *idealistic*. We freed the slaves, fought a war for democracy, opened our doors to the afflicted of every race. It is evident that any of these ideals, if examined, reflects very much the psychology of identification. From such identification comes the possibility of gathering individuals to a common cause.

We are one country and distinct from other countries. Symbols of our country are our flag and our Constitution, as well as

our army and navy. The flag itself stands for purity, loyalty, and courage. The Constitution is the charter of a free people. The army and navy have never fought a selfish war. Given this psychology, these symbols become deeply motivating forces in relationship to the individuals whose emotions they express.

Let, therefore, an alien insult our flag, and it is an insult to the nation. F. H. Allport has said of this process:

When one of our nationals has been killed abroad it is not a mere man, but an *American*, who has been slain. It is in a sense our flag which has been insulted. The symbols which the loyal citizen has learned from infancy to hold sacred have been profaned by *aliens*. The affront seems deeper and wider in scope than a mere outrage to personal feelings. Through our tendency to project a reality behind our symbols an attack upon the symbolic object becomes an attack upon that for which the symbol stands. The killing of one of our citizens . . . is thus not merely a crime against that person, but an insult to our country . . . [1, p. 147].

A more subtle thing is an attack upon our sovereign rights. If we have an agreement for trade with China, the interference of Japan with those rights is another attack upon our country, and not upon those who are carrying on the trade relationships.

The Prestige of a Nation

The prestige of a state in the international sphere is predicated upon the ability of a strong community to rally its own citizens behind it during such a crisis. If it can rally this support, it is assumed that the country would go to war to support the state on this issue if necessary. If it cannot rally this support, it may have to take the so-called insult of the other nation. The fact that it takes an insult is considered an index of its inability to rally its population for war. If the stronger country can rally this support, it may not have to go to war, because the other country must back down. Prestige then is based on the capacity to win a war. This in itself is based upon material resources and ability to rally the community to support the state.

If a country takes an insult without protest it hurts its influence in international affairs. As R. G. Hawtrey has said:

Prestige is not entirely a matter of calculation but partly of indirect inference. In a diplomatic conflict the country which yields is likely to suffer in prestige, because the fact of yielding is taken by the rest of the world to be evidence of conscious weakness. The visible components of power do not tell the whole story and no one can judge better of the invisible components than the authorities governing the country itself. If they show want of confidence people infer that there is some hidden source of weakness.

If the country's prestige is thus diminished, it is weakened in any future diplomatic conflict. And if a diplomatic conflict is about anything substantial, the failure is likely to mean a diminution of material strength.

A decline of prestige is therefore an injury to be dreaded. But in the last resort prestige means reputation for strength in war, and doubts on the subject can be set at rest by war itself. A country will fight when it believes that its prestige in diplomacy is not equivalent to its real strength. Trial by battle is an exceptional incident, but the conflict of national force is continuous. That is inherent in the international anarchy [3, p. 96].

Through the use of prestige gained from our national state, individuals find a capacity to carry on foreign trade, to secure new markets, and new concessions. The layman knows little about such things. Yet it is through the effect of the symbols of the national state upon him, in creating a public to support the state, that such occupations are carried on.

War

In a period when activity seems to be carried on because the layman does not object, rather than because he wants or desires some particular program, one must consider how wars are waged. For in war the layman must do more than not object, he must assist. But as F. H. Allport has said:

Nowhere is the nationalistic fallacy more clearly revealed than in the actual business of launching and conducting a war. When an international dispute arises the precise effect of yielding one

country's policy in favor of the other—the effect, that is upon the *individuals*—is seldom the center of consideration. Our statesmen and publicists speak instead of the “violation of the country's rights,” “the breaking of national treaties,” or “the infringement of the Nation's sovereignty.” At every step the negotiating nations are personified and treated as super-individual beings. If the situation “becomes aggravated” the ambassador of each country to the other is recalled, a procedure by which “speaking relations” between the “Nations” are severed. A “state of war” is then declared. This is necessary, because otherwise the nationals of neither country would know how to treat those of the other, nor what treatment they might in turn expect. *Thus far it is really only the “Nations” which are at swords’ points. The psychology of the individual lags far behind.*

True it is that indignation has swept over the country, a wave of anger aroused by alleged offenses to national honor, or by some other cause; *but it is a far cry from this abstract and “public” sort of anger to that personal hatred which is necessary to induce one man to go out and kill another.* We acquiesce in the war before we are ready to kill. The officials of the government are thus faced by the task of getting the citizens into a fighting mood; and a campaign of “education” follows in which the national symbols and nationalistic fallacy are played upon to the uttermost* [1, pp. 149-150].

War in this period is sold to the public in great advertising campaigns. Large-scale propaganda in America was discovered with the World War. Books have been written examining this propaganda. It suffices for us to note that the actions of the state do not depend upon public opinion in the international sphere, but public opinion flows from the consequences of the actions of the state in the international arena.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE ERA OF SOCIAL CLASSES

The Development of Conscious Social Classes

No fact has so disturbed the modern world as has the development of class consciousness. The problem is, of course, more acute in Europe than in America. In our own country we still read editorials directed against some politician who is said to be intent on stirring antagonism between classes. Sigmund Freud has described the situation in *The Future of an Illusion*. He says:

If we turn to those restrictions that only apply to certain classes of society, we encounter a state of things which is glaringly obvious and has always been recognized. It is to be expected that the neglected classes will grudge the favoured ones their privileges and that they will do everything in their power to rid themselves of their own surplus of privation. Where this is not possible a lasting measure of discontent will obtain within this culture, and this may lead to dangerous outbreaks. But if a culture has not got beyond the stage in which the satisfaction of one group of its members necessarily involves the suppression of another, perhaps the majority—and this is the case in all modern cultures—it is intelligible that these suppressed classes should develop an intense hostility to the culture; a culture, whose existence they make possible by their labour, but in whose resources they have too small a share. In such conditions one must not expect to find an internalization of the cultural prohibitions among the suppressed classes; indeed they are not even prepared to acknowledge these prohibitions, intent as they are, on the destruction of the culture itself and perhaps even of the assumptions on which it rests. These classes are so manifestly hostile to culture that on that account the more latent hostility of the better provided social strata has been overlooked. It need not be said that a culture which leaves unsatisfied and drives to rebelliousness so large a number of its members neither has a prospect of continued existence, nor deserves it [pp. 20-21].

Our interest in the problem described by Freud is in the effect of class consciousness on the operation of public opinion, politics, government, the state, and social institutions generally. Freud, as one interested in mental hygiene, is more interested in the effect of this situation upon the mind of the individual. Our aim is to clarify the modern historical picture; to make modern times intelligible to the individual living in a class-conscious age.

We must again leave to the economist and the sociologist the main analysis of the economic and social changes which ended the 'golden age,' and its psychology of opportunism which so characterized institutions in the era of the public. A capitalistic economy seems to enter a new phase when the opportunities to reinvest surplus capital disappear. Foreign markets are eventually cornered by various nations, and only a few isolated lands remain uncontrolled by some country; the frontier passes away, and cities soon dominate the economy; colonies begin developing their own industrial plants; last, but not least, the top soil is gone and the price of land has risen with an increased population. There still exists the possibility of seizure of someone else's markets or colonies, but this is accomplished only by imperialistic wars.

This evolutionary development has reached a critical point. Early depressions were conquered by internal changes in culture, by new institutions, by new attitudes toward the foreign world, and even by wars. Modern depressions close factories, glut the markets, put millions into the ranks of the unemployed, wreck banks, and result in conditions approaching chaos. No new institution seems to answer the demand, for any new institutional device to solve the problem either leads to lowered living standards on the part of labor, or increases taxation upon the propertied classes to a degree that means confiscation. All pious sentiment is increasingly stripped away. The situation is now exposed as one of a *struggle for power* by opposed groups of capital and labor. Confiscation means a change not in culture, but in the very basis of society. Lowered living standards eliminate a basic psychological factor

upon which contemporary institutions were built and upon which modern culture flourished. The culture is between the horns of a dilemma.

The Objective Features of the Present Age

The age of the public was the age of increased large-scale production. In the age of social classes America's capacity to produce, as measured by as conservative a group as Brookings Institution, is beyond the dream of men in other epochs. The devices invented for social organization which have been described in the two previous chapters are not foolish folklore, as many modern debunking writers would have us believe. These institutions made possible a collective organization of society, oriented toward production, which pushed the development of material culture far beyond any previous goal of human history.

The increased capacity to produce no longer captivates the population, however. Where in the earlier epoch increased efficiency meant a higher living standard for everybody, this ceases to be true in the new era. Objectively, the capacity to produce exists, and also the desire for the goods. But there is no objective possibility of maintaining production at its capacity in our society except at the expense of (1) people of other countries, or (2) the propertied classes (which means some kind of confiscation), or (3) labor (by lowering living standards).

This state of affairs, moreover, is not a consequence of the motives of men, but a function of the actual situation. Liberals who argue that a greater distribution of wealth would mean more consuming power in the masses and, therefore, a means to continue production miss the point. Wealth is no longer consumers' goods. If all the consumers' goods were divided equally, the wealth of each individual would be only slightly increased. Wealth exists in great chains of producers' capital. The efficiency of this system comes from its unity. To take a lathe out of a great industrial plant and give it to a consumer would not aid the situation. To confiscate one wing of an

automobile factory would help nobody. Reducing the huge salary of a corporation head will not alter the situation, for his salary is a bubble in an ocean.

Wealth comes only from operating these great units at increased capacity and creating new large-scale units out of small inefficient ones. The owners of capital have no motive to do this unless there is a market for their goods. And there is no longer any way to create such a market, except by taking one of the alternatives suggested. The real problem is not how to distribute ownership in these big units, but how to preserve their unity and how to make them go.

In the era of publics, opportunists who have risen from one social class to another have status and prestige because they possess money, and money has the capacity to buy most things. The age of opportunism seems on its way out. Where Hill and Harriman, Rockefeller and Ford were acclaimed even in their own time, not for the kind of race they ran, but because they were victors, Insull and Kreuger are condemned by conservative capital as outsiders jeopardizing conservative wealth, and by labor and the liberals as possessing no social ethics. In politics, where Napoleon and Disraeli were popular heroes, such opportunists as Stalin and Hitler receive no such universal acclaim, and are only defended by a particular section of society. There is, then, no longer a general prestige of success alone.

In the same way the scientist comes under question. As the giver of all good gifts in one age, he could command the respect of the entire culture. In this later age his prestige is a function of other attitudes and outlooks, and in certain places he is now the devil of a society instead of its saint.

Likewise the objective situation no longer possesses unequivocal implications for all sections of the population. Individuals actually live in different worlds. Labor still lives in a world of machines. People of the better classes are increasingly out of touch with this sort of life. Their automobiles are not a product of science to them, but devices for getting them com-

fortably from place to place. The foolproof nature of modern machinery makes their homes, offices, and vehicles of transportation seem like given facts of nature. Increasingly their milieu is a social world in which manipulation of people rather than the manipulation of nature seems the important fact of life.

In the same way the relationship of the population to the objective facts of the division of labor alters. Coupon clippers live in a similar world, whether their coupons come from steel and glass factories or from U. S. Government bonds. A class of individuals living on interest knows little about the division-of-labor nature of an industrial economy. Their common life becomes increasingly similar instead of increasingly different. Trips to Europe, yachts, golf courses, sports, are similar diversions to the entire group. At the same time, the youth who has never known employment undergoes an experience in one respect not unlike that of the coupon clipper. To one on the dole, the difference between plumbing, steamfitting, carpentry, lathe operation, or unskilled labor is an unfelt distinction. He does know better, however, the common scorn of the culture against him, the problems of sexual relations without income, and a life of uncleanness in a culture which values sanitation.

The nature of large-scale production also has its effect upon workers. The nature of modern industrial plants de-emphasizes individual capacity and stresses team work. If one machine breaks down, a whole plant may stop. The factory operates in a highly unified fashion. Promoters of industry, however, meet a different situation. Here the problem is more of manipulating men than of collective production. One business may succeed where another fails because of an advertising campaign, special legislation from congress, or anticipation of public demand for stocks. Here special individual capacity seems to be the deciding factor, whereas in the factory collective enterprise is the order of the day.

The General Psychological Implications of the Objective Situation

The psychological implications of these objective factors are not hard to discuss. First, in one section of the population, overstimulation of ambition has given way to a desire to protect present holdings. Conservative wealth is no longer fired with the desires to build empires, subdue continents, and launch forth new and spectacular enterprises. It is content if it can protect what it has. Furthermore, members of this group disapprove actions of others which jeopardize their security. In England, for instance, the desire to invest for speculation has long since passed away. No Englishman thinks of the rising value of his stocks. Rather, he measures his wealth in yearly interest. He has no thought of having a hundred thousand pounds but rather an income of four thousand. In a second section of the population, overstimulation of ambition is still present but thwarted by lack of opportunity. In an age where nobody has much chance for success, there is no need of accepting personal responsibility for failure. The frustrated emotions are now projected out upon society. Some individuals blame it on the machine and the scientists. Others blame it on money financiers and claim it to be a financial arrangement which is at fault. Still others blame it on the actual relationships of production which constitute society. A third section of society wavers between two attitudes. Individuals are still fired by desire for success, but are aware of the decreased possibility of attaining it. Sometimes these individuals project their frustration upon society. Upon other occasions they feel that, though not many can accomplish a jump from one social level to another, they themselves may be the exception to the rule.

Second, the field of consciousness is no longer dominated by economic goals. The economic funnel has failed. The promise of fortunes no longer hypnotizes the individual to the extent of blotting out all other conditions of the situation. We see, in the place of this single mindedness of the previous epoch,

a rise of interest in the pluralistic science of politics. All brands of political groups get a hearing: technocrats; epic planners; Townsendites; followers of Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and Upton Sinclair; inflationists; deflationists; isolationists; and internationalists. Just as the frustrated project their dissatisfaction on certain political parties, different groups look to various changes in the social order as the solution of their personal problems.

Third, we find changes in attitudes toward science. Increasingly, certain men begin to talk about mysticism and mystery. Others demand a retreat from intellectualism. Others stand by science, but call for a criticism of its basic assumptions to see where it stands in relationship to the political problem developing round about them. Finally, some demand that science be applied to the problem of the social world.

Fourth, we find changes in attitudes toward leadership. Certain groups still look for the great individual, the man on the white horse, who can solve their problems. Other groups have no faith in the single individual and set their faces toward a collectivistic solution in terms of an entire group.

Fifth, we find the development of class centrism. Increasingly, great groups do not know how the rest of the world lives. They meet only individuals of their own section of society. Their common talk bolsters prevailing attitudes in their group. Their tastes affect one another. An analysis of one of their members is accepted as correct, because everyone else of their station talks the same way. Each section is, in fact, a mutual admiration society.

Finally, the entire set of problems may be said to represent the incipient development of two cultures within a society. As one writer has put it, "Arrayed in mortal combat are two civilizations whose fundamental values cannot be arbitrated by an appeal to objective social duty."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

In addition to this general psychological problem, there is the specific problem of class consciousness. Social classes have

always existed in our society even from the very beginning. But classes have always been distinguished by their role, rather than by *consciousness of kind* or *consciousness of role*. We have demonstrated earlier the common consciousness which pervaded all sections of the culture, in the era of publics, irrespective of role.

Nor is it probably true that all individuals playing similar roles in a society develop class consciousness at the same time. In fact, it is probably true that a majority of a class reaches such a psychological conclusion only in the heat of a revolution. Class consciousness at best seldom characterizes more than a minority of a class. But this minority plays an influential part both in the activities of the class and in the development of the culture. Nor does class consciousness develop in the same fashion in different classes. Hence we must approach the problems of class consciousness separately for the different classes.

Class Consciousness in Labor

In the development of class consciousness in labor, it is necessary to describe the role of the *intellectual*. The section of labor which achieves class consciousness is not anti-intellectual as in certain other groups. There are several reasons why this is so. (1) Mystical talk sounds too much like nonsense to industrial labor. Their lives are related to machines. Men who understand engineering and science are the men who in everyday life solve the problems of labor. Science makes sense to them. (2) They are classicists by temperament. *Emotion as a solution of problems* does not impress them. Their experience with problems with machines is that they are settled by intellect.* As a consequence, class consciousness is generally fostered and directed by intellectuals of real stature. Class consciousness is achieved under intellectual leadership. The laboring-class movement has produced as many eminent social thinkers in

* This is revealed in their attitudes toward leadership. The real boss in a crisis is often a man of no official position in whose knowledge they trust. In dealing with danger in a steel mill, men have been known to refuse to work, because of their recognition of the incapacity of the boss.

the last hundred years as almost any division of science. Names like Sorel, Engels, Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, DeLeon, Jaures, demonstrate this point. These men were not laborers themselves, but they derived their inspiration from participation in the labor movement. The literature of class-conscious labor is both profound and voluminous.

Labor Parties

Certain political parties also exist for the purposes of spreading class consciousness. They range from Social Democrats on one end to Anarchists on the other. In spite of their diverse doctrines they agree upon one thing: capitalistic social relationships cannot solve the contradictions of modern industrial culture. Although they draw the same indictment of society, when it comes to a positive program, they have diverse views. It is, nevertheless, on the destructive side that class consciousness arises. These parties are often led by *agitators* whose aim is to educate the laboring group to class consciousness and to direct it into specific channels. The parties generally disseminate the doctrine of the intellectuals whose program they approve. The parties are very much unlike the political parties of the era of publicists. Save perhaps for the Social Democrats, they are not opportunistic instruments by which individuals climb to power by political deals. They are, in fact, more like educational forums. In them the class centrism, already discussed, is accentuated. The study of the intellectuals gives them a common explanation of society and its operation. They are keen students of economics and politics. The situation is unequivocal to them as a group owing to their common background. As a result they become increasingly like-minded, so like-minded that they can accept a very narrow party line without conflict.

The Positive Program of Labor Parties

The positive program of labor parties is a reflection of these different attitudes prevalent in the population with which they deal.

The Party of Peaceful Evolution. There is always one party, usually called Social Democracy, which stands for peaceful evolution from capitalistic society to collectivistic relationships. Let us consider first its leadership. This party is generally organized by both labor and former members of the middle class who have turned intellectually toward labor. There are many members of the middle class who decide to side with labor. Most of them have read Marx and call themselves Marxists with, of course, some revisions. Many of them are sentimentalists with a genuine intellectual and emotional desire to aid the conditions of labor. Socialism to them is an ideal. They do not see in collectivism a solution of their personal problems, but in leading a socialistic party they find an outlet for their personalities. As some one has said, they do not lose themselves in this movement as does labor, but find themselves; i.e., frustrated in modern economic life, they find the opportunity to be leaders, to express their idealistic traits, to lead a full and useful life. Where, in its outset, the leadership is not opportunistic but idealistic, as the party gains in political importance the situation changes. The opportunity increasingly offers itself to these leaders to become successful and approved members of the conservative class by leading the party of peaceful evolution into the right political bargains. Caught in the dilemma of choosing between their ideals and a good bargain personally, many of these leaders become opportunists. Where in early days labor leadership meets barriers to personal ambitions, which leads to radicalism in thought, the growth in importance of a radical party eventually destroys these barriers and makes possible the solution of the original ambition. The role of this middle-class leadership has been, as a consequence of this change in situation, to sterilize the radicalism of the labor movement rather than to lead it toward socialism.

In the same fashion the program of the social democrats contains a similar sort of joker. The party at one and the same time seeks the socialist state and immediate social reforms. The first aim is its most vocal aim. Its leaders are extremely loud in their ambitions to achieve a socialist economy. But the

socialist state is to them a stereotype. Nobody knows exactly what it means. It symbolizes the wants of the laboring class which are becoming increasingly articulate. In a sense its appeal is somewhat like the appeal of Heaven in religion. It promises a 'hereafter' which shall be more pleasant than the present. At the same time the fact that this party seeks a workers' state flatters the vanity of the individual laborer and plays upon the psychology of identification. Third, the socialist state is to be achieved by ballots, not bullets; so that it is only necessary to secure a majority at the polls and the new state will be initiated. Now the workers are in favor of democracy. This program seems to mean democracy at its highest, for they have been taught that democracy is majority rule. All these aims are complicated by another factor: if the state can be turned socialistic through the medium of the ballot, so also can social reforms be brought about in the immediate future. This last fact connects the social democrats immediately with a new device, the trade unions. In the unions labor is already organized and needs only political direction. Just as the unions fight for higher wages day by day, so the social democratic party with the trade unions will fight for political benefits day by day. Here the inconsistency of the social democratic program comes to light. The trade unions are primarily interested in keeping their members at work, and by the same tactics, the social democrats become interested in wringing benefits for labor from the conservative party. More men can be kept at work if the economy is flourishing, and more benefits can be wrung from the conservatives if their books are in the black and not the red, if they are making profits. Inasmuch as national expansion offers opportunities to make business good, and consequently to benefit labor, should not the social democrats then support war as an instrument of national policy?

The ability to win immediate social reforms appeals widely to labor, and this capacity of the social democrats to serve labor is a great vote getter. At the same time the practical results inflate the party membership. Moreover, the unions, like the old city machines, are organized so that they can readily get out and

dictate the vote. The combination of social democracy and the unions is therefore a potent force. At the same time this reformist aim puts the social democrats in a dilemma every time an imperialistic measure comes up which would enhance labor's pay through increased business for capital at the expense of some other nation. It explains also, as one author has put it, why "they feel such an inner solidarity with the rest of the population in fighting off the dangers which threaten from without," and why, in England, for instance, labor parties end by being the defenders of Empire.

The orientation of social democracy toward practical immediate reform produces an important change in the social composition of the party. As S. Hook says of Germany, "Numerous non-proletarian elements—petty bourgeois shopkeepers, professionals and intellectuals—began to stream into the organization. They did not stay in the rank and file but, in virtue of their technical accomplishments and social connections, forged to the top of the party as functionaries, theoreticians and political representatives. Although the party membership still remained overwhelmingly proletarian, their strategic posts enabled them to wield an influence altogether disproportionate to their numbers."*

Anti-State Parties. Opposed to the labor party of social reform and peaceful evolution are two groups: the syndicalists and the Bolsheviki. Both groups have as their aim, not the socialist state, but the overthrow of the capitalistic state, the assumption being that the socialist state would build itself if the capitalistic state were removed and destroyed.

The most extreme program is that of the syndicalists. Their methods are in direct opposition to the social democrats. The syndicalists see clearly the contradictions of the socialistic reform, and they overcorrect. Because a political party develops into opportunism, they oppose all political effort. Unity is to be sought in the empirical practice of the defensive and offensive strike. Where the social democrats seek a new ad-

* S. Hook, *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*, New York; John Day & Co., 1933, p. 21.

ministration, the syndicalists seek a new state. A program of violence immediately excluded from the syndicalist group the sentimentalists, the members of the middle class, and the opportunists. It focused attention upon the necessity of risking something in action. The revolution is just around the corner, they assume, and the duty of all syndicalists is to lead the laboring class to class consciousness by opposing force with force. This view is not based on scientific analysis. Violence is not to be used at some critical theoretical moment when the analysis of the situation indicates success. Every labor flareup is to be treated as a potential revolution and is to be so utilized. Syndicalists have to be men capable of leading in direct action. And such men are selected out by the movement. As one critic has said of European countries, "The most the syndicalists could do was to scare the state, not to conquer it," for syndicalism was "the headless horseman of the revolution riding furiously in all directions at once." The members of this group can consistently stand by their theoretical position until a revolution is over. Unlike the social democrats they are never put in a position where the incompatibility of their aims forces them to desert their revolutionary goal. But for the same reason the syndicalist movement never appeals to the worker except during moments of crisis when men capable of strong deeds are at a premium.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, accept the party program of the social democrats and the aim of the syndicalists. They have the virtues of both groups and the dangers of both programs. As a group oriented against the state, the Bolsheviks conceive their party as a technique of struggle for power. They leave the question of the socialist state to be settled not by the plans of men but by the objective features of the real world which would remain, once capitalistic control was removed. Their leaders must, therefore, be first-class theoreticians if the movement is to be successful. They cannot hope to win masses of the workers to their standards except in that moment of disillusionment which comes when the social democrats turn opportunists, when the syndicalists have no institutional form for

carrying on a revolution, and when the masses are ripe for action against the state. Yet there is the consistent temptation to attract the masses immediately, and there is always the danger that under this pressure the party will take over the role of a social democratic party in seeking reform instead of power. To prevent this, a real Bolshevik party creates rigid entrance requirements. No intellectual is accepted on a part-time basis. The group recognizes that a foot in two camps may cause an individual to turn opportunist at a critical moment. No party member is promoted to leadership, or to editorship of a party paper, or any other responsible position, if he has not been a member for five or six years. The other danger is, however, that such leaders may well turn pedantic and become academic theorists out of touch with real workers' movements. The party attempts to correct for this danger by another tactic. The party supports all social reforms which are in the interest of the workers. Moreover, it is the function of the leadership to anticipate these practical demands of the workers and formulate them before either the workers or the social democrats do. At the same time, the party adopts a very sophisticated position (to those who do not understand the capacity of the workers to follow such a line) of supporting every reform and exposing the leaders who espouse it as being insincere in proposing it. Two principles of propaganda are at stake here. The one device is the principle of being the first to support a program. The more the social democrats take over proposals originally suggested by the Bolsheviks, the greater the prestige the Bolsheviks acquire with the workers. Second is the principle of being correct in prediction. The Bolsheviks assume that the social democrat who supports reforms must ultimately turn opportunist. By exposing him in advance the Bolshevik demonstrates to the workers that he alone has the capacity to understand the actual social forces in operation in modern times. This program can work only if the Bolsheviks are correct in assuming that the economy will eventually reach an insoluble crisis. Their technique is predicated on the belief that external facts will eventually demonstrate the truth of a proposition, and by doing

so give status to those who can call events correctly in advance. It is a position which demands great fortitude. Such a program cannot expect many followers. It practically invites the workers to follow the leadership of another party until the workers become convinced of the insincerity and the incapacity of other parties to deliver the things they promise. By refusing to lead the workers except in revolutionary activity, the Bolsheviks continually make it possible for other parties to function, by delivering the reforms for which the Bolsheviks call. They dare not enter into a coalition government seeking reform, even though granted the opportunity, for in so doing status is given not only to the program but to other party leaders, and, once given, it cannot be recalled. The Bolsheviks can only support that government as long as it carries out its promises, exposing in advance the opportunism which they believe to be inevitable.

Their policy in regard to the trade unions differs from that of the social democrats. They propagandize for a form of trade union which leaves power in the hands of the worker and puts the leaders under the mandate of a direct referendum. In this sense we see an attempt to return to the simple form of government of the rural community on vital issues. The reason for this aim is clear. They believe that the leaders will eventually turn opportunists. A democratic form of trade union government may prevent the leaders from taking the unions with them in any political deal. The temporizing leaders can be checkmated if able leadership rises in the unions at a moment of crisis. The trade unions are also forms of workers' organizations which are capable of undertaking the direction of a revolution if democratically constituted.

The Liberal and Conservative Parties and Class Consciousness in Labor. At the same time, the old-time parties help to produce class consciousness in labor by their bad tactics. The party in opposition attempts to label everything done by the liberal or social democratic party as communist, bolshevist, or anarchist in origin. Inasmuch as most social reforms so labeled are eventually put into operation by a non-labor party or by the

social democrats in cooperation with some other party, the laboring group are continually educated by the opposition not to fear these labels. In fact, a sort of status is created for the radical parties by the fact that the conservative groups attempt to prevent liberal reform by giving it radical names.

The Development of Class Consciousness in Upper-Class Groups

Class consciousness in the upper-class groups is an anti-intellectualistic movement. Its ideologists are poets, mystics, theologians, political jargonists, and others who place emotion over the intellect. The propagandistic necessities of the upper-class solution in society prevent a scientific analysis of the situation. Such an analysis indicates no possibility of a solution of the upper-class position without the assistance of some subsidiary class, and that assistance can be gained only through propagandizing the assisting group. Scientific analysis must therefore be made covertly by the upper-class groups (for no program can succeed which ignores reality) but it must not be overtly stated. There is then no group of intellectual leaders actively and openly engaged in creating class consciousness in the upper classes. Ideologists are for propagandistic purposes, for gaining extra-class support. How then does such a consciousness develop without leadership? Does the lack of scientific ideologists place the upper class at a disadvantage with labor? The answer to both questions is this: The full effect of the scientific position of class-conscious labor can never be realized until, as we will see, the upper-class groups have exhausted all the potentials of the situation which might lead to a solution in their favor. A revolutionary situation arises not from the class consciousness of labor alone, but from the inability of the upper-class groups to operate according to any of the old techniques. In the interval of trial and error, there is as great a chance that labor will turn opportunist as there is that upper-class groups will make some mistake which cannot be remedied. Hence an upper-class solution of contemporary

problems without revolution always seems to be what the English call muddling through.

Finally, it must be clearly recognized that there is no completely general class consciousness, in the sense we are using it, in the upper classes any more than in labor. For class consciousness means more than consciousness of kind; it means also *class solidarity*. And until the upper class is presented with a revolutionary situation, they too show tendencies toward opportunism. The ratio of development of class solidarity in the upper-class group probably keeps an even pace with the same phenomena in the labor population.

In the upper-class groups consciousness of kind is more directly under social control than in the laboring classes. Consciousness of kind in the laboring population undoubtedly grows directly out of the common conditions of life. In the upper-class groups, definite effort is directed toward the creation of upper-class manners and attitudes. The right preparatory school is important for the upper-class boy, as is the finishing school for the girl. So is the right university, and the right club for the man. The emphasis of the schools is on formalistic culture, and undoubtedly the common training makes for a consciousness of kind. The important fact to note is that the end is to make individuals of a class commonly acquainted with other members over a wide geographical area. This factor makes for a situation much like the rural community in which the members of the class are known to each other in a very personal fashion. Relationships return to a primary rather than a secondary-group nature. In the same fashion middle-class groups have their schools, clubs, and favorite boats to Europe. The effect of these common activities upon a lesser class is not so important. They meet on a face-to-face level, it is true, but they are dominated in values by the group above them to whose status most of the individuals of the middle class aspire.

The hierarchy of classes has another important role. It is like the Bolshevik group at the other end of the social scale in that it deals a blow to opportunism. It is true that climbers are eventually admitted to the top level, but the initiation is a

demonstration on the part of the individual that he has renounced all opportunistic tendencies. For example, consider the role of the London clubs, in the British culture. To belong to the better level of clubs, an individual must adopt the attitudes of conservative wealth, must recognize class problems as more important than individual problems, and must never desert his class for individual advantage. The clubs are not satisfied with the selection process as the only check on predatory individuals. Public opinion in the clubs very much resembles public opinion in the rural community. It is a consequence of face-to-face discussion. Once formed, it is practically compulsive upon the individual; the consequence of violation is ostracism. In the same fashion the schools provide a testing ground for some of the sons and daughters of successful opportunists. All English upper-class society is based on the principle of the negation of the opportunism of the middle class. The ability to award titles to middle-class and labor leaders who have served the conservative interests well is a protective device. Finally, the upper tier of the upper-class groups controls opportunism not only by a rigid standard of selection, but also by keeping opportunists in the lower groups sterilized. This is done through conservative individuals in the lower groups whose chances of rising in social fortune depend upon their ability to keep their club or group in good repute. Ambitious members of a lower group will turn their scorn on an 'unadjusted' member, for their clique must give the appearance of being as capable as any other group.*

These mechanisms in themselves are not enough to create class solidarity. Class solidarity depends not only on the renunciation of opportunism, but also on the willingness of individuals to stop competition among themselves where such competition leads to dangerous consequences. Such class solidarity is found only in crises. In England one crisis was the general strike. In other countries it is the rise of the Communistic vote to major proportions. In the general strike, con-

* Undoubtedly, devices of this sort are just appearing in America.

servative members of English society were given an actual taste of what could happen if the opposition gained power. It taught such a complete lesson to the members of the upper groups that hardly an individual has thought of stepping out of the class position as enunciated by political leaders at later dates. All that needs to be done to bring an English business man to his senses is to remind him of the days of 1926.

The Psychology of the Lower-Middle-Class Groups

The lower middle class is caught between the interests of the extremes. Still dominated by ambition and opportunism, this group sees the avenues to achievement rapidly closing. Any prospect that these avenues will reopen is seized upon avidly. At the same time, the members of this group are confronted with the problem of protecting what they have and living from day to day. Any program which cuts their cost of living or their taxes is immediately espoused; any procedure which promises safety to their investments, bank accounts, or insurance is favored; any technique which insures their job-tenure is welcomed.

It is assumed that because the psychology of this group is essentially capitalistic, it cannot be manipulated in the interests of labor. This assumption fails to see the objective foundations of the age in which we live. The individuals of the lower-middle classes are profoundly split in their objective and subjective interests. Any leadership which can continually expose their self-interest on every issue at every moment and secure concessions through militant demands and threats of action can hold them, in spite of their psychological attitudes in the other direction. Eventually these demands can no longer be made without confiscation of capital, and at such a critical point a new situation will be created in which solidarity and consciousness of kind can be reoriented in the direction of revolutionary action.

The existence in this group of a fundamentally capitalistic psychology, however, means that, between promises (not

delivery) of social reforms, the middle class prefers eminently the promises of a group which offers the restoration of old conditions of opportunity. The aim of the upper class, hence, is to obscure the economic self-interest of this class and to play upon its favorable psychology. The upper group must give up direct taxation for indirect taxation; it must blame a rising cost of living upon the wage demands of labor; it must make issues of *national unity* and talk about *national crises* which demand common sacrifice, and in fact do anything to stop the pressure upon government which is delivering actual social reform to the lower middle class as well as to labor. As long as the actual delivery of results goes on, the lower middle classes will not desert their attack.

The evidence, then, is that the struggle to win this class is an even proposition. Any side appealing to this group which wavers at a crisis is lost. If labor leadership does anything which contributes to the obfuscation of the economic interests of the middle class, it aids in sinking its own ally. If upper-class leadership does anything which exposes its naked necessity for further cutting into the economic interests of the middle class, it jeopardizes its own situation. If labor leadership fails to continue an audacious exposure of economic realities, it loses the fight. If upper-class leadership falters in its belief in its own program of obfuscation, it weakens its position.

Local Government in an Era of Social Classes

We cannot ignore the profound effects of these shifting conditions upon processes of local government, public opinion, the state, and nationalism. In the preceding age, local government was the happy hunting ground of the 'boss.' The boss was a political opportunist of the highest water. Possessed of no principles, he traded the support of his political machine for privileges and his cut in the national spoils. At home he allied himself with gangsters and racketeers to control local vice and to protect the monopoly rights of business which would play ball. In his own district he gained the support of the voters by

welfare programs, by supporting social legislation, by appealing to racial prejudices, and by a vigorous policy of personal and intimate relations with constituents.

In the halcyon days, business men were wont to defend a "wide open" city as a good city in which to do business. Vice gave one city a competitive advantage over another in securing visitors and buyers, and in keeping money in circulation. But business interests, confronted by the heavy cost of city government in an era in which profits are cut to the minimum, in which the costs of relief and social reform are mounting, cannot afford any such luxury. The occasional boost to city business is not equaled by the hardship of high taxes.

On the other hand, the rise of class-conscious labor with its demands for welfare legislation, relief, and social security cuts the ground out from beneath a city machine like Tammany. The direct pressure of labor throughout the nation brings social benefits directly from the national government. Increasingly the city masses look to the labor party as the deliverer of these benefits, and come to scorn the charity program of the city machine.

The realistic politician is quick to see that the labor unions present a device for turning out the vote equal in capacity to any city machine. The demands of the unions are also often upon the national rather than the city budget. The unions will stand in line on principle, though these principles are often costly to the politician who makes a bargain with them.

The city politician finds himself in a dilemma. He cannot continue the cost of government at the previous high level. He must continue expensive social services at a level never before encountered. In the first stage of this developing problem there is what might be called the *Huey Long solution*. The machine system can take over labor support, and talk socialistic in its program, while making its money from contracts and spoils as it has always done. It cannot do this, however, if it raises taxes or if it cuts social legislation. Hence, it resorts to a big stick method of cutting into the profits of concerns doing business with the government. Thus in Ohio a contract for haul-

ing state liquor is broken with a company because the costs are too high. It is immediately sublet back to the same company through another agency. In the interval the company has been forced to chip in \$50,000 of its profits to the machine or members of the machine. This is a new kind of alliance of opportunism with class consciousness at the expense of the business interests. As a result of such tactics a politician like Huey Long incurs the hatred of upper-class groups in his own state.

This fusion of class consciousness and opportunistic politics can probably occur in cities and states where monopoly business has little influence. The system of a hijacking levy on capital enterprise in a period of declining profits has too many serious consequences elsewhere. In cities like New York the reform of local politics is conducted by a fusion of labor with conservative interests. In such an arrangement business interests prefer to deal directly with the labor union rather than dealing with "piratical middle-men" who charge high for the privilege. The usual leaders of such a fusion are men motivated by a desire to rise in national politics, rather than by the desire to make profits out of politics. In a sense this last point indicates another development that is taking place. City politics are becoming part of national politics. A mayor of New York becomes automatically a possible candidate for the presidency of the United States. A mayor of Detroit becomes a good candidate for governor of Michigan.

In any case the profits are fast disappearing in city government, and in its place comes a civil service appointed upon merit rather than upon spoils. Nor is this a passing reform as was often true of good government campaigns in the era of publicans. Good city government has come to stay. The city government in itself becomes a bureaucracy with its own interests. But it is a much cheaper apparatus than boss rule of local politics. In European cities such as London, where labor government has long ago taken over the operation of the municipality, the honesty and efficiency of local government are unimpeachable. The disappearance of the problem of local government is another way of saying that the problems of our

economy are now national and not local. In a sense local politics becomes simply a phase of the political events of the wider scene.

Social Classes and the Police Force

In the local field, this new balancing of forces also affects the police. In America the police have been used with considerable freedom on the part of local governments to break up strikes and to force agitators to leave the community. The election of governors with labor support and of mayors on fusion tickets commits these individuals to stopping this policy. A new respect for civil liberties is developed in the local field in addition to the old respect for property. A few individuals in places where labor is still on the up grade win temporary fame for daring to carry on in the old high-handed manner, but fame only with a conservative class which fails to recognize its own self-interest.

In countries such as England, the civil liberties are protected with great care even by conservative governments. The right to freedom of speech by radicals, the right to parades by labor, the right to strike are not to be interfered with, because such discriminatory actions destroy the illusion that the state is conducted in the interests of all. A general strike is made illegal not because it interferes in any way with the operation of business, but because it threatens the whole community. This formula is widely accepted by both the conservatives and the lower classes. The technique of breaking strikes becomes much more subtle. The subtle techniques work only if the crude techniques *are completely abandoned*.*

The Local Trade Unions

In a sense the local trade unions become the battleground for the interplay of all the forces of modern times. Although the unionization movement takes place over a long period of

* To prevent the police force from being affected by the developing labor consciousness, the English system recruits new men from the rural areas.

years, its largest period of growth is generally within a short span. At first sight a labor union may seem much like a functional public described in the last chapter, and undoubtedly many unions start in this fashion. In such a case the officers of the union are given a free hand. The members pay their dues and go along with the officers because they seem to deliver beneficial results. In many cases this attitude leads to the formation of a structure of organization in which the officers can make bargains with capitalistic organization, irrespective of the attitudes of their membership. Unions of this sort are in a sense only a lobby with members as the supporting public. The development of the class struggle then results in a movement from the bottom to bring democracy to these organizations. The C.I.O. movement in America represents this struggle, as well as another aim. Before class consciousness is general, most labor unions, as functional struggle groups, appeal most highly to craft workers. The industrial union movement is a demand on the part of all labor to participate in union bargaining activity. Such unions as the C.I.O. are democratic face-to-face groups in which debate, discussion of policy, and workers' education go hand in hand.

The history of modern times has demonstrated these units to be capable of many different tasks: (1) Potential soviets for carrying on government. (2) Potential fighting forces for organizing a revolution. (3) Devices for delivering the vote in a parliamentary government to a candidate who stands for social reform. (4) Devices for dividing labor in a crisis by controlling enough of the leaders. (5) Devices for organizing labor for effective use in war. (6) Devices for organizing labor in a Fascist economy.

PUBLIC OPINION AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN AN ERA OF SOCIAL CLASSES

Public opinion becomes difficult to describe in this epoch. We shall take only three or four distinct movements of the times and describe the differences in techniques in these groups from that of the public in the earlier era. The chief distinctions

in technique are not made on a basis of right and left, but rather in terms of democratic or non-democratic methods. The extremists, of course, have methods which are different enough from the psychology of publics to be fairly easily described. But the extremists' movements are not necessarily right or left movements. The Bolshevik movement starts on the left, but the Fascist movement has its origin in the middle classes and in the floating labor population. It is true, of course, that the Fascist technique is successful only when it joins with the extreme right as a supporting and directing base, but its appeal is to a left center group.

Bolshevist and Fascist tactics are similar in form and different in content. One of the main propaganda techniques of the Bolshevik party is to deepen the class centrism of labor. The Bolshevik leadership aims to take the different content of experience of class-conscious labor and give it characteristic objective distinction. Thus, the Bolshevik group fosters a common salute for its members, the clenched fist; a common greeting, "comrade"; a common hymn, the Internationale; and a common flag, the flag of the hammer and sickle. The symbolic significance of these institutionalized responses is evident in terms of the class consciousness of labor. The Fascist group fosters a common salute for members, the flat hand salute to the leader; a common greeting, "Heil Hitler"; a common hymn, a song of revenge and nationalism; and a common flag, the swastika. Here the symbolism is quite different, exalting individual leadership, mysticism, nationalism, and a common enemy.

The propaganda appeals of these two units toward their members are fairly obvious. One appeals to petty bourgeois emotions, the other to class-conscious experiences. To non-class-conscious labor (and most of it is not that conscious) or to non-intellectual members of the middle class, these two sets of pleas may seem equivalent. In a time of crisis many labor members choose the Fascist leaders and some middle-class individuals choose the Communist leaders under the impression that they are joining the opposite camp. But the chief prop-

aganda appeal of either of these two groups to the petty bourgeoisie or non-class-conscious labor is its boldness. As one Frenchman has put it, "L'audace, toujours l'audace." Both groups have no fear of violence. The Bolshevik aim is the overthrow of the state through the collective action of labor. The Fascist aim is seldom as clearly articulated, but it is generally the ousting from the community of those elements which they claim to be responsible for the crisis, namely, the bankers, Jews, Marxists, war profiteers, and foreigners. Both parties predicate their program on their belief that parliamentary tactics are unable to do anything about the increasingly distressing economic situation.

The tactics of these two groups have two effects: (1) In order to convince the public of the clarity of this line, they must risk going to jail, suffering police oppression, and enduring mob violence as well as the violent opposition of the opposed group. The Bolshevik group demonstrate this courage by entering into the everyday struggle of labor unions for better working conditions. Every strike is welcomed as a time for the education of workers by courageous leadership in the most dangerous situations. Every demonstration against the injustice of the courts, the prejudice of state administrators, or against imperialistic interests is an opportunity to lead in the thick of the fight. If the Bolshevik group loses this courage and militancy it loses its propaganda effect. This does not mean that the Bolsheviks endorse syndicalist violence. They take part in struggles to demonstrate a corresponding violence in the opposition, and to expose the hypocrisy of the peace-talking opposition. To find leaders who are willing to risk their physical well-being in such a fight, the Bolsheviks turn to individuals whose emotions have been fired by actual injustices of a vivid sort in their own lives. In a sense the Bolshevik movement has a reservoir of leadership rising out of the brutal treatment of workers. In countries like England where the conservative group have evolved less violent methods for dealing with the opposition, such leaders are absent. In the countries like America where the workers are often exposed to un-

bridled violence, the Bolshevik movement can be insured of leadership capable of carrying on its program. The Fascist party, on the other hand, appeals to a great many individuals who have lost status in the community. These people have correspondingly developed deep feelings of inferiority of a sort which are best sublimated in sadism. They find in a Fascist movement the opportunity to acquire status, just as the man willing to perform violence in a lynching crowd acquires status. But this is not a group of sadists who can operate individually. They demand the support of some technique which can give them both a positive status as well as an inferior group to vent their hatred on. The Fascist movement needs uniforms and a leader, and an assurance of its importance. They have both delusions of persecution and delusions of superiority. And both these needs can be satisfied if a good angel can be found to finance the movement. Their technique of violence resembles very much the violence of the crowd. The individual must be allowed to perpetrate such acts under the protection of his gang. (2) As a consequence of these techniques neither Bolshevism nor Fascism has much propaganda effect in any country except upon the exceedingly maladjusted individual, as long as the country can be successfully run by social democratic tactics. Accordingly, we must analyze the public opinion tactics of a group which still operates through parliamentary methods, though, as we shall soon see, they operate with increasing difficulty.

Social Democratic Tactics

It is in the social democratic group that we find the most interesting changes in leadership. Whereas the great liberal leaders of another generation were characterized not only by their liberalism, but also by their ability and aptitude in political horse-trading, the leaders of the new social democracy are of a different stamp. The great liberal opportunists such as Alfred E. Smith and Henry Mencken in America suddenly find themselves completely incompetent in the art of public-opinion manipulation at which they once excelled. For in the

era of publics, the liberal leader was essentially a broker who earned his living by finding the right formula in public action for the sentiments of his followers. But the issues in which he traded had little or nothing to do with his own life. Now he is put in the situation of the lawyer pleading his own case. Every issue is fraught with personal consequences. Can he lead the masses in a raid upon the public treasury when such action will raise his own taxes? Can he fight for the dissolution of holding companies when most of his investments are in such types of business enterprise? Instead of advancing the most plausible argument which bridges the gap between the wants of his public and his own wants, he increasingly finds himself advocating those programs which seem most satisfactory to solve his own conflicts. And that is just why a lawyer pleading his own case generally loses it. He has lost the very ability which crowned him with success, the ability to think objectively instead of subjectively. Men like Mencken and Smith begin to resemble maladjusted husbands who turn every social gathering into a forum in which they hold forth on their wives' faults; they become political bores. They are like men testifying at meetings about their subjective values rather than operators in the field of public opinion.

The same process is taking place in political trading. It is impossible for such individuals to make political deals on issues which violate their personal feelings. And with this new psychology the whole art of parliamentary practice changes. The new type of leader, who assumes the role of leadership of public opinion and political accommodation, is a man of destiny, a man with a mission. The newcomer has found an ideological expression of his conflicts, which the great liberal is unable to find. On the one hand there exists the wealthy or socially prominent individual of strong social conscience such as a Blum in France, a Norman Thomas in America, or a Sir Stafford Cripps in England. Their most eminent ideologist is Bernard Shaw, and they are commonly called *Fabians*. They stand for an eminently respectable socialism. As respectable people, they fear violence of all sorts, they distrust direct

action, they dislike vulgar people (and the Communists and Fascists are guilty on every indictment), but as people of sensitive nature they espouse social reform, they favor community responsibility over predatory self-interest, idealism over materialism (and socialism seems to have all such elements). Slightly to the right politically of this group are such individuals as Chautemps in France, Borah in America, and the editors of the *Manchester Guardian* in England. They might be called *benevolent conservatives*. They are not so idealistic as to be led by Utopian programs. They propose the socialization of capitalism as the compromise. Farther to the left politically of the Fabians is the rugged labor leadership of such men as Henderson in England, John Lewis in America, or Thorez in France. These men are not afraid of violence. They recognize their kinship with labor. But, being men of limited education or breadth of outlook, they can see only narrow problems before them. They are not likely to be influenced by the bribes of the conservatives in the form of property, title, status, or nationalistic pride. They fail to see, however, the broad interest of labor in the interest of some isolated problem out of context. These individuals might be called simply *trade unionists*, for they see nothing beyond trade union needs. They are often expressing conflict in their own lives to as great a degree as they are aiming to lead political movements. They make speeches that jibe with their own personal problems and find themselves leading movements. The correspondence of their own personal problems with that of the masses gives the impression that they are men of destiny. They find themselves, as one individual has so nicely put it, in the center of a political movement, and the corroboration from the external world of their internally felt solution gives them an impression of importance. Every word that falls from their mouths is so approved that it awes them in regard to their own role.

This correspondence is no accident. These leaders rise from a spot in the social structure which is occupied by a larger number of other people. The leader is the articulate expression of the emotions which they have only just begun to feel. More-

over, he is likely to be the articulate expression of every group to the left of the center which he occupies. Labor is not completely self-conscious, for class consciousness is just beginning to spread. As a laborer begins to feel class consciousness, he becomes articulate in a demand for the socialization of capitalism. As it deepens, he becomes articulate in a demand for socialism achieved through parliamentary technique. When this fails he demands direct action, either for socialism or for reform of capitalism, depending upon the leadership.

Parliamentary government in a sense narrows down to the ability of different sections of the community to effect a coalition upon single issues. The arts of log rolling, social lobbying, and spoils politics belong to another day. All opportunistic practices are useless, and the political leader trained in these practices finds himself very much at a loss. The world has left him behind. Every leader is committed to a position which reflects both his personal feelings and his following. He cannot desert it without a religious conversion, and then only by splitting his following. The art of debate fast becomes ancient history, for it was a device for settling matters on which opportunists had little personal feeling. There is only one technique left, and it resembles the international politics of earlier days. It is the art of achieving a balance of power by coalition. This can be achieved by finding single issues on which two or more parties can meet. And it is also achieved by tactics which demoralize and split an opposition party. A parliament becomes a device for weighing the influence of each group within the population. A party stands up and votes as a unit on the direction of the leader. Individualists no longer climb over party fences.

A parliament can function, because for every proposition in the community there is an opposition. A central party then can run a government by allowing its opposition on the right to cancel its opposition on the left. Both opposition groups must submit to this process, for any failure to go along might lead, not to the maintenance of the present balance, but to the success of the other extreme. Thus the benevolent conserva-

tives can form a government and be the most extreme right group in it. It can be sure of the votes of all the left groups as long as it follows a policy which commits it to maintaining the standards of living of labor. This policy will be tolerated by the left groups if class consciousness is not rising. It will be tolerated by the right if it does not mean confiscation. A Fabian group can maintain a center in a situation where class consciousness is rising, but confiscation is a long way off. Such a center will be supported by a group as far left as the Communists, for its program of social reform strengthens labor. It will be tolerated by the right because it quiets social unrest by social benefits.

A right wing conservative group can maintain a government by an external program which neither cuts the living standards of labor nor confiscates domestic capital. A militant imperialism can rally all sections except the Bolsheviki to its support. It cannot be rejected by the social democrats because it raises wages. It cannot be rejected by the conservatives because it protects foreign investments and opens new fields for exploitation. The Bolsheviki are impotent in such a situation, for it destroys the class consciousness of labor.

Given other situations and any party can be successful by demoralizing a second party, or by a status quo which rapidly leads the country into a chaotic economic situation. Given a situation where any social reforms mean confiscation, a conservative party must either go under, accept the aid of the Fascists, or succeed in demoralizing an opposition party. Given the same situation, the social democrats must either accept the aid of the Bolsheviks in direct action, go under, or succeed in demoralizing both the conservatives and the Bolsheviks.

The parliamentary process continues to function, then, because it can be directed by a group which is able to set up an opposition both on the left and the right whose combined effects cancel each other. It may be argued that this cannot happen in a two-party system. In England, however, through the installation of a national government composed of various parties from the extreme right to the extreme left, the same

technique was put into operation. It lasted long enough to allow the conservatives on the right to develop enough solidarity among themselves so that they could take power alone. This latter event can happen only when the upper-class group has become so keenly conscious of the state of affairs that they will make any sacrifices necessary to keep in power, and when the labor groups show insufficient unity among themselves to insist upon continued operation under the coalition system.*

It has been argued that there is another psychological characteristic of this type of coalition government; namely, any center party is almost always unable to rule by itself, and is in fact a minority. Thus, no matter what the mandate of the party is from its constituents, its leaders can always argue that they are unable to do more than compromise, because of the necessity of securing the cooperation of others in the coalition. In this way a fairly left party can be elected to office, a party with a mandate to effect socialism, and still effect only temporary reforms. In other words, this minority system gives a member of the ruling party a chance to explain to his constituents why he is unable to carry out their mandate.

Shifting Public Opinion and Political Parties

Just as a leader is elevated to power because the sentiments he expresses correspond with those of his group, so he is demoted when sentiments change. No longer as in the old opportunist days can he say that he made a mistake, and that now he believes in some other policy. This condition arises out of real differences in the situation. In the days of opportunism the fact that a man was dry and then that he turned *wet* to keep on the bandwagon was not a very significant fact. Most members of Congress adopted one attitude or the other only because they thought it was the view of their constituents. In class politics the situation is more like the type of situation which prevailed in a few instances where the congressman

*The Roosevelt administration in America created a government through a combination of spoils politics of the old-fashioned sort and a coalition of various political groups.

was a fanatical dry devoted to the cause. The politicians with a mission are devoted to their program as strongly as the fanatical drys. It is the expression of their class outlook on social problems. To shift their outlook means a complete re-orientation of personality. In the same fashion their constituents have followed them not because of spoils, but because the constituents themselves were devoted to this position. A move left or right on the part of the politician would be quite useless. There are already individuals in both these positions who have been enunciating these more atypical programs. To espouse their program is to give prestige to them, for it is no longer possible as in the old days for the Republican party to meet left opposition by adopting socialist principles. It is true, however, that an individual can desert his party and go over to the opposition with a certain number of followers. By doing so he becomes a follower rather than a leader.*

One of the tactical moves of every party is to demoralize an adjoining party and destroy its unity. The conservative party in England succeeded in doing this by persuading certain members of the labor party to enter a national government, and by forcing this group of deserters to sponsor a conservative program which consisted of cutting the social welfare grants to labor. The leaders of the party of social reform in such a case end in the role of persuading labor to give back hard-won gains. The fact that this desertion of leaders was able to demoralize the labor party indicates the absence of an effective group directing labor unity from below. In Russia, by maintaining unity of labor through supporting social democrats against reactionaries, the Bolsheviks were able to expose the incapacity of social democratic leadership and to carry the labor population forward to social revolution. In Germany, on the other hand, the conservative element owing to their own inability to stop the rise of communist influence were forced to a union with the Fascists. The German communists were

* A man like Premier MacDonald in England who had switched from the social democrats to the conservatives might fancy himself still a leader; but he is in reality something of a puppet for a real leader who prefers to lead from backstage.

unable to meet this new alliance by an alliance with the social democrats, for they had indicted the entire social democratic party for social fascist tendencies. Had they denounced only the leadership, they might have been able to maintain unity with the following. The result of this failure has frightened the French communistic group to the opposite extreme. They now foster a popular front not only with the social democrats, but with some middle-class parties to the right, hoping in this fashion to save the unity of labor.*

THE STATE IN AN ERA OF SOCIAL CLASSES

We have yet to consider the effect of these new psychological conditions on the armed forces of the state. The army and navy are recruited primarily from city centers. The members of the armed forces are bound to come from families affected by the growing class consciousness of labor. The navy is more likely to be affected with a radical virus than the army, for naval life is a highly collective life. The navy is concerned with handling a highly industrialized plant in the modern battleship. Just as the factory system contributes to a teamwork view of life as opposed to an individualistic view, so naval life leads to a group psychology. One of the first military forces to revolt in Soviet Russia was the sailors of Kronstadt. Because of their proletarian origin the most radical element of the British state forces has been the navy. A cut in wages which a conservative British government meant to place on the naval forces was immediately recalled after the policy produced a naval revolt.

*In France, when this book went to press, there was a stalemate of forces. Labor, under the influence of the communistic policies of the united front and collective security, was maintaining unity. Even an inspired crisis in the franc had not destroyed this unity. There exists one remaining way to shake it which will undoubtedly soon be tried. In the defense of the Soviet Union the French communists have been forced to support measures for strengthening the armed forces of the state. A crisis with an enemy from without along this line might allow the formation of a national government which could finally use the state to destroy the communistic element.

An upper-class check against the contact of the military forces with the growing consciousness of labor arises in the development of specialized schools for officers. Whereas many of the old officers rose from the ranks, American officers are selected more and more from better-class families and are boys who have had the opportunity of attending the official military academies of West Point and Annapolis. A similar practice has long existed in Great Britain. In such schools, class consciousness is bound to be disseminated in a considerable degree. That is not the only gain from the conservative side. A rigorous training also teaches these officers to avoid stupidity in their relationships to the class problem. The upper-class military group in both America and England has fought to preserve the wages and advantages of the private. Military men of unbridled Fascist tendencies have been put in their places, for they unnecessarily jeopardize the military apparatus. Nor has there been any Prussian handling of privates in either country. In fact, the American officer of Annapolis training has a remarkable ability which probably exists in no other great navy of the world—the ability to meet the gob as a fellow sailor and not a superior-class member. The class struggle in America is of too recent origin to have destroyed this quality. American officers are known to have entered gun turrets with their hats turned backwards and their coats off. Their democratic spirit leads to strengthening the morale of the fighting force. Undoubtedly American naval forces will demonstrate a morale in future naval engagements which no other country will equal.

The attitude of the military forces toward the political scene is also worthy of mention. A disciplined military force such as that of the German republic stood by and took no part in the violent political changes effected by the Nazis. An army revolt in Spain could not detach the entire army, many units remaining loyal to a radical government. The psychology back of these events is of a peculiar sort. It means that the army staff feels its allegiance, not to popular mandate or popular will, but to the symbols of government. Whoever gets these

symbols has the power to command. We have already noted that a genuine Bolshevik party cannot control these symbols.* In Spain the Communist party chose to turn the leadership of the country over to a left bourgeois government rather than suffer the loss of what remained of the armed forces. (They also hoped to secure the support of liberal democracies such as France and England.) The army staff is rooted in the capitalist system and cannot be maintained unless the system is maintained. Between forms, however, it does not choose. A very radical left government which does not propose revolution can keep their allegiance, and a very reactionary right government which supports the property relationships by violent mob behavior can also hold them.

The Utilization of the State for Political Purposes

This situation in regard to the state leaves it as an instrument which can be used by capital to destroy labor opposition in strikes and boycotts. Labor is put in a position where it must be very careful of its tactics or the state will be used against it. Labor attempted to intimidate British capital by a general strike. The strike not only tied up industry but also tended to demoralize middle-class support by jeopardizing their food supply, health necessities, and news service. Immediately the politicians interpreted this action as revolt against the government. As such, the armed forces could be called upon to quell it. Moreover, the armed forces, affected by no sentiments of revolution, for even labor did not interpret the strike in this fashion, were undoubtedly prepared to put down the strike. In America, in the general strike in San Francisco, the state militia was introduced by the same psychology. The state, then, can be used to break labor's unity.

*Namely, the workers will always take the party most to the right in choosing between parties of identical offerings. Inasmuch as the petty bourgeoisie party also stands for these symbols, the support of them by the Communist must transfer status and leadership to such a party.

THE CROWD AS A CLASS STRUGGLE GROUP

In the epoch of the rural community, we found crowd psychology to be a mechanism by which individuals solved in direct action various common problems which could not be solved through prevailing institutional channels. In the epoch of the public, we find the crowd a mechanism for facilitating the development of some public opinion to the stage of a mania. In the epoch of social classes the crowd becomes a device of struggle for power.

We have discussed how institutions are developed to accommodate the psychological problems which arise out of social classes. The procedure is by no means automatic. The social reforms which are gained by liberal and social democratic parties, and in fact the willingness of business interests to support such governments, are a consequence of some realization of the effects of alternative policies. It is by strikes and riots that labor demonstrates the necessity of an accommodation on the part of the conservative interests, and crowd behavior plays a part in securing these gains.

In labor crowds much of the emotion of labor is against the 'scab' who comes to take the workers' job in times of strikes. The scab is a direct threat to the workers' means of subsistence. As such, he constitutes an excellent crowd-moving theme, for crowds operate on very basic motives. After the scab the next object of hatred is the 'fink.' The fink is the paid agent for breaking strikes and is generally a gangster. A strike conceived in these terms is not a revolutionary strike. The consciousness of labor is on labor solidarity, not on the class nature of the state. The scab and the fink are individuals who fail to stay with their class, and they are stealing the food of the striker's family. Under the facilitation of the common emotion of his fellows, the individual striker feels his own ire rise. He feels a justification of his attitude in the 'ideals' of his group. This reinforces his own conviction. In the milling about of individuals in a labor demonstration this conviction grows to the degree of universality. Everybody feels the same way he

does. As a class-conscious labor crowd develops, however, it turns revolutionary. Private needs begin to conflict with institutional attitudes about not destroying property or taking another individual's life. These attitudes are the very essence of the state, for they are the attitudes in the general public which permit the state to operate as a separate institution. If crowd psychology develops, the private needs will eventually overcome the institutional attitudes of the members. This happens largely because, as crowd psychology deepens, the psychological elements of everyday life which generally are associated with the institutional attitudes are transferred to the private need. In everyday life the feeling of universality is on the side of law and order. In the crowd the universal sentiment is against the scab or the fink. When some individual starts strong action, the individual member feels that the members of the crowd not only approve but will participate. Who is he to stand out against a community in which he has so great a consciousness of kind?

The interference with labor crowds on the part of the police changes this psychology. Where it was formerly oriented against the scab and the fink, the crowd becomes oriented against the 'cossacks.' This represents a more revolutionary stand on the part of labor, for members may carry into their private lives these crowd attitudes against the state apparatus. Moreover, labor begins to identify the state apparatus and the capitalistic class as one unit. The more intelligent governments have recognized this fact. The English government, for instance, has been much more reluctant to use police against labor units than other countries. The Russian pre-war government, on the other hand, used the most ruthless police tactics, and a corresponding residue of attitude in labor was found in 1917.

Every revolution, even though it is put down, becomes in a sense the preparatory school for the next one. Thus the revolution of 1905 in Russia became the background for the revolution of 1917. For a new reorientation, once won, is hard to shake. In the same fashion a division of labor springs up in a

revolution. The nature of this process has already been demonstrated in regard to rural crowds. Individuals discover a capacity for leadership; other individuals recognize this capacity, and organization develops.

In the Russian revolution of 1917 of a few months' duration, it is possible to find all the different stages of governmental development which have taken place in liberal democracies over a long period of time. Because of the backward nature of the economy, the class struggle found only the extreme groups capable of holding power. The leadership of the revolution was pushed up from below. Each group was tested for its capacity and eliminated until there was only the revolution and the counterrevolution left, and the revolution was victorious.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERREVOLUTION, FASCISM

In Germany, the conservative parties, faced with a rising communist opposition, joined forces with the Fascists. Labor was unable to create unity against this opposition, owing, as we have already seen, to the false position of the Communist party. There was too much hatred between two labor groups to effect unity. In Russia, by maintaining unity of labor in cooperation with Kerensky, the Bolsheviks were able to expose the social democratic leadership of the revolution and to carry the labor population through to a social revolution.

Where Fascism has succeeded in being accepted by the conservative members of the community as the only antidote to Bolshevism, we have the development of some interesting techniques of government. Fascism accepts the solution of a continued operation of a capitalistic economy by lowering the living standards. This is done with sacrifices by the conservative members of the community as well as labor. The living standards can be lowered only if the class consciousness of labor can be sublimated.

The major psychological techniques of Fascism are then aimed at the sublimation of labor class consciousness, for Fascism solves the problem of the decreased standard of living

which causes class consciousness by war. While a Fascist economy prepares for war it adopts an entirely new set of conditions at home. First, it maintains a *permanent war psychology*. All war psychologies involve certain common factors: (1) *A common enemy*. The centralized propaganda agencies of the capitalistic economy are turned to developing a paranoiac psychology of persecution from without and of internal glory. (2) *Common sacrifice*. On the internal side Fascism must destroy the objective appearance of unequal wealth. The culture must take on a Spartan quality. In time of war, every group sacrifices for the good of the nation. If one group seems to be enjoying the benefits of life while the other suffers, discontent will result. (3) *A common scapegoat*. To divert class consciousness from societal relationship a scapegoat is found to be punished for the prevailing economic situation. In Germany the Jews, profiteers, and Marxists were singled out for special humiliation. (4) *The elimination of all agitators*. In war-time all agitators can be eliminated by public consent. Concentration camps are set up to eliminate all agitators from influencing the community. Spies are kept in all public groups so that agitators must increasingly operate underground. No groups are allowed to meet which do not have Fascist party leadership. Any group, even the rotary club, must be disbanded, for history has shown that even the most innocent group may become the center of opposition. (5) *Objective signs of national unity*. Moreover, we cannot know what people think; we can only see how they act. If they act in a manner which indicates support and unity, we are inclined to believe that they approve such a program. Thus the Fascist group imposes its objective characteristics upon everybody. These institutionalized forms such as the Fascist salute and common greeting have already been discussed. They become compulsory under threat of punishment. (6) *Objective signs of community good will*. Nowhere is good will so apparent as in sports. Sports, by their nature, are affairs of friends and comrades. In sports is a fellowship that overrides schisms. The Nazi state fosters great sports programs. (7) *The removal*

of vice. Vice and dissipation are the luxuries of the rich. They indicate to the community the existence of groups of special privilege. The bright light areas of Nazi cities take on the same Spartan tone which characterizes the rest of the community. (8) *Acts of national prestige*. At the same time, the Nazi economy must go in for overt acts which give some weight to the claims of grandeur which are circulated from within. Every coup d'état in the foreign field indicates the greatness of the nation and the talent of the leader. (9) *The provision of disciplined leadership for all groups*. The labor unions are transformed into the national labor front under the leadership of Fascist leaders. Every group is reorganized and coordinated under Nazi direction.

Though all these methods are successful in eliminating class consciousness in labor, and in creating a situation in which the Fascist leader could carry the majority of the population in a free election, this technique of operation is exceedingly expensive and very precarious. The standard of living cannot be reduced too far without expensive consequences, no matter what devices are used to sublimate class attitudes by party leadership. The Fascist party is perfectly clear in the realistic economic solution to this problem, which is imperialistic war. War will result in the gain of territory and will provide an outlet for surplus capital.

Hence we see the development of institutions capable of carrying on war in the most efficient manner. (1) The creation of a highly mobilized and highly mechanized army. Limited in economic resources, the Fascist nation must rely on a quick program of armaments as the way out. (2) The problem of finding finance for a war. The Fascist economy would be exceedingly taxed to carry on a war. It must hope to find finance from some democratic capitalist class. Such groups face the wrath of labor at home if they support Fascism. So the Fascist's economy has to have a clear-cut foreign policy aimed away from imperialistic interests of the prominent capitalist nations. By various threats it must frighten the democratic countries with fear of invasion. If the technique works

it may create a situation in which capital in a democratic nation can convince labor that it is better to have the Fascists attack some other country than the home country. (3) The mobilization of the entire population for war. The paranoiac psychology allows the mobilization of the entire population for war. In democratic countries the class divisions prevent the government from taking a militant stand in the international sphere. (4) Finding an international slogan to split the labor movements of other countries. The program of Fascism is to save the world from Communism. Conservative groups in other countries are strongly impressed by this slogan. Right wing labor is also affected by it. Thus the slogan of the Fascist countries becomes not only a means of finding a 'goat' at home but also a technique for weakening possible enemies abroad. (5) International coup d'état. The fact that the Fascist government has its population under a unified psychological control makes it possible for them to act boldly in the international sphere. Divided countries must criticize every act from the standpoint of its effect on the relationship of social classes. While the French are demoralized, the Germans retake the Rhine. While the English debate, the Italians take Ethiopia. While America vacillates, the Japanese occupy China.

Every proposition, however, creates its opposition. The militancy of Fascism and its barbarities to labor alarm the working population of democratic nations. All that democratic states have to do to rally labor into unity with conservative forces is to take a strong anti-Fascist stand in international affairs. This, however, the conservative groups are not inclined to do, for they fear that such tactics may drive Fascist countries over to Communism. Caught between the horns of this dilemma democratic governments remain paralyzed waiting for something decisive to happen to destroy their paralysis.

CHAPTER XX

THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE MODERN WORLD

The Individual as the Source or Locus of Social Values

We have attempted to bring to the reader a social psychology which adequately covers both the subjective and objective aspects of the individual as he adjusts in the social and material world around him. In Part I our attention was focused upon the average individual and his societal relationships. In Part II our interest was in the psychological mechanisms and main-springs of action. In Part III we turned to the study of the development of individuality, of attitudes and personality in a person in contact with a social world. In Part IV we completed our study with a picture of the changing social world of which the individual is one member.

We have carried on our theme without resorting to such mysterious principles as the group mind or the superorganic. We have not attempted to develop the problems of social psychology in terms of mysterious forces over and above the problem of individuals adjusting in a world which offers things which satisfy human need. We have, however, emphasized the fact that men achieve their ends through controlling one another and cooperating with their fellows. Hence our account has not confined social life to the level of reflexes, or instincts, or other such oversimplified schemes which have characterized American social psychology.

We have preserved man as a complex, intelligent individual existing in a complex and changing world. An understanding of his physiology enabled us to understand him better as a man. An understanding of the societal behavior of people generally gave us a picture of the barriers which often exist between the individual and his goals. The knowledge of per-

sonality told of his goals and his valuation of various ends of life. The changing social world indicated changing personal problems in individuals. All in all, we have found man a human animal confronted with the problem of solving his personal needs in a complicated and shifting environment. Sometimes he has seemed a blind animal solving his problems in a difficult maze, sometimes he has acted as an alert problem-solving creature of great creative capacity.

To see man steadily and see him whole has been a difficult venture. In this final synthesis, we wish to emphasize again that each separate analysis has been for specific purposes and in no way denies the validity of any other section. In the last chapter, for instance, we have attempted to see the "specificity" of historical situations, to see the elements of difference in the operation of a mechanism such as public opinion in one era as compared with another era. This is a useful task for the social engineer because his ability to operate in the field of social relationships is based upon his recognition of these differences as well as the similarities in different social situations in different epochs. To know these unique characteristics of any historical period detached from a scientific fund of universal knowledge which transcends each specific situation would be shallow indeed, and the psychological processes of identification or suggestion will probably continue to operate irrespective of governments or systems of philosophy.

The first question the intelligent individual caught in this modern world should ask is this: what shall I do as an individual? Not what shall the nation do nor what shall society do, nor what is destiny doing, but what shall I do? The individual is the locus of all value. Science can describe what is happening, but the individual must decide for himself what he wants to happen. He must decide what solutions are scientifically possible. Those who talk of a totalitarian state, the necessity of perpetuating the white race, the destiny of the Nordic type are self-interested propagandists seeking their own values, which are usually un verbalized. If the individual

wishes to build a totalitarian state, he should be conscious of its cost to other personal values which he holds dear. The problem of the individual today is that he is often forced to desert one set of values for another. He is forced to give up his cake, if he wishes to eat it. And this problem of choice now as at any other time is limited by the freedom which his environment offers to him.

The Problem of Choice

An individual located in the middle classes believes himself in a dilemma: Which is the most important value in his personal life? Is it his ambition which has been overstimulated in his training in youth? Or should he place first economic security, or personal freedom of expression, or peace? An individual in the lower classes feels a different set of conflicts: Although his ambition has disappeared he finds himself listening with admiration to great leaders who foster the laboring man's cause with mighty words. Yet at the same time his work-a-day world has taught him to value individual leadership less and less and to depend upon teamwork and collective enterprise. Can he desert this idolatry of persons and depend upon the developing democratic consciousness and functional leadership of his own community? The individual in the wealthier level of society is confronted with the peculiar problems of his class: Is security of wealth to be preferred to an increase in fortune through speculation? Is the renunciation of ownership of natural resources, public utilities and industries connected with the basic livelihood of the masses to be preferred to having to resort to strong coercive action against labor. All these problems are as much individual problems of choice as is the problem of vocation, of choosing a wife, or selecting the house in which one lives. Each individual solves these questions in terms of his own values both as an individual located in his social world, and as a personality with individual tastes, aims, and aspirations.

Science and History and the Modern World

But the individual no longer has to solve these problems as a blind animal in a maze. Modern man is a history- and science-making creature. History has preserved his experimental attempts in other epochs to solve similar problems. Science gives us for the first time an understanding of the factors with which we deal. These products of man's intelligence exist as blueprints, devices which give insight into the total working of things. If the individual approaches these problems in an uninformed manner it is his own personal failure for neglecting to seek counsel of those who can pilot him through the complexity of life.

The development of science and history in highly segmental fashion in our division of labor society makes this aim sometimes difficult, though not impossible. For it is as much a compulsion of this age that science shall turn historical as it is compulsion that men shall redefine their institutions. Self-analysis and reflection are forced upon all of us; and history and science exist as available tools for accomplishing our ends. They are as well guides which point out the possibility of some ends and the impossibility of others. Social psychology becomes a science both of the cross-sectional and of the developmental aspects of individual and social life.

The Effect of This Development Upon Culture

The modern world is a consequence of great changes both in the content of the individual and in his objective relationships. Only in the field of political institutions and in culture is there a basic lag. Most of the evolution of the social control over nature is already achieved.

When the process is complete the romantic outlook which characterized the past age is bound to be destroyed by its own product. Ambition and individual striving of a particular age created the most magnificent material world that history recalls. Under these conditions man came increasingly to believe that he, as an isolated individual, was the master of his fate and the

captain of his soul. The increased interrelationships of modern productive life leave him an individual who must master his relationships not to the material world but to his fellows. His chance for survival and increased success depends upon community action.

The group has discovered a weapon which is essentially a collective weapon, science. Science is a classical discipline, not a romantic one. It exalts collective experience over the single individual. It stresses humility above the self-seeking aims of the individual. It is highly interdependent, since it rests upon the achievements of many people. No individual is competent to carry the load alone. No individual can understand the discipline until he is ready to desert wishful thinking in favor of reality thinking.

No group which is not barbarian can refuse to accept this challenge. Too many men have already discovered the reality principle of taking into account scientific truth and objective fact. Only by the most violent coercive tactics can these individuals be silenced.

An eminent scientist, who has studied the social organization of ants, was once introduced by a great university president as the man who demonstrated that ants like men could organize and carry on society without the use of reason. Undoubtedly this has been true of societies in the past, and perhaps it will be true in many respects of societies in the future. But it will no longer be true in the fields of production and consumption of the basic necessities of life. The emergence of large material units of production in modern life, and the development of modern society, have produced in these fields an objective reality which is becoming increasingly more visible to all men. In these hard-headed spheres the role of myths and propaganda is doomed. Any future conflicts in culture to which we bring only the blind techniques of past ages must lie in those spheres of life still unopen to the scientific approach. The dynamics of future culture will not exist in the material sphere, but in the sphere of more complex psychological and social relationships. That future cultures will have their problems and a

logic of development of their own we do not doubt. For the first time in history man stands in sight of social relationships conducted above the plane of an ant colony. History repeats itself, we are told, first as a tragedy and then as a farce. But in an age of science men do learn from their history.

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